(dissenting).
On the undisputed facts I would hold that paragraph (3) of Section 2055(a) of Title 26 permits the deduction, and therefore I would not reach plaintiff’s alternative contentions that the bequest is also deductible under paragraph (2) of Section 2055(a) or exempted by the Treaty.
I
The general rule that a tax deduction is allowable only if specifically authorized in the Internal Revenue Code (e. g., New Colonial Ice Co., Inc. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440, 54 S.Ct. 788, 78 L.Ed. 1348 (1934)) does not dictate a niggardly construction of Section 2055 (a). The provisions, including 2055(a), permitting exemption or deduction of amounts allotted to charitable uses “were begotten from motives of public policy, and are not to be narrowly construed.” Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144, 151, 55 S.Ct. 17, 21, 79 L.Ed. 246 (1934); see, e. g., Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Estate of Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187, 190 n. 3, 75 S.Ct. 229, 99 L.Ed. 246 (1955); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 301 U.S. 379, 383, 384, 57 S.Ct. 813, 81 L.Ed. 1169 (1937); United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272, 285, 54 S.Ct. 389, 78 L.Ed. 793 (1934); Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U.S. 61, 63, 44 S.Ct. 293, 68 L.Ed. 564 (1924); Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, etc., 263 U.S. 578, 44 S.Ct. 204, 68 L.Ed. 458 (1924). By the same principle, “if a general charitable purpose is manifest within the limits of the language [of the will], a broad and liberal construction should be applied to that language and the gift upheld” as one intended for charitable ends. Estate of Boyles, 4 T.C. 1092, 1095 (1945); accord, Estate of Sells, 10 T.C. 692, 699 (1948); see Beggs v. United States, 27 F.Supp. 599, 89 Ct.Cl. 39 (1939); Marine Midland Trust Co. v. McGowan, 223 F.2d 408 (C.A. 2, 1955); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Burnet, 59 F.2d 922 (C.A. 8, 1932); Brown v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 50 F.2d 842 (C.A. 3, 1931); Michigan Trust Co. v. United States, 21 F.Supp. 482 (W.D. Mich.1937); Estate of Davis, 26 T.C. 549, 552 (1956); Estate of Gilbert, 4 T. C. 1006, 1010-1011 (1945). “In granting tax deductions for bequests of the type listed in [predecessor to Section *7322055(a) (2) and (3)], Congress could not have intended to encourage bequests for eleemosynary purposes only to have them defeated by narrow construction.” Hight v. United States, 256 F.2d 795, 802 (C.A. 2, 1958).
If Section 2055(a) (3) is considered alone, these two direction signals clearly point to the deductibility of the Wasserman bequest. The statutory paragraph permits the deduction of legacies “to a trustee or trustees * * * if such contributions or gifts are to be used by such trustee or trustees * * * exclusively for * * * charitable * * * purposes.” Each of these conditions is met here.
The first requirement is that the bequest be made to “a trustee or trustees.” It cannot be intended as an outright transfer, even if the recipient, because of some compulsion arising outside the will, applies the gift to a charitable purpose or transfers it to a charitable organization. See Estate of Lamson v. United States, 338 F.2d 376, 168 Ct.Cl. 33 (1964), and cases cited. Nor will mere precatory language suffice. See Delaney v. Gardner, 204 F.2d 855, 856-860 (C.A. 1, 1953); Augusta C. Burger, 12 B.T.A. 1391 (1928). The will must order the recipient to hold the contribution for, or apply it to, a charitable project.
