delivered the opinion of the Court.
This litigation involves a challenge to a federal grant program that provides funding for services relating to adolescent sexuality and pregnancy. Considering the federal statute both “on its face” and “as applied,” the District Court ruled that the statute violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment insofar as it provided for the involvement of religious organizations in the federally funded programs. We conclude ^ however, that the statute is not unconstitutional on its face, and that a determination of whether any of the- grants made pursuant to the statute violate the Establishment Clause requires further proceedings in the District Court.
I
The Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA or Act), Pub. L. 97-35, 95 Stat. 578, 42 U. S. C. §300z et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. IV), was passed by Congress in 1981 in response to the “severe adverse health, social, and economic consequences” that often follow pregnancy and childbirth among unmarried adolescents. 42 U. S. C. §300z(a)(5) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). Like its predecessor, the Adolescent Health Services and Pregnancy. Prevention and Care Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-626, Tit. VI, 92 Stat., 3595-3601 (Title VI), the AFLA is essentially a scheme for providing grants to public or nonprofit private organizations or agencies “for services and research in the area of premarital adolescent sexual relations and pregnancy.” S. Rep. No. 97-161, p~. 1 (1981) (hereinafter Senate Report). These grants are intended to serve several purposes, including the promotion of “self discipline and other prudent approaches to the problem of adolescent premarital sexual relations,” § 300z(b)(l), the promotion of adoption as an alternative for adolescent parents, § 300z(b)(2), the *594establishment of new approaches to the delivery of care services for pregnant adolescents, §300z(b)(3), and the support of research and demonstration projects “concerning the societal causes and consequences of adolescent premarital sexual relations, contraceptive use, pregnancy, and child rearing,” § 300z(b)(4).
In pertinent part, grant recipients are to provide two types of services: “care services,” for the provision of care to pregnant adolescents and adolescent parents, § 300z-l(a)(7), and “prevention services,” for the prevention of adolescent sexual relations, §300z-l(a)(8).1 While the AFLA leaves it up to the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the Secretary) to define exactly what-types of services a grantee must provide, see §§300z-l (a)(7), (8), 300z-l(b), the statute contains a listing of “necessary services” that may be funded. These services include pregnancy testing and maternity counseling, adoption counseling and referral services, prenatal and postnatal health care, nutritional information, counseling, child care, mental health services, and perhaps most importantly for present purposes, “educational services relating to’family life and problems associated with adolescent premarital sexual relations,” §300z-l(a)(4).2
*595In drawing up the AFLA and determining what services to provide under the Act, Congress was well aware that “the problems of adolescent premarital sexual relations, pregnancy, and parenthood are multiple and complex.” § 300z(a) (8)(A). Indeed, Congress expressly recognized that legislative or governmental action alone would be insufficient:
“[S]uch problems are best approached through a variety of integrated and essential services provided to adolescents and their families by other family members, religious and charitable organizations, voluntary associations, and other groups in the private sector as well ' as services provided by publicly sponsored initiatives.” § 300z(a)(8)(B).
*596Accordingly, the AFLA expressly states that federally provided services in this area should promote the involvement of parents, and should “emphasize the provision of support by other family members, religious and charitable organizations, voluntary associations, and other groups.” §300z(a)(10)(C). The AFLA implements this goal by providing in § 300z-2 that demonstration projects funded by the government
“shall use such methods as will strengthen the capacity of families to deal with the sexual behavior, pregnancy, or parenthood of adolescents and to make use of support systems such as other family members, friends, religious and charitable organizations, -and voluntary associations.”
In addition, AFLA requires grant applicants, among other things, to describe how they will, “as appropriate in the provision of services[,] involve families of adolescents[, and] involve religious and charitable organizations, voluntary associations, and other groups in the private sector as well as services provided by publicly sponsored initiatives.” § 300z-5(a)(21). This broad-based involvement of groups outside of the government was intended by Congress to “establish better coordination, integration, and linkages” among existing programs in the community, §300z(b)(3) (1982 ed., Supp. IV), to aid in the development of “strong family values and close family ties,” §300z(a)(10)(A), and to “help adolescents and their families deal with complex issues of adolescent premarital sexual relations and the consequences of such relations.” §300z(a)(10)(C).
In line with its purposes, the AFLA also imposes limitations on the use of funds by grantees. First, the AFLA expressly states that no funds provided for demonstration projects under the statute may be used for family planning services (other than counseling and referral services) unless appropriate family planning services are not otherwise available in the community. § 300z-3(b)(l). Second, the AFLA restricts the awarding of grants to “programs or projects *597which do not provide abortions or abortion counseling or referral,” except that the program may provide referral for abortion counseling if the adolescent and her parents request such referral. §300z-10(a). Finally, the AFLA states that “grants may be made only to projects or programs which do not advocate, promote, or encourage abortion.” § 300z-I0(a).3
Since 1981, when the AFLA was adopted, the Secretary has received 1,088 grant applications and awarded 141 grants. Brief for Federal Appellant 8. Funding has gone to a wide variety of recipients, including state and local health agencies, private-hospitals, community health associations, privately operated health care centers, and community and charitable organizations. It is undisputed that a number of grantees or subgrantees were organizations with institutional ties to religious denominations. See App. 748-756 (listing grantees).
In 1983, this lawsuit against the Secretary was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia by appellees, a group of federal taxpayers, clergymen, and the American Jewish Congress. Seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief, appellees challenged the constitutionality of the AFLA on the grounds that on its face and as applied the statute violates the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.4 Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the *598District Court held for appellees and declared that the AFLA was invalid both on its face and as applied “insofar as religious organizations are involved in carrying out the programs and purposes of the Act.” 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1570 (DC 1987).
