(dissenting):
I dissent and would affirm the judgment of conviction.
The key witness for the government was Lipsky. As so frequently is the case, particularly when the crime is murder, narcotics dealing or bank robbery, the government’s witnesses are not outstanding members of the community noted for their morality and rectitude. The jury is invariably instructed, as it *1121was here, that, in the light of all the facts brought out on examination and cross-examination, they may accept or reject any or all of the witnesses’ testimony. The opportunity to see the witness, hear his testimony and appraise its worth is fundamental to our system of criminal justice.
There were only two persons present at the scene of Parks’ murder, Pacelli and Lipsky. Lipsky recited his version of what he saw and heard. Many reasons for disbelief were advanced, amongst which were the facts that Lip-sky was a perjurer and Lipsky had been promised immunity and lenient treatment. Such a man might well be disbelieved by a jury, and for good cause. However, this jury believed him.
Of course, error can be found if the jury was influenced by improper testimony but any judge experienced in reviewing jury trials knows that every violation of text book rules of evidence does not and should not constitute reversible error. Although a doctrine of “harmless error” has been evolved by appellate courts, this is but a catchphrase for an ultimate conclusion of fact by the reviewing court. Translated into realistic terms, it means not that the appellate court knows with any degree of certainty what piece or pieces of evidence influenced any particular juror and in what way; but rather, on balance, was the evidence so strong for conviction that the appellate court is willing to substitute itself for the jury and decide that the “harmless error” evidence placed before the jury would not—or better, should not—have changed the result. In my opinion, the decision here should be made upon this theory which, in turn, calls for an analysis of the specific facts allegedly erroneously admitted.
As stated, the murder scene on February 4, 1972, was luridly described and Pacelli’s role therein presented by Lip-sky. The method of the murder, the blood in the car, the blood on the coat, Pacelli’s statement to Lipsky on February 5th of satisfaction at having killed Parks, were all properly before the jury. If the jury believed Lipsky (and it apparently did), nothing more was required.
Turning now to the “hearsay” constituting, according to the majority, reversible error, of what does this hearsay, so damaging as to require reversal, consist? On February 10th at the apartment of Frank Bassi (Pacelli’s uncle) were gathered, Bassi, Pacelli’s wife, Beverly, Beverly’s sister, Barbara, Pacelli’s sister, Loretta, three friends, A1 Bracer, Abby Perez and Barbara Jalaba, and a man named Bayron. By this time via the public press, Parks’ murder and the burning of the body had been revealed to the public at large. Frank Bassi commented about the bungling technique used in trying to dispose of the body. Lipsky was induced to go away for a while and given $1,000 by Perez for that purpose. From this the majority conclude that these “extra-judicial statements clearly implied knowledge and belief on the part of third person declarants not available for cross-examination as to the source of their knowledge regarding the ultimate fact in issue, i. e., whether Pacelli killed Parks.” However, there was no declaration that Pacelli had told them that he had killed Parks and none expressed an opinion to this effect so that any such “hearsay” problem is not before us. Thus, Lipsky’s statements of the February 10th apartment conversation added so little—and this only by way of inference—to his actual eye-witness testimony as to the events on February 4th that it does not, in my opinion, fall within the category of reversible error.
Turning to the alleged Jencks Act violation, there is no doubt that the Lip-sky-Morvillo letter revealed that Lipsky wished to go to extremes to obtain favorable prosecution and court consideration. However, this field had been adequately covered on cross-examination and the jury was well aware of the circumstances under which the testimony was given. Thus this letter did not con*1122tain the crucial ammunition for cross-examination that the appellant would have us believe.
With the majority’s conclusion and discussion of Section 241 I am in accord.
For the above reasons, I would affirm.