The Wasserman will does, and was designed to do, just that. Although no trust instrument was executed and no formal trust relationship created, the will — particularly the phrase “to be used and expended for the benefit of”- — is couched in trust language manifesting the testator’s desire to designate the “Mayor & Magistratsraete” as trustees of the funds transferred. Neither the form of paragraph (3) nor any authority indicates that more is needed, or that there must be either an express designation of a trustee or the explicit creation of a trust. See In re Sage’s Estate, 122 F.2d 480, 484, 137 A.L.R. 658 (C.A. 3, 1941), cert. denied 314 U.S. 699, 62 S.Ct. 480, 86 L.Ed. 559 (1942); Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. United States, 159 F.Supp. 204, 205, 207, 208 (D.R.I.1958) ; Estate of Carlson, 21 T.C. 291, 292, 294 (1953); Estate of Sells, supra, 10 T.C. at 699; cf. Marine Midland Trust Co. v. McGowan, supra, 223 F.2d at 409. This position also accords with the general precepts of charitable trusts. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 351 (1959); IV Scott on Trusts § 351 (3d ed. 1967). In fact, Illinois, the state of the decedent's residence, appears to hold squarely that a disposition of this type creates a charitable trust. City of Aurora ex rel. Egan v. Y.M.C.A., 9 Ill.2d 286, 137 N.E.2d 347, 351 (1956) (a conveyance to the city of Aurora of land “to hold and use and permit the use for public purposes” held “to vest legal title in the city of Aurora upon an express trust to use the land for public purposes. Such a gift, when accepted, created a charitable trust with legal title in the city as trustee for the benefit of the public”).
Paragraph (3) further demands that the bequest be intended “exclusively for * * * charitable * * * purposes.” Applying that phrase, courts and administrators have allowed the deduction of legacies “for the beneficial usage of the citizens of Sharon and vicinity, without regard to what may be deemed legal or public charities within the contemplation of the laws of Pennsylvania” (Koehler v. Lewellyn, 44 F.2d 654 (W.D.Pa.1930)); “for civic purposes in the City of Houston” (Estate of Boyles, supra, 4 T.C. at 1095);1 “to secure a site and erect *733thereon such an auditorium as will * * * meet the requirements and needs of the residents and citizens of the city of M” to which the ownership of the building could be transferred (Sol. Op. 159, III-l Cum.Bull. 480, 481 (1924)); for “such benevolent purposes as, in their opinion, will constitute a fitting testimonial or memorial for me and, in some degree, extend my usefulness and helpfulness to others” (emphasis added) (St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Burnet, supra, 59 F.2d at 924); and for “such charitable, benevolent, religious or educational institutions as my exceutors hereinafter named may determine” (emphasis added) (Hight v. United States, supra, 256 F.2d at 797). Compare the deduction, as a bequest to a corporation organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes under the equivalent of Section 2055(a) (2), of a legacy to a body organized for “the promotion of practical benevolence in the city of New Haven” (emphasis added) (Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Eaton, 20 F.2d 419, 421 (D. Conn.1927)), as well as the deduction of gifts of trust income to two German cities “for charitable, educational and/or benevolent purposes” (emphasis added) (Schoellkopf v. United States, 124 F.2d 982, 985 (C.A. 2, 1942) (income tax deduction)). See, also, Holdeen v. Ratterree, 292 F.2d 338, 341 (C.A. 2, 1961).2
There is little doubt in my mind that Mr. Wasserman, in setting aside his residuary estate “for the benefit of said city of Fuerth,” wished to advantage the citizenry of that place — in other words, the legacy was “for the beneficial use of the citizens” of Fuerth, or for “civic purposes” in the city, or a project to “meet the requirements and needs of the residents and citizens of the city”, or for “benevolent” purposes. It is most unlikely that he would have been satisfied if the money had been used for some “political,” “proprietary,” or other noncharitable end. He did not merely give the money to the “Mayor & Magistratsraete” simpliciter, but added the phrase about “benefit”; his motivation was plainly philanthropic. Apparently responding to the decedent’s instruction, the city council has used the funds for an old peoples’ home, the most typical of charities. As the courts have held, this implementation of the gift is far from irrelevant in interpreting the will. See Beggs v. United States, 27 F.Supp. 599, 606-607, 89 Ct.Cl. 39, 53-55 (1939); Hight v. United States, supra, 256 F.2d at 798-799; St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Burnet, supra, 59 F.2d at 929; Eagan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 43 F.2d 881, 884, 71 A.L.R. 863 (C.A. 5, 1930).
