(concurring in the result):
Perhaps the exercise of greater caution would forfend against my expressing any disagreement from what has been said by our respected colleague, Judge McGowan. He has written so well and has said so much with which I am in accord that, possibly, I should suppress comment. Were I convinced that properly we could here reach the merits, I would concur in his ultimate conclusions.
It is my judgment that we may not— and therefore that we should not — reach the merits. I am persuaded that jurisdiction is wanting in that: 1, the respective Ripon plaintiffs lacked standing to initiate this action; and 2, the issue submitted on this record is nonjusticiable. I thus join substantially 1 in the respective discussions tendered by my colleagues, Judges Tamm and Wilkey.
Introduction
Let me turn immediately to an important aspect of the business before us. Involved is the Republican Party’s plan, embodied in its Rule 30, for the allocation to its 1976 Convention of delegates from the various States, the Territories and the District of Columbia. There is a real distinction between the Republican Party’s allocation program and the “state” problems involved in “apportionment” cases treating of legislative reapportionment plans or dealing with Congressional redistricting issues and similar situations which, from time to time, have engaged the attention of the Court.2
The Ripon plaintiffs, in their allegations of record here, repeatedly have spoken of the “apportionment of delegates.” In their motion before the Supreme Court they had alleged in their paragraph 3:
The stay of the injunctive portion of the District Court’s order is wholly inconsistent with the procedure approved by this Court for the granting of relief in reapportionment cases cited and followed by the District Court. See especially Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 584-586, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). (Ripon plaintiffs’ motion, Supreme Court file, dated August 17, 1972). (Emphasis added.)
Justice Rehnquist did not miss the point, however, for he specifically wrote in Republican Committee v. Ripon Society, supra note 1, 409 U.S. at 1225, 93 S.Ct. at 1477:
In the case at bar, of course, we deal with a delegate-allocation dispute that retains importance until 1976 rather than a credentials dispute such as was involved in O’Brien v. Brown [409 U.S. *5911, 92 S.Ct. 2718, 34 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972)]. (Emphasis added.)3
I
It must be remembered that nothing in the Constitution refers to national party conventions. Congress has passed no statute giving access to the courts in respect of the allocation of delegate strength to a national party convention, and Congress certainly knows how to do just that, were Congress so to decide. Contrast the instant situation with the provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act, as amended, where the codified 2 U.S.C. § 437h(a) provides:
The Commission, the national committee of any political party, or any individual eligible to vote in any election for the office of President of the United States may institute such actions in the appropriate district court of the United States, including actions for declaratory judgment, as may be appropriate to construe the constitutionality of any provision of this Act 4
This court recently considered the import of this language in Buckley v. Valeo, 171 U.S.App.D.C. 172, 201, 519 F.2d 821, 850 (1975) (en banc) where it was pointed out that the section
does not entitle the eligible plaintiffs to raise any conceivable constitutional issue with respect to the Act and the relevant criminal sections, no matter how remote or speculative. We perceive no congressional intent to waive article Ill’s requirement that there be a present “case or controversy.” The declaratory judgment, often seen as the outer limits of article III jurisdiction, nevertheless requires that there be an actual controversy. (Footnotes omitted.)
It is not in any way to disparage the purposes of The Ripon Society, Inc. that we say, flatly, the corporation totally lacks standing to sue. Surely it is entitled to no relief on its own account; obviously it has no vote. The Supreme Court has told us in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972),
a mere “interest in a problem,” no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the organization “adversely affected” or “aggrieved” within the meaning of the APA. Id., at 739, 92 S.Ct. at 1368.
And see United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177-180, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 41 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974).
*592The individual Ripon plaintiffs here stand on no higher plane. They allege no specific injury pertinent to themselves. No statute has authorized the institution of this action by them. There has been no denial of a right in any of the individual plaintiffs to a seat in the Republican Convention. Indeed a national party convention is under no obligation to receive any of these Ripon plaintiffs as a delegate, as Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 488, 95 S.Ct. 541, 42 L.Ed.2d 595 (1975) makes clear.
The alleged ground of aggrievement is a mere abstraction.5 These individual Ripon plaintiffs have afforded no predicate for action by the courts. They are in no different position on any account than is any member of the public.6 It would seem inevitable that their action should be barred. They lack standing within the test laid down in Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-221, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 2932, 41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974) where the Court said
Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution. It adds the essential dimension of specificity to the dispute by requiring that the complaining party have suffered a particular injury caused by the action challenged as unlawful. This personal stake is what the Court has consistently held enables a complainant authoritatively to present to a court a complete perspective upon the adverse consequences flowing from the specific set of facts undergirding his grievance. Such authoritative presentations are an integral part of the judicial process, for a court must rely on the parties’ treatment of the facts and claims before it to develop its rules of law. Only concrete injury presents the factual context within which a court, aided by parties who argue within the context, is capable of making decisions. (Footnote omitted.)
