Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge KAVANAUGH, with whom Chief Judge SENTELLE and Circuit Judge HENDERSON join.
BROWN, Circuit Judge:After illegally collecting a three percent excise tax, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS” or “the Service”) created a refund procedure for taxpayers to recoup their money. That procedure, Appellants argue, is unlawful. We have no occasion to visit the merits of Appellants’ claims, as we granted rehearing en banc only to determine whether we have the authority to hear the case. We do.
I1
The Internal Revenue Code imposes a three percent excise tax on phone calls. 26 U.S.C. § 4251. Telephone service providers collect the tax and pay it over to the IRS. See id. § 4291. Individual taxpayers *720are not required to calculate their own excise tax liability or to maintain adequate supporting documentation to do so. See Rev. Rui. 60-58, 1960-1 C.B. 638. The Code taxes communications charges that are based upon distance and transmission time. 26 U.S.C. § 4252(b). Decades ago, these requirements posed no problem, as phone companies based their billing on multiple factors, including the key components of distance and time. Nat’l R.R. Passenger v. United States, 431 F.3d 374, 375 (D.C.Cir.2005). The telecommunications revolution has changed all that. Many consumers now pay strictly based on transmission time; frequently, rates no longer vary based on the distance of a call. Id. Despite recognizing this shift, the IRS continued to collect taxes on all long-distance communications. See I.R.S. Notice 2005-79, 2005-2 C.B. 952 (“Notice 2005-79”); see also Rev. Rui. 79-404, 1979-2 C.B. 382 (determining communication between ships at sea or other offshore facilities and telephone subscribers in the United States were subject to the excise tax though the charges varied only based on transmission time).
Multiple corporate taxpayers brought refund suits claiming the excise tax was illegal and several circuits, including this one, concluded time-only rate structures render calls nontaxable under the Code. Nat’l R.R. Passenger, 431 F.3d at 375-76. While these lawsuits proceeded, the IRS remained adamant regarding the continuing applicability of the excise tax. After it lost an appeal in the Eleventh Circuit, see Am. Bankers Ins. Group v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir.2005), the Service declared it would continue to litigate the applicability of the tax and directed phone service providers to continue collecting the tax, even from individuals in the Eleventh Circuit’s jurisdiction. Notice 2005-79. The IRS further ordered taxpayers to continue paying the tax, but permitted placeholder refund claims “for overpayments.” Id. Taxpayers were advised, however, the Service would not process place-holder refund claims while related cases remained pending in federal courts of appeals. Id.
The IRS lost in each of the five circuits that considered its application of § 4251. All held the tax inapplicable to long-distance rates calculated without reference to distance. Reese Bros., Inc. v. United States, 447 F.3d 229, 231 (3d Cir.2006); Fortis, Inc. v. United States, 447 F.3d 190, 191 (2d Cir.2006); Nat’l R.R. Passenger, 431 F.3d at 374; OfficeMax, Inc. v. United States, 428 F.3d 583, 585 (6th Cir.2005); Am. Bankers Ins. Group, 408 F.3d at 1338. On May 26, 2006, after the last of these rulings came down, the IRS issued Notice 2006-50, discontinuing the excise tax for phone charges based solely on transmission time. See I.R.S. Notice 2006-50, 2006-1 C.B. 1141 (“Notice 2006-50”).2
Notice 2006-50 provided a one-time exclusive mechanism for taxpayers to obtain a refund for excise taxes erroneously collected between February 28, 2003, and August 1, 2006.3 Id. § 5(a) (agreeing to provide refund “if the taxpayer requests the credit or refund in the manner prescribed in this notice”); id. § 5(g) (refusing to process refund requests “that do not follow the provisions of this notice”). Although the IRS collected the excise tax through *721telephone service providers, Notice 2006-50 required individual taxpayers to request a refund on their 2006 federal income tax returns. Id. § 5(a)(2). Taxpayers who otherwise did not need to file income tax returns nevertheless had to file a return in order to submit a refund request. Id. Taxpayers could request either a “safe harbor” amount, which required no documentation, or the actual amount of tax they paid, for which the IRS could demand documentation.4 Id. § 5(c); Notice 2007-11, § 11 (setting the safe harbor at between $80 and $60 depending on the number of exemptions and refusing to require telephone companies to supply customers with billing records during the refund period).
Various lawsuits challenged the lawfulness and adequacy of the refund process. See In re Long-Distance Tel. Serv. Fed. Excise Tax Refund Litig., 469 F.Supp.2d 1348 (J.P.M.L.2006) (Transfer Order). The Multidistrict Litigation (“MDL”) Panel consolidated and transferred three district court cases, Cohen, Sloan, and Gurrola into an MDL proceeding before the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Id. at 1350. In each of the three consolidated suits, Appellants purported to represent a class of taxpayers who lacked the resources or expertise necessary to individually seek a refund under Notice 2006-50, or amounts at stake sufficient to make individual actions worthwhile.5 Appellants claim Notice 2006-50 is substantively flawed because it undercompensates many taxpayers for the actual excise taxes paid and is procedurally flawed because the IRS did not comply with the notice and comment procedures required under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., when it issued the notice. See Second Amended Complaint ¶ 2 (“The I.R.S.’s program is unlawful because it fails to compensate consumers for anything approaching the full amount of the money illegally taken, is without a basis in law, is arbitrary in the extreme, and was promulgated without any of the procedures that are required to accompany agency rulemaking”).
The district court dismissed the cases after concluding Appellants failed to exhaust the administrative remedies for their refund claims and failed to state valid claims under federal law. In re Long-Distance Tel. Serv. Fed. Excise Tax Refund Litig., 539 F.Supp.2d 281, 287 (D.D.C.2008) (“[N]o refund claim, no refund suit”). That court further found Notice 2006-50 was an “internal policy,” did not adversely affect Appellants, and therefore constituted unreviewable agency action. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 702; Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78, 117 S.Ct. *7221154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (requiring “final agency action” to be the “consummation” of agency decisionmaking and either affect legal “rights or obligations” or result in “legal consequences”); Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 185 (D.C.Cir.2006) (explaining the “final agency action” requirement is not jurisdictional, but rather a limitation on an APA cause of action). The district court also ruled Appellants’ APA claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were mooted by the IRS’s decision to discontinue the tax on time-based phone charges. 539 F.Supp.2d at 287.
