The action in the District Court was brought under the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
Plaintiff’s (Dewey’s) claim was that he was wrongfully discharged by his employer, the defendant, Reynolds Metals Company (Reynolds), because of his religious beliefs, and he prayed for reinstatement with back pay.
Prior to bringing the action, Dewey filed grievances with Reynolds on the identical claim set forth in his complaint, under the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement entered into by Reynolds with Local 277, United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Workers of America, AFL-CIO (UAW), which was the bargaining representative of Reynolds’ employees. Dewey was a member of UAW. The grievances were processed and resulted in their submission to a mutually agreeable arbitrator, who made an award denying them on June 29, 1967.
Contemporaneously with the submission of the grievances, Dewey made application to the Michigan Civil Rights Commission for issuance of a complaint against Reynolds, alleging discrimination on account of his religious beliefs.
The following is a Summary of Findings and Order of Dismissal, entered by the Commission on December 13, 1966:
“The findings indicate that the claimant, despite due notice of overtime requirements by the company and the applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement provisions, continued to refuse to perform scheduled overtime work on Sundays and took the position that his right to continued employment while following his religious belief without interference was an absolute right.
“The Commission has previously ruled that where the normal work week and foreseeable overtime requirements are prescribed in a Collective Bargaining Agreement, that absent or (sic) intent on the part of respondent to discriminate on religious grounds, an employee is not entitled to demand any alteration in such requirement to accommodate his religious beliefs.
“The investigation did not reveal any intent on the part of the respondent to discriminate on religious grounds and it is, therefore, recommended that this application for the issuance of a complaint be denied for lack of probable cause.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
“The Commission has found insufficient grounds on which to issue a Complaint and, therefore, the above Application is herewith denied. This Order of Dismissal shall automatically become effective within 15 days from the date of mailing unless the Claimant shall demand a hearing prior thereto.” (App. 93a-94a)
Dewey requested the United States Office of Federal Contract Compliance to review his charges of religious discrimination, and that office found no basis for a charge of discrimination.
On January 4, 1967, Dewey filed a charge with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), claiming religious discrimination. The Commission, on January 5, 1967, contrary to the recommendation of its Regional Director that the Commission find no probable cause, determined that there was reasonable cause to believe that Reynolds had engaged in unlawful employment practices and authorized the bringing of the present action in the District Court. Reynolds moved for dismissal of the complaint filed in the District Court on the grounds that the arbitrator’s award was a final adjudication of the grievances and that they could not be relitigated. The District Judge, in a memorandum opinion, denied the motion to dismiss. 291 F.Supp. 786 (W.D.Mich.1968).
Reynolds then answered, denying it discriminated against Dewey on account of his religion and pleaded provisions of the collective bargaining agreement which required employees to perform all straight time and overtime work required of them by the company. Reynolds fur*328ther alleged that Dewey refused to perform overtime work on Sundays or to arrange for another qualified employee to replace him, basing his refusal on his religious convictions. Reynolds, after giving warnings and a three-days' layoff, finally discharged Dewey under its plant rules for his continued refusal to comply with the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
The parties stipulated the facts and the ease was tried by the Court without a jury. In a memorandum opinion, the District Judge ruled in favor of Dewey. He ordered Reynolds to reinstate Dewey with back pay and enjoined Reynolds from requiring Dewey to work on Sundays. 300 F.Supp. 709 (W.D.Mieh.1969). The District Court refused to stay ex-, ecution on the reinstatement pending appeal, and required Reynolds to post a $15,000-bond to stay execution on the judgment of $7,286.92 for back pay. 304 F.Supp. 1116 (W.D.Mich.1969). Reynolds appealed. We reverse.
The applicable statute is 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), which provides as follows:
“(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; * *
The legislative history of the statute is clear that it was aimed only at discriminating practices. Congressional Record, Yol. 110, pages 13079-13080, June 9, 1964.
. In order to prove a violation of the Act it was incumbent on Dewey to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his employer discriminated-against him on account of his religion. In 1964 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News, page 2515, it is stated:
“A substantial number of committee members, however, preferred that the ultimate determination of discrimination rest with the Federal judiciary. * * * jn addition, we believe that the employer or labor union will have a fairer forum to establish innocence since a trial de novo is required in district court proceedings together with the necessity of the Commission proving discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.”