II
Even were we to assume, contrary to what has been said in Part I, supra, that these Ripon plaintiffs have standing, we are nonetheless bound to order that their complaint be dismissed. The issue they have tendered, in my view, is simply nonjusticiable.7
There is much more involved in a party’s national convention than its merely nominating candidates for the presidency and vice presidency. That convention, (perhaps most importantly, at least on occasion), will be called upon to set forth the aims and political objectives of the political party and its adherents.8
*593To succeed in an election, the presidential nominee in a nation as populous and with interests as diverse as ours must carry the states whose electoral votes cumulatively will provide the victory which he seeks and which the party adherents desire. But that is not all. That presidential nominee, in addition to promoting his own candidacy, will be expected by the party and its adherents to contribute to the election of United States Senators and members of the House who will be expected to assist in the accomplishment of the party’s program. Long before the national convention, on the hustings, via televised appeals, in local debates, through published statements and otherwise, party candidates for national office as well as for both branches of the Congress and for gubernatorial recognition, will have sought to arouse the electorate and to recruit party adherents. The allocation of delegates will thus serve a twofold purpose.
Organization of public thought and the rallying of voters behind the presidential nominee and his program will become essential not only in an appeal to party members but to independent voters and even to members of an opposition party.9 It is a fundamental truism that any party must seek to maximize voting support from its already registered voters. Appeal to local constituencies often enough can be marshalled through leadership already there recognized because of qualities long since made evident.
Recognition of such individuals in delegate allocation may not only add strength to the management of the convention, but additionally will tend to enhance the possibilities of garnering the electoral vote state by state, and cumulatively thus result in election of the presidential nominee. The candidate and the party adherents who can bring about that result will achieve the very purpose for which assoeiational significance is recognized and protected. Not to be forgotten is the fact that the electoral vote of a particular state may turn upon a mere plurality, no matter how small, of that state’s voters. Allocation of delegates to such states — and the selection and seating10 of such delegates as can advance “the cause” — will seldom be out of mind among party leaders of either major party. The ultimate popular will, of course, ascertained at the election itself, reflects the collective mind of the American voter, and success or repudiation of the candidate, or the party will follow.11
Taking account of what a party may seek to do and what its adherents think it should do to accomplish the party’s objectives, may we not wonder what steps are open to a court to manage the party’s convention composition in delegate allocation or otherwise? Success is what the party seeks, of course. In light of what we have been saying, and having over a period of some three decades gained no more than a minority status, the Republican Party in 1972 had adopted rules and a program designed, it was thought, to improve its status and to *594achieve that success.12 It is clear from the record before us, note 12 supra, that views largely shared by the Ripon plaintiffs were presented at length during the 1972 convention and finally were rejected by a vote of nine hundred ten to four hundred thirty-four. Losers at the convention, claiming a denial of equal protection, the Ripon plaintiffs moved to the courts, and here we are.13
Justiciability of state ordered and state regulated proceedings in this area afford us no guidance in the present context. Were Congress to have acted and to have regulated the composition of the national convention of a major political party, we would have before us a totally different problem.14 It may be supposed that few jurists have been more perceptive than the late Mr. Justice Jackson who realized that the “one man-one vote” approach involved scrapping the present electoral system and providing for direct election of the President. Dissenting in Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 234, 72 S.Ct. 654, 664, 96 L.Ed. 894 (1952), he wrote:
The demise of the whole electoral system would not impress me as a disaster. At its best it is a mystifying and distorting factor in presidential elections which may resolve a popular defeat into an electoral victory. At its worst it is open to local corruption and manipulation, once so flagrant as to threaten the stability of the country. To abolish it and substitute direct election of the President, so that every vote wherever cast would have equal weight in calculating the result, would seem to me a gain for simplicity and integrity of our governmental processes.
After the order had been entered that this case be set for hearing en banc, we invited the Democratic National Committee as amicus to submit a brief and to argue. We directed attention to certain specific points including those of standing and justiciability. Recognizing that there are issues involved in this litigation which bear upon the “traditional” role of political parties and the “traditional” nature of the political process, Amicus told us on brief “the Democratic Party has a vital interest in the actions taken by this court and welcomes the opportunity to present its views.”15
*595Amicus continues that the decision of the district court, in accepting jurisdiction and in holding the claim asserted by Appellants to be justiciable, represents a departure from the historical reluctance of courts to intrude in the political process, in the absence of racial discrimination or clear state action. It is the view of the Democratic National Committee that such a departure is both unwarranted and unwise. Because of the well-established First Amendment rights of political parties and their adherents, and the clear lack of judicially manageable standards involved in any question of delegate allocation, this court should adopt the view expressed in Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 287 F.Supp. 797 (sic) (D.Minn.1968), aff’d, 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968). The court in Irish refused to intervene in a delegate allocation matter, and expressed the view that the political process is best served by the compromise and consensus institutionalized in the political parties. Amicus Brief at 2.