The court first found that under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 (1968), appellees had standing to challenge the statute both on its face and as applied. Turning to the merits, the District Court applied the three-part test for Establishment Clause cases set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971).5 The court concluded that the AFLA has a valid secular purpose: the prevention of social and economic injury caused by teenage pregnancy and premarital sexual relations. In the court’s view, however, the AFLA does not survive the second prong of the Lemon test because it has the “direct and immediate” effect of advancing religion insofar as it expressly requires grant applicants to describe how they will involve , religious organizations in the provision of services. § 300z-5(a)(21)(B). The statute also permits religious organizations to be grantees and “envisions a direct role for those organizations in the education and counseling components of AFLA grants.” 657 F. Supp., at 1562. As written, the AFLA makes it possible for religióusly affiliated grantees to teach adolescents on issues .that can be considered “fundamental elements of religious doctrine.” The *599AFLA does all this without imposing any restriction whatsoever against the teaching of “religion qua religion” or the inculcation of religious beliefs in federally funded programs. As. the District Court put it, “[t]o presume that AFLA counselors from religious organizations can put their beliefs aside when counseling an adolescent on matters that are part of religious doctrine is simply unrealistic.” Id., at 1563 (citing Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373 (1985)).
The District Court then concluded that the statute as applied also runs afoul of the Lemon effects test.6 The evidence presented by appellees revealed that AFLA grants had gone to various organizations that were affiliated with religious denominations and that had corporate requirements that the organizations abide by religious doctrines. Other AFLA grantees were- not explicitly affiliated with organized religions, but were “religiously inspired and dedicated to teaching the dogma that inspired them.” 657 F. Supp., at 1564. In the District Court’s view, the record clearly established that the AFLA, as it has been administered by the Secretary, has in fact directly advanced religion, provided funding for institutions that wére “pervasively sectarian,” or allowed federal funds to be used for education and counseling that “amounts to the teaching of religion.” Ibid. As to. the entanglement prong of Lemon, the court ruled that because AFLA funds are used largely for counseling and teaching, it would require overly intrusive monitoring or oversight to ensure that religion is not advanced by religiously affiliated AFLÁ grantees. Indeed, the court felt that “it is impossible to comprehend entanglement more extensive and continuous *600than that necessitated by the AFLA.” 657 F. Supp., at 1568.7
In a separate order, filed August 13, 1987, the District Court ruled that the “constitutionally infirm language of the AFLA, namely its references to ‘religious organizations,’” App. to Juris. Statement in No. 431, p. 53a, is severable from the Act pursuant to Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U. S. 678 (1987). The court also denied the Secretary’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion to clarify what the court meant by “religious organizations” for purposes of determining the scope of its injunction. On the same day that this order was entered, appellants docketed their appeal on the merits directly with this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252. A separate appeal from the District Court’s August 13 order was also docketed, as was a cross-appeal by appel-lees on the severability issue. On November 9, 1987, we noted probable jurisdiction in all three appeals and consolidated the cases for argument. 484 U. S. 942 (1987).
II
The District Court in this lawsuit held the AFLA unconstitutional both on its face and as applied. Few of our cases in the Establishment Clause area have explicitly distinguished between facial challenges to a statute and attacks on the statute as applied. Several cases have clearly involved challenges to a statute “on its face.” For example, in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578 (1987), we considered the validity of the Louisiana “Creationism Act,” finding the Act “facially invalid.” Indeed, in that case it was clear that only a facial challenge could have been considered, as the Act had not been implemented. Id., at 581, n. 1. Other cases, as well, have considered the validity of statutes without the benefit of a record as to how the statute had actually been applied. *601See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229 (1977); Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1973).
In other cases we have, in the course of determining the constitutionality of a statute, referred not only to the language of the statute but also to the manner in which it had been administered in practice. Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty, 413 U. S. 472, 479 (1973); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349 (1975). See also Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, supra, at 377-379; Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U. S. 402 (1985). In several cases we have expressly recognized that an otherwise valid statute authorizing grants might be challenged on the grounds that the award of a grant in a particular case would be impermissible. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1973), involved a challenge to a South Carolina statute that provided for the issuance of revenue bonds to assist “institutions of higher learning” in constructing new facilities. . The plaintiffs in that case did not contest the validity of the statute as a whole, but contended only that a statutory grant to a religiously affiliated college would be invalid. Id., at 736. In Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the Court reviewed a federal statute authorizing construction grants to colleges exclusively for secular educational purposes. We rejected the contention that the statute was invalid- “on its face” and “as applied” to the four church-related colleges that were named as defendants in the case. However, we did leave open the possibility that the statute might authorize grants which could be invalid, stating that “[individual projects can be properly evaluated if and when challenges arise with respect to particular recipients and some evidence is then presented to show that the institution does in fact possess” sectarian characteristics that might make a grant of aid to the institution constitutionally impermissible. Id., at 682. See also Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Public Works, 426 U. S. 736, 760-761 (1976) (upholding a similar statute authorizing grants to colléges against *602a “facial” attack and pretermitting the question whether “particular applications may result in unconstitutional use of funds”).
There is, then, precedent in this area of constitutional law for distinguishing between the validity of the statute on its face and its validity in particular applications. Although the Court’s opinions have not even adverted to (to say nothing of explicitly delineated) the consequences of this distinction between “on its face” and “as applied” in this context, we think they do justify the District Court’s approach in separating the two issues as it did here.
This said, we turn to consider whether the District Court was correct in concluding that the AFLA was unconstitutional on its face. As in previous cases involving facial challenges on Establishment Clause grounds, e. g., Edwards v. Aguillard, supra; Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 (1983), we assess the constitutionality of an enactment by reference to the three factors first articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971). Under the Lemon standard, which guides “[t]he general nature of our. inquiry in this area,” Mueller v. Allen, supra, at 394, a court may invalidate a statute only if it is motivated wholly by an impermissible purpose, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 680 (1984); Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39, 41 (1980), if its primary effect is the advancement of religion, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U. S. 703, 708 (1985), or if it requires excessive entanglement between church and state, Lemon, supra, at 613; Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970). We consider each of these factors in turn.
