NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 23a0357n.06
Case No. 22-5452
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
Aug 04, 2023
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v. ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
SHAWN CHRISTOPHER WRIGHT, )
Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION
)
Before: COLE, READLER, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
DAVIS, Circuit Judge. In 2019, authorities discovered firearms and drugs in Shawn
Wright’s truck. Wright was charged in a federal indictment with being a felon in possession of
firearms and ammunition and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. He pleaded
guilty to both charges.
At sentencing, Wright and the government disputed whether he was a “career offender”
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. If deemed a career offender, Wright’s Guidelines
range would increase by over five years. Wright argued that his earlier conviction for second-
degree assault under Kentucky law was not a predicate offense for career-offender status because
it was not a “crime of violence” as defined in the Guidelines. More specifically, Wright claimed
that because Kentucky’s second-degree-assault statute was indivisible and criminalized
“wanton[]” conduct, it did not satisfy the “elements” clause of the “crime of violence” definition.
Case No. 22-5452, United States v. Wright
The district court disagreed. It concluded that the assault conviction was a crime of violence, that
Wright had the necessary career-offender predicates, and that the Guidelines range would be
enhanced accordingly. The district court sentenced Wright to the bottom of that enhanced range,
188 months’ imprisonment. In doing so, the court noted that even if Wright did not have the
requisite predicates for the career-offender designation, it would impose the same sentence because
it deemed him a “de facto” career offender.
Wright appeals. As explained below, regardless of whether his second-degree assault
conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause, Wright has not shown that
the district court’s alternate basis for imposing a 188-month sentence was unreasonable.
Therefore, we AFFIRM on that basis alone.
I.
In November 2019, a sheriff’s deputy was dispatched to a residence in Harrogate,
Tennessee to investigate a possible burglary. Upon arrival, the deputy saw a clawfoot bathtub
loaded in the bed of Wright’s truck. The deputy spoke to the homeowner and learned that neither
Wright nor the other suspect, Toni Andrews, had permission to take the tub. So, the deputy
arrested both suspects. Authorities then searched the truck and found a loaded revolver, a loaded
AR-15 rifle, and loaded magazines. They also found 40 grams of methamphetamine, 3.5 grams
of suspected heroin, and 49 suspected clonazepam pills. Andrews denied knowledge of the rifle
and drugs, and Wright admitted that he stored the revolver in the truck. Wright also divulged that
he was a convicted felon.
A grand jury charged Wright with being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possession with intent to distribute five or more grams
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Case No. 22-5452, United States v. Wright
of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). Wright pleaded guilty to
both charges.
Ahead of sentencing, a United States probation officer prepared a presentence investigation
report (“PSR”). After reviewing Wright’s criminal history, the officer concluded that Wright was
a “career offender” under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. A defendant is a career
offender under the Guidelines if, among other things, he has at least two prior felony convictions
of either a “crime of violence” or a “controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). As
relevant here, one of the two predicate offenses the probation officer identified was a Kentucky
second-degree-assault conviction from 2001. If deemed a career offender, Wright’s Guidelines
range would increase—from 120–150 months’ imprisonment to 188–235 months’ imprisonment.
Wright objected to the PSR’s designation of his Kentucky second-degree-assault
conviction as a “crime of violence.” The Guidelines define “crime of violence” as any felony that
(1) “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person
of another” (the “elements clause”); or (2) is an enumerated crime, including “aggravated assault”
(the “enumerated clause”). Id. § 4B1.2(a). Wright pointed out that the Supreme Court had recently
concluded that the identically worded elements clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act did not
include “reckless” crimes. See Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1825 (2021). And he
argued that under Kentucky law, wanton conduct is the equivalent of reckless conduct and that
Kentucky’s second-degree-assault statute criminalized wanton conduct. Wright therefore claimed
that under Borden, his second-degree-assault conviction did not satisfy § 4B1.2(a)’s elements
clause. As for the enumerated clause, Wright argued that wanton second-degree assault was
broader than the enumerated offense of “aggravated robbery,” so his Kentucky conviction was also
not a crime of violence under that clause.