A divided panel of this court reversed, holding Notice 2006-50 constituted final agency action reviewable under the APA. Cohen, 578 F.3d 1, 4-14 (D.C.Cir.2009). Before doing so, the majority rejected two challenges to the court’s jurisdiction. In the majority’s view, neither the Anti-Injunction Act (“AIA”), which provides that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person,” 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), nor the Declaratory Judgment Act (“DJA”), which authorizes declaratory relief except “with respect to Federal taxes,” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), stripped the court of jurisdiction to hear Appellants’ claims for equitable relief. Cohen, 578 F.3d at 5. Although the text of the AIA and DJA differ, the majority reasoned, our circuit precedent held the two “coterminous.” Id. Thus, if one did not bar Appellants’ APA claims, neither did the other. Id. at 13 (citing “Americans United” Inc. v. Walters, 477 F.2d 1169, 1176 (D.C.Cir.1973), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Alexander v. “Americans United” Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 94 S.Ct. 2053, 40 L.Ed.2d 518 (1974) (“The breadth of the tax exception of [the DJA] is coextensive with the effect of [the AIA], and so the applicability of the latter to our situation is determinative of jurisdiction.”)).
The panel dissent, on the other hand, argued the DJA barred Appellants’ APA claims. In the dissent’s view, our precedent required the AIA and DJA to be read coterminously, but permitted us to select the broader of the two provisions as the baseline. As between the two, the dissent argued “reading the two statutes to coterminously bar declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to federal taxes is consistent with precedent, adheres to the plain text of the later-enacted [DJA], and corresponds to the well-established principle that challenges to tax regulations should be brought in refund suits.” Id. at 18 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). The dissent also argued Appellants’ claims were not ripe because Appellants had not filed refund requests under Notice 2006-50. Id. at 20 (citing Stephenson v. Brady, 927 F.2d 596 (table), 1991 WL 22835, at *1, 1991 U.S.App. LEXIS 2886, at *4 (4th Cir.1991) (per curiam)).
On September 21, 2009, the IRS petitioned the court for rehearing en banc. We granted the petition, limiting our en banc review to four questions, all concerning (1) whether we have jurisdiction and (2) whether Appellants state a valid claim upon which relief may be granted. Our review is de novo. Kassem v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 513 F.3d 251, 253 (D.C.Cir.2008).
II
We address jurisdiction first. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). In that regard, two different questions are pertinent: Does section 10(a) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702, waive sovereign immunity with respect to Appellants’ claims, and does the AIA, DJA, or both provide “other limitations on judicial review?” 5 U.S.C. § 702.
*723A
Our jurisdiction extends generally to cases and controversies involving questions of federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The APA- — a federal law — provides a “generic cause of action in favor of persons aggrieved by agency action,” though it is not an independent source of jurisdiction. Md. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 763 F.2d 1441, 1445 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.1985); cf. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288, 318 (D.C.Cir.1988) (“Congress has seen fit to provide broadly for judicial review of those actions, affecting as they do the lives and liberties of the American people. This is fully in keeping with fundamental notions in our policy that the exercise of governmental power, as a general matter, should not go unchecked.”); Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 183 (“[T]he APA does not afford an implied grant of subject matter jurisdiction permitting federal judicial review of agency action.”) (quoting Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977)).
In contrast, “[sjovereign immunity is jurisdictional” and “[ajbsent a waiver, ... shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994). Appellants, who seek only equitable relief, argue Congress provided the necessary waiver of immunity in § 702, which reads in part:
An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency ... acted or failed to act ... shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is an indispensable party.
5 U.S.C. § 702. We agree. Even construing § 702 “strictly,” as the Service requests, see Dep’t of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 260-61, 119 S.Ct. 687, 142 L.Ed.2d 718 (1999), there is no doubt Congress lifted the bar of sovereign immunity in actions not seeking money damages. See Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 186. The IRS is not special in this regard; no exception exists shielding it — unlike the rest of the Federal Government — from suit under the APA. See e.g., Foodservice & Lodging Inst. v. Regan, 809 F.2d 842 (D.C.Cir.1987) (per curiam) (concluding the district court allowed under the APA a challenge to an IRS regulation unrelated to the assessment or collection of tax); Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Shultz, 376 F.Supp. 889, 892 (D.D.C.1974) (invalidating a Revenue Ruling under the APA, quoted approvingly in Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 103, 124 S.Ct. 2276, 159 L.Ed.2d 172 (2004)); Nat’l Restaurant Ass’n v. Simon, 411 F.Supp. 993, 995-99 (D.D.C.1976) (allowing a challenge to a Revenue Ruling to proceed under the APA).
The IRS insists § 702’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply here because it does not encompass review of actions “committed to agency discretion.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). We previously rejected this argument when the Service couched it in terms of a want of “final agency action” under § 704, see Cohen, 578 F.3d at 7-10, and did not request briefing on the issue in our order granting en banc review. There is no need to revisit the issue now. Put simply, “Notice 2006-50 binds the IRS.” Cohen, 578 F.3d at 8. Because the IRS “forfeited the discretion it retained prior to issuing the notice,” id. at 8, we need not address whether the APA’s “final agency action” requirement limits its waiver of sovereign immunity. In any event, we have previously held it did not. Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 187 (‘We also hold that the waiver applies regardless of whether the FTC’s press release constitutes ‘final agency action.’ ”).
*724B
Even though § 702 waives the Government’s immunity, it preserves “other limitations on judicial review” and does not “confer[] authority to grant relief if any other statute ... expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.” 5 U.S.C. § 702; see Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 108 (D.C.Cir.1981) (stating the Government’s immunity remains intact when “another statute expressly or implicitly forecloses injunctive [or declaratory] relief’); Smith v. Booth, 823 F.2d 94, 97 (5th Cir.1987) (same); Fostvedt v. United States, 978 F.2d 1201, 1204 (10th Cir.1992) (same); see also H.R.Rep. No. 94-1656, at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6121, 6132-33 (stating that § 702 of the APA is to have no effect on limitations and prohibition of the AIA and DJA). The IRS argues the AIA and DJA provide such “other limitations” on our review. At the en banc stage, we may “set aside [our] own precedent” reading the two statutes as coterminous. Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 876 (D.C.Cir. 1992); see also id. at 880 (Randolph, J., concurring) (noting stare decisis is “most compelling” in cases of statutory interpretation) (quoting Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 205, 112 S.Ct. 560, 116 L.Ed.2d 560 (1991)). We therefore address separately whether each statute limits judicial review under the APA.
The dissent suggests these questions of statutory interpretation are academic. Diss. Op. at 745 n. 12. But this statement is puzzling. These questions are the same ones the dissent raised at the panel stage, the same questions the court granted en banc review to consider, and the same questions the court asked the litigants to address. The court did not grant en banc review to reconsider whether this case was ripe, or whether Appellants failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.
1
Enacted in 1867, the AIA “apparently has no recorded legislative history, but its language could scarcely be more explicit.” Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736, 94 S.Ct. 2038, 40 L.Ed.2d 496 (1974) (footnote omitted). It states:
[N]o suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.