As we see it, it is clear from the face of the statute that the AFLA was motivated primarily, if not entirely, by a legitimate secular purpose — the elimination or reduction of social and economic problems caused by teenage sexuality, pregnancy, and parenthood. See §§300z(a), (b) (1982 ed. and Supp. IV). Appellees cannot, and do not, dispute that, on the whole, religious concerns were not the sole motivation *603behind the Act, see Lynch, supra, at 680, nor can it be said that the AFLA lacks a legitimate secular purpose, see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S., at 585. In the court below, however, appellees argued that the real purpose of the AFLA could only be understood in reference to the AFLA’s predecessor, Title VI. Appellees contended that Congress had an impermissible purpose in adopting the AFLA because it specifically amended Title VI to increase the role of religious organizations in the programs sponsored by the Act. In particular, they pointed to the fact that the AFLA, unlike Title VI, requires grant applicants to describe how they will involve religious organizations in the programs funded by the AFLA. § 300z-5(a)(21)(B).
The District Court rejected this argument,- however, reasoning that even if it is assumed that the AFLA was motivated in part by improper concerns, the parts of the statute to which appellees object were also motivated by other, entirely legitimate secular concerns. We agree with this conclusion. As the District Court correctly pointed out, Congress amended Title VI in a number of ways, most importantly for present purposes by attempting to enlist the aid of not only “religious organizations,” but also “family members . . .., charitable organizations, voluntary associations, and other groups in the private sector,” in addressing the problems associated with adolescent sexuality. § 300z(a)(8)(B); see also §§300z-5(a)(21)(A), (B), Cf. Title VI, § 601(a) (5) (“[T]he problems of adolescent [sexuality] . . . are best approached through a variety of integrated and essential services”). Congress’ decision to amend the statute in this way reflects the entirely appropriate aim of increasing broad-based community involvement “in helping adolescent boys and girls understand the implications of premarital sexual relations, pregnancy, and parenthood.” See Senate Report, at 2, 15-16. In adopting the AFLA, Congress expressly intended to expand the services already authorized by Title VI, to insure the increased participation of parents in education *604and support services, to increase the flexibility of the programs, and to spark the development of new, innovative services. Id., at 7-9. These are all legitimate secular goals that are furthered by the AFLA’s additions to Title VI, including the challenged provisions that refer to religious organizations. There simply is no evidence that Congress’ “actual purpose” in passing the AFLA was one of “endorsing religion.” See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S., at 589-594. Nor are we in a position to doubt that Congress’ expressed purposes are “sincere and not a sham.” Id., at 587.8
As usual in Establishment Clause cases, see, e. g., Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373 (1985); Mueller, supra, the more difficult question is whether the primary effect of the challenged statute is impermissible. Before we address this question, however, it is useful to review again just what the AFLA sets out to do. Simply stated, it authorizes grants to institutions that are capable of providing certain care and prevention services to adolescents. Because of the complexity of the problems that Congress sought to remedy, potential grantees are required to describe how they will involve other organizations, including religious organizations, in the programs funded by the federal grants. § 300z-5(a)(21)(B); see also § 300z-2(a). There is no requirement in the Act that grantees be affiliated with any religious denomination, although the Act clearly does not rule out grants to religious organizations.9 The services to be pro*605vided under the AFLA are not religious in character, see n. 2, supra, nor has there been any suggestion that religious institutions or organizations with religious ties are uniquely well qualified to carry out those services.10 Certainly it is true that a substantial part of the services listed as “necessary services” under the Act involve some sort of education or counseling, see, e. g., §§300z-l(a)(4)(D), (G), (H), (J), (L), (M), (0), but there is nothing inherently religious about these activities and appellees do not contend that, by themselves, the AFLA’s “necessary services” somehow have the primary effect of advancing religion. Finally, it is clear that the AFLA takes a particular approach toward dealing with adolescent sexuality and pregnancy — for example, two of its stated purposes are to “promote self discipline and other prudent approaches to the problem of adolescent premarital sexual relations,” §300z(b)(l), and to “promote adoption as an alternative,” 300z(b)(2) — but again, that approach is not inherently religious * although it may coincide with the approach taken by certain religions.
Given this statutory framework, there are two ways in which the statute, considered “on its face,” might be said to have the impermissible primary effect of advancing religion. First, it can be argued that the AFLA advances religion by expressly recognizing that “religious organizations have a role to play” in addressing the problems associated with teen*606age sexuality. Senate Report, at 16. In this view, even if no religious institution receives aid or funding pursuant to the AFLA, the statute is invalid under the Establishment Clause because, among other things, it expressly enlists the involvement of religiously affiliated organizations in the federally subsidized programs, it endorses religious solutions to the problems addressed by the Act, or it creates symbolic ties between church and state. Secondly, it can be argued that the AFLA is invalid on its face because it allows religiously affiliated organizations to participate as grantees or subgrantees in AFLA programs. From this standpoint, the Act is invalid because it authorizes direct federal funding of religious organizations which, given the AFLA’s educational function and the fact that the AFLA’s “viewpoint” may coincide with the grantee’s “viewpoint” on sexual matters, will result unavoidably in the impermissible “inculcation” of religious beliefs in the context of a federally funded program.
We consider the former objection first. As noted previously, the AFLA expressly mentions the role of religious organizations in four places. It states (1) that the problems of teenage sexuality are “best approached through a variety of integrated and essential services provided to adolescents and their families by[, among others,] religious organizations,” §300z(a)(8)(B), (2) that federally subsidized services “should emphasize the provision of support by[, among others,] religious and charitable organizations,” §300z(a)(10)(C), (3) that AFLA programs “shall use such methods as will strengthen the capacity of families ... to make use of support systems such as . . . religious . . . organizations,” §300z-2(a), and (4) that grant applicants shall describe how they will involve religious organizations, among other groups, in the provision of services under the Act. § 300z-5(a)(21)(B).