On page 2516 it is stated:
“Similarly, management prerogatives, and union freedoms are to be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible. Internal affairs of employers and labor organizations must not be interfered with except to the limited extent that correction is required in discrimination practices.”
Reference to the collective bargaining agreement indicates rather clearly that the provisions with respect to straight time and overtime work apply to all employees equally and do not discriminate against Dewey or any other employee.
Reynolds operated a “job type” plant, producing, on order, aluminum extrusions and billets. It was necessary therefore for production to be scheduled to meet delivery dates provided for in contracts with customers.
Prior to the 1960 collective bargaining agreement, overtime was performed by employees on a voluntary basis. As a result thereof, with an increase in orders it became impossible to schedule production on Saturdays and Sundays. In order to remedy this difficulty, Reynolds negotiated with UAW the 1960 and 1965 collective bargaining agreements which provided that the company had the right to set straight time and overtime schedules and the employees were obligated to work such schedules unless they had a substantial and justifiable reason for not doing so. The 1965 agreement provided:
“All employees shall be obligated to perform all straight time and overtime work required of them by the Company except when an employee has a substantial and justifiable reason for not working; provided, however, that no employee shall be required to work *329more than twelve (12) continuous hours without his consent.”
The agreement provided time and one-half for work on Saturdays and double time for work on Sundays.
The agreement further provided that overtime work shall be divided as equally as possible. If more employees are needed they are assigned in the inverse order of their seniority. Reynolds also issued an interpretation that any employee assigned to overtime could be relieved from the assignment simply by arranging for another qualified employee to replace him. This system was used extensively.
Dewey had been employed by Reynolds in various capacities since 1951, and at the time of his discharge, on September 12,1966, was a die repairman. Since 1961 Dewey has been a member of Faith Reformed Church. He never volunteered for overtime work on Sunday after joining the church, although he did volunteer for other days.
Dewey was scheduled to work on Sunday, November 21, 1965. He refused to work because of his religious beliefs. He was given a warning and informed as to the necessity of a seven-day operation and was advised that a repetition would lead to disciplinary action under Plant Rule 11, which prohibits “absence from work without reasonable cause,” and provides a three-offense progression of punishment with discharge for the third offense.
Between January and August, 1966, Dewey was scheduled to work on five Sundays. He obtained replacements as provided in the contract. On August 28, 1966, he was scheduled again to work on Sunday, and he not only refused to work but also refused to obtain a replacement on the ground of his religious beliefs. The arbitrator found:
“(Dewey, it will be recalled, accelerated his disciplinary timetable by telling Zagman [a fellow employee] not to serve as a replacement any more.)”
On September 4, 1966, Dewey refused to work or to obtain a replacement. He was given a written warning and a disciplinary layoff of three days. Again he refused to work or to obtain a replacement on September 11 1966, and was discharged for violation of Plant Rule 11.
We find nothing discriminatory in the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement or in the manner in which Reynolds executed it. In our opinion, it provided a fair and equitable method- of distributing the heavy workload among the employees without discrimination against any of them.
The District Judge found that the compulsory overtime provision of the collective bargaining agreement “is not discriminatory on its face.” We agree. However, he said this is only the first step. He found it was discriminatory in its impact. We disagree. He relied on Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) ; but this case involved state, and not private action.
In reaching his decision that the collective bargaining agreement discriminated against Dewey, the District Judge applied retroactively Regulation 1605.1, adopted by EEOC effective July 10, 1967, which was nearly ten months after Dewey had been discharged and after the arbitrator and the Michigan Civil Rights Commission had rejected Dewey’s charges.
In our opinion, it would have been more appropriate for the District Court to have applied the EEOC Regulation 1605.1 which was in force at the time of Dewey’s discharge, and which became effective June 15, 1966.