Another significant sign of the charitable nature of this bequest is the law of Illinois — the jurisdiction which validates the will and determines what Fuerth may do with the gift. (The court’s opinion stresses the law in Bavaria, but Bavarian law could not authorize Fuerth to use the money for purposes which Illinois would not sanction under this will.) “[T]he law of his state, with reference to which the testator may be presumed to have made testamentary disposition of his property, is not without some force as indicating his intent and purpose.” St. *734Louis Union Trust Co. v. Burnet, supra, 59 F.2d at 927; see Hight v. United States, supra, 256 F.2d at 799. Illinois statute and case law indicates that “for the benefit of” would manifest an intent that the property be devoted to charitable purposes. The words “benevolent” and “beneficent” have been used together with “charitable” in tax exemption statutes (S.H.A. ch. 120, § 401 (1968) (state inheritance tax); S.H.A. ch. 120, § 500.7 (Supp.1968) (property tax)), and have been construed in this context as synonymous with “charitable”. People v. YMCA, 365 Ill. 118, 6 N.E.2d 166 (1936) ; Turnverein “Lincoln” v. Board of Appeals, 358 Ill. 135, 192 N.E. 780 (1934); People ex rel. Greer v. Thomas Walters Chapter of the Daughters of the American Revolution, 311 Ill. 304, 142 N.E. 566 (1924).3 There is likewise no doubt that under Illinois common law, the bequest here would be held to create a charitable trust. I have already noted City of Aurora ex rel. Egan v. Y.M.C.A., supra, 9 Ill.2d 286, 137 N.E.2d 347, 351 (1956), in which a conveyance to the city of Aurora of land “to hold and use and permit the use for public purposes” was held “to vest legal title in the city of Aurora upon an express trust to use the land for public purposes. Such a gift, when accepted, created a charitable trust with legal title in the city as trustee for the benefit of the public.” See, also, Dickenson v. City of Anna, 310 Ill. 222, 141 N.E. 754, 30 A.L.R. 587 (1923).
All this the court summarily brushes aside because of its underlying premise that the presence in the Internal Revenue Code of Section 2055(a) (1) requires the “exclusively for * * * charitable * * * purposes” standard of 2055 (a) (3) to be read and applied strictly, rather than liberally, where foreign governmental units are involved. It is thought that this approach is necessary in order to fulfill the Congressional aim not -to allow deductions for bequests to alien public entities which are not “exclusively charitable” in nature, though they may be for “public purposes”. The court does not adopt the position of Edwards v. Phillips, infra, 373 F.2d 6160(C.A. 10), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 834, 88 S.Ct. 38, 19 L.Ed.2d 94 (1967) — that 2055(a) (1) necessarily excludes from 2055(a) (3) all charitable bequests to foreign governmental organizations — but it does use 2055(a) (1) to look askance at gifts to such foreign bodies seeking coverage under (a) (3). As I see it, this basic concept, which pervades the majority’s treatment of this point, is quite mistaken and without support in the legislation or its history. When Congress authorized deductions in 2055(a) (3) only where the purposes were exclusively charitable, it obviously meant to bar those which were not exclusively charitable. Yet the courts have never taken this dichotomy as a reason for construing 2055(a) (3) narrowly in order to assure that all noncharitable bequests *735are left out; the rule and the practice, as I have pointed out, has been decidedly to the contrary. By the same token, there is no warrant for making a special case of 2055(a) (3), in the single instance where foreign governments are involved, simply because Congress may have indicated that certain activities of those governments were not to be covered by that subsection. Nothing in the legislative history or background suggests that under 2055(a) (3) bequests involving foreign public bodies are to be dealt with any differently than gifts involving American governmental entities or private trustees, individuals, or groups (foreign or domestic). For all of these categories alike, Congress wished to limit the deduction under 2055(a) (3) to charitable uses, and there is no intimation in the history of varying criteria for any of these subclasses, or of any hesitancy or caution as to the single group comprising foreign governmental units. See Part II, infra. All are treated on the same plane in the statute and its history.
For these reasons, I must conclude that, since the statutory term “exclusively for * * * charitable * * * purposes” covers a broad spectrum of projects benefiting a community and its members,4 a bequest “for the benefit of said city of Fuerth” meets that requirement of Section 2055(a) (3).5
II
The Government urges, however, that the scope of 2055(a) (3) is impliedly limited by 2055(a) (1), which allows the deduction of bequests “to or for the use of the United States, any State, Territory, any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, for exclusively public purposes.” The argument is that Congress, by treating only domestic political units in paragraph (1), must have intended to exclude from the whole of Section 2055(a) any bequest to or for the use of a foreign governmental body, even though the legacy was indisputably charitable and would otherwise come within one of the remaining clauses of the provision.