Putting aside for the moment the possible role of religious organizations as grantees, these provisions of the statute reflect at most Congress’ considered judgment that religious organizations can help solve the problems to which the *607AFLA is addressed. See Senate Report, at 15-16. Nothing in our previous eases prevents Congress from making such a judgment or from recognizing the important part that religion or religious organizations may play in resolving certain, secular problems. Particularly when, as Congress found, “prevention of adolescent sexual activity and adolescent pregnancy depends primarily upon developing strong family values and close family ties,” § 300z(a)(10)(A), it seems quite sensible for Congress to recognize that religious organizations can influence values and can have some influence on family life, including parents’ relations with their adolescent children. To the extent that this congressional recognition has any effect of advancing religion, the effect is at most “incidental and remote.” See Lynch, 465 U. S., at 683; Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U. S., at 710; Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 771. In addition, although the AFLA does require potential grantees to describe how they will involve religious organizations in the provision, of services under the Act, it also requires grantees to describe the involvement of “charitable organizations, voluntary associations, and other groups in the private sector,” § 300z-5(a)(21)(B).11 In our view, this reflects the statute’s successful maintenance of “a course of neutrality among religions, and between religion and non-religion,” Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U. S., at 382.
*608This brings us to the second ground for objecting to the AFLA: the fact that it allows religious institutions' to participate as recipients of federal funds. The AFLA defines an “eligible grant recipient” as a “public or nonprofit private organization or agency” which demonstrates the capability of providing the requisite services. § 300z — 1(a)(3). As this provision would indicate, a fairly wide spectrum' of organizations is eligible to apply for and receive funding under the Act, and nothing on the face of the Act suggests it is anything but neutral with respect to the grantee’s status as a sectarian or purely secular institution. See Senate Report, at 16 (“Religious affiliation is not a criterion for selection as a grantee . . .”). In this regard, then, the AFLA is similar to other statutes that this Court has upheld against Establishment Clause challenges in the past. In Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Public Works, 426 U. S. 736 (1976), for example, we upheld a Maryland statute that provided annual subsidies directly to qualifying colleges and universities in the State, including religiously affiliated institutions. As the plurality stated, “religious institutions need not be quarantined from public benefits that are neutrally available to all.” Id., at 746 (discussing Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (approving busing services equally available to both public and private school children), and Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968) (upholding state provision of secular textbooks for both public and private school students)). Similarly, in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), we approved the federal Higher Educational Facilities Act, which was intended by Congress to .provide construction grants to “all colleges and universities regardless of any affiliation with or sponsorship by a religious body.” Id., at 676. And in Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1973), we rejected a challenge to a South Carolina statute that made certain benefits “available to all institutions of higher education in South Carolina, whether or not having a religious affiliation.” Id., at 741. In other cases involving indirect *609grants of state aid to religious institutions, we have found it important that the aid is made available regardless of whether it will ultimately flow to a secular or sectarian institution. See, e. g., Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for Blind, 474 U. S. 481, 487 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S., at 398; Everson v. Board of Education, supra, at 17-18; Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S., at 676.
We, note in addition that this Court has never held that religious institutions are disabled by the First Amendment from participating in publicly sponsored social welfare programs. To the contrary, in Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291 (1899), the Court upheld an agreement between the Commissioners of the District of Columbia and a religiously affiliated hospital whereby the Federal Government would pay for the construction of a new building on the grounds of the hospital. In effect, the Court refused to hold that the mere fact that the hospital was “conducted under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church” was sufficient to alter the purely secular legal character of the corporation, id., at 298, particularly in the absence of any allegation that the hospital discriminated on the basis of religion or operated in any way inconsistent with its secular charter. In the Court’s view, the giving of federal aid to the hospital was entirely consistent with the Establishment-Clause, and the fact that the hospital was religiously affiliated was “wholly immaterial.” Ibid. The propriety of this holding, and the long history of cooperation and interdependency between governments and charitable or religious organizations is reflected in the legislative history of the AFLA. See S. Rep. No. 98-496, p. 10 (1984) (“Charitable organizations with religious affiliations historically have provided social services with the support of their communities and without controversy”).
Of course, even when the challenged statute appears to be neutral on its face, we have always been careful to ensure that direct government aid to religiously affiliated institutions does not have the primary effect of advancing religion. *610One way in which direct government aid might have that effect is if the aid flows to institutions that are “pervasively sectarian.” We stated in Hunt that
“[a]id normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission _” 413 U. S., at 743.
The reason for this is that there is a risk that direct government funding, even if it is designated for specific secular purposes, may nonetheless advance the pervasively sectarian institution’s “religious mission.” See Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U. S., at 385 (discussing how aid to religious schools may impermissibly advance religion). Accordingly, a relevant factor in deciding whether a particular statute on its face can be said to have the improper effect of advancing religion is the determination of whether, and to what extent, the statute directs government aid to pervasively sectarian institutions. In Grand Rapids School District, for example, the Court began its “effects” inquiry with “a consideration of the nature of the institutions in which the [challenged] programs operate.” Id., at 384.
In this lawsuit, nothing on the face of the AFLA indicates that a significant proportion of the federal funds will be disbursed to “pervasively sectarian” institutions. Indeed, the contention that there is a substantial risk of such institutions receiving direct aid is undercut by the AFLA’s facially neutral grant requirements, the wide spectrum of public ánd private organizations which are capable of meeting the AFLA’s requirements, and the fact that, of the eligible religious institutions, many will not deserve the label of “pervasively sectarian.”12 This is not a case like Gmnd Rapids, where the *611challenged aid flowed almost entirely to parochial schools. In that case the State’s “Shared Time” program was directed specifically at providing certain classes for nonpublic schools, and 40 of 41 of the schools that actually participated in the program were found to be “pervasively sectarian.” Id., at 385. See also Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 768 (“‘all or practically all’ ” of the schools entitled to receive grants were religiously affiliated); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S., at 371. Instead, this litigation more closely resembles Tilton and Roemer, where it was foreseeable that some proportion of the recipients of government aid would be religiously affiliated, but that only a small portion of these, if any, could be considered “pervasively sectarian.” In those cases we upheld the challenged statutes on their face and as applied to the institutions named in the complaints, but left open the consequences which would ensue if they allowed federal aid to go to institutions that were in fact pervasively sectarian. Tilton, 403 U. S., at 682; Roemer, 426 U. S., at 760. As in Tilton and Roemer, we do not think the possibility that AFLA grants may go to religious institutions that can be considered “pervasively sectarian” is sufficient to conclude that no grants whatsoever can. be given under the statute to religious organizations. We think that the District Court was wrong in concluding otherwise.
