(dissenting):
With a full appreciation of the earnest and sincere purpose animating my two colleagues, I must respectfully dissent. To my mind the only logical result for this court to reach is to affirm the District Court’s dismissal of appellant Tarl-ton’s complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
My disagreement ■ rests on three grounds:
1. What this court does, on the thin basis of finding a cause of action in an individual prisoner’s complaint, is to thrust upon a single judge of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia the task of Congressional oversight on the operations of the FBI, with directions to devise an appropriate judicial amendment of the relevant statute, 28 U.S.C. § 534, if the District Court’s inquiry finds that additional legislation is needed.
2. Surprisingly, in its effort to determine how the FBI is doing its job and what further legislation is necessary, the court seems to have largely overlooked appellant Tarlton, the legalities and practicalities of the relief he sought, and has impliedly ruled against him on all his principal points.
3. The further legislation, which the opinion makes clear is obviously desired, although its exact nature is to be determined after the District Court makes a broad inquiry, will inevitably compel the FBI to undertake the monumental task of passing judgment on the “constitutional accuracy” of the criminal information contained in the FBI fingerprint arrest file.
I. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND LEGISLATION
It is difficult to articulate the remarkable metamorphosis this case has undergone from the case as argued to us. As a result, the majority opinion virtually ignores the appellant Tarlton,1 the facts of his situation, the three types of relief he sought, his standing, and the other legal points brought before us on appeal. By saying Tarlton has “stated a cause of action” and then remanding to the District Court, the court here is obviously using Tarlton’s *1132complaint to undertake a full-scale legislative inquiry of national scope. This conclusion is not vitiated by such language in the opinion as “recognition of a duty on the part of the FBI to make reasonable efforts to maintain constitutionally accurate criminal files is but an exercise of judicial authority to use ‘remedial mechanisms to address or obviate . . . constitutional injuries.’ ” What the court is doing is amending section 534 to require the FBI to do many more things than the Congress required, most of which may turn out to be impractical, and none of which can be asserted to be required constitutionally.
The breadth of the inquiry which the District Judge is directed to make, Parts II, III and IV of the majority opinion, clearly shows the legislative nature of the task entrusted to him. The vehicle of this legislative oversight and amendment (interpretation) of section 534 is a direction to a District Judge in one judicial district to conduct an inquiry of the broadest range based on the allegations of one defendant. The inquiry involved is the type which a Congressional committee is supposed to make, taking into account data on a nationwide basis from all interested parties, before drafting and enacting legislation. This court thrusts on one District Judge sitting in the District of Columbia a task of national scope. Of course, this court sits ready to shoulder some of his burden by review of his findings.
My two colleagues have apparently decided that section 534 must be amended, that the FBI can no longer be left to do only what Congress empowered it to do, 1. e., acquire, collect, classify, and preserve criminal records, and exchange that information with other authorized bodies concerned with such matters. The issue as phrased by the court here is: “To what extent, if any, does the FBI have a duty to take reasonable measures to safeguard the accuracy of information in its criminal files which is subject to dissemination?” This phrasing is innocuous enough, until one realizes what the real thrust of the court’s direction is. The words “accurate” or “constitutionally accurate” occur innumerable times in the majority’s discussion as to what the FBI should be required under section 534 to do. This, of course, necessarily implies that the FBI must pass judgment on what is “accurate” or “constitutionally accurate” before disseminating the information, a point which will be discussed at length later.
If there is a constitutional requirement affecting the FBI’s operation, this court has a right to say so. If there is no constitutional requirement but only a statutory one, neither this court nor the District Court has a right to make a legislative oversight inquiry to determine the need for additional legislation. Under the guise of interpreting a statute, a court cannot make a general inquiry into the manner in which the FBI carries out its responsibilities under section 534. In particular, this court cannot compel the FBI to vouch for the “constitutional accuracy” of all criminal information it disseminates because such an “interpretation” is so completely foreign to section 534 that it would constitute a drastic amendment of the statute by judicial fiat.2
*1133In light of the concluding paragraphs of the majority opinion, I think it is necessary for me to emphasize the exact sense in which I use the term “Congressional oversight.” Certainly a large element of my concern in this case lies in the fact that we are asking the District Court to engage in a broad-ranging inquiry into the satisfactory working of the FBI. However, the thrust of my interest is the rationale for this inquiry. Congress has a general responsibility to see to it that Executive agencies are satisfactorily performing their duties. Congress also has the responsibility of making the laws, a duty which oftimes requires an inquiry into the functioning of agencies and their operations. The courts have neither of these responsibilities.
However, incident to litigation before them, they will require changes in governmental procedures and operations when the manner in which an agency operates violates constitutional or statutory rights. In this case, the court refuses to say that the Constitution requires the FBI to make an inquiry as to the legality of each arrest in its records. Similarly, I do not believe that Congress in section 534 intended to place such a burden on the FBI. Therefore, the inquiry which the District Court will have to undertake will be legislative in its most fundamental sense, in that its purpose will be the legislative one of deciding whether it would be preferable (as opposed to constitutionally or statutorily required) for certain changes to be made in FBI procedures.
II. TARLTON
Having virtually forgotten about Tarl-ton in the lengthy period this case has been under most serious consideration, the majority find “a cause of action” in the complaint in order to direct the District Court to conduct a legislative inquiry into the functioning of the FBI, but in so doing they negate Tarlton’s claims for relief. An examination of these claims, the basis for this entire cause of action, is necessary to make this clear.
Appellant Tarlton is a federal prisoner ; at the time of oral argument he was on parole.3 He brought this action against the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI to compel either a modification of FBI records relating to appellant or an injunction restraining the appellees from presentation of such records to federal courts and correctional officials. (A third claim for damages was not pressed on appeal.) He alleges that he was originally denied parole because of his long history of arrests and convictions supplied to the Parole Board by the FBI.