The 1966 regulation contained the following provisions which restricted any obligation upon the part of the employer to accommodate to the reasonable religious needs of his employees:
Section 1605.1(a):
“(3) However, the Commission believes that an employer is free under Title VII to establish a normal work week (including paid holidays) generally applicable to all employees, notwithstanding that this schedule may *330not operate with uniformity in its effect upon the religious observances of his employees. For example, an employer who is closed for business on Sunday does not discriminate merely because he requires that all his employees be available for work on Saturday."
Section 1605.1(b):
"(3) The employer may prescribe the normal work week and foreseeable overtime requirements, and, absent an intent on the part of the employer to. discriminate on religious grounds, a job applicant or employee who accepted the job knowing or having reason to believe that such requirements would conflict with his religious obligations is not entitled to demand any alterations in such requirements to accommodate his religious needs.”
. The 1967 regulation, retroactively applied by the District Court, omitted the above quoted language and other material parts of the 1966 regulation, and instead of providing definite guidelines for the assistance of employers who might be affected, left the matter largely on an ad hoc basis for the decision of the Commission on the particular facts of each case.
It is clear that Reynolds complied with the 1966 regulation. The obligations contained in the collective bargaining contract, which were lawful under the regulations of EEOC then in effect, ought not to be impaired by the application of a subsequently passed inconsistent regulation.
The District Judge took into account his ex post facto application of the 1967 EEOC regulation by starting Dewey’s back pay from August 1, 1967, instead of from the date of his discharge, holding that this date was a reasonable time after the 1967 regulation became effective for the company to work out accommodation to it. The trouble with this treatment is that Dewey was no longer in the employ of Reynolds. Having a lawful right at the time to discharge Dewey under the 1966 regulations, Reynolds ought not to be required to reemploy him at a later date and pay his back salary merely because EEOC decided to change the rule by adopting new, inconsistent regulations. The rights of Dewey and Reynolds were governed by the law in effect at the time of the discharge. EEOC could not affect these rights by subsequently adopting a new regulation.
The Act further provides:
“No order of the court shall require * * * the hiring, reinstatement or promotion of an individual employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual * * * was suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex or national origin or in violation of section 2000e~ 3(a) of this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
The reason for Dewey’s discharge was not discrimination on account of his religion; it was because he violated the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement entered into by his union with his employer, which provisions were applicable equally to all employees. The violation consisted not only of his refusing to work on Sundays, but also his refusing to arrange for a replacement, which was an alternate procedure. He did arrange for five replacements, but later refused even to do this, claiming that it was a sin. He apparently did not regard it as sinful for him to collect wages from an employer who was compelled to schedule overtime production in order to meet its contractual commitments and eventually meet its payroll.
To accede to Dewey’s demands would require Reynolds to discriminate against its other employees by requiring them to work on Sundays in the place of Dewey, thereby relieving Dewey of his contractual obligation. This would constitute unequal administration of the collective bargaining agreement among the employees, and could create chaotic personnel problems and lead to grievances and additional arbitrations. The practice of permitting the employee, rather than *331the employer, to secure the replacement served to insulate the employer against any charge of unequal naming of replacements.
But even if the 1967 regulations are applied, we think that Reynolds complied with Section 1605.1(b) thereof by making a reasonable accommodation to the religious needs of its employees when it permitted Dewey, by the replacement system, to observe Sunday as his Sabbath.1 He stubbornly refused to exercise this privilege. The finding of the District Court that Reynolds did not make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of Dewey is not supported by substantial evidence and is clearly erroneous. Rule 52(a) Fed.R.Civ.P.
The District Court referred to the inalienable right of freedom of religion, which he said is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution and the Civil Rights Act. The employer did not question Dewey’s right to freedom of religion; Reynolds did question Dewey’s right to practice his religious beliefs on it and to interfere with the operation of its plant.
An additional defense is provided in the first sentence of 42 U.S..C. § 2000e-5 (g), which provides:
“If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include reinstatement or hiring o,f employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice).”
This section of the statute requires a finding that the employer has intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice before the court may award relief. Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F.Supp. 338, 341 (D.Ore.1969).