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Case No. 22-5452, United States v. Wright
The government disagreed. While the government would ultimately concede that under
Borden, the elements clause did not include second-degree assault committed wantonly,
it maintained that the elements clause nonetheless included Wright’s particular conviction. In its
view, Kentucky’s second-degree-assault statute is “divisible,” meaning that it creates three
different offenses, two of which criminalize intentional conduct. The government further
maintained that the indictment and plea agreement for the assault conviction made clear that
Wright committed one of the intentional offenses. Thus, in the government’s view, the elements
clause included Wright’s second-degree-assault conviction.
The district court largely agreed with the government. It first concluded that Kentucky’s
second-degree-assault statute is divisible. The court then noted that Wright’s plea agreement for
his assault conviction incorporated the facts alleged in the indictment, which provided that Wright
had “intentionally shot Savannah Sanders with a deadly weapon thereby causing serious physical
injury.” (R. 52, Sentencing Hrg. Tr., PageID 297, 304; R. 35-1, Indictment, PageID 138, 141). As
such, the district court concluded that Wright committed one of the intentional varieties of second-
degree assault, and Wright’s conviction therefore satisfied the elements clause. Based on this
reasoning, the district court applied the career-offender enhancement and calculated Wright’s
Guidelines range to be 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment.
At sentencing, the court deemed Wright’s offense of conviction “serious,” explaining that
he “possessed multiple guns and ammunition as well as distribution quantities of
methamphetamine.” (R. 52, Sentencing Hrg. Tr., PageID 316). As for Wright’s history and
characteristics, the court noted that even after serving 12 years in prison for second-degree assault,
he continued to commit offenses “in ways that [were] dangerous and violent.” (Id. at PageID 315–
16). The district court sentenced Wright to 188 months’ imprisonment, which was the bottom of
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Case No. 22-5452, United States v. Wright
the career-offender enhanced Guidelines range. The court added that “even if” Wright was not
“technically a career offender” under the Guidelines, the nature of his current offense and his
criminal history rendered him a “de facto” career offender warranting the same 188-month
sentence. (Id. at PageID 316, 319).
Wright appeals. He makes three arguments in support of resentencing. First, he argues
that Kentucky’s second-degree-assault statute is not divisible, and since it criminalizes wanton
conduct, it does not satisfy the Guidelines’ “crime of violence” definition. Even if the statute is
divisible, Wright argues that the indictment, plea agreement, and judgment for his second-degree-
assault conviction do not show that he committed one of the intentional varieties of second-degree
assault. Finally, Wright argues that if we find the district court erred in applying the career-
offender enhancement, the district court’s alternate basis for his 188-month sentence was both
procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
II.
A.
To be deemed a career offender under the Guidelines, a defendant must (among other
criteria) have at least two prior felony convictions that are a crime of violence or a controlled-
substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). A felony is a crime of violence if it satisfies the “elements
clause,” meaning it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another.” Id. § 4B1.2(a)(1). And although not at issue on appeal, a felony
also qualifies as a crime of violence under the “enumerated clause” if it is one of the listed offenses,
which includes “aggravated assault.” Id. § 4B1.2(a)(2).
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Case No. 22-5452, United States v. Wright
In deciding whether a prior conviction satisfies the elements clause, we employ the now-
familiar categorical approach. Under that approach, courts focus on the elements of the statute of
conviction (as opposed the defendant’s conduct leading to the conviction) and decide whether the
statute of conviction “necessarily” has “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another.” Mass v. United States, 736 F. App’x 102, 104 (6th
Cir. 2018) (quoting § 4B1.2(a)(1)); United States v. Patterson, 853 F.3d 298, 305 (6th Cir. 2017).
The “necessarily” modifier is important: “[i]f any—even the least culpable—of the acts” that the
statute criminalizes does not involve the type of force described in the elements clause, the statute
does not satisfy the clause. Borden, 141 S. Ct. at 1822 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added); see
United States v. Butts, 40 F.4th 766, 770 (6th Cir. 2022).