Nor do we agree with the District Court that the AFLA necessarily has the effect of advancing religion because the religiously affiliated AFLA grantees will be providing educational arid counseling services to adolescents. Of course, we have said that the Establishment Clause does “prohibit government-financed or government-sponsored indoctrination into the beliefs of a particular religious faith,” Grand *612Rapids, supra, at 385, and we have accordingly struck down programs that entail an unacceptable risk that government funding would be used to “advance the religious mission” of the religious institution receiving aid. See, e. g., Meek, supra, at 370. But nothing in our prior cases warrants the presumption adopted by the District Court that religiously affiliated AFLA grantees are not capable of carrying out their functions under the AFLA in a lawful, secular manner. Only in the context of aid to “pervasively sectarian” institutions have we invalidated an aid program on the grounds that there was a “substantial” risk that aid to these religious institutions would, knowingly or unknowingly, result in religious indoctrination. E. g., Grand Rapids, supra, at 387-398; Meek, supra, at 371. In contrast, when the aid is to flow to religiously affiliated institutions that were not pervasively sectarian, as in Roemer, we refused to presume that it would be used in a way that would have the primary effect of advancing religion. Roemer, 426 U. S., at 760 (“We must assume that the colleges . . . will exercise their delegated control over use of the funds in compliance with the statutory, and therefore the constitutional, mandate”). We think that the type of presumption that the District Court applied in this case is simply unwarranted. As we stated in Roemer: “It has not been the Court’s practice, in considering facial challenges to statutes of this kind, to strike them down in anticipation that particular applications may result in unconstitutional use of funds.” Id., at 761; see also Tilton, supra, at 682.
We also disagree with the District Court’s conclusion that the AFLA is invalid because it authorizes “teaching” by religious grant recipients on “matters [that] are fundamental elements of religious doctrine,” such as the harm of premarital sex and the reasons for choosing adoption over abortion. 657 F. Supp., at 1562. On an issue as sensitive and important as teenage sexuality, it is not surprising that the Government’s secular concerns would either coincide or conflict *613with those of religious institutions. But the possibility or even the likelihood that some of the religious institutions who receive AFLA funding will agree with the message that Congress intended to deliver to adolescents through the AFLA is insufficient to warrant a finding that the statute on its face has the primary effect of advancing religion. See Lynch, 465 U. S., at 682; id., at 715-716 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 319-320 (1980). Nor does the alignment of the statute and the religious views of the grantees run afoul of our proscription against “fund[ing] a specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting.” Hunt, 413 U. S., at 743. The facially neutral projects authorized by the AFLA — including pregnancy testing, adoption counseling and referral services, prenatal and postnatal care, educational services, residential care, child care, consumer education, etc. — aré not themselves “specifically religious activities,” and they are not converted into such activities by the fact that they are carried out by organizations with religious affiliations.
As yet another reason for invalidating parts of the AFLA, the District Court found that the involvement of religious organizations in the Act has the impermissible effect of creating a “crucial symbolic link” between government and religion. 657 F. Supp., at 1564 (citing, e. g., Grand Rapids, 473 U. S., at 390). If we were to adopt the District Court’s reasoning, it could be argued that any time a government aid program provides funding to religious organizations in an area in which the organization also has an interest, an impermissible “symbolic link” could be created, no matter whether the aid was to be used solely for secular purposes. This would jeopardize government aid to religiously affiliated hospitals, for example, on the ground that patients would perceive a “symbolic link” between the hospital — part of whose “religious mission” might be to save lives — and whatever government entity is subsidizing the purely secular medical services provided to the patient. We decline to adopt the *614District Court’s reasoning and conclude that,, in this litigation, whatever “symbolic link” might in fact be created by the AFLA’s disbursement of funds to religious institutions is not sufficient to justify striking down the statute on its face.
A final argument that has been advanced for striking down the AFLA on “effects” grounds is the fact that the statute lacks an express provision preventing the use of federal funds for religious purposes.13 Cf. Tilton, 403 U. S., at 675; Roemer, supra, at 740-741. Clearly, if there were such a provision in this statute, it would be easier to conclude that the statute on its face could not be said to have the primary effect of advancing religion, see, e. g., Roemer, supra, at 760, but we have never stated that a statutory restriction is constitutionally required. The closest we came to such a holding was in Tilton, where we struck down a provision of the statute that would have eliminated Government sanctions for violating the statute’s restrictions on religious uses of funds after 20 years. 403 U. S., at 683. The reason we did so, however, was because the 20-year limit on sanctions created a risk that the religious institution would, after the 20 years were up, act as if there were no longer any constitutional or statutory limitations on its use of the federally funded building. This aspect of the decision in Tilton was thus intended to indicate that the constitutional limitations on use of federal funds, as embodied in the statutory restriction, could not simply “expire” at some point during the economic life of the benefitthat the grantee received from the Government. In this litigation, although there is no express statutory limitation on religious use of funds, there is also no intimation in the statute that at some point, or for some grantees, religious uses are permitted. To the contrary, the 1984 Senate Report on the AFLA states that “the use of Adolescent Family Life Act funds to *615promote religion, or to teach the religious doctrines of a. particular sect, is contrary to the intent of this legislation.” S. Rep. No. 98-496, p. 10 (1984). We note in addition that the AFLA requires each grantee to undergo evaluations of the services it provides, § 300z-5(b)(l), and also requires grantees to “make such reports concerning its use of Federal funds as the Secretary may require,” § 300z-5(c). The application requirements of the Act, as well, require potential grantees to disclose in detail exactly what services they intend to provide and how they will be provided. §3Q0z-5(a). These provisions, taken together, create a mechanism whereby the Secretary can police the grants that are given out under the Act to ensure that federal funds are not used for impermissible purposes. Unlike some other grant programs, in which aid might be given out in one-time grants without ongoing supervision by the Government, the programs established under the authority of the AFLA can be monitored to determine whether the funds are, in effect, being used by the grantees in such a way as to advance religion. Given this statutory scheme, we do not think that the absence of an express limitation on the use of federal funds for religious purposes means that the statute, on its face, has the primary effect of advancing religion..