“Appellant does not deny that he was in fact arrested and convicted as shown by his FBI record,”4 but he alleges that a large number of the arrests and con*1134victions were invalid. At the time of appellant’s first eligibility for parole, his FBI record contained a total of 21 entries spanning 20 years. In five of these entries, he alleges, either no charges were brought after arrest or the grand jury refused to indict. In four other cases (three charges for “drunkenness” and an illegal U-turn) appellant does not dispute the substance of the charges.
In the remaining 12 cases appellant asserts that the charges were either false, the detentions were illegal, or that convictions were obtained by violating his constitutional rights. Several of these 12 were vagrancy convictions, which appellant contends were based on charges under unconstitutionally vague statutes. Two convictions for theft and one for assault, three of the most serious charges, were allegedly obtained without affording appellant assistance of counsel in contravention of appellant’s constitutional rights.5 Appellant contends that he was subsequently cleared of a fourth serious conviction (burglary), but admits that a conviction for escape from prison (assertedly prompted by his detention on the false burglary charge) was obtained after a trial in which he was represented by counsel, and that he did in fact escape from what he claimed was unlawful detention.
In sum, appellant contends that his apparently long history of criminal involvement is not a true reflection of the facts. Through a combination of poor luck and injustice, he has allegedly been characterized as “a professional criminal” when in fact he is a relatively innocent victim of circumstances.6 To some extent we would all agree with appellant; part of his record is that of a ne’er-do-well, one of life’s losers, not necessarily a “professional criminal.” Never was appellant Tarlton able to proclaim, “I am the master of my fate, I am the captain of my soul.” Tarlton staggered from blow to blow.
In the District Court appellant sought to have his FBI record altered to reflect what he contends is the true nature of his past record,7 purged of all its present contents except for the four minor convictions, the validity of which he does not contest. The Government argued that it is under no duty to alter its records unless it knows them to be false; 8 for example, the FBI will delete *1135an entry of an arrest only if it ascertains, usually from the agency reporting the arrest, that the arrest did not in fact occur. The Government denied any obligation to inquire into the probable cause for an arrest or the fairness and legal accuracy of a conviction, or the constitutionality of either. Such arguments of validity and constitutionality, in the Government’s view, are more appropriately made to local authorities, who are closer to the facts and records of the case and thus in a better position to make such evaluations. If the local authorities determine that an arrest or conviction was invalid, they may ask the FBI to return the record of the event and it is FBI policy to do so.
Consistent with the Government position in Tarlton’s case, that the FBI can be held accountable for anything it knows “in Menard v. Saxbe (II), we held that the FBI must expunge information from its criminal file when the local agency . . . later reports information disputing the accuracy of the relevant FBI records” (Majority Opinion, p. 1121).9 But Tarlton’s case is not Menard’s case; there is no evidence and no claim that any local agency ever reported one item of information casting doubt on Tarlton’s fingerprint arrest record.
Tarlton asks us to thrust on the FBI a retroactive duty of affirmative inquiry. This alone will satisfy Tarlton’s problem, and this my two colleagues deny (even though they find Tarlton “has stated a cause of action”): “ . the question of whether the FBI must guarantee the accuracy of information in its files, and similarly . . . the question of whether the FBI must resolve conflicting allegations as to the accuracy of its records. . . . [Ujnder present circumstances these latter two questions could not be resolved in Tarl-ton’s favor.” (Majority Opinion, p. 1121.)
The majority opinion goes even farther to deny Tarlton any effective relief, indeed, the only relief he asks for. “ ‘Realistically, the FBI cannot be expected to investigate the facts underlying every arrest or detention reported to it.’ . . . Furthermore, in the case of alleged unconstitutional arrests or convictions, the FBI is not authorized or equipped to make judgments concerning what might be difficult questions of constitutional interpretation.” (P. 1127.)10 “Similar reasons limit the re*1136lief United States Courts in this district may legally and practically grant to litigants in Tarlton’s position. The District Court cannot review the constitutionality and relitigate the merits of all the arrests and convictions in the United States.” (P. 1127.)11
In these passages my colleagues are facing reality. Yet, the demand, the cause of action, of Tarlton in this case *1137is that the FBI either VERIFY or ELIMINATE each and every arrest or conviction from his record. The majority opinion wisely rejects this as neither legally required nor possible in fact. Nothing, certainly nothing which would gratify any of appellant Tarlton’s demands, remains of his “cause of action.” 12
III. “CONSTITUTIONAL ACCURACY”
Despite the specific disclaimer that the FBI need not “guarantee the accuracy of information in its files” (p. 4), the reiterated insistence on establishing “accuracy” or “constitutional accuracy” as a sine qua non before the FBI can disseminate any criminal information inescapably puts the FBI in the position of an investigator, a decider, and ultimately a guarantor of the accuracy of every fingerprint arrest record which is submitted to it and later challenged. Even if the obligation of the FBI to determine the accuracy of the fingerprint arrest records in its file is limited to those challenged, the burden on the FBI would be an enormous one never contemplated by Congress.13 Section 534 does not require or imply that the FBI has the duty of inquiry of the local agency furnishing the fingerprint arrest reports, cheeking the accuracy of the reports, deciding whether the local agency or the challenger is right, and then disseminating or not on the basis of such a decision.