26 U.S.C. § 7421(a). “The manifest purpose of § 7421(a) is to permit the United States to assess and collect taxes alleged to be due without judicial intervention, and to require that the legal right to the disputed sums be determined in a suit for refund.” Enochs v. Williams Packing & Nav. Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7, 82 S.Ct. 1125, 8 L.Ed.2d 292 (1962) (interpreting AIA by looking at “comparable” Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”) of 1937, 50 Stat. 738 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1341)). As the Supreme Court explained, the provision reflected “appropriate concern about the ... danger that a multitude of spurious suits, or even suits with possible merit, would so interrupt the free flow of revenues as to jeopardize the Nation’s fiscal stability.” Alexander v. “Americans United” Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 769, 94 S.Ct. 2053, 40 L.Ed.2d 518 (1974) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 410, 102 S.Ct. 2498, 73 L.Ed.2d 93 (1982) (interpreting TIA).
The AIA has “almost literal effect”: It prohibits only those suits seeking to restrain the assessment or collection of taxes. Bob Jones, 416 U.S. at 737, 94 S.Ct. 2038 (quoting Williams Packing, 370 U.S. *725at 6-7, 82 S.Ct. 1125)6; see also Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 102-03, 124 S.Ct. 2276. Thus, in a late nineteenth century case, the AIA prohibited enjoining the collection of a tax on tobacco on the theory the tax was “illegally assessed.” Snyder v. Marks, 109 U.S. 189, 192-93, 3 S.Ct. 157, 27 L.Ed. 901 (1883); see also Hannewinkle v. City of Georgetown, 82 U.S. 547, 548, 15 Wall. 547, 21 L.Ed. 231 (1872). Similarly, in Bob Jones University v. Simon, the AIA precluded injunctive relief when Bob Jones University lost its status as a tax exempt organization under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. 416 U.S. at 739, 94 S.Ct. 2038. An injunction would have impacted the university’s future tax liability because § 501(c)(3) organizations are exempt from FICA (social security) and FUTA (unemployment) taxes. Id.; see also “Americans United” Inc., 416 U.S. at 762 n. 13, 94 5.Ct. 2053 (holding a suit for injunctive relief barred by the AIA because “[s]o long as the imposition of a federal tax, without regard to its nature, follows from the Service’s withdrawal of § 501(c)(3) status, [injunctive relief is barred and] a refund suit following the collection of that tax is an appropriate vehicle for litigating the legality of the Service’s actions under § 501(c)(3).”). By contrast, in Hibbs v. Winn, Arizona taxpayers sought to invalidate an Arizona tax credit that allegedly supported parochial schools in violation of the Establishment Clause. 542 U.S. at 92, 124 S.Ct. 2276. The Supreme Court allowed the state taxpayers’ suit for declaratory and injunctive relief to proceed despite the comparable TIA because the suit did not alter the taxpayers’ individual tax liability or deplete the state’s tax revenue in any way. See id. at 107, 124 S.Ct. 2276.
This suit does not seek to restrain the assessment or collection of any tax. The IRS previously assessed and collected the excise tax at issue. The money is in the U.S. treasury; the legal right to it has been previously determined. As a result, this suit is similar to Hibbs. Hearing it— whatever its merit — will not obstruct the collection of revenue as in Snyder, alter Appellants’ future tax liabilities as in Bob Jones,7 or shift the risk of insolvency as the Court feared in Grace Brethren Church. This suit is strictly about the procedures under which the IRS will return taxpayers’ money. In any event, whether the IRS’s procedures are upheld or the Appellants succeed in forcing a different set of procedures, those procedures are not retroactive; they do not and can*726not affect the assessment or collection of taxes after the fact.
But the IRS thinks otherwise. The Service argues the Court has construed the AIA to preclude suit in similar circumstances. In support, the Service points to United States v. Clintwood Elkhom Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 128 S.Ct. 1511, 170 L.Ed.2d 392 (2008), and United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 110 S.Ct. 1361, 108 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990). But Clintwood Elkhom and Dalm are distinguishable. The Court’s focus in each was on how the AIA and § 7422(a), together, establish the statutory conditions upon which a taxpayer may bring a refund suit without interrupting the orderly assessment and collection of taxes. Clintwood Elkhom and Dalm do not speak to suits outside the § 7422(a) refund process. See Dalm, 494 U.S. at 601,110 S.Ct. 1361.
The IRS envisions a world in which no challenge to its actions is ever outside the closed loop of its taxing authority. It argues assessment and collection are part of a “single mechanism” that ultimately determines the amount of revenue the Treasury retains. Because this suit will ultimately affect the money Treasury retains, the IRS argues, it involves “assessment and collection.”8 But the Supreme Court rejected this “single mechanism” theory of assessment and collection in Hibbs, choosing instead to define “assessment and collection” as is done in the Internal Revenue Code. “[Ajssessment” is not “synonymous with the entire plan of taxation,” but rather with “the trigger for levy and collection efforts,” 542 U.S. at 102, 124 S.Ct. 2276, and “collection” is the actual imposition of a tax against a plaintiff, and does not concern third-parties trying to contest the validity of a tax or to stop its collection. Id. at 104,124 S.Ct. 2276. The assessment and collection in this case are long-since completed and no “single mechanism” theory will revive them.
The IRS has a third theory — this one structural rather than textual. The IRS argues, as did the dissent at the panel stage, that the AIA bars Appellants’ APA claims because a complex regulatory scheme requires that “challenges to tax laws, regulations, decisions, or actions ordinarily be brought in refund suits after plaintiffs have sought a refund from, and exhausted their administrative remedies with, the IRS.” Cohen, 578 F.3d at 17 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). But this neglects the nuance. The Supreme Court, this court, and other circuits have allowed challenges to tax laws outside the context of a 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) proceeding (a refund suit). For example, in South Carolina v. Regan, the Supreme Court rejected the IRS’s argument that, because a taxpayer could have filed a refund suit instead, the AIA prohibited a suit in which South Carolina challenged the constitutionality of a federal statute imposing restrictions on the state’s issuance of bonds. 465 U.S. at 378, 104 S.Ct. 1107. The Court concluded the AIA “was intended to apply only when Congress has provided an alternative avenue for an aggrieved party to litigate its claims on its own behalf.” Id. at 381, 104 S.Ct. 1107. For reasons developed more fully below, a refund suit is not an “alternative avenue” here.