Sometimes the statute of conviction is “divisible,” which means that it defines multiple
offenses. See Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 505 (2016). In that scenario, courts employ
the “modified” categorical approach: they “look[] to a limited class of documents (for example,
the indictment, jury instructions, or plea agreement and colloquy) to determine what crime, with
what elements, a defendant was convicted of.” Id. at 505–06 (citing Shepard v. United States, 544
U.S. 13, 26 (2005)). If these Shepard documents reveal which of the multiple offenses the
defendant committed, the court can then employ the categorical approach in the usual way. See
id. at 506.
In the district court, Wright asserted that his second-degree-assault conviction was not a
crime of violence under the Guidelines, so we review that issue de novo. See United States v.
Raymore, 965 F.3d 475, 487 (6th Cir. 2020).
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Case No. 22-5452, United States v. Wright
B.
Under Kentucky law a person is guilty of second-degree assault when:
(a) He intentionally causes serious physical injury to another person; or
(b) He intentionally causes physical injury to another person by means of a
deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or
(c) He wantonly causes serious physical injury to another person by means
of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument.
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508.020 (West 2000).
As noted, the government conceded below that the wanton variety of second-degree assault
does not qualify as a crime of violence under the elements clause. So if the second-degree-assault
statute is indivisible, as Wright contends, then one of the acts criminalized by the statute—wanton
assault—would not involve the type of force described in the elements clause. But if the statute is
divisible, as the government argues, and if the Shepard documents show that Wright committed
either of the two intentional varieties of second-degree assault, then Wright’s prior conviction
would satisfy the elements clause.
Although for reasons discussed below, we need not definitively resolve the issue, it appears
that Wright has the better of the divisibility argument.
Start with Supreme Court precedent. In Mathis, the Court addressed whether a state statute
prohibiting burglary at alternative locations—a “building, structure, [or] land, water, or air
vehicle”—was divisible. 579 U.S. at 507. The answer was “easy” because a state court decision
had “definitively” resolved the question. Id. at 517. The Iowa Supreme Court had held that the
locations were “‘alternative method[s]’ of committing one offense, so that a jury need not agree
whether the burgled location was a building, other structure, or vehicle.” Id. at 517–18 (quoting
State v. Duncan, 312 N.W.2d 519, 523 (Iowa 1981)). As such, an Iowa jury could convict if six
jurors believed that the burglarized location was a house and the other six believed it was a marina.
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Case No. 22-5452, United States v. Wright
See Duncan, 312 N.W.2d at 523. Yet a statute’s “elements” are “what the jury must find beyond
a reasonable doubt to convict the defendant.” Mathis, 579 U.S. at 504. Because the Iowa statute
merely listed alternative “factual means of committing a single element,” it was indivisible. See
id. at 505–06, 517.
Both before and after Mathis, our sister circuits have also considered whether jury
unanimity is required in deciding whether a state statute is divisible. For instance, the Ninth Circuit
has provided, “[w]hile the jury faced with a divisible statute must unanimously agree on the
particular offense of which the petitioner has been convicted (and thus, the alternative element),
the opposite is true of indivisible statutes; the jury need not so agree.” Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d
1077, 1085 (9th Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Herrold, 883 F.3d 517, 522–23 (5th Cir.
2018) (en banc) (similar), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2712, reinstated in relevant part, 941 F.3d 173, 177
(5th Cir. 2019) (en banc); United States v. McArthur, 850 F.3d 925, 938 (8th Cir. 2017) (similar);
United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485, 498 (4th Cir. 2015) (similar).
So what have Kentucky courts said about jury unanimity? The Kentucky Supreme Court
has “consistently maintained that the jurors may reach a unanimous verdict even though they may
not all agree upon the means or method by which a defendant has committed the criminal act.”