How my colleagues would change section 534 is seen even by a cursory examination of the opinion. The opinion is replete with references to “constitutionally accurate arrests or convictions” (p. 1121), “constitutionally accurate criminal files” (p. 1125), and “making reasonable efforts to safeguard the accuracy of the information” before dissemination (p. 1122). The distinction between “constitutionally accurate” and constitutionally inaccurate arrests and convictions obviously requires a judgment of constitutional validity by someone. By whom? The originating local law enforcement agency? The FBI? The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia? Or, perhaps the user of the information before the information is used, particularly in light of the large type disclaimer as to accuracy which the FBI puts on each fingerprint arrest record.
How can this court say that “recognition of the duty on the part of the FBI to make reasonable efforts to maintain constitutionally accurate criminal files is but an exercise of judicial authority” (p. 1125) ? What does “constitutionally accurate criminal files” mean? If the FBI can only maintain constitutionally accurate files, it means, if I interpret the opinion correctly, records of arrest which are constitutionally invulnerable to challenge. So this puts the FBI inevitably in the position of checking the constitutionality of every arrest record that its disseminates. Nothing could be farther from Congress’ intent. Nothing could be farther from practicality.
Let us not forget that we have an individual appellant involved here, hence *1138the user of the FBI assembled data would have been the United States District Court for Eastern Tennessee where Tarlton was sentenced, or the United States Parole Board which has had occasion to consider his post-conviction release. I submit that neither the FBI nor the United States District Court for the District of Columbia is in a position, nor do they need, to determine for their own purposes the accuracy of the information reposing in the FBI files.
In Menard we held: “[S]ound principles of justice and judicial administration dictate that in general actions to vindicate constitutional rights, by ex-pungement of arrest records [should] be maintained against the local law enforcement agency involved.”14 The ar-restee challenging the validity of the arrest must start where the arrest occurred. Nothing could be more sensible, and, if followed as a policy, would inevitably result in the FBI records being correct, because the FBI follows a policy of correcting its own arrest records or expunging them as the local authorities do.
IV. THE POTENTIAL HARM OF INACCURATE ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS
Appellant’s request that his arrest and conviction records be expunged is based on the fear that he has suffered and may continue to suffer unjustly from prejudice toward those with criminal records. The remedy for such potential harm is not, however, to impose a general duty on the FBI to verify the accuracy and propriety of each item of information in its files. The FBI acts as a mere repository of information; as such there is no harm, in the abstract, in the FBI’s accumulation of information.15 No prejudice to the subject arises until the damaging information is released, possibly not until someone with the capacity of effective action (e. g., a sentencing judge, parole board, or prospective employer in a sensitive occupation) is prepared to take action on the basis of it.
The record of arrests and convictions is submitted on the basis of fingerprint identification only, mathematically established to be the freest from error of any known method of human identification. If a source other than fingerprints is used, it is specially noted “as investigative leads as being possibly identical with subject” (see Appendix). To illustrate, appellant’s arrest and conviction record here (see Appendix), which he demands be “corrected,” is comprised of one- to three-line entries reflecting fingerprinting at the time of arrest or conviction. No other source was used. The first time appellant Tarlton was arrested, fingerprinted, and the prints transmitted to the FBI, the FBI set up a fingerprint file in its criminal records on a person bearing these distinctive identifiable prints and giving the name to the arresting authorities of John Brent Tarlton, Jr. This person may have been arrested before without being fingerprinted, or arrested and fingerprinted without the prints being forwarded to the FBI; the FBI does not know nor inquire. The FBI only receives and records original and subsequent arrest and conviction data on the basis of fingerprints, not by name or other descriptive data, unless specially noted. As to the accuracy of the system, it is significant that appellant Tarl-ton does not contest the accuracy of a single entry in his arrest and conviction record entirely based on fingerprints; his challenge is to “probable cause” for arrests and “justification” for convictions, issues which the fingerprint classifier at the FBI has no way of resolving.
*1139However, the FBI has long since taken precautions to assure that users of FBI information know that the reports or “rap sheets” are not warranted by the FBI to be accurate in every detail. Each such “rap sheet” carries the warning that
Information shown on this Identification Record represents data furnished FBI by fingerprint contributors. WHERE FINAL DISPOSITION IS NOT SHOWN OR FURTHER EXPLANATION OF CHARGE IS DESIRED, COMMUNICATE WITH AGENCY CONTRIBUTING THOSE FINGERPRINTS.
This caveat assures that users do not grant too much weight to reports merely because the information is supplied by the FBI. This is essentially an acknowl-edgement by the FBI that it is a repository rather than a guarantor of information.
This role of the FBI was reaffirmed by the Congress in 1971 when it passed, after the U.S. District Court decision in Menard v. Mitchell, supra, which might have been deemed to restrict the FBI in its customary dissemination of arrest and conviction data, a statutory redirection to the FBI to disseminate the arrest and conviction records, not only to courts and law enforcement agencies, but also
for the exchange of identification records with officials of federally chartered or insured banking institutions to promote or maintain the security of those institutions, and, if authorized by State statute and approved by the Attorney General, to officials of State and local governments for purposes of employment and licensing, any such exchange to be made only for the official use of any such official and subject to the same restriction with respect to dissemination as that provided for under the aforementioned Act.16
This represents an up-to-date statement by Congress of its considered judgment as to the proper role of the FBI in the collection, collation, and dissemination of arrest and conviction data. Unless appellant can point convincingly to some constitutional barrier to the exercise of this function by the FBI as Congress understood it most recently to be, and he has not done so, this Congressional mandate governs.
