with whom
The Chief Justice joins, dissenting.A statute enacted by the First Congress in 1789 created the office of Attorney General of the United States and de*709scribed some of the responsibilities of that office. That statute provided:
“. . . And there shall also be appointed a meet person, learned in the law, to act as attorney-general for the United States, who shall be sworn or affirmed to a faithful execution of his office; whose duty it shall be to prosecute and conduct all suits in the Supreme Court in which the United States shall be concerned, and to give his advice and opinion upon questions of law when required by the President of the United States, or when requested by the heads of any of the departments, touching any matters that may concern their departments, and shall receive such compensation for his services as shall by law be provided.” Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 93 (emphasis supplied).
The 1789 Act has been amended to make it clear that the Solicitor General has essentially the same authority to conduct litigation in this Court as does the Attorney General and that such authority may be delegated to others. See ante, at 699-700. In substance, however, the provision has remained unaltered for nearly 200 years; the Attorney General — and now the Solicitor General as well — is charged with conducting all litigation before this Court in which the United States is “concerned” or “interested.”
Most litigation in which the United States is interested is, of course, conducted by the Executive Branch of the Government. Orderly administration requires that such litigation be conducted under the supervision and direction of a single office. Congress therefore wisely granted the Attorney General broad enough authority to accomplish that misr sion. It is unlikely, however, that when this statute was enacted Congress foresaw the possibility that matters such as judicial contempts, see Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A., 481 U. S. 787 (1987), legislative contempts, see Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204 (1821); *710McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1927), or the need to defend a legislative veto, see INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 (1983), would present justiciable controversies in which the Congress or the Judiciary might have interests that diverge from those of the Executive Branch of the Government, but nevertheless be cases “in which the United States shall be concerned.” It is equally unlikely that Congress, through amendment and more recent consideration of the provision, has perceived, much less endorsed, the view that § 518(a) should be read to place control of such litigation exclusively in the hands of the Executive Branch. Although the texts of the statutes that Congress enacted can be read to foreclose either the Congress or the Judiciary from appointing counsel to participate in litigation in this Court, we have long held that in construing a statute, we are not bound to follow the literal language of the statute — “however clear the words may appear on ‘superficial examination’” — when doing so leads to “absurd,” or even “unreasonable,” results. United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 543-544 (1940) (citation omitted); see also Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U. S. 207 (1986); O’Connor v. United States, 479 U. S. 27 (1986); California Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U. S. 272, 284 (1987); United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U. S. 351 (1988).
Both history and common sense make clear that Congress never intended to grant the Executive Branch exclusive authority to control all litigation before this Court in which a coequal branch of government maintains a substantial, justiciable interest. As early as 1818, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution directing the Speaker of the House “to employ such counsel, as he may think proper to defend the suit brought by John Anderson against the said Thomas Dunn, and that the expenses be defrayed out of the contingent fund of the House.” 33 Annals of Cong. 434 (1818). The Speaker retained William Wirt to defend the suit, which established the congressional power of legislative *711contempt. See Anderson v. Dunn, supra. Although Wirt was then serving as Attorney General, Congress nonetheless deemed it necessary to retain Wirt in his private capacity and to pay him $500 to defend the suit. See American State Papers, Misc. Vol. 2, p. 932 (1834) (“A statement of the sums paid to William Wirt, Attorney General of the United States, beyond his salary, for services not required of him by law”). Had Congress read “in which the United States shall be concerned” to extend beyond the interests of the Executive Branch, the Attorney General would already have been obliged to “prosecute” or “conduct” the suit in the Supreme Court, and no separate retainer agreement would have been necessary. Indeed, the House Committee on the Judiciary later explained that payment above and beyond the Attorney General’s salary was proper because it was provided “for services rendered which did not belong to his office, which he was in no manner bound to perform, and for which, therefore, if he did perform them, he was entitled to be paid as any other professional man would be.”1 Id., at 931.