This precise issue was recently decided in the Government’s favor by the Tenth Circuit, which, finding “nothing outside the language of the statute that leads to resolution of the question,” held that “the venerable doctrine inclusio unius est exclusio alterius” compels the conclusion that “the language of subpart (1) of § 2055(a) does not allow a deduction from the gross estate for bequests to foreign governments or political subdivisions thereof.” Edwards v. Phillips, supra, 373 F.2d 616, 619 (C.A. 10), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 834, 88 S.Ct. 38, 19 L.Ed.2d 94 (1967).6 On the other hand, the Second *736Circuit, in an opinion not cited to the Tenth Circuit, earlier declined to apply the maximum when interpreting an income tax statute (Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 23(n), 45 Stat. 791, 801) substantially identical to Section 2055(a) (1) and (3), and held that gifts, other than “unrestricted gifts”, to foreign municipalities could be exempted under a provision like paragraph (3) of Section 2055(a). Schoellkopf v. United States, supra, 124 F.2d 982, 985 (C.A. 2, 1942) (per Judge Learned Hand).
As taxpayer readily admits, and Schoellkopf held, expressio unius would obviously exclude bequests to foreign governments from the coverage of paragraph (1) itself. Cf. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 375-376, 78 S.Ct. 352, 2 L.Ed.2d 340 (1958). But to use the doctrine to evoke a negative implication from that part of the statute in order to narrow the broad reach of paragraph (3) is quite another matter. The canon, like the other aids to construction, is but “an axiom of experience” (Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48, 49 S.Ct. 52, 73 L.Ed. 170 (1928); Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum.L.Rev. 527, 544 (1947)), and experience counsels, where “differing views may readily be entertained”, to “seiz[e] every thing from which aid can be derived” (Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 392 U.S. 206, 212, 88 S.Ct. 1970, 1974, 20 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1968)), rather than to look mechanically to one “rule” alone. Cf. Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 206, 48 S.Ct. 480, 72 L.Ed. 845 (1928) ; Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 677-678, 55 S.Ct. 595, 79 L.Ed. 1110 (1935); Neuberger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 311 U.S. 83, 88, 61 S.Ct. 97, 85 L.Ed. 58 (1940); Sims v. United States, 359 U.S. 108,111-113, 79 S.Ct. 641, 3 L.Ed.2d 667 (1959); United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 486-489, 80 S.Ct. 884, 4 L.Ed.2d 903 (1960).
We are particularly told that “ ‘great caution is requisite in dealing with’ ” expressio unius; that “‘[i]t is often a valuable servant, but a dangerous master to follow in the construction of statutes’”; and that “‘[t]he exclusio is often the result of inadvertence or accident’ * * * ” Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 612, 47 S.Ct. 531, 537, 71 L.Ed. 793 (1927). In this light, the Supreme Court has said, quite precisely, that the “maxim properly applies only when in the natural association of ideas in the mind of the reader that which is expressed is so set over by way of strong contrast to that which is omitted that the contrast enforces the affirmative inference that that which is omitted must be intended to have opposite and contrary treatment.” Id. at 611, 47 S.Ct. at 537.