In assaying the potential harm to appellant from the use of the FBI arrest and conviction data, we are urged to consider the incompleteness and flimsiness of all but four or five items in the criminal record — arrests with no conviction thereafter recorded, arrests and convictions for vagrancy, convictions for drunken driving. All this is obvious to appellant’s counsel, obvious to us, and also, I suggest, obvious to the experienced U.S. District Judge in Eastern Tennessee, who sentenced appellant to serve six years for forgery, and obvious to the Parole Board considering for the first time appellant’s eligibility for parole from Atlanta Penitentiary.17 The five serious convictions — two for theft, one each for assault, burglary, and escape from confinement — were doubtless *1140evaluated differently. Just how differently we have no way of knowing on this record. We have no way of knowing, for example, how much (if any) of what appellant now says about these convictions was conveyed to the probation officer in the Eastern District of Tennessee, how much was included in the probation officer’s presentence report (if any was rendered) to the District Judge, and what access the Parole Board had or consideration it gave to a presentence report or the sentencing proceedings in court.
The named party defendants (appel-lees) in this proceeding are the Attorney General of the United States and the Director of the FBI. To the extent that appellant’s pleas for relief suggest that we should direct the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee how to conduct its business, I think we have neither authority nor desire to do so. The same goes for the United States Board of Parole. On the other hand, to the extent that we can fashion procedures in the United States courts in the District of Columbia to avoid the type of prejudice to others which appellant asserts has harmed him, we should do so.
V. FEASIBLE PROTECTION AGAINST USE OF INACCURATE ARREST AND CONVICTION DATA
A. In Judicial Proceedings
In proceedings in which information may be used to an individual’s detriment, if we give recognition both to fairness and a desire to act on only the most accurate information, it is most obviously necessary that he be able to obtain and examine the FBI fingerprint data of arrests and convictions. Without this right, the individual cannot hope to know if the information is complete and accurate, or even perhaps if the report is actually his own. Unless an individual has such access, he will not know if he should attempt to obtain correction of erroneous or incomplete information by the supplier.
In a great majority of cases in the U. S. District Court in the District of Columbia the defendant or his counsel has access to the FBI “rap sheet” (fingerprint record of arrests and convictions) as a matter of practice if not of right. This may occur at different stages of the trial. Depending on the trial tactical situation, the prosecuting attorney may show the “rap sheet” to defense counsel prior to trial in the hope of inducing a guilty plea. For the same reason, this is sometimes done at the close of the prosecutor’s case, in an attempt to emphasize the hopelessness of defendant’s position. Or, prior to making a decision whether to put his client on the stand, defense counsel may request to see the record of prior convictions, in order to ask the judge to rule in advance which convictions will be admissible for impeachment purposes. Such advance rulings are customarily given in this Circuit, although not as a matter of right. At the close of trial, if there has been a conviction, in the preparation of a pre-sentence report the probation officer customarily asks the defendant or his counsel to comment on the previous convictions, and presumably this information is incorporated in the presentence report given the District Judge. Finally, we are aware of the practice of most District Judges, although under Rule 32 they have a discretion as to what parts of the presentence report (if any) they reveal to the defendant or his counsel, to inform the defendant in open court of the record of prior convictions the judge will take into consideration in sentencing, and to invite comment thereon.
From the numerous records in previous cases on appeal in this jurisdiction we are aware that the above is customarily done, but not as a matter of right to the convicted accused. I suggest that as a matter of due process the FBI fingerprint record of both arrests and convictions, the record made the subject of this litigation, should be given to the ac*1141cused or his counsel, if a conviction is obtained, for comment as to accuracy. Logically this should be done immediately after conviction, if it has not been done before, in order that defense counsel may confer with his client and then inform both the probation officer and the prosecuting attorney of any discrepancies in the FBI record which the accused now convicted wishes to challenge.18 This will give the probation officer the opportunity to make his cheek, and likewise the prosecution the opportunity to rebut any claim of the defendant while the probation officer is making his other investigation and preparing his report for the judge. When the day comes for sentencing, the judge will have the presentenee report and should inform the accused of the criminal record which he is taking into consideration and of the facts regarding the criminal record as found by the probation officer. The prosecution can make its own statement as to the facts it found regarding those arrests and convictions challenged by the defendant. On this basis the judge can sentence, clearly and on the record taking into consideration only that criminal record which the court is fully satisfied is accurate.
B. Before the Parole Board
We are not asked to assert any jurisdiction or supervisory power here (even assuming this court should), but a practice similar to the above practice, which we believe the District Judges here are in the vast majority of cases already utilizing and have found feasible, may commend itself to the Parole Board. If the Parole Board would give every inmate a chance to comment on the accuracy of his previous record, coupled with the warning that frivolous or false challenges would not aid his cause,19 the fairness of the action of the Parole Board would be enhanced; certainly its visible fairness would, and the complaints of those such as appellant would be stilled.20
C. In FBI Data Files
In conclusion, I turn to the records of the agency charged by law with the responsibility of acquiring, collecting, classifying, preserving, and exchanging data on individual arrests and convictions. The input from law enforcement agencies, that which they voluntarily supply, is now enormous and well systematized. I suggest it is time that equal effort be devoted to voluntary corrections and supplementation of original law enforcement data.21
*1142Almost every police force in the country is furnished with forms on which fingerprints taken in connection with an arrest or conviction can be reported to the FBI. Those same police forces and other law enforcement agencies should be equipped with a similar fingerprint form, on which an individual could request and have recorded his fingerprints and a correction or completion of a fingerprint record he is aware has probably been submitted to the FBI, e. g., failure to charge after arrest, dismissed or acquitted after formal charges have been brought. The agencies themselves should do this, but there is no feasible way to compel them to do so; a workable way for the affected individual to help himself should be a vast improvement.