*712On numerous occasions since Anderson v. Dunn, Congress has seen fit to retain private counsel to represent its interests. See, e. g., Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1881); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U. S. 655 (1929); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486 (1969); Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606 (1972); INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 (1983); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714 (1986). Similarly, the interests of the Federal Judiciary, which are certainly interests *713of the United States as well, have been represented in litigation in this Court by private counsel on several occasions. See, e. g., Will v. United States, 389 U. S. 90 (1967); Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit, 398 U. S. 74 (1970); Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U. S. 655 (1978); Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A., 481 U. S. 787 (1987). Yet, from the time of Anderson v. Dunn until today, we have heard argument in these cases without bothering to determine whether or not the Solicitor General approved of their participation in the litigation. In addition, we have frequently appointed counsel — sometimes designated as “amicus curiae,” but nevertheless fully authorized to argue cases in which the United States is interested, see, e. g., Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926); Bob Jones University v. United States, 456 U. S. 922 (1982) (appointing counsel), 461 U. S. 574 (1983) — without asking for the approval of the Solicitor General before taking such action. Moreover, despite the fact that 28 U. S. C. § 516 contains language similar to that found in § 518(a),2 we have confirmed the power of the Judiciary to appoint counsel to conduct litigation in which the United States is interested. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A., supra.
This long and previously unquestioned practice comports well with common sense. Section 518(a) directs that “[e]xcept when the Attorney General in a particular case directs otherwise, the Attorney General and the Solicitor General shall conduct and argue suits and appeals in the Supreme Court ... in which the United States is interested.” The language is mandatory. In any case in which the United States is interested, the Solicitor General shall argue an appeal in the Supreme Court. Of course, and quite properly so, the Solicitor General does not seek certiorari in every *714case adversely affecting an interest of the United States. Instead, the Solicitor General acts strategically, choosing the most important cases and the cases in which the United States is most likely to prevail. In thus separating the wheat from the chaff, the Solicitor General makes a series of judgments as to what is in the United States’ interest. As an executive officer,3 the Solicitor General may reasonably weigh and consider the interests of the executive agencies. When faced with a difference of view between the Executive Branch and a coordinate branch of government, however, the Solicitor General faces a conflict of interest that undeniably would be intolerable if encountered in the private sector. In essence, he or she is asked to resolve conflicting interests between clients. Common sense dictates that Congress did not intend to create such a conflict in the Office of the Solicitor General.4 Moreover, and even more compellingly so, it is unreasonable to conclude that Congress intended to abdicate to the Solicitor General and the Department of Justice the function of determining what is in the interest of the Congress or the Judiciary. Certainly, Congress did not intend that these executive offices be charged with weighing competing executive and congressional or judicial interests, with authority — absent further legislation5 — to deny Congress and the Judiciary access to this Court.
*715Not only is our prior practice consistent with a commonsense reading of § 518, but it is also significant that the officer most interested in a correct interpretation of that provision— the Solicitor General — places this interpretation on its text. In his brief in this case, he submits:
“[Title] 28 U. S. C. 518(a), like the other statutes that vest the Attorney General with exclusive control over *716litigation, applies to cases in which the United States is ‘interested’ by virtue of the constitutional and statutory responsibilities of the Executive Branch — the Branch in which the Attorney General serves. Cf. ICC v. Southern Ry., Co., 543 F. 2d 534, 536 (5th Cir. 1976) (Section 516 ‘not only centralizes responsibility for the conduct of public litigation but enables the President, through the Attorney General, to supervise the various policies of the executive branch’).” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Response to Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss 13.
Because I agree with that interpretation of the statute, I respectfully dissent.
At the request of the House of Representatives, President Monroe transmitted to Congress “information relating to the amount of the public money paid the Attorney General, over and above his salary fixed by law . . . .” This information was accompanied by a Presidential message that sheds further light on the early understanding of the Act of 1789, providing, in part:
“By the act of the 24th of September, 1789, instituting the office of Attorney General, it was made his duty to prosecute and conduct all suits in the Supreme Court, in which the United States should be concerned .... It will be seen, therefore, by the statement communicated, that no money whatever has been paid to the Attorney General for his services in that character, nor for any duty belonging to his office, beyond his salary, as fixed by law.” American State Papers, Misc. Vol. 2, p. 931 (1834).
The House Committee agreed with the President that the nonsalary payments to Attorney General Wirt were for services beyond the scope of his statutory duties:
“That the office of Attorney General was established by the act of the 24th September, 1789, and his duty defined to be, ‘to prosecute and con-*712duet all suits in the Supreme Court in which the United States shall be concerned . . . .’