This, of eourse,. brings us to the third prong of the Lemon Establishment Clause “test” — the question whether the AFLA leads to “‘an.excessive government entanglement with religion.'” Lemon, 403 U. S., at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Common, 397 U. S., at 674). There is no doubt that the monitoring of AFLA grants is necessary if the Secretary is to ensure that public money is to be spent in the way that Congress intended and in a way that comports with the Establishment Clause. Accordingly, this litigation presents us with yet another “Catch-22” argument: the very supervision of the aid to assure that it does not further religion renders the statute invalid. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U. S., at 421 (Rehn-QUIST, J., dissenting); id., .at 418 (Powell, J., concurring) *616(interaction of entanglement and effects tests forces schools “to tread an extremely narrow line”); Roemer., 426 U. S., at 768-769 (White, J., concurring in judgment). For this and other reasons, the “entanglement” prong of the Lemon test has been much criticized over the years. See, e. g., Aguilar v. Felton, supra, at 429 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 109-110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S., at 689 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Lemon, supra, at 666-668 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). Most of the cases in which the Court has divided over the “entanglement” part of - the Lemon test have involved aid to parochial schools; in Aguilar v. Felton, for example, the Court’s finding of excessive entanglement rested in large part on the undisputed fact that the elementary and secondary schools receiving aid were “pervasively sectarian” and had “‘as a substantial purpose the inculcation of religious values.’” 473 U. S., at 411 (quoting Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 768); see also 473 U. S., at 411 (expressly distinguishing Roemer, Hunt, and Tilton as cases involving aid to institutions that were not pervasively sectarian). In Aguilar, the Court feared that an adequate level of supervision would require extensive and permanent on-site monitoring, 473 U. S., at 412-413, and would threaten both the “freedom of religious belief of those who [were] not adherents of that denomination” and the “freedom of . . . the adherents of the denomination.” Id., at 409-410.
Here, by contrast, there is no reason to assume that the religious organizations which may receive grants are “pervasively sectarian” in the same sense as the Court has held parochial schools to be. There is accordingly no reason to fear that the less intensive monitoring involved here will cause the Government to intrude unduly in the day-to-day operation of the religiously affiliated AFLA grantees. Unquestionably, the Secretary will review the programs set up and run by the AFLA grantees, and undoubtedly this will involve a review of, for example, the educational materials that a *617grantee proposes to use. The Secretary may also wish to have Government employees visit the clinics or offices where AFLA programs are being carried out to see whether they are in fact being administered in accordance with statutory and constitutional requirements. But in our view, this type of grant monitoring does not amount to “excessive entanglement,” at least in the context of a statute authorizing grants to religiously affiliated organizations that are not necessarily “pervasively sectarian.”14
In sum, in this somewdiat lengthy discussion of the validity of the AFLA on its face, we have concluded that the statute has a valid secular purpose, does not have the primary effect of advancing religion, and does not create an excessive entanglement of church and state. We note, as is proper given the traditional presumption in favor of the constitutionality of statutes enacted by Congress, that our conclusion that the statute does not violate the Establishment Clause is consistent with the conclusion Congress reached in the course of its deliberations on the AFLA. As the Senate Committee Report states:
“In the committee’s view, provisions for the involvement of religious organizations [in the AFLA] do not violate the constitutional separation between church and state. Recognizing the limitations of Government in dealing with a problem that has complex moral and social dimensions, the committee believes that prompting the involvement of religious organizations in the solution to *618these problems is neither inappropriate or illegal. ” Senate Report, at 15-16.
For the foregoing reasons we conclude that the AFLA does not violate the Establishment Clause “on its face.”
