(dissenting).
I agree with the majority that competing marks should be considered in their entirety, but respectfully suggest the emphasis here on the word “cultured” virtually nullifies that test and results in the tail wagging the dog.
It would be difficult to imagine two words in the trademark world more unlike than “Bemberg” and “Cotton.” They do not look alike, sound alike, or create the same impression. They differ in length and in spelling, with no letter of the alphabet in common. They differ in meaning and are used on different fabrics. How, then, can an ordinary word like “cultured” be endowed with such strength as to overcome the sharp differences between “Bemberg” and “Cotton,” and so dilute them as to create a likelihood of confusion where none could possibly have existed before? Although that question is vital to the issue here, there seems to be no unanimity as to exactly why such is the case. The examiner said the word was “fanciful and arbitrary;” the Assistant Commissioner said it was “an arbitrary use of an ordinary word;” the applicant strongly contends that it is descriptive, or at least highly suggestive; yet the majority does not say expressly what it is, but holds that appellant has not proved its contentions.
I find nothing in the definition of the word “culture”1 or its proposed use by appellant to support the unusual veto power accorded it. It is not a coined *440word, but one belonging in the public domain; as such its use should not be denied those in the • trademark world without sounder reasons than those advanced here. Indeed, in view of the sharp contrast between “Bemberg” and “Cotton” it is not unreasonable to suppose that denial of appellant’s application would vest in the prior registrant a virtual monopoly of the word “cultured,” at least in the textile field. In my opinion we are sorely underestimating the intelligence of the average purchaser in holding that concurrent use of the instant marks would be likely to result in confusion, especially since it is reasonable to assume that the average purchaser of the instant fabrics in the piece would be expected to exercise at least some degree of selectivity.
I would reverse.
MARTIN, J., concurs in dissent.