“The appointments heretofore made, and the compensation heretofore and now allowed, have had reference only to the existing constitution of the office, and the duties belonging to it, as already stated.
“It follows clearly that no Department of the Government has a right, nor ever has had a right, to call upon the Attorney General to perform any other duties; and it would be difficult to show that an officer is under a greater obligation than a private citizen to render gratuitous services to the Government, particularly where they are of a nature to be estimated and paid for.
“In the extensive and interesting concerns of the nation, it will nevertheless happen, as it has frequently happened, that the Government will have occasion for other or further legal aid than that which their officers are bound, or, in some cases, able to afford. . . .
“Where such occasional aid can be afforded by the Attorney General without interference with his proper duties,. . . there is no objection to his being employed upon the ordinary professional footing — of receiving a compensation for the service required. It was not the design of the office, as has already appeared, that he should render any other than the stated duties for the stated compensation or salary; and it was never understood or intended that the office was to deprive the officer of the right to employ his professional talents and learning for his own benefit, where that could be done without prejudice to the faithful performance of his stated duties. . . .
“In reviewing the past, then, the committee finds nothing to disapprove. Where additional professional aid has been employed, it seems to have been necessary and proper, and not to have been compensated beyond a fair and reasonable amount. Where compensation has been allowed to the Attorney General, it has been for services rendered which did not belong to his office, which he was in no manner bound to perform, and for which, therefore, if he did perform them, he was entitled to be paid as any other professional man would be. . . .” Id,., at 930-931.
Title 28 U. S. C. § 516 provides:
“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, ... is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General.”
Title 28 U. S. C. § 501 provides that “[t]he Department of Justice is an executive department of the United States . . . Section 505, in turn, provides that “[t]he President shall appoint in the Department of Justice, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a Solicitor General, learned in the law, to assist the Attorney General in the performance of his duties.”
Although this conflict could be avoided if the Solicitor General were to authorize certiorari and delegate control of the litigation in every case in which a coordinate branch asserts an interest, I doubt that Congress intended that the mandatory language of § 518(a) apply to Congress and the Judiciary merely so that the Solicitor General could then simply reallocate control of the litigation back to them whenever requested to do so.
In 1978, legislation was enacted creating the Office of Senate Legal Counsel. See 92 Stat. 1875, 2 U. S. C. § 288 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III). Title 2 U. S. C. § 288e(a) provides: “When directed to do so ... , *715the Counsel shall intervene or appear as amicus curiae in the name of the Senate ... in any legal action or proceeding pending in any court of the United States ... in which the powers and responsibilities of Congress under the Constitution of the United States are placed in issue.” Section 2881 further provides that “[pjermission to intervene as a party or to appear as amicus curiae under section 288e . . . shall be of right. . . .” And §288k relieves the Attorney General of certain representational responsibilities when notified that the Senate Counsel is handling the matter and also requires that the Attorney General “notify the Counsel with respect to any proceeding in which the United States is a party of any determination by the Attorney General or the Solicitor General not to appeal any court decision affecting the constitutionality of an Act . . . within such time as will enable the Senate to direct the Counsel to intervene as a party in such proceeding . . . .”
No similar statute provides for representation of the House of Representatives, which declined coverage under §288. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1756, p. 80 (1978). Moreover, it does not appear that in enacting § 288 Congress intended to create an exception to § 518(a), nor does it appear that Congress saw a need to do so. Rather, the Senate determined that “the interests of Congress as an institution make its present reliance on the ad hoc services of the Justice Department and private counsel wholly unsatisfactory.” S. Rep. No. 95-170, p. 11 (1977). Representation by the Department of Justice was deemed unsatisfactory because “[t]he Department of Justice is a part of the executive branch and its first and foremost responsibility is to represent the interests of the President and the executive branch,” id., at 11-12, thus creating an unacceptable conflict of interest. The continued reliance on private representation in eases involving a conflict with the Department of Justice was also rejected because of the high cost of retaining private counsel on a case-by-case basis, because of the need to maintain consistency among legal positions taken by the Senate, and because there is often insufficient time when the need for representation arises to locate and retain private counsel. See id., at 14-15. In essence, the Senate saw a need to hire in-house counsel, not a need to create an exception to § 518(a) permitting a form of legal representation that Congress has engaged in for years.