IWe turn now to consider whether the District Court correctly ruled that the AFLA was unconstitutional as applied. Our first task in this regard is to consider whether appellees had standing to raise this claim. In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 (1968), we held that federal taxpayers have standing to raise Establishment Clause claims against exercises of congressional power under the taxing and spending power of Article I, §8, of the Constitution. Although we have considered the problem of standing and Article III limitations on federal jurisdiction many times since then, we have consistently adhered to Flast and the narrow exception it created to the general rule against taxpayer standing established in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923). Accordingly, in this case there is no dispute that appellees have standing to raise their challenge to the AFLA on its face. What is disputed, however, is whether appellees also have standing to challenge the statute as applied. The answer to this question turns on our decision in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464 (1982). In Valley Forge, we ruled that taxpayers did not have standing to challenge a decision by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to dispose of certain property pursuant to the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 377, as amended, 40 U. S. C. §471 et seq. We rejected the taxpayers’ claim of standing for two reasons: first, because “the source of their complaint is not a congressional action, but a decision by HEW to transfer a parcel of federal property,” 454 U. S., at 479, and second, because “the property transfer about which [the taxpayers] complain was not an exercise of *619authority conferred by the Taxing and Spending Clause of Art. I, §8,” id., at 480. Appellants now contend that appel-lees’ standing in this case is deficient for the former reason; they argue that a challenge to the AFLA “as applied” is really a challenge to executive action, not to an exercise of congressional authority under the Taxing and Spending Clause. We do not think, however, that appellees’ claim that AFLA funds are being used improperly by individual grantees is any less a challenge to congressional taxing and spending power simply because the funding authorized by-Congress has flowed through and been administered by the Secretary. Indeed, Flast itself was a suit against the Secretary of HEW, who had been given the authority under the challenged statute to administer the spending program that Congress had created. In subsequent cases, most notably Tilton, we have not questioned the standing of taxpayer plaintiffs to raise Establishment Clause challenges, even when their claims raised questions about the administratively made grants. See Tilton, 403 U. S., at 676; see also Hunt, 413 U. S., at 735-736 (not questioning standing of state taxpayer to file suit against state executive in an “as applied” challenge); Roemer, 426 U. S., at 744 (same). This is not a case like Valley Forge, where the challenge was to an exercise of executive authority pursuant to the Property Clause of Article IV, §3, see 454 U. S., at 480, or Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 228 (1974), where the plaintiffs challenged the executive decision to allow Members of Congress to maintain their status as officers of the Armed Forces Reserve. See also United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166, 175 (1974) (rejecting standing in challenge to statutes regulating the Central Intelligence Agency’s accounting and reporting requirements). Nor is this, as we stated in Flast, a challenge to “an incidental expenditure of tax funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute.” 392 U. S., at 102. The AFLA is at heart a program of disbursement of funds pursuant to Con*620gress’ taxing and spending powers, and appellees’ claims call into question how the funds authorized by Congress are being disbursed pursuant to the AFLA’s statutory mandate. In this litigation there is thus a sufficient nexus between the taxpayer’s standing as a taxpayer and the congressional exercise of taxing and spending power, notwithstanding the role the Secretary plays in administering the statute.15
On the merits of the “as applied” challenge, it seems to us that the District Court did not follow the proper approach in assessing appellees’ claim that the Secretary is making grants under the Act that violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Although the District Court stated several times that AFLA aid had" been given to religious organizations that were “pervasively sectarian,” see 657 F. Supp., at 1564, 1565, 1567, it did not identify which grantees it was referring to, nor did it discuss with any particularity the aspects of those organizations which in its view warranted classification as “pervasively sectarian.”16 The District Court did identify certain instances in which it felt AFLA-funds were used for constitutionally improper purposes, but in our view the court did not adequately design its remedy to address the specific problems it found-in the Secretary’s administration of the statute. Accordingly, although there is no dispute that the record contains evidence of specific incidents of impermissible behavior by AFLA grantees, we feel that this lawsuit should be remanded to the District *621Court for consideration of the evidence presented by appel-lees insofar as it sheds light on the manner in which the statute is presently being administered. It is the latter inquiry to which the court must direct itself on remand.
In particular, it will be open to appellees on remand to show that AFLA aid is flowing to grantees that can be considered “pervasively sectarian” religious institutions, such as we have held parochial schools to be. See Hunt, supra, at 743. As our previous discussion has indicated, and as Tilton, Hunt, and Roemer make clear, it is not enough to show that the recipient of a challenged grant is affiliated with a religious institution or that it is “religiously inspired.”
The District Court should also consider on remand whether in particular cases AFLA aid has been used to fund “specifically religious activities] in an otherwise substantially secular setting.” Hunt, supra, at 743. In Hunt, for example, we deemed it important that the conditions on which the aid was granted were sufficient to preclude the possibility that funds would be used for the construction of a building used for religious purposes. Here it would be relevant to determine, for example, whether the Secretary has permitted AFLA grantees to use materials that have an explicitly religious content or are designed to inculcate the views of a particular religious faith. As we have pointed out in our previous discussion, evidence that the views espoused on questions such as premarital sex, abortion, and the like happen to coincide with the religious views of the AFLA grantee would not be sufficient to show that the grant funds are being used in such a way as to have a primary effect of advancing religion.
If the District Court concludes on the evidence presented that grants are being made by the Secretary in violation of the Establishment Clause, it should then, turn to the question of the appropriate remedy. We deal here with a funding statute with respect to which Congress has expressed the view that the use of funds by grantees to promote religion, *622or to teach religious doctrines of a particular sect, would be contrary to the intent of the statute. See S. Rep. No. 98-496, p. 10 (1984). The Secretary has promulgated a series of conditions to each grant, including a prohibition against teaching or promoting religion. See App. 757. While these strictures may not be coterminous with the requirements of the Establishment Clause, they make it very likely that any particular grant which would violate the Establishment Clause would also violate the statute and the grant conditions imposed by the Secretary. Should the court conclude that the Secretary has wrongfully approved certain AFLA grants, an appropriate remedy would require the Secretary to withdraw such approval.
> t — l
We conclude, first, that the District Court erred in holding that the AFLA is invalid on its face, ánd second, that the court should consider on remand whether particular AFLA grants have had the primary effect of advancing religion. Should the court conclude that the Secretary’s current practice does allow such grants, it should devise a remedy to insure that grants awarded by the Secretary eomply with the Constitution and the statute. The judgment of the District Court is accordingly
Reversed.
In addition to these services, the AFLA also provides funding for research projects. See §§ 300z(b)(4)-(6), 300z-7. This aspect of the statute is not involved in this case.
Section 300z-l(a)(4) provides in full:
“(4) ‘necessary services’ means services which may be provided by grantees which are—
“(A) pregnancy testing and maternity counseling;
“(B) adoption counseling and referral services which present adoption as an option for pregnant adolescents, including referral to licensed adoption agencies in the community if the eligible grant recipient is not a licensed adoption agency;
“(C) primary and preventive health services including prenatal and postnatal care;
“(D) nutrition information and counseling;
“(E) referral for screening and treatment of venereal disease;
“(F) referral to appropriate pediatric-care;
*595“(G) educational services relating to family life and problems associated with- adolescent premarital sexual relations, including—
“(i) information about adoption;
“(ii) education on the responsibilities of sexuality and parenting;
“(iii) the development of material to support the role of parents as the provider of sex education; and
“(iv) assistance to parents, schools, youth agencies, and health providers to educate adolescents and preadolescents concerning self-discipline and responsibility in human- sexuality;
“(H) appropriate educational and vocational services and referral to such services;
“(I) referral to licensed residential care or maternity home services; and
“(J) mental health services and referral to mental health services and to other appropriate physical health services;
“(K) child care sufficient to enable the adolescent parent to continue education or to enter into employment;
“(L) consumer education and homemaking;
“(M) counseling for the immediate and extended family members of the eligible person;
“(N) transportation;
“(0) outreach services to families of adolescents to discourage sexual relations among unemancipated minors;
“(P) family planning services; and
“(Q) such other services consistent with the purposes of this subchapter as the Secretary may approve in accordance with regulations promulgated by the Secretary.”