Similarly, this court has allowed constitutional claims against the IRS to go *727forward in the face of the AIA. Thus, in We the People Foundation, Inc. v. United States, we held the AIA “[b]y its terms,” did not bar “a straight First Amendment Petition Clause claim,” 485 F.3d 140, 143 (D.C.Cir.2007) (Kavanaugh, J.), even though it did bar a tax collection claim “couched ... in constitutional terms,” id.; see also, e.g., Foodservice & Lodging Inst., 809 F.2d at 846 n. 10 (allowing APA challenge to IRS tip regulation). Contrary to the IRS’s position here, We the People does not support reading the AIA to reach all disputes tangentially related to taxes. Quite the opposite. It requires a careful inquiry into the remedy sought, the statutory basis for that remedy, and any implication the remedy may have on assessment and collection. This is in accord with the holdings of several other courts. See, e.g., Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1983) (allowing Fourth Amendment claim against IRS for return of seized materials); see also Tax Analysts & Advocates 376 F.Supp. at 892 (allowing action to compel IRS to collect additional taxes); McGlotten v. Connolly, 338 F.Supp. 448, 453-54 (D.D.C.1972) (three judge court) (allowing challenge to IRS grants of income tax exemptions to discriminatory organizations). The principle the case law elucidates is therefore quite simple: The AIA, as its plain text states, bars suits concerning the “assessment or collection of any tax.” It is no obstacle to other claims seeking to enjoin the IRS, regardless of any attenuated connection to the broader regulatory scheme. As Appellants’ suit does not implicate assessment or collection, the AIA does not apply.
2
Having established our authority to hear Appellants’ claim for injunctive relief, we pause to consider whether it is necessary, or prudent, to wander further. Appellants claim not to care about the declaratory relief they seek, as it may become academic if they succeed in enjoining the IRS. Even so, Appellants refuse to waive the argument. Admittedly, it is odd “to think that a court with authority to issue [an injunction] is without power to declare the rights of the parties in connection therewith.” Tomlinson v. Smith, 128 F.2d 808 (7th Cir.1942). Nevertheless, establishing our jurisdiction over Appellants’ claim for declaratory relief is not an academic exercise. Appellants do not abandon their claim and the DJA is a distinct grant of judicial authority, separate and apart from the court’s power to award injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Moreover, if the district court determines an injunction is not warranted on remand, questions about its jurisdiction to hear Appellants’ claim for declaratory relief will unnecessarily prolong the case even further. We therefore venture onward, and consider whether the DJA is an “other limitation[] on judicial review,” 5 U.S.C. § 702, precluding the court’s power to award Appellants the declaratory relief they seek.
As before, our inquiry begins with the statutory text. Unlike the AIA, the DJA seems to carve out of its ambit any suit “with respect to Federal taxes.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). But precedent interprets the DJA and AIA as coterminous. See E. Kentucky Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1284 (D.C.Cir.1974); “Am. United” Inc., 477 F.2d at 1176. In other words, “with respect to Federal taxes” means “with respect to the assessment or collection of taxes.” This interpretation is consistent with law in several other circuits. See United Mine Workers of Am.1992 Benefit Plan v. Leckie Smokeless Coal Co. (In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co.), 99 F.3d 573, 583-84 (4th Cir.1996); Ecclesiastical Order of ISM of AM v. IRS, 725 F.2d 398, 404-05 (6th Cir.1984); Per*728lowin v. Sassi, 711 F.2d 910, 911 (9th Cir.1983) (per curiam); McCabe v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 963 (5th Cir.1976) (per curiam); Tomlinson, 128 F.2d at 811.
The panel dissent read things differently. While acknowledging our prior interpretation of the AIA and DJA as coterminous, the dissent questioned such cases’ precedential value, and wondered why a coterminous reading of the two statutes narrowed the scope of the DJA rather than broadening the scope of the AIA. Cohen 578 F.3d at 18. Favoring the latter, the dissent concluded the text of the DJA (and deductively that of the AIA) “squarely precludes this APA suit at this time.” Id. at 17. But the dissent went further, suggesting our precedent stemmed from a different and unruly era in which judges viewed statutory text not as an analytic starting point, but as a necessary formality in crafting opinions. To remedy this, the dissent urged the “en banc Court [to] clear this up,” “pay greater attention to statutory text,” and “not find [the AIA and DJA] coterminous.” Id. at 19 n. 6.
So is Appellants’ APA challenge properly characterized as a suit “with respect to Federal taxes”? It is in the sense the action is against the IRS, the agency charged with administering our federal tax system, and concerns refund procedures for a previously collected federal tax. This suit eludes that characterization in the sense its result — regardless of who wins— will not directly affect the disposition of any federal tax. Even if Appellants win, it does not follow that they are entitled to a tax refund. Whatever Appellants ultimately hope to achieve, this is not a refund suit. The IRS may still adopt a new version of the same notice after fixing any substantive and procedural defects. Which scope of “with respect to Federal taxes” is correct then — the broad one or the narrow one?
Despite our obligation to begin with the statutory text, discerning our jurisdiction to hear Appellants’ request for declaratory relief must come not from staring hard at the phrase “with respect to Federal taxes,” but from its context — linguistic, historical, and functional. A fuller consideration of the phrase reveals that both “actions brought under section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, [and] a proceeding under section 505 or 1146 of title 11,” are outside the tax exception. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). To oust the courts of jurisdiction, it is not enough that claims relate in the loose sense to “Federal taxes”; they must also not pertain to the status and classification of section 501(c)(3) organizations (ie., 26 U.S.C. § 7428 proceedings), unpaid tax liability of the debtor in a Chapter 11 reorganization (ie., 11 U.S.C. § 505 proceedings), or the tax effects of a Chapter 11 reorganization plan if not obtained from the IRS within 270 days (ie., 11 U.S.C. § 1146 proceedings). These carve outs are notable: first, because they cabin the phrase “with respect to Federal taxes,” thus implying an all-encompassing reading is inappropriate, and second, because each relates to tax assessment or collection, thus suggesting the term “Federal taxes” similarly pertains to assessment or collection.
The earliest cases construing the DJA’s tax exception also rejected a broad construction of the statute. In Tomlinson v. Smith, 128 F.2d 808 (7th Cir.1942), for example, the IRS sought to collect a partnership’s taxes from the owners of a property leased by the partnership. The property’s trustee sued the IRS in federal court seeking declaratory relief concerning title to the debt. The IRS argued the court was precluded by the DJA from declaring the parties’ rights concerning the property, because the action related to federal taxes and impinged on the Service’s *729collection efforts. On appeal from entry of an interlocutory injunction, the court determined the matter was appropriate for injunctive relief under a previous version of the AIA9 because “plaintiff is not the alleged tax debtor” and “sues in the capacity of a trustee for the purpose of protecting the mortgage lien on property” the IRS was encumbering to extract taxes owed by the partnership. Id. at 810-11. The court then considered whether declaratory relief was barred by the DJA, and concluded:
It is unreasonable to think that a court with authority to issue a restraining order is without power to declare the rights of the parties in connection therewith. In other words, it is our view that the language which excepts federal taxes from the Declaratory Judgment Act is co-extensive with that which precludes the maintenance of a suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of a tax.