Looking to the terms, purpose, and history of this charitable deduction, I do not find it natural to infer that Congress intended to cut off all bequests to foreign governmental bodies simply because it dealt specifically with the domestic variety. Aside from the disputed inference to be drawn from 2055(a) (1), there is not the slightest indication, so far as I know, that Congress wanted to exclude legacies to foreign governments from the coverage of 2055(a) (3) if the bequest satisfied the requirements of that paragraph.7 It has been suggested that perhaps Congress did not want to encourage gifts to foreign governments because the legacy might be used for purposes inimical to the interests of the United States. The Tenth Circuit rejected that contention as unsubstantiated in fact (Edwards v. Phillips, supra, 373 F.2d at 619), and I agree. Not only might bequests to foreign governments *737be potentially more beneficial than detrimental to American concerns (cf. Eaton, Charitable Foundations Making Grants Abroad, 17 Tax L.Rev. 41, 74-75 (1961), and authorities cited), but, had that been Congress' fear, it would probably have barred the deduction of all bequests for foreign beneficiaries— which it did not do.8
Nor is the mere existence of Section 12055(a) (1) enough of a ground for inferring that foreign public entities cannot come under the broad language of Section 2055(a) (3). There is no real clue as to why Congress singled out American political organizations, but one can readily think of reasons unconnected with an intent to exclude alien bodies entirely from any part of Section 2055 (a). Perhaps Congress wished to offset the possibility that paragraph (2) — dealing with gifts to religious, charitable, etc. “corporations” — might be interpreted, as New York had read its comparable inheritance tax provision, to exclude political bodies. See United States v. Perkins, supra, n. 2, 163 U.S. at 630-631, 16 S.Ct. 1073. Perhaps Congress felt that bequests to domestic governmental units were especially desirable and wished to encourage them. It is conceivable, of course, that the draftsmen thought that gifts to political subdivisions could not come under either paragraph (2) or paragraph (3) at all — -but of this there is no inkling anywhere in the history. It is at least as plausible that Congress desired to allow gifts to domestic political entities unencumbered by the various limitations imposed on gifts coming under the other two clauses of Section 2055(a).
Indeed, it might have been harder to deny that Section 2055(a) (1), in itself, blankets the whole subject of bequests to governmental bodies — both domestic and alien — if all gifts to American governments deductible under that provision would also be covered by my reading of paragraph (3). If that were so, the former would be entirely superfluous and redundant. But 2055(a) (1) permits legacies to domestic political units “for exclusively public purposes”, while 2055 (a) (3) specifies that the bequest must be made “exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals”, and also prohibits use for substantial propaganda and lobbying activities. Some bequests deductible under paragraph (1) as intended for “public purposes” might not be deductible under the different requirements of paragraph (3) — for example, a con*738tribution for the municipal bus system, for election expenses, or for lobbying at the state or federal level for increased grants to a municipality or for home rule. Compare Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 373, comment c, and 374, comment k, at 256, 260-61 (1959) (indicating that, for some purposes, such expenses might be considered “charitable”). Certainly the express proscription of lobbying and propaganda activities would take from the ambit of 2055 (a) (3) at least one class of gifts within 2055(a) (1). Further, and the Second Circuit noted this possibility in Schoellkopf v. United States, supra, 124 F.2d at 985, an outright bequest to be placed directly in an American city’s coffers might be deductible under 2055(a) (1) but not under 2055(a) (3).9 Conversely, if paragraph (1) had been omitted, many but not all gifts to governmental bodies, both American and foreign, could have been made under paragraph (3) through a trust arrangement. Thus, even for domestic governmental units, there is an imperfect correlation between the two segments of Section 2055(a), with substantial though partial overlap. Paragraph (1) may be the main vehicle but it is not exclusive; the remaining portions of the statute have substantial functions.10
Without reliable support for the application of expressio unius in the history or ordering of the statute, I am very reluctant to give Section 2055(a) a construction that seems so at odds with its undisputed purpose of encouraging charitable bequests. Cf. S. E. C. v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-351, 64 S.Ct. 120, 88 L.Ed. 88 (1943); United States v. Barnes, 222 U.S. 513, 518-520, 32 S.Ct. 117, 56 L.Ed. 291 (1912); Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 196 U.S. 1, 14-17, 25 S.Ct. 158, 49 L.Ed. 363 (1904); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458-459, 12 S.Ct. 511, 36 L.Ed. 226 (1892). Wholesale exclusion from Section 2055 (a) of bequests to foreign governments is not a “natural association of ideas” (Ford v. United States, supra, 273 U.S. at 611, 47 S.Ct. 531) in a statute that, through the use of broad and overlapping phraseology, is clearly designed to authorize the deduction of a very wide range of bequests for humanitarian purposes. I think, rather, that, if the attention of Congress had been focused on the problem, it would not have indicated that gifts such as this were non-deductible.11
*739I must therefore disagree with Edwards v. Phillips, supra, and follow instead the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Sehoellkopf v. United States, supra.12 In my view, the Tenth Circuit — which premised its opinion on the rule that a deduction must be specifically provided for, without referring to the equally pertinent principle that provisions for charitable bequests must be liberally construed —gave Section 2055(a) an unnecessarily restrictive reading. Of course, the rule of liberal construction does not mean that the words of the statute are to be given “unusual or tortured meanings” or that “express limitations on such exemptions are to be ignored.” Better Business Bureau v. United States, supra, 326 U.S. at 283, 66 S.Ct. at 114 (1945). But Section 2055(a) (3) seems, without stretching its language, fairly applicable to the Wasserman bequest, and I am unwilling to shrink it by a hypothetical negative implication from paragraph (1) that is not sustained by the legislative history or purpose, or by the structure of the section as a whole.
