(concurring).
Several years ago I took issue by dissent with a holding of this court that a *823depletion of corporate reserves comprised an “interference with interstate commerce” within the meaning of the Hobbs Act where a corporation was engaged in interstate commerce. United States v. Amabile, 395 F.2d 47, 54 (7th Cir., 1968), cert, denied, 401 U.S. 924, 91 S.Ct. 869, 27 L.Ed.2d 828. My concern was centered on the unlimited reach of the doctrine espoused by the majority:
If a depletion of reserves is all that is necessary to show the requisite affect on commerce, then a threat of any kind to extract money made to a person who happens to operate a business engaged to any extent in interstate commerce comes within the statute’s proscription. Under this rationale, a retail store owner, for example would be afforded federal protection from extortion, regardless of the nature or the likely affect of the threat simply because his stock of merchandise had in some measure moved in interstate commerce. 395 F.2d at 55.
Exactly what I apprehended in 1968 has today come to pass. My misgivings, however, did not persuade my brethren in Amabile, and I stand by the decision reached in this ease as the law of the circuit.
I would also narrow what some might read to be the holding of the majority on the question of extortion under the Hobbs Act. DeMet was prosecuted below for a violation of that portion of the Hobbs Act which makes illegal “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened fear.” As my colleagues recognize, the proof of the Government was directed to demonstrating a fear of economic loss on the part of King. Proof of fear may not have been necessary had the Government chosen to rely on another provision to the Hobbs Act, namely, that prohibiting “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, . . . under color of official right.” (emphasis supplied). It is, of course, hardly appropriate to render a decision on that issue in this case, and I express no views on it.*
It is worthy of note, however, that an argument has been made in the literature that this provision renders criminal any reception of money (not rightfully due) “under color of official right” by a police officer or other public official, without reference to whether the facts which surround the receipt characterize tlie action as bribery or extortion. See Stern, Prosecutions of Local Political Corruption Under the Hobbs Act: The Unnecessary Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion. 3 Seton Hall L.Rev. 1 (1971).