Id. (emphasis added).
The Second Circuit relied on Tomlinson in a 1962 decision involving similar facts. Bullock v. Latham, 306 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir.1962). Although Bullock v. Latham did not explicitly hold the AIA and DJA were co-extensive, it quoted Tomlinson’s determination that the court’s ability to provide injunctive relief was “determinative of its jurisdiction” to provide declaratory relief. Id. at 47. Bullock thus follows Tomlinson by reading the DJA’s federal tax exemption narrowly. It applies to “controversies involving tax liabilities of parties qua taxpayers,” but not all conceivable controversies relating to Federal taxes, even those altering the Service’s ability to assess and collect. Id. at 48.
Congress did not intend to provide declaratory relief for litigants when the AIA barred injunctive relief. Holding to the contrary, as the IRS urges, would vitiate the structural design of the DJA. The legislative history speaks directly to this point. A year after passing the DJA, in § 405 of the Revenue Act of 1935, Congress amended the statute to expressly except disputes “with respect to Federal taxes.” The Senate Finance Committee Report explained the animating purpose of the amendment, noting “[t]he application of the Declaratory Judgments Act to taxes would constitute a radical departure from the long-continued policy of Congress (as expressed in [the AIA] and other provisions) with respect to the determination, assessment, and collection of Federal taxes.” S.Rep. No. 74-1240, at 11 (1935) (emphasis added).
When reading the legislative history, the Supreme Court declared: “[i]t is clear enough that one ‘radical departure’ which was averted by the amendment was the potential circumvention of the ‘pay first and litigate later’ rule by way of suits for declaratory judgments in tax cases.” Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 165, 80 S.Ct. 630, 4 L.Ed.2d 623 (1960). By design, the DJA tax exception serves a critical but limited purpose. It strips courts of jurisdiction to circumvent the AIA by providing declaratory relief in cases “restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Our prior case law — that from another era — also acknowledged the instructive role the DJA’s legislative history plays in its construction. See, e.g., E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 506 F.2d at 1285 n. 11 (citing examples of 1935 cases attempting to circumvent the prohibitions of the AIA by using the DJA); “Americans United” Inc., 477 F.2d at *7301176. The same is true of the first court to describe the DJA as “coterminous,” see McGlotten, 338 F.Supp. at 453 n. 22, as well as other circuits to consider the issue, see, e.g., In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co., 99 F.3d at 585; Ecclesiastical Order of ISM of AM, 725 F.2d at 405.
Of course, “it is the enacted text rather than the unenacted legislative history that prevails.” Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. Mayflower Transit, LLC, 615 F.3d 790, 792 (7th Cir.2010) (Easterbrook, J.). “Legislative history— what would in contract interpretation be called extrinsic ambiguity — does not justify revising a text that has no intrinsic ambiguity or any difficulty in application.” Id. Here, “with respect to Federal taxes” is intrinsically ambiguous. It does not bar all suits against the IRS, and thus does not encompass everything conceivably “with respect to Federal taxes.” Having eliminated this broad interpretive gloss, what is and is not “with respect to Federal taxes” is left a mystery, with no great direction from the statutory text. Although we have questioned the utility of relying on legislative history, see, e.g., Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1309-10 (D.C.Cir.1986) (Scalia, J.), the legislative history of the DJA is quite small — a single paragraph— and surprisingly straightforward. It bears repeating: “Your committee believes that the orderly and prompt determination and collection of Federal taxes should not be interfered with.” S.Rep. No. 74-1240, at 11 (1935) (emphasis added).
Finally, a functional concern exists with construing the DJA’s exception to bar relief otherwise allowed under the AIA. The court would have jurisdiction to enjoin the parties appearing before it, but not to declare their rights. This defies common sense, however, “since an injunction of a tax and a judicial declaration that a tax is illegal have the same prohibitory effect on the federal government’s ability to assess and collect taxes.” Wyoming Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. Bentsen, 82 F.3d 930, 933 (10th Cir.1996). A non-coterminous reading of the two statutes thus poses an insurmountable obstacle. The court would not have jurisdiction to provide declaratory relief but could effectively do so anyway.
The Supreme Court suggested an answer to this riddle in Hibbs. Recall, Arizona taxpayers challenged the constitutionality of an Arizona statute permitting tax credits for contributions to Arizona parochial schools. 542 U.S. at 92, 124 S.Ct. 2276. To determine whether jurisdiction existed, the Court had to interpret the Tax Injunction Act (TIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1341. The TIA, “modeled” after the AIA, id. at 102, 124 S.Ct. 2276, “shields state tax collections from federal-court restraints,” id. at 104, 124 S.Ct. 2276. Before beginning its interpretive quest, the Court “identified] the relief sought.” Id. at 99, 124 S.Ct. 2276. As Appellants do here, the Arizona taxpayers sought both an injunction and a declaratory judgment. Id. Rather than bifurcate the inquiry, however, as we do here, the Court classified the requested remedies as a single form of relief — “prospective relief only.” Id. (“Respondents seek prospective relief only. Specifically, their complaint requests ‘injunctive relief....’ Complaint 7, App. 15.... [,] a ‘declaration.... ’ Ibid, [and] ‘[a]n order....’ Complaint 7-8, App. 15.”); see also Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. at 408, 102 S.Ct. 2498 (“[T]here is little practical difference between injunctive and declaratory relief.”).
A coterminous reading of the DJA and the AIA makes sense in light of Hibbs, which construed the relief Appellants seek in the singular, as equitable relief, and not separately, as an injunction and declaratory judgment. In this light, the case is greatly simplified. The DJA falls out of *731the picture because the scope of relief available under the DJA is subsumed by the broader injunctive relief available under the AIA.
But what to make of the bugle sounding the textualist battle cry? It is true, the AIA and DJA use different words. But this observation does not beget a certain interpretive result. A baker who receives an order for “six” donuts and another for “half-a-dozen” does not assume the terms are requests for different quantities of donuts. Similarly, a man does not receive different directions to Dupont Circle if he is told by one person to “take the Metro” and by another to “catch the Red Line.” What the AIA accomplishes by denying its application to “any suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax” the DJA accomplishes by an exception “with respect to Federal taxes.” By nature, language is simultaneously robust and precise. Different verbal formulations can, and sometimes do, mean the same thing.
In sum, we hold that APA § 702’s waiver of sovereign immunity permits Appellants’ APA cause of action and neither the AIA nor DJA otherwise limits our review.
Ill
We now consider whether Appellants state a valid cause of action. Under § 704, “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.”10 5 U.S.C. § 704. The IRS argues, and Appellants concede, if an adequate remedy at law exists, equitable relief is not available under the APA.