Accordingly, I would deny defendant’s motion for summary judgment, grant plaintiff’s motion, and enter judgment that plaintiff is entitled to recover.
LARAMORE and NICHOLS, JJ., join in the foregoing dissenting opinion.
. The defendant’s contention that the charitable nature of the bequest was not at issue in Boyles is refuted by the Tax Court’s statement that the “issue thus turns on whether the term ‘civic purposes in the City of Houston’ is susceptible of a public or charitable use” and its conclusion that the bequest “was clearly charitable in nature.” 4 T.C. at 1096. The court’s reference to “public” use may have been intended to indicate that the bequest was deductible under the 1939 Code equivalent of 2055 (a) (1), as well as the equivalent of 2055(a) (3).
. Estate of Slayton, 3 B.T.A. 1343 (1926), has no bearing on the applicability of Section 2055(a) (3). The Board of Tax Appeals held that a gift to a city of an organ and a trust fund for its maintenance, as a memorial and “to encourage musical education in the community”, was not deductible under the then income tax equivalent of Section 2055(a) (2) because “a municipal corporation is not a corporation organized and operated exclusively for * * * charitable * * * or educational purposes.” 3 B.T.A. at 1346. That statute (Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 214(a) (11), 40 Stat. 1057, 1068 (1919)) had no parallel to paragraphs (1) or (3) of Section 2055(a), and the Board, therefore, had no opportunity to • decide whether the city could be considered the trustee of a bequest to be used exclusively for charitable purposes. Similarly, United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625, 630-631, 16 S.Ct. 1073, 41 L.Ed. 287 (1896), held that the United States did not qualify as a corporation “exempt by law from taxation” under the New York inheritance tax act; the decision turned on that particular state law and does not, in any event, affect 2055(a) (3).
. See, especially, Smith-Hurl Illinois Annotated Statutes, ch. 23, § 4001 (1968), authorizing the State of Illinois to accept gifts of property to it and its institutions. Entitled “Effect of gift to state for charitable use,” it provides: “Whenever any grant, gift, donation, devise, or' bequest of real or personal property has been or shall be * * * made to or for the use of the state * * * or other charitable or educational institution of the state, and the deed, will or other instrument by which such grant, gift, donation, devise or bequest is made, declares that such property shall be held, managed, improved and invested or otherwise disposed of for the benefit of such institution or other charitable use, the title to such property may and shall be taken to be vested in the state for the use so expressed, and shall be held * * * by the trustees of such institution or other officers thereto duly authorized, in such manner as will best promote and carry into effect the purpose and intention of the person making such grant, gift, donation, devise or bequest, as expressed in the instrument by which the same was or shall be so made” (emphasis added). It appears from this statute that the language of the Wasserman will would have been an appropriate form of transferring this bequest to certain governmental instrumentalities for a charitable use in Illinois.
. Though possibly not every use that might be called a “public purpose.” See the discussion of Section 2055(a) (1), Part II, infra.
. Paragraph (3) also requires that the trustees not carry on substantial propaganda and lobbying activities. The defendant does not dispute the affidavit of the mayor (who was also the former legal adviser) of Fuerth that neither the city nor its officials engage in such activities.
Whether the City of Fuerth qualifies, under Section 2055(a) (2), as a “corporation organized and operated exclusively for * * * charitable * * * purposes” is irrelevant in determining the application of 2055(a) (3). See Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. United States, 159 F.Supp. 204, 208 (D.R.I.1958); Estate of Audenried, 26 T.C. 120, 126 (1956). However, it is relevant to our problem that, even as to (a) (2), the courts have not read “exclusively” strictly to mean “without any exceptions”, but rather that the nonconforming activities be no more than incidental in nature. Dulles v. Johnson, 273 F.2d 362, 363 (C.A.2, 1959) cert. denied, 364 U.S. 834, 81 S.Ct. 54, 5 L.Ed.2d 60 (1960); see Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283, 66 S.Ct. 112, 90 L.Ed. 67 (1945); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d 427, 431-432 (C.A.8, 1967).