It can hardly be said that Reynolds intentionally violated the Act when no discrimination was found by either the Michigan Civil Rights Commission, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance, the arbitrator chosen by agreement of the parties, or the Regional Director of the EEOC in Cleveland. In addition, in order to support his finding of an unlawful employment practice, the District Judge had to apply regulations adopted subsequent to the employee’s discharge and ignore those in force at the time the alleged violation took place. The finding of the District Court that there was an intentional violation of the Act is not supported by substantial evidence and is clearly erroneous. Rule 52(a) Fed.R.Civ. P.
Effect of the Arbitration
It is clear that if the arbitrator of the grievances had granted an award to Dewey, instead of to Reynolds, the award would have been final, binding and conclusive on Reynolds. Reynolds would not have been permitted to relitigate the award in the courts. This is the teaching of the United Steelworkers trilogy, which clearly defined the respective functions of the courts and the arbitrator. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 to 602, 80 S.Ct. 1343, to 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 to 1408, 363 U.S. 574 to 592, 80 S.Ct. 1347 to 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 to 1423, 363 U.S. 593 to 602, 80 S.Ct. 1358 to 1363, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 to 1431 (1960); Washington v. Aerojet-General Corp., 282 F.Supp. 517 (C.D.Cal., 1968).
*332In Steelworkers, the Court said:
“When the judiciary undertakes to determine the merits of a grievance under the guise of interpreting the grievance procedure of collective bargaining agreements, it usurps a function which under that regime is entrusted to the arbitration tribunal.”
(Id. at 569, 80 S.Ct. at 1347)
The arbitrator had jurisdiction to determine the grievances. The arbitration involved an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement with respect to Dewey’s claims that he had been laid off and discharged because of his religious beliefs. In arbitration proceedings, frequently questions of law and fact are resolved by the arbitrator. Where the grievances are based on an alleged civil rights violation, and the parties consent to arbitration by a mutually agreeable arbitrator, in our judgment the arbitrator has a right to finally determine them. Any other construction would bring about the result present in the instant case, namely, that the employer, but not the employee, is bound by the arbitration.
This result could sound the death knell to arbitration of labor disputes, which has been so usefully employed in their settlement. Employers would not be inclined to agree to arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements if they provide only a one-way street, i. e., that the awards are binding on them but not on their employees.
The tremendous increase in civil rights litigation leads one to the belief that the Act will be used more frequently in labor disputes. Such use ought not to destroy the efficacy of arbitration.
In the supplemental brief of EEOC as amicus curiae, the ease of Smith v. Evening News Ass’n, 371 U.S. 195, 197-198, 83 S.Ct. 267, 9 L.Ed.2d 246 (1962), is cited for the proposition that “the complainant is not required to elect between his contractual rights or his statutory rights but may seek to vindicate his claim in contractual and statutory proceedings.” (EEOC Supp. Brief, p. 3) The writer of the brief neglected to state that the collective bargaining agreement in Evening News contained no grievance arbitration procedure which had to be exhausted before recourse could be had to the courts. 371 U.S. 196, fn 1, 83 S.Ct. 267.
The question in our case is not whether arbitration and resort to the courts could be maintained at the same time; rather our case involves the question whether suit may be brought in court after the grievance has been finally adjudicated by arbitration.
We see no good analogy between jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board and that of EEOC. The Labor Board has adjudicatory powers over unfair labor practices, subject only to judicial review. Orders of the Board may be vacated on review only when they are not supported by substantial evidence upon consideration of the record as a whole. EEOC, on the other hand, has no such power. The District Court considers EEOC cases de novo. The legislative history, from which we have previously quoted, indicates the reason for the difference.
Nor do we find any national policy for ousting arbitrators of jurisdiction to finally determine grievances initiated by employees, based on alleged violation of their civil rights.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the cause is remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint.
. It should be observed that it is regulation 1605.1(b) and not the statute (§ 2000e-2 (a)) that requires an employer to make reasonable accommodation to the religious needs of its employees. As we have pointed out, the gravamen of an offense under the statute is only discrimination. The authority of EEOC to adopt a regulation interfering with the internal affairs of an employer, absent discrimination, may well be doubted.