The IRS and the dissenting opinion contend § 7422(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, the refund suit mechanism, provides Appellants the relief they seek.11 That provision bars any lawsuit for recovery of excessive or wrongfully collected taxes “until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary, according to the provisions of law in that regard, and the regulations of the Secretary established in pursuance thereof.” 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a).
At first blush, § 7422(a) does not apply. This is not a suit “for the recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected.” Id. Even if Appellants are entirely successful, they cannot recover the wrongfully assessed tax unless they follow whatever new administrative procedures the IRS decides to implement.12 This suit is an APA action; it questions the administrative procedures by which the IRS al*732lows taxpayers to request refunds for the wrongfully collected excise tax. Moreover, § 7422(a) would not provide Appellants the equitable relief they seek. Section 7422(a) provides “for the recovery of any internal revenue tax.” Id. It does not, at least explicitly, allow for prospective relief. The Service itself unknowingly concedes this point, as it believes the AIA and DJA preclude equitable remedies outside of a refund suit and is agnostic concerning the availability of broad equitable remedies as part of a refund suit. Apparently, even if § 7422(a) allowed for an injunction or declaratory judgment, the relief would be individualized, not class wide as Appellants seek. Each taxpayer would have to litigate separately the Service’s use of Notice 2006-50. As the IRS explained at oral argument: “just because we lose in one court doesn’t mean that we give up.” Oral Arg. Tr. 39.
The dissent assumes a refund suit provides an adequate remedy at law. If this were the case, it is undisputed Appellants would have to proceed through Notice 2006-50. If adequate, Notice 2006-50 would render Appellants’ claims unripe before they filed them refund actions. See Full Value Advisors, LLC v. SEC, 633 F.3d 1101, 1108 (D.C.Cir.2011) (“[Petitioner’s] failure to fully comply with the Commission’s process (i.e. exhaust) has left some of its claims unfit for review (i.e. unripe) and that is perhaps not surprising given the two doctrines’ common origins; they are both ‘prudential doctrines’ designed to ‘respond to pragmatic concerns about the relationship between courts and agencies.’ ” (quoting John Doe, Inc. v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 484 F.3d 561, 567 (D.C.Cir.2007))).
But the adequacy of Notice 2006-50 is the gravamen of Appellants’ suit. Appellants claim Notice 2006-50 is unlawful, and therefore inadequate, because it was not subject to notice and comment rulemaking and is substantively unreasonable. As a result, Appellants argue they do not have to comply with Notice 2006-50 to challenge it. In support they cite McCarthy v. Madigan, a case where the Supreme Court cites several cases in which circumstances weighed against requiring administrative exhaustion. 503 U.S. 140, 147-49, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992). In Barry v. Barchi, a horse trainer challenged a New York law allowing for summary suspension of his professional license without a presuspension hearing. 443 U.S. 55, 60-62, 99 S.Ct. 2642, 61 L.Ed.2d 365 (1979). The Board suspended Barchi’s license for fifteen days, a time period shorter than the thirty days in which the Board had to issue a final order. Id. at 59, 61, 99 S.Ct. 2642. In Gibson v. Berryhill, a state board, composed entirely of members of the optometry association, sought to revoke the licenses of a small number of optometrists who worked for a corporation, a violation of the association’s membership code. 411 U.S. 564, 567-68, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973). The threatened optometrists argued the Board was unconstitutionally constituted. Id. at 569-70, 93 S.Ct. 1689. Finally, in McCarthy itself, the Court declined to require exhaustion because the Court found “Congress ha[d] not meaningfully addressed the appropriateness of requiring exhaustion in this context” and the plaintiffs “individual interests outweigh[ed] countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion.” 503 U.S. at 149, 112 S.Ct. 1081. The Court concluded: “exhaustion has not been required where the challenge is to the adequacy of the agency procedure itself, such that ‘the question of the adequacy of the administrative remedy ... [is] for all practical purposes identical with the merits of [the plaintiffs] lawsuit.’ ” Id. at 148, 112 S.Ct. 1081 (quoting Barchi, 443 U.S. at 63, 99 S.Ct. 2642).
*733This is precisely such a case. Congress has not required exhaustion in APA suits challenging the adequacy of IRS procedures, only in suits “for the recovery of any internal revenue tax.” 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a). Although the cases from which the Court’s synthesis is drawn are distinguishable on their facts, the animating principle is a perfect fit: it is “improper to impose an exhaustion requirement” when the allegation is that the “administrative remedy furnishes no effective remedy at all.” Id. at 156,112 S.Ct. 1081 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
In sum, this suit is mi generis. Allowing Appellants to proceed without first filing a refund claim will not open the courthouse door to those wishing to avoid administrative exhaustion procedures in other cases. In the tax context, the only APA suits subject to review would be those cases pertaining to final agency action unrelated to tax assessment and collection. More broadly, litigants could not avoid exhaustion when challenging agency decisionmaking, because McCarthy and its progeny apply only when litigants challenge the exhaustion scheme itself. And once litigated, precedent would preclude later litigants challenging exhaustion procedures from relying on McCarthy in a court that had previously rejected the same argument.
The dissent argues Appellants fail to exhaust their claims under either § 703 or § 704 of the APA because a tax refund suit is an otherwise adequate procedure “for a taxpayer to wrangle with the IRS over taxes, refunds, or the legality of IRS tax collection or refund practices.” Diss. Op. at 739. But this argument conflates the existence of an alternative remedy with an “adequate remedy.” Even if equitable relief were possible in a § 7422 proceeding, it would be cold comfort to direct Appellants to proceed in a series of individual suits, submitting themselves one by one to the very refund procedures that they claim to be unlawful. The dissent suggests Appellants could avoid this inefficiency by winning a single case that would have preclusive effect across the nation. But the IRS has already shown itself unwilling to accept the binding effect of judicial opinions from one circuit to another, and the Supreme Court is highly unlikely to provide a nationwide decree because it rarely grants certiorari in an individual tax refund dispute. Another obstacle to Supreme Court review arises where, as here, the taxpayer wins at the appellate stage and is left with no avenue for seeking certiorari. See Electr. Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241, 242, 59 S.Ct. 860, 83 L.Ed. 1263 (1939) (“A party may not appeal from a judgment or decree in his favor....”); Camreta v. Greene, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2020, 2030, 179 L.Ed.2d 1118 (2011) (“As a matter of practice and prudence, we have generally declined to consider cases at the request of a prevailing party.”) Furthermore, the cases upon which the dissent relies are inapposite. Clintwood Elkhom, Hibbs, “Americans United”, and Bob Jones involved taxpayer challenges to the validity of an individual tax — paradigmatic refund suits. See e.g., Clintwood Elkhom, 553 U.S. at 4, 128 S.Ct. 1511 (coal tax); Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 103-04, 124 S.Ct. 2276 (parochial school tax credits). For example, “Americans United” and Bob Jones Univ. addressed corporations’ status as § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt non-profit organizations. See “Americans United” Inc., 416 U.S. at 762, 94 S.Ct. 2053; Bob Jones, 416 U.S. at 746-47, 94 S.Ct. 2038. None of the cases involved a challenge to an IRS regulation, action, or procedure unrelated to the individual assessment or collection of taxes. Cf. Foodservice & Lodging Inst., 809 F.2d at 846 n. 10 (allowing APA chal*734lenge to IRS tip regulation without individual refund suits).