In addition to the right of correction and completion, there should be a limited right to explain or clarify information that is in an FBI file. It may, for example, be that an arrest or conviction has subsequently been held unconstitutional. An individual should be able to point this out in some brief way in order to assure that an ultimate using agency does not rely on information which is unfairly prejudicial, although I think it crystal clear that there is no space for complex constitutional argument on an FBI “rap sheet.” 22
On pages 1128-1130 of the majority opinion my colleagues make several other suggestions for improving the accuracy and fairness of the FBI criminal data collection and dissemination, most of which appear worthy of serious consideration. These suggestions are addressed to the District Court as possible subjects of its “inquiry.” The majority opinion emphasized that all of these suggestions are subject to the primary test of feasibility and practicality, as the District Court may determine.
This emphasizes my primary disagreement with my colleagues. The question of what is administratively practical and feasible for the FBI in carrying out its duties under the statute is primarily for the FBI to determine. If any oversight as to how the FBI is carrying out its duties is needed, this should be exercised by a Congressional committee in appropriate legislative hearings; especially since my colleagues have eschewed any constitutional ground for their decision, a court’s intervention is not called for.
For all of the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.
APPENDIX
For the purpose of this appeal we take appellant’s FBI arrest and conviction record (“rap sheet”) as he has alleged it to be. Note 5, supra. The majority holds that appellant Tarlton is not entitled to “a requirement that the FBI resolve factual or legal issues that might arise if the allegations of the individual subject of the record and the statements of the local law enforcement agency conflict. Neither could the exercise of such a duty give rise to a legal obligation on the part of the FBI to guarantee the accuracy of records which are the subject of an FBI request to a local law enforcement agency.” (Majority Opinion, p. 1129.)
*1143An examination of appellant’s actual FBI record, furnished and made a part of the record on appeal after oral argument, shows appellant has even less ground for claiming harm than by reason of the record he alleged. On five pages there are 34 entries, only 6 of which are “incomplete.”
The first two, ear theft December 1950 and burglary 1953, have no disposition shown, although these are two serious charges appellant informs us resulted in convictions; appellant’s challenge is to the “justification” for the convictions because of asserted absence of counsel. But as the record stands, these two incompletions are favorable to appellant; two convictions are not shown.
The third, drunk and assaulting officer April 1958, and fourth, highway violation November 1960 (probably appellant’s U-tum), appellant himself does not contest and treats as minor offenses (see text, supra, following note 4).
The fifth, vagrancy March 1961, has no disposition shown, but is a type charge whether resulting in dismissal or conviction which would have no impact on a sentencing judge or parole board. Of the sixth, driving while intoxicated and no operator’s license in possession August 1962, the same might be said, and this arrest may be one of the four minor charges of which appellant himself makes no complaint.
I conclude that appellant Tarlton suffered no prejudice whatsoever because of the incompleteness of his FBI fingerprint record. If we complete the first two omissions with the convictions for the two serious charges of car theft and burglary appellant informs us he actually received, complete the third and fourth omissions with convictions for the minor charges of drunkenness and a highway violation which appellant does not contest or ask for any action in regard thereto, and postulate acquittals on the last two minor charges of vagrancy and DWI, then appellant’s record complete looks considerably worse than it does incomplete.
To the uninitiated in examining these records (which certainly does NOT include trial judges, probation or parole authorities) I point out that a blank in the “disposition” column does not mean the story is incomplete. The story may already be complete, or the “Disposition” may be shown by another entry. For example, on page one of appellant’s record immediately following, “ATM” (Fisher County) 10 March 1954 was disposed of 7 October 1954 by a conviction and sentence of five years for assault with intent to murder (“ATM” translates as either “Attempt to Murder” or “Assault to Murder”), of which appellant served three years, being discharged 25 March 1957.
As a final example, the last three entries on page five, which carry nothing in the “Disposition” column, are complete in themselves. These three entries relate the sad tale of how appellant Tarlton was arrested for carrying a prohibited weapon 12 February 1973, brought up for parole revocation 28 March (instead of being charged with the additional new offense), and by 6 June 1973 was safely lodged back in his old quarters in U. S. Penitentiary, Atlanta, Georgia, on his old conviction for forging and uttering U. S. postal money orders.
*1144FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537
The following FBI record, NUMBER 470 306 A, is furnished FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Information shown on this Identification Record represents data furnished FBI by fingerprint contributors. WHERE FINAL DISPOSITION IS NOT SHOWN OR FURTHER EXPLANATION OF CHARGE IS DESIRED, COMMUNICATE WITH AGENCY CONTRIBUTING THOSE FINGERPRINTS.