King v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.3d 343, 352 (Ky. 2018), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson
v. Commonwealth, --- S.W.3d ---, 2023 WL 4037845, at *8 (Ky. June 15, 2023). This rule
originated with Wells v. Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 85 (Ky. 1978). There, the court found that
a jury instruction for first-degree assault did not violate Kentucky’s jury-unanimity requirement
even though the instruction allowed the defendant to be convicted “if some of the jurors
believed . . . that he acted intentionally,” while “the remainder of them believed . . . that he acted
wantonly.” Id. at 87–88.
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And Kentucky courts have applied the Wells rule to the very statute at issue in this case.
For instance, in Moore v. Commonwealth, the jury instruction presented “alternate methods” of
committing second-degree assault. 597 S.W.2d 155, 156 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). The defendant
argued that the resulting conviction “[could not] stand because the jury verdict was not necessarily
unanimous” as to the method of assault. Id. The Kentucky Court of Appeals disagreed, finding
Wells “dispositive of this issue.” Id. And more recently, in Coffman v. Commonwealth, the
defendant argued that the second-degree-assault jury instruction was erroneous because it
permitted some jurors to find that he committed the crime intentionally while allowing other jurors
to find that he committed it wantonly based on the same conduct (shooting the victim with a B.B.
gun). No. 2004-CA-002140-MR, 2005 WL 3334356, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2005). The
Kentucky Court of Appeals rejected this argument and explained, “[a]lthough a defendant cannot
be convicted of a crime without a unanimous verdict, an instruction containing alternate theories
of liability does not deprive a defendant of a unanimous verdict if each theory is supported by the
evidence.” Id. (citation omitted).
Kentucky’s long-standing rule that a unanimous verdict does not require a jury to agree on
the means of committing certain crimes, Wells, 561 S.W.2d at 87–88, coupled with Kentucky’s
application of this rule to its second-degree-assault statute, is strong evidence that the statute is
indivisible. It thus appears that the three types of assault set out in the statute are not alternative
elements defining multiple crimes but instead alternative means for committing one crime: second-
degree assault. See also Commonwealth v. Hammond, 633 S.W.2d 73, 74 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982)
(providing that the “three elements” of Kentucky’s first- and second-degree assault statutes are
“the assailant’s mental state, the means of attack, and the resultant injury”).
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Ultimately though, we need not decide the issue because, as we explain below, even if the
district court erred in concluding that Wright was a career offender under the Guidelines, the error
was harmless.
III.
Assuming the district court erred in finding that Wright’s assault conviction satisfied the
elements clause, and thus erred in calculating the Guidelines range, Wright would still not be
entitled to a resentencing if this error was harmless.
A.
The government has the burden of showing that the miscalculated Guidelines range was
harmless. See United States v. Collins, 800 F. App’x 361, 362 (6th Cir. 2020). “To carry this
burden, the government must demonstrate to this Court with certainty that the error at sentencing
did not cause the defendant to receive a more severe sentence.” United States v. Lanesky, 494 F.3d
558, 561 (6th Cir. 2007) (emphasis omitted) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The
purpose of our harmless-error analysis is to avoid the efficiency cost of resentencing in cases where
we are absolutely certain that the district court would have announced the same sentence had it not
erred.” United States v. Montgomery, 969 F.3d 582, 583 (6th Cir. 2020).
We have found the requisite certainty that a sentencing error was harmless when the district
court has explained that even without a Guidelines enhancement, it would have given the same
sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 852 F.3d 488, 491–92 (6th Cir. 2017); United States
v. Butler, 812 F. App’x 311, 315 (6th Cir. 2020). Here, the district court did just that; it expressly
declared that “even if” Wright did not have the necessary predicates for the career-offender
designation, it would “still” sentence Wright to 188 months’ imprisonment because, in its view,
he was a “de facto” career offender. (R. 52, Sentencing Hrg. Tr., PageID 316, 319). And the
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district court explained its basis for deeming Wright a “de facto” career offender, referencing his
“significant prior criminal history involving violence, drug trafficking and firearms” as well as the
need to protect the public from further crimes by Wright. (Id. at PageID 319). Thus, we are
convinced that it would have given the same sentence had it found that Wright was not technically
a career offender under the Guidelines. Wright makes no argument to the contrary.