Finally, the dissent concocts an extravagant scenario in an effort to show that a refund suit would be an adequate alternative remedy. In the dissent’s view, Appellants should have “skip[ped] the administrative process altogether and directly file[d] tax refund suits under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1).” Diss. Op. at 741. Then, in order to rebuff the IRS’s inevitable motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the Appellants could assert that, under McCarthy, their lack of exhaustion is excusable because the IRS’s administrative remedies are unreasonable and unlawful. Id.
The first problem is, as explained above, this is not a refund suit — Appellants are seeking equitable relief rather than “recovery of any internal revenue tax.” 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a). Therefore allowing Appellants’ APA suit to proceed does not “duplicate existing procedures for review of agency action.” Bowen v. Mass., 487 U.S. 879, 903, 108 S.Ct. 2722, 101 L.Ed.2d 749 (1988). Indeed, allowing judicial review of Appellants’ APA suit is consistent with the APA’s underlying purpose — “remov[ing] obstacles to judicial review of agency action,” Id. at 904, 108 S.Ct. 2722 (quoting Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51, 75 S.Ct. 591, 99 L.Ed. 868 (1955)), — and the proper construction of § 704, Bowen, 487 U.S. at 904, 108 S.Ct. 2722 (rejecting a “restrictive” interpretation of § 704). Even putting that aside, however, the dissent’s theory could contradict the language of § 7422, which states: “No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal revenue tax ... until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary.” This language seems not to make an exception for suits challenging the legality of administrative procedures. Without deciding whether a McCarthy-based objection to exhaustion procedures is cognizable in a refund suit, we note that in McCarthy itself, “Congress ha[d] not meaningfully addressed the appropriateness of requiring exhaustion.” 503 U.S. at 149,112 S.Ct. 1081. And for this reason, it is far from clear Appellants could challenge Notice 2006-50 in a refund suit without first having to proceed through it.
The dissent’s defense of the IRS’s prerogatives is ironic. The IRS promulgated Notice 2006-50 as a way to avoid thousands of successful corporate refund suits and to spare individuals, who — unlike their corporate counterparts — had no incentive to pursue costly litigation against the IRS. By promulgating the 2006 rule, the IRS effectively conceded a case-by-case resolution would be both inefficient and unfair. The moral of the dissent’s story is that such remedies are now perfectly adequate.
IV
The IRS argues this suit is not ripe because it is a “pre-enforcement” action. The aim of the ripeness doctrine is to “prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148^9, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), abrogated on other grounds by Califano, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). “The ripeness inquiry probes the fitness for review of the legal issue presented, along with (in at least some cases) ‘the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.’ ” Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sebelius, 595 F.3d 1303, 1308 (D.C.Cir.2010) (quoting *735Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808, 123 S.Ct. 2026, 155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003)); see also Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n, 538 U.S. at 807-OS, 123 S.Ct. 2026 (refusing to hear a preenforcement challenge because agency guidelines did not carry the force of law); Unity08 v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 596 F.3d 861, 865 (D.C.Cir.2010) (“[A] claim that a challenge to an agency’s final legal position must await an enforcement proceeding is analyzed under the ripeness doctrine’s requirement[ ] that issues be fit for review....”) “This court has long understood the approach in Abbott Labs to incorporate a presumption of reviewability.” Sabre, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 429 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C.Cir.2005) (citing Nat’l Automatic Laundry Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 694 (D.C.Cir. 1971)); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 417 F.3d 1272, 1282 (D.C.Cir.2005) (quoting Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Fowler, 324 F.3d 752, 757 (D.C.Cir.2003)).
We rejected the Service’s pre-enforcement argument at the panel stage and did not grant en banc review to reconsider it. The panel held this case was a post-enforcement action, and therefore fit for review, because Notice 2006-50 constituted final and reviewable agency action barring Appellants “from pursuing their refunds in court by virtue of the fact that they did not exhaust their administrative remedies under the only available avenue — Notice 2006-50.” Cohen, 578 F.3d. at 6-13; cf, McGuirl v. United States, 360 F.Supp.2d 129, 132 (D.D.C.2004) (reviewing post-enforcement challenge); Nat’l Restaurant Ass’n, 411 F.Supp. at 995-99; Tax Analysts & Advocates, 376 F.Supp. at 892, quoted approvingly in Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 103-04 & n. 6,124 S.Ct. 2276.
The dissent tweaks this argument by describing this case as a “pre-application” challenge, rather than a “pre-enforcement” challenge. Diss. Op. at 745. Thus, the dissent shifts focus from the fitness of Notice 2006-50, which the dissent concedes, Diss. Op. at 742-43, to the alleged “benefit” Appellants seek, i.e. the hardship inquiry. Diss. Op. at 744. But again, conceiving of Appellants as taxpayers looking for a handout is flawed. The APA does not offer any monetary award. Nor is the money the IRS wrongfully took a benefit the Service may choose (or not choose) to bestow upon Appellants, such as amnesty for undocumented immigrants, see Reno v. Catholic Social Services, 509 U.S. 43, 46, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993), or a government certification, see Toilet Goods Ass’n, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 161, 165, 87 S.Ct. 1520, 18 L.Ed.2d 697 (1967).
The dissent argues any delay caused by filing individual refund claims would not “constitute [a] sufficient hardship.” Diss. Op. at 743. But, in the context of APA challenges, we have previously said “[lack of] hardship cannot tip the balance against judicial review,” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 440 F.3d 459, 465 (D.C.Cir.2006) (quoting Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 324 F.3d at 756-57) (alterations in original), “is largely irrelevant,” Electric Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 391 F.3d 1255, 1263 (D.C.Cir.2004), and “is not an independent requirement divorced from the consideration of the institutional interests of the court and agency,” AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 349 F.3d 692, 700 (D.C.Cir.2003). “[0]nce we have determined that an issue is clearly fit for review, there is no need to consider ‘the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.’ ” Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1258 (D.C.Cir.1995) (quoting Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507). When the hardship Appellants suffer is compliance *736with allegedly unlawful administrative procedures, we have consistently held claims are ripe for review. See Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Forest Service, 165 F.3d 43, 51 (D.C.Cir.1999) (dismissing NEPA claim as unripe but considering procedural claim); Action for Children’s Television, 59 F.3d at 1258. Moreover, the Supreme Court implied the same in Reno — the case upon which the dissent primarily relies. Reno, 509 U.S. at 60-61, 113 S.Ct. 2485 (distinguishing McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 487, 111 S.Ct. 888,112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991)).