Contributor of Arrested or Fingerprints Name and Number Received Charge Disposition
Police Department Hobbs, New Mexico John Brent Tarlton Jr1" February 7,1950 Investigating burglary Released to Juvenile
Sheriff’s Office Vernon,Texas John Brent Tarlton Jr #A-3106 July 13, 1950 Car Theft Jailed in default of perfecting a $750.00 bond
Police Department Snyder, Texas John Tarlton #726 November 8,1951 Investigation Released
Sheriff’s Office Rankin, Texas John Brent Tarlton #253 December 25,1952 Car Theft
Sheriff’s Office Roby, Texas John Brent Tarlton Jr November 20, 1953 Burglary
Sheriff’s Office Lubbock, Texas John B Tarleton Jr #7803 March 10, 1954 “ATM” (Fisher County)
Texas Prison System Huntsville, Texas John Brent Tarleton Jr #130971 October 7,1954 Assault with intent to murder (1) Burglary (3)4-2 to 5 “con”) 5 years March 25, 1957 Discharged
Sheriff’s Office Andrews, Texas John Brent Tarlton Jr November 16,1957 carrying concealed weapon Fined $321.45
Police Department Big Spring, Texas John B. Tarlton #1744 January 13, 1958 Drunk $15.00 fine
Sheriff’s Office Big Spring, Texas John Tarlton #14364 April Drunk and 12,1958 Assaulting Officer
*1145Contributor of Arrested or Fingerprints Name and Number Received' Charge Disposition
Sheriff’s Office Monahans, Texas John Brent Tarlton Jr February Theft Under 17,1959 30 days
Police ■Department Lovington, New Mexico John Brent Tarleton Jr #A-1923 July 13, 1960 Drunk J ustice of the Peace Court 90 days jail with no suspended
Sheriff’s Office Lovington, New Mexico John Brent Tarleton Jr #9134 July 13, 1960 Drunk/Selling Anothers Property 60 days
Sheriff’s Office Odessa, Texas John Brent Tarlton #6881 November 27, 1960 Highway Violation
Sheriff’s Office Snyder, Texas John Tarleton #168 January 10,1961 Carrying Concealed Weapon $126.35 fine and cost
Sheriff’s Office Odessa, Texas John Brent Tarlton #6881 March 5, 1961 Vagrancy
Police Department San Angelo, Texas John Brent Tarleton Jr #12126 October 29, 1961 Vagrancy Fined $15.00
Sheriff’s Office Snyder, Texas John Brent Tarlton Jr #168 June 12, 1962 Drunk $20.50 fine
Police Department Lovington, New Mexico John Brent Tarlton Jr #A-2728 August 8,1962 Driving While Intoxicated No Operators License in Possession Pled Not Guilty Bond set as $500 Blood Alcohol Test 2.5%
Sheriff’s Office Odessa, Texas John Brent Tarlton #6881 October 28.1963 Drunk Fine and cost, $44.50
Police Department Odessa, Texas John Brent Tarlton # P-19592 November 13.1963 Drunk $25 Fine
Sheriff’s Office Perryton, Texas John Brent Tarlton #2546 June 26, 1964 Felony Theft No Billed Released
*1146Contributor of Arrested or Fingerprints Name and Number Received Charge Disposition
Police Department Berger, Texas John Brent Tarlton Jr #7609 August Drunk 6,1964 Pedestrian $15.00 fine
Police Department Midland, Texas John Brent Tarlton Jr #23065 February Drunk 10, 1966 Fined $25.00
Police Department Chattanooga, Tennessee John Brent Tarlton Jr #23144 May 10, Fugitive from 1968 California Released to Federal Authorities
United States Marshall Chattanooga, Tennessee John Brent Tarlton #630 May 11, 1968 Passing stolen postal money orders
United States Penitentiary Atlanta, Georgia J ohn B. Tarlton Jr #92165 June 28, 1968 Forging United States Postal Money Orders Uttering and Passing Forged Money Orders 6 years
Police Department Atlanta, Georgia John Brent Tarlton Jr #278354 October 18, 1970 United States Prisoner on Writ
United States Penitentiary Atlanta, Georgia John B. Tarlton #92165-131 November 2, 1970 Forging and Uttering United States Postal Money Order 6 years Received as #92165-131 from United States Penitentiary Atlanta (round trip)
SO Post Texas John Brent Tarlton Jr. #390 6-19-72 Drunk Profane Language Destroying Public Property $34.00 on drk chg
PD Snyder Texas John Brent Tarlton Jr 405 10-6-72 drunk in public 4200 bond forfeited
SO Snyder Texas John Brent Tarleton Jr 168 2-12-73 Carrying a Prohibited Weapon
*1147Contributor of Arrested or Fingerprints Name and Number Received Charge Disposition
USM Lubbock TX John Brent Tarlton Jr 01950 3-28-73 mandatory rel violator (Orig. Offense Forging US Postal Money Order & Uttering & Passing US Postal Money Order
US Pen Atlanta Ga John B. Tarlton 92165 131 6-6-73 Forg & Utt P.M.O.’s-
Since neither fingerprints nor an identifying number which is indexed in our files accompanied your request, FBI cannot guarantee any manner that this material concerns the individual in whom you are interested.
Notations indicated by * are NOT based on fingerprints in FBI files but are listed only as investigative leads as being possibly identical with subject of this record.
IDENTIFICATION DIVISION
*1148UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION IDENTIFICATION DIVISION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20537
G
The following information from FBI record, NUMBER 470 306 A, is furnished FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
All descriptive factors (if any) furnished by you match those in our identification file unless herein quoted.
Description and Related Data:
Race: W
Sex: M
Height: 68"
Weight: 146 lbs.
Hair: brn
Eyes: hazel
Date and Place of Birth: 4-22-32 Henderson Texas
Scars and Marks: scar on left arm
Address: 1911 Ave E. Snyder Texas (in 1973)
Occupation: Laborer
Since neither fingerprints nor an identifying number which is indexed in our files accompanied your request, FBI cannot guarantee any manner that this material concerns the individual in whom you are interested.
. Tlie name of “Tarlton” or “appellant” or “he” or “him” is only used a total of 14 times in the entire majority opinion (12 of these references being in the first 2 pages), and used not once in Part III, the really operative part of the opinion.
. 28 U.S.C. § 534 provides:
§ 534. Acquisition, preservation, and exchange of identification records; appointment of officials.
(a) The Attorney General shall' — ■
(1) acquire, collect, classify, and preserve identification, criminal identification, crime, and other records; and
(2) exchange these records with, and for the official use of, authorized officials of the Federal Government, the States, cities, and penal and other institutions.
(b) The exchange of records authorized by subsection (a) (2) of this section is subject to cancellation if dissemination is made outside the receiving departments or related agencies.
(c) The Attorney General may appoint officials to perform the functions autho*1133rized by this section. Added Pub.L. 89-554, § 4(c), Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 616.