Section 300z-10(a) reads in full;
“Grants or payments may be made only to programs or projects which do not provide abortions or abortion counseling or referral, or which do not subcontract with or make any payment to any person who provides abortions or abortion counseling or referral, except that any such program or project may provide referral for abortion counseling to a pregnant adolescent- if such adolescent and the parents or guardians of such adolescent request such referral; and grants may be made only to projects or programs which do not advocate, promote, or encourage abortion.”
On October 2, 1984, the District Court allowed United Families of America (UFA) to intervene and participate as a defendant-intervenor in support of the constitutionality of the AFLA.
The court rejected appellees’ claim that a striet-serutiny standard should apply to the AFLA because the statute’s restriction of funding to organizations that oppose abortion explicitly and deliberately discriminates among religious denominations. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228 (1982). The court found that the AFLA does not precondition the award of a grant on a grantee’s having a particular religious belief; it merely restricts the grantees from using federal tax dollars to advocate a certain course of action. See § 300z-10. While the AFLA’s restriction on the advocacy of abortion does coincide with certain religious beliefs, that fact by itself did not, in the District Court’s opinion, trigger the application of strict scrutiny under Larson. This aspect of the District Court’s opinion has not been challenged on this appeal.
Prior to this, the court reviewed “the motions, the statements of material fact not in dispute, the allegations of disputed facts, the gol'conda of documents submitted to the Court, and the case law,” and .concluded that the material facts were not in dispute and that summary judgment would be proper. 657 F. Supp., at 1554.
The court also found that the AFLA’s funding of religious organizations is likely to incite political divisiveness. See id., at 1569 (citing, e. g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 689 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
We also see no reason to conclude that the AFLA serves an impermissible religious purpose simply because some of the goals of the statute coincide with the beliefs of certain religious organizations. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 319-320 (1980); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961).
Indeed, the legislative history shows that Congress was aware that religious organizations had been grantees under Title VI and that it did not disapprove of that practice. The Senate Report, at 16, states:
“It should be noted that under current law [Title VI], the Office of Adolescent Pregnancy Programs has made grants to two religious-affiliated organizations, two Christian organizations and several other groups that are *605indirectly affiliated with religious bodies. Religious affiliation is not a criterion for selection- as a grantee under the adolescent family life program, but any such grants made by the Secretary would be a simple recognition that nonprofit religious organizations have a role to play in the provision of services to adolescents.”
One witness before the Senate Committee testified that “projects which target hispanic and other minority populations are more accepted by the population if they include sectarian, as well as non-sectarian, organizations in the delivery of those services.” S. Rep. No. 98-496, p. 10 (1984). This indicates not that sectarian grantees are particularly well qualified to perform AFLA services, but that the inclusion of both secular and sectarian grantees can improve the effectiveness of the Act’s programs.
This undercuts any argument that religion has been “advanced” simply because AFLA added to Title VI the various references to religious organizations. As we noted previously, the amendments to Title VI were motivated by the secular purpose of increasing community involvement in the problems associated with adolescent sexuality. Although the AFLA amendments may have the effect of increasing the role of religious organizations in services provided under the AFLA. at least relative to services provided under Title VI, this reflects merelythe fact that the AFLA program as a whole was expanded, with the role of all community organizations being increased as a result. This expansion of programs available under the AFLA, as opposed to Title VI, has only the “incidental” effect, if that, of advancing religion.
The validity of this observation is borne out by the statistics for the AFLA program in fiscal year 1986. According to the record of funding for that year, some $10.7 million in funding was awarded under the AFLA to a total of 86 organizations. Of this, about $3.3 million went to 23 religiously *611affiliated grantees, with only $1.3 million of this figure going to the 13 projects that were cited by the District Court for constitutional violations. App. 748-756. Qf these 13 projects, 4 appear to be state or local government. organizations, and at least 1 is a hospital. Id., at 755. Of the 13 religiously affiliated organizations listed, 2 are universities. Id., at 756.
Section 300z-3 does, however, expressly define the uses to which federal funds may be put, including providing care and prevention services to eligible individuals. Nowhere in this section is it suggested that use of funds for religious purposes would be permissible.
We also disagree with the District Court’s conclusion that the AFLA is invalid because it is likely to create political division along religious lines. See 657 F. Supp., at 1569. It may well be that because of the importance of the issues relating to adolescent sexuality there may be a division of opinion along religious lines as well as ocher lines. But the same may be said- of a great number of other public issues of our day. In addition, as we said in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388, 404, n. 11 (1983), the question of “political divisiveness” should be “regarded as confined to cases where direct financial subsidies are paid to parochial schools or to teachers in parochial schools.”
Because we find that the taxpayer appellees have standing, we need not consider the standing of the clergy or the American Jewish Congress.
The closest the court came was to identify “at least ten AFLA grantees or subgrantees [that] were themselves ‘religious organizations,’ in the sense that they have explicit corporate ties to a particular religious 'faith and by-laws or policies that prohibit any deviation from religious doctrine.” 657 F. Supp., at 1565. While these factors are relevant to the determination of whether an institution is “pervasively sectarian,” they are not conclusive, and we do not find the court’s conclusion that these institutions are “religious organizations” to be equivalent to a finding that their secular purposes and religious mission are “inextricably intertwined.”