The practical consequence of the dissent’s ripeness argument is a judicially created exemption for the IRS from suit under the APA. There may be good policy reasons to exempt IRS action from judicial review. Revenue protection is one. See Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 104-05, 124 S.Ct. 2276. But Congress has not made that call. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(l)(A)-(H) (stating exceptions to the APA’s definition of “agency”); Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 105, 124 S.Ct. 2276 (“Nowhere does the legislative history announce a sweeping congressional direction to prevent ‘federal-court interference with all aspects of state tax administration.’ ”); Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 289 (D.C.Cir.1991) (concluding, based on the legislative history of the APA, Congress “wanted to avoid a formalistic definition of ‘agency’ ”). And we are in no position to usurp that choice on the basis of ripeness. Cf. Mayo Found, for Med. Educ. & Res. v. United States, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 704, 713, 178 L.Ed.2d 588 (2011) (noting in the context of tax regulations “the importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial review of administrative action”) (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154, 119 S.Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999)).
V
The litigation position of the IRS throughout the history of the excise tax has been startling. But the taxpayers’ response to Notice 2006-50 is not so shocking. After conceding the excise tax was collected illegally, the Service set up a virtual obstacle course for taxpayers to get their money back.
This suit is not about the excise tax, its assessment, or its illegal collection. Nor is it about the money owed the taxpayers. This suit is about the obstacle course, and the decisions made by the IRS while setting it up. As a result, we have federal question jurisdiction, and neither the AIA nor the DJA provide a limitation on our exercise of it. Because Appellants have no other adequate remedy at law, the district court should consider the merits of their APA claim on remand.
So ordered.
. The panel decision, Cohen v. United States, 578 F.3d 1, 3-4 (D.C.Cir.2009), sets out much of the relevant factual and procedural background of this case. We draw, often verbatim, from that decision in summarizing the background here.
. The IRS modified Notice 2006-50 on January 29, 2007. See I.R.S. Notice 2007-11, 2007-1 C.B. 405 ("Notice 2007-11”).
. The IRS promulgated a different procedure for business entities (as opposed to individuals) seeking an excise tax refund. See Notice 2007-11. Entities could use the "Business and Nonprofit Estimation Method” formula to calculate their refund, or gather all their phone records during the refund period instead. See id. § 12.
. Notice 2006-50 ultimately proved an ineffective means of refunding the excise tax. According to a report issued by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, the IRS illegally collected approximately $8 billion between February 28, 2003, and August 1, 2006. Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, Report No. 2007-30-178, Although Strong Efforts Were Made, a Significant Amount of the Telephone Excise Tax Over-collected From Individual Taxpayers May Never Be Refunded 6 (Sept. 26, 2007). But the IRS only refunded "just over half” that amount, id. at 5 n. 3, as only 1.7 percent of the 10 to 30 million eligible individuals without income tax filling obligations actually sought a refund. U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-07-695, Tax Administration: Telephone Excise Tax Refund Requests Are Fewer Than Projected And Have Had Minimal Impact On IRS Services 10 (2007).
. The three suits differ in one important respect. The Cohen plaintiffs separately filed a refund claim with the Service, which the district court dismissed as premature. Our panel decision affirmed the dismissal, Cohen, 578 F.3d 1, 14-15 (D.C.Cir.2009), and that claim is not at issue here.
. In Williams Packing, the Supreme Court recognized a narrow judicially created exception to the AIA’s prohibition on injunctive relief: when "it is clear that [1] under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail, the central purpose of the Act is inapplicable and ... [2] the attempted collection may be enjoined if equity jurisdiction otherwise exists.” Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 7, 82 S.Ct. 1125. South Carolina v. Regan provides a similar escape valve in the absence of an alternative remedy. 465 U.S. 367, 374, 104 S.Ct. 1107, 79 L.Ed.2d 372 (1984). Because we hold the AIA does not preclude Appellants’ claims, there is no need to inquire whether an exception to the AIA would apply if it did.
. The IRS argues Bob Jones, and its companion case Alexander v. “Americans United” Inc., support reading the AIA to preclude Appellants’ claims because neither “directly involved] assessment or collection.” This misconstrues the holding of Bob Jones and "Americans United." In both cases, the judicial relief requested would have impacted the litigants’ future tax liability because only 501(c)(3) organizations are exempt from FICA and FUTA taxes. Bob Jones, 416 U.S. at 727-28, 94 S.Ct. 2038. The Court emphasized this point in characterizing both Bob Jones and "Americans United” as pre-enforcement cases. Id. at 727, 94 S.Ct. 2038 ("This case and ["Americans United”] involve ... whether, prior to the assessment and collection of any tax, a court may enjoin the Service....”).
. Furthermore, because the AIA strips the court of its authority to issue injunctive relief, the IRS's proposed reading of "assessment and collection” would also preclude equitable relief in § 7422(a) proceedings (i.e. refund suits), since a refund claim may ultimately alter the amount of revenue the Treasury retains. This result, however, is at odds with the Service's subsequent argument that Appellants could obtain the relief they sought in a refund suit. Oral Arg. 41.
. Congress subsequently amended the AIA to preclude suits by third-party property holders. Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub.L. No. 89-719, § 110, 80 Stat. 1125, 1144.
. Section 704 "is not a jurisdiction-conferring statute." Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 183; see also Micei Int’l. v. Dep’t. of Commerce, 613 F.3d 1147, 1152 (D.C.Cir.2010); Oryszak v. Sullivan, 576 F.3d 522, 525 n. 2 (D.C.Cir. 2009).
. To clarify, although 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) grants concurrent jurisdiction to district courts and the Court of Federal Claims, the Code speaks of refund suits as those filed "under section 7422(a),” 26 U.S.C. § 6532, and "filed with the Secretary," id. § 7422(a).
. The dissent argues Appellants' "objectives” are monetary: “billions of dollars in additional refunds” and a "class-wide jackpot.” Diss. Op. at 737, 737-38. But this framing is misleading. Although Appellants may ultimately seek additional refunds if IRS Notice 2006-50 is invalidated and they succeed in substituting a more "effective” (and perhaps more fruitful) refund mechanism in its stead, Appellants' APA suit is a distinct part of their bifurcated litigation strategy. It offers no monetary relief, tax refund or otherwise. Furthermore, the IRS is no victim. And Appellants are not raiders in pursuit of an unwarranted windfall; they are aggrieved citizens in search of accountability.