This provision was amended in part by Pub. L.No.92-184 (15 Dec. 1971), § 902, which reads as follows:
Sec. 902. The funds provided in the Department of Justice Appropriation Act, 1972, for Salaries and Expenses, Federal Bureau of Investigation, may be used, in addition to those uses authorized thereunder, for the exchange of identification records with officials of federally chartered or insured banking institutions to jaromote or maintain the security by those institutions, and, if authorized by State statute and approved by the Attorney General, to officials of State and local governments for purposes of employment and licensing, any such exchange to be made only for the official use of any such official and subject to the same restriction with respect to dissemination as that provided for under the aforementioned Act.
. Appellant was actually granted parole subsequent to the filing of his brief on appeal, but remained subject to the jurisdiction of the Parole Board. From the FBI fingerprint record of arrests and convictions, by agreement of counsel furnished and made a part of the record after oral argument, we learned that on 12 February 1973 appellant was arrested for carrying a prohibited weapon, on 28 March found to be a parole violator, and on 6 June 1973 returned to the U.S. penitentiary at Atlanta, Georgia. See Appendix, pp. 1146-1147.
. Appellant’s Brief, p. 19.
. If Tarlton was without the assistance of counsel when he was prosecuted and convicted, the resulting convictions would probably be invalid. However, the present action is the wrong channel for bringing up this matter. Rather, as indicated in Part V of this opinion, a means should be afforded a defendant in judicial proceedings and before parole boards, when arrest records are being used, to correct inaccurate or misleading entries.
. Since appellant’s action below was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, he was never given an opportunity to prove the facts alleged in his complaint. We therefore assume on this appeal that the facts he alleges regarding his criminal record could ultimately be established as true, although, as discussed later, the FBI fingerprint record, part of the record on appeal subsequent to oral argument, shows that appellant has slightly exaggerated the number and importance of incomplete entries. See Appendix.
. Appellant asked the District Court to declare that the presentation to courts and correctional officials of the false and illegally created information in his FBI files is unconstitutional and to enjoin the further presentation of such information. Appellant also requested copies of the complaints against him and various other records pertaining to his past arrests. In addition, he sought damages to compensate him for his imprisonment. This opinion deals at length with appellant’s first requested relief. With regard to appellant’s request for a copy of his FBI arrest and conviction record, the Government has made that a part of the record in this case; such issue is now moot. It is obvious from appellant’s detailed and almost exact knowledge of the offenses shown on his FBI fingerprint record (cf. Appendix) that at some time he had been informed of its contents. In this court appellant did not press his request for monetary damages.
. The Government states in its brief, “The FBI has a responsibility not to disseminate arrest information which it knows to be false.” Government’s Brief at 7. See Menard v. Mitchell, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 113, 430 *1135F.2d 486 (1970), and Menard v. Saxbe, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 284, 498 F.2d 1017 (1974).
. The court’s opinion also footnotes “whether the FBI may retain records of police ‘detentions’ for which it knows that no probable cause for arrest existed. Menard (II) decided that such interaction between citizen and police was not the kind of criminal activity which may be included in FBI files. The corollary of Menard (II) is that arrests or convictions known by the FBI to be unconstitutional are not properly enshrined in FBI files.” Note 7.
Although I am in full agreement with our decision in Menard (II), I believe our opinion there must be limited to those cases where the FBI later learns that information in its records is inaccurate. The majority here seeks to place an affirmative duty on the FBI to ferret out subsequent information about each arrest entry in their records. It is this additional burden on the FBI which I find unacceptable.
. In appellant’s case, for example, a determination of whether his convictions on more serious charges (two on theft, one each on assault, burglary, and escape) were obtained in a fair and constitutional manner would require an inquiry into the facts surrounding the arrests and convictions. Records and witnesses would have to be examined to determine if probable cause existed for the arrest, if appellant had been represented by counsel, if the jury had been properly instructed, if the evidence supported the verdict, or if any other defect that one might think of existed. Similarly, to expunge the items reflecting only an arrest without conviction, which appellant challenged by admitting the fact the arrest occurred but denying the probable cause for the arrest, represents a task of infinite, astronomical proportions. Inquiry would have to be made into the background of events long since forgotten, into records sent to archives or destroyed, into the recollection of witnesses dead, missing or forgetful.
Such an inquiry into the “justifiability” of a record item would be indescribably difficult and burdensome upon the best of circumstances, when conducted in a nearby locality *1136covering recent events. The problem would be compounded when as in this case the challenged incidents occurred over twenty years ago in different jurisdictions thousands of miles away. The history of appellant’s prior arrests and convictions began in 1950, ended in 1964, and occurred primarily in Texas and New Mexico. At the time of the Parole Board action of which appellant complains, and in which this record was made available to the Parole Board, appellant liad been incarcerated since 1966 as a result of a conviction in the U. S. District Court for the Ehstern District of Tennessee for forgery of U. S. postal money orders witli ensuing sentence of six years.
At present, the FBI lias 3,300 employees doing nothing but the routine administrative task of assembling the data of fingerprints and other records. Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F.Supp. 718, 721 (D.D.C.1971). Each day these 3,300 employees must process over 29,000 fingerprints, 13,000 of which are received in connection with arrests alone. In 1973 there were 9,027,700 arrests in the United States reported to the FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States: Uniform Crime Reports — 1973, at 121 (Table 24). The number of additional employees that would be required to investigate and verify these 13,000 items per day or 7,000,000 per year is beyond comprehension.
During oral argument appellant narrowed the scope of his requested relief from the infinite to the merely enormous by saying that he would require the FBI to investigate only if requested to do so by a prisoner. We gain little solace from this concession. There are currently in the Federal prison system over 23,071 inmates. Weekly Report, U. S. Department of Justice — Bureau Week of 11 September 1974. It is obvious, of Prisons, Federal Prisoners Confined as appellant’s counsel admitted, that the remedy urged here must also be available to those incarcerated in state and local prisons.