B.
Instead, Wright argues that the district court’s alternative bases for imposing a 188-month
sentence—38 months above the top of the non-enhanced Guidelines range—result in a sentence
that is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
1.
Wright says his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court did not
adequately explain its reasons for deeming him a “de facto” career offender. See Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (providing that a district court commits procedural error if it “fail[s]
to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the
Guidelines range”). The district court stated that Wright’s criminal history included “violent,
dangerous offenses,” (R. 52, Sentencing Hrg. Tr., PageID 315), but, according to Wright, the court
declined to specify those offenses and failed to recognize that his prior offenses were already
factored into the Guidelines range.
Wright did not preserve this procedural challenge below. And “unpreserved procedural
challenges are reviewed for plain error, requiring an obvious error that would result in a
miscarriage of justice without reversal.” United States v. Skouteris, 51 F.4th 658, 671 (6th Cir.
2022).
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Case No. 22-5452, United States v. Wright
We cannot say that the district court committed obvious error. During sentencing, the
district court discussed Wright’s criminal history in detail and, contrary to Wright’s argument, it
did specify the dangerous and violent offenses that led it to conclude he was a “de facto” career
offender. The court highlighted the fact that Wright’s second-degree-assault conviction involved
shooting the victim with a gun. It also pointed out that in 2015, Wright was convicted for drug
trafficking while in possession of a firearm. Moreover, the court discussed how Wright violated a
personal protection order by showing up near his estranged wife’s home on multiple occasions,
which prompted her to call 911 on one occasion. Thus, contrary to Wright’s claim, the district
court did specify the offenses that it believed supported a de facto career-offender status.
Resisting this result, Wright says this case is just like United States v. Martinez, 821 F.3d
984 (8th Cir. 2016). There, the district court incorrectly concluded that the defendant was a career
offender under the Guidelines and, like here, indicated that even if he was not “technically” a
career offender, it would still consider him to be one. 821 F.3d at 989. But the sentencing court’s
assumption that the defendant’s prior conviction for escape involved violence was not borne out
by the record, and the sentencing court also read too much into his gang ties. See id. at 989–90.
In contrast, the district court’s findings here—that Wright shot someone with a firearm, trafficked
drugs while possessing a firearm (as a felon), and violated the terms of a personal protection
order—are all supported by the record. Moreover, the sentencing court in Martinez varied upward
nine years from the correct Guidelines range. Id. at 990. To be sure, the roughly three-year upward
variance here is consequential. But by comparison, it is relatively modest. See Gall, 552 U.S. at
50 (“[A] major departure [from the Guidelines range] should be supported by a more significant
justification than a minor one.”). Accordingly, Martinez is unpersuasive on the facts of this case.
In short, Wright has not demonstrated that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable.
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2.
Wright says his sentence is substantively unreasonable for several reasons.
“The substantive reasonableness inquiry determines if the length of a sentence conforms
with the sentencing goals set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Small, 988 F.3d 241,
258 (6th Cir. 2021). This inquiry includes whether the district court arbitrarily decided on a
sentence, based “the sentence on impermissible factors,” failed “to consider relevant sentencing
factors,” or gave “an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.” Id. at 259 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Here, assuming the enhancement was inappropriate, the district court
effectively varied upward from the (presumptively) correct Guidelines range of 120 to 150 months,
so we must ensure that the district court’s “justification is sufficiently compelling to support the
degree of the variance.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Our substantive
reasonableness review is for abuse of discretion. United States v. Wells, 55 F.4th 1086, 1093 (6th
Cir. 2022).
Wright asserts that the district court’s sentence was substantively unreasonable because the
court mischaracterized his criminal history as “violent” and “dangerous.”