. The bequest in Edwards was to a Danish school district “To be used by said school district in any manner it may wish for the betterment of the schools or aid to the students of said district.” 373 F.2d at 617. The parties stipulated that the school district was a Danish *736political subdivision. The court did not reach the question of whether the school district was also a trustee under paragraph (3) or a charitable corporation under paragraph (2).
. The charitable-bequest deduction of the estate tax was first enacted in the Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 403(a) (3), 40 Stat. 1057, 1098 (1919), and has been carried forward with no substantial amendments (for present purposes).
. The current income tnx provisions are quite different. For either an individual or a corporation, the recipient trust must be organized or created in, or under the laws of, the United States, a state, or a United States possession. However, only a corporate gift must be for use within the United States or its possessions. See Int.Rev.Code of 1954, § 170 (c) (2). These restrictions evolved from the provision permitting, for the first time, a deduction by a corporation for charitable donations. Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 829, § 102(c), 49 Stat 1014, 1016; Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 23 (q), 49 Stat. 1648, 1661. The “domestic organization” restriction on contributions by individuals was inserted by the Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 23(o), 52 Stat. 447, 463, and was changed to what is essentially its present form by the Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 247, § 224(a), 53 Stat. 862, 880. The House Report accompanying the 1938 Act states that the exemption “is based upon the theory that the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden [s] which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare. The United States derives no such benefit from gifts to foreign institutions, and the proposed limitation is consistent with the above theory.” H.R.Rep. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938), reprinted in 1939-1 Cum.Bull. 728, 742. See generally Eaton, supra, 17 Tax.L.Rev. at 42-46. Congress never placed similar restrictions on the estate tax deduction, a point which the regulations mention. See Treas.Reg. § 20.2055 — 1(a) (1958). It is also significant that, even with respect to the limitation in the income tax provision, Congress expressed no concern over the possibility that a bequest to a foreign organization might be used for a purpose adverse to American interests.
. Schoellkopf excepted “unrestricted gifts” from a provision equivalent to 2055(a) (3). Probably this was meant to cover an outright gift (i. e., not through a trustee), but it may have been aimed at designating a gift not necessarily devoted to charitable purposes (i. e., a gift covering “political” or “proprietary” purposes). In either event, the boundaries of paragraph (1) would not be the same as those of paragraph (3) with respect to bequests to domestic governmental organizations. The former would have broader coverage.
. Prom other aspects of Section 2055 (a) it is. also plain that expressio unius cannot be applied rigorously. Paragraph (2), for instance, explicitly allows deduction of gifts to corporations organized and operated for the “encouragement of art.” Paragraph (3) makes no reference to that subject. Expressio unius could therefore be invoked to deny a deduction for a bequest in trust for the encouragement of the arts. This does not seem at all consonant with Congress’ intent, and in Estate of Kirkwood, 23 B.T.A. 955, 965 (1931), the Board of Tax Appeals, without hesitation, permitted the deduction of a bequest which, through a trustee, was to be used for an art gallery and the purchase of works of art.
. The defendant invokes another time-honored “rule” of construction — that the “general language of a statutory provision * * * will not be held to apply to a matter specifically dealt with in another part of the same enactment.” The defect in this argument is the same as that which besets the application of expressio unius. Section 2055(a) (1) does not specifically deal with bequests to or for the use of foreign political units, and the relevance of the “general-specific” rule must rest on the assumption that Congress, by omitting reference to bequests to such bodies from paragraph (1), intended to exclude them from coverage under any part of 2055 (a). As pointed out in the text, I cannot accept that assumption.
. In Schoellkopf the gift was explicitly in trust, but I have already expressed the view, in the first half of this opinion, that the present decedent’s bequest must likewise be viewed as in trust, falling under Section 2055(a) (3). The majority agrees that the bequest was in trust.