. The proposed remedy here is in truth a rather ingenious way to challenge (1) by collateral attack in a federal court the validity of (2) previous convictions (3) and arrests (4) in all States, (5) with each and every such action possibly to be initiated in the District of Columbia, legal domicile of the Attorney General and Director of the FBI. In this sense, the requested relief is similar to a petition for habeas corpus or action under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). As with other kinds of collateral attack, this remedy would require substantial inquiries into tire facts of a case. Unlike these other remedies, however, the action proposed here would result, not in reversal of a conviction, but rather a mere ban on FBI dissemination of tlie previous arrest or conviction record. In sucli a court proceeding evidence -would be required to support any finding of fact or law requested by the prisoner or ex-prisoner initiating the action. The inquiry in court would necessarily be as detailed as that of the FBI described above. The evidence sufficient to justify a finding by the District Court that a previous conviction in the court of another jurisdiction was “unjustified,” i. e., should be null and void, and therefore that ail mention of it in the FBI record must be expunged, would likewise necessarily need to be detailed, searching, and convincing. What consequential legal effects such findings of fact and law in this subsequent inquiry by the U. S. District Court would have on the original conviction, in addition to the FBI record expunging, would require a pause to ponder. Nor can we here delineate precisely the standard of proof required of the petitioner to obtain in effect a declaration that a previous conviction is null and void, even for a limited objective. It is sufficient for our purpose here to say that such proceedings could never be pro forma, could never bo concluded satisfactorily for the petitioner without sufficient evidence to justify overturning a previously valid conviction, and on this basis then to contemplate the burden that authorizing such actions would place on the entire United States court system.
The contemplation of this massive new form of collateral attack inevitably leads one to wonder where all of this litigation will take place. The instant case was brought in the District of Columbia. Appellant was incarcerated in a federal prison in Atlanta, Georgia, in the Fifth Circuit. He was sentenced on the charge, from which he sought parole,' by the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, in the Sixth Circuit. He seeks to have the U. S. District Court for tlie District of Columbia alter records located in this jurisdiction. These records reflect arrests and convictions that occurred in state courts in Texas and New Mexico. The question of the most convenient forum gives one pause.
. Although this opinion is phrased in such a way as to make clear that no cause of action remains to Tarlton, it could equally well have been put in terms of no subject-matter jurisdiction. In either event, it is obvious that there does not remain an outstanding controversy between Tarlton and the named defendants and as a result there is no jurisdiction in the District Court to undertake the hearing required by the majority.
If the purpose of the remand to the District Court is only to initiate an inquiry as to wliat the FBI can and should be doing, i. e., to see if section 534 should be amended, then this is purely a legislative task. If, on the other hand, a remand to the District Court is to be directed to the specific complaint of injustice to the appellant Tarlton, then the appropriate forum is either Georgia, where Tarlton is confined, or Eastern Tennessee, where Tarlton was sentenced.
. See note 9, supra.
. United States v. Menard, supra, 498 F.2d at 1025.
. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, at 10, 12-13, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972).
. Pub.D.No.92-184 (15 Dec. 1971), § 902.
. Appellant argues “ . . . his present imprisonment is a direct result of the information whose accuracy he is challenging.” (Brief, p. 26.) I suggest his imprisonment is a direct result of being found guilty by a federal jury and judge of forging a U. S. postal money order, a conviction whose accuracy appellant has not challenged.
Appellant further asserts, “ . . . Appellant [is] languishing in prison because of the information he seeks to challenge, . ” (Brief, p. 27.) We have no way of knowing what evaluation the Parole Board made of his previous record; my understanding is that the Parole Board customarily gives primary consideration to the record of the inmate since entering prison. If it is true that the Parole Board characterized his record as that of a “professional criminal,” this was doubtless with reference to the five serious offenses which appellant wants to challenge — plus the unchallenged forgery conviction.
. To discourage bad faith allegations by defendants, and a concomitant waste of manpower resources in chasing down phony claims, the judge or probation officer should make it clear to the defendant personally, at the time the criminal record is turned over to the defense for comment, that any patently frivolous or false challenges to the accuracy of the FBI record will be duly reported by the probation officer to the judge to be considered at the time of sentencing.
. See note 18 supra.
. In many cases the inquiry directed to the inmate would be only to ask if the prisoner had any additional information to submit beyond that furnished the trial court at the time of sentencing.
. During the hearings on confirmation of Clarence M. Kelley as the nominee for Director of the FBI, Senator Roman I-Irus-ka of Nebraska suggested that it would be sound policy for FBI records to be complete and disclosed to the individual involved. Washington Post, 20 June 1973, § A, at 1, col. 3, con’d, at § A, p. 9, col. 1.
It may be that it would be sound policy to permit all citizens to have access to their FBI fingerprint record; it is clearly within the power of Congress to create such a general right. Courts, however, must deal in the contest of actual harms to' existing rights; there simply is no basis for contending that the mere compilation of records, without more, constitutes a harm sufficiently immediate to warrant court intervention. Laird v. Tatum, supra, so holds:
The decisions in [certain] cases fully recognize that governmental action may be subject to constitutional challenge even though it has only an indirect effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights. At the same time, however, these decisions have in no way eroded the
*1142“established principle that to entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained, or is immediately in danger of sustaining, a direct injury as the result of that action . . . . ” Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634, 58 S.Ct. 1, 82 L.Ed. 493 (1937).
408 U.S. at 12-13, 92 S.Ct. at 2325.
. Cf. Consumer Credit Protection Act § 611, 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (1970) which provides a limited right to challenge credit bureau data.