We disagree. As discussed, in 2001, Wright was convicted for shooting someone. Then,
in 2015, Wright was convicted for drug trafficking while in possession of a firearm and for being
a felon in possession of a firearm. These firearm-related offenses in combination with drug
trafficking are fairly characterized as “dangerous” or “violent.” And, regarding the personal
protection order violations, even if Wright did not actually contact his estranged wife, he hid inside
or behind a neighbor’s residence near her home on more than one occasion. It was not
unreasonable for the district court to view Wright’s behavior as dangerous—indeed, Wright’s wife
called 911. As for Wright’s assertion that the district court mischaracterized his criminal history
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as “escalating over time,” the court merely stated, “Wright has a lengthy criminal history that dates
back to the age of approximately 21. As he aged, the seriousness of these violations has
continued.” (R. 52, Sentencing Hrg. Tr., PageID 315). “Continued” is not the same as “escalated.”
In all, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Wright had “repeatedly violated
the laws in ways that are dangerous and violent.” (Id. at PageID 316).
Wright also complains that the district court placed undue weight on his criminal history.
He points out that his criminal history was already factored into the Guidelines range, thus
implying that the district court “double counted” his criminal history when sentencing him.
An upward variance based on a defendant’s criminal history is not unreasonable “simply
because the Guidelines calculation already accounts for criminal history as a factor.” United States
v. Dunnican, 961 F.3d 859, 881 (6th Cir. 2020). But an “extreme” upward variance based on a
defendant’s criminal history may be unreasonable because it creates sentencing disparities among
offenders “with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” United States v.
Johnson, 26 F.4th 726, 738 (6th Cir. 2022) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
That concern is not present here. First, assuming Wright was not a career offender, his
Guidelines range was 120 to 150 months’ imprisonment, meaning that the district court varied
upward by 38 months. That variance is modest compared to the significant moves in the cases
Wright cites. See id. (upward variance of 115 months); United States v. Warren, 771 F. App’x
637, 639 (6th Cir. 2019) (upward variance that nearly doubled the top of the Guidelines range);
United States v. Bistline, 665 F.3d 758, 760 (6th Cir. 2012) (downward variance from 63 months
to one day in prison). Second, Wright has not shown that he is similarly situated to the typical
offender with a Guidelines range of 120 to 150 months’ imprisonment such that his 188-month
sentence creates an unwarranted sentencing disparity. To the contrary: the district court reasonably
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found that Wright’s criminal history was significant enough to warrant an upward variance absent
the career-offender enhancement.
Finally, Wright claims that the district court erred in finding that a sentence at the bottom
of the career-offender Guidelines range avoided an “unwarranted sentencing disparity with others
who are classified as career offenders.” (R. 52, Sentencing Hrg. Tr., PageID 318–19). In support,
Wright points out that in 2016, the Sentencing Commission reported that where the predicates for
a defendant’s career-offender designation were mixed (e.g., one drug-trafficking predicate and one
crime-of-violence predicate), the defendant was sentenced below the career-offender Guidelines
range 76% of the time. Wright cites a similar statistic from fiscal year 2019. Given that judges
typically sentence actual career offenders below the career-offender Guidelines range, Wright
argues that his sentence within that range when he is not actually a career offender creates
unwarranted sentencing disparities. Wright also says that the career-offender Guidelines range is
so unreliable that the district court’s use of that range to evaluate sentencing disparities was
arbitrary and deprived him of due process.
Perhaps if nearly all courts sentenced career offenders like Wright to substantially below
the career-offender Guidelines, the district court’s reliance on those Guidelines to avoid sentencing
disparities would be unreasonable. But Wright’s data does not show that. While more recent data
indicates that about 80 percent of career offenders are sentenced below the Guidelines range, that
figure includes individuals who received substantial-assistance departures—which Wright did
not—and those with only drug-trafficking predicates. See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Quick Facts,
Career Offenders 2 (June 2022).1 Accordingly, the sentencing data that Wright cites does not
1
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/Career_Offenders_FY21.pdf
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demonstrate that his sentence creates an unwarranted sentencing disparity with similarly situated
offenders.
* * *
For the reasons given, we AFFIRM Wright’s sentence.
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