Asserting the position of the Democratic National Committee, Amicus cogently has argued that questions involving the allocation of delegates at a national convention will reflect policies which are subject to change and development, in part, at least, because of changes in a party’s constituency. Associational prerogatives include retention of flexibility in a party’s shaping its own organization.
One may conclude that one party may seek its strength in a certain area where dependence upon a liberal and urbanized appeal can be expected, especially in light of past performance, to yield the greater effectiveness. The party very properly may oppose judicial intervention in the political process where in addition to the business of nominating candidates, “vital” rights of association guaranteed by the Constitution are also involved, Cousins v. Wigoda, supra, 419 U.S. at 487, 95 S.Ct. 541.16 It would seem to follow that a party, be it Democratic or Republican, is clearly in position to limit access to the decision-making processes of the party in order best to promote the interests of the party’s adherents. Just who they may be cannot accurately be determined even by the party itself, and it would seem, all the more clearly, that the problem is nonjusticiable because of the inability of the courts to define the party’s constituency.
I have said enough to predicate my conclusion that the issue here is nonjusticiable.17 On that ground, I would reverse the judgment of the District Court and order that the Ripon plaintiffs’ complaint be dismissed. Even correctly to decide on the merits that the present Republican delegate-allocation formula is *596impervious to successful challenge will conclude only this case. I think, absent racial or other invidious discrimination of constitutional dimension, that we should dispose of the instant type of challenge, once and for all.
. For example, I see no need for us to overrule this court’s earlier opinions in Georgia v. National Democratic Party, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 102, 447 F.2d 1271, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858, 92 S.Ct. 109, 30 L.Ed.2d 101 (1971); and in Bode v. National Democratic Party, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 373, 452 F.2d 1302 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019, 92 S.Ct. 684, 30 L.Ed.2d 668 (1972). Different treatment undoubtedly would have been developed if there then had been available the Court’s discussion in O’Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 2718, 34 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972), Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 95 S.Ct. 541, 42 L.Ed.2d 595 (1975) and the Memorandum Opinion by Rehnquist, J., in Republican Committee v. Ripon Society, 409 U.S. 1222, 93 S.Ct. 1475 (1972).
. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 37 L.Ed.2d 298 (1973); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 93 S.Ct. 2348, 37 L.Ed.2d 335 (1973); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 93 S.Ct. 979, 35 L.Ed.2d 320 (1973); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), each of which, among many others, demonstrably involved “state” action. We are not here talking about a “right to vote” as in election situations, e. g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941), or Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968), after constitutional prerogatives had been denied.
. Mr. Justice Blackmun further particularized in Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 3, 95 S.Ct. 751, 42 L.Ed.2d 766 (1975):
This case presents the issue of the constitutionality of a federal-court-ordered reapportionment of the North Dakota Legislature. That State, like many others, has struggled to satisfy constitutional requirements for legislative apportionment delineated in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964) * * * [and other cases.] (Emphasis added.)
The Ripon plaintiffs simply fail to distinguish the “apportionment” problems arising under state law from action by the Republican ■Party Convention. In Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 378, 83 S.Ct. 801, 807, 9 L.Ed.2d 821, note 10 (1963) the Court expressly specified:
We do not reach here the questions that would be presented were the convention systern used for nominating candidates in lieu of the primary system.
Even in Reynolds v. Sims, text supra, 377 U.S. at 565, 84 S.Ct. at 1383, the Court itself explained that a citizen “has an inalienable right to full and effective participation in the political processes of his State’s legislative bodies," and further, that “full and effective participation by all citizens in state government requires, therefore, that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of members of his state legislature." (Emphasis added.)
. See Powell, J., concurring in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 194, 94 S.Ct. at 2955: “. the Court has not broken with the traditional requirement that, in the absence of a specific statutory grant of the right of review, a plaintiff must allege some particularized injury that sets him apart from the man on the street.” (Emphasis added.) See also, id., notes 15 and 16.
. While not controlling here, to be sure, even in an “apportionment” setting, Mr. Justice Frankfurter undertook his own definition of what he deemed to be an abstract claim. The term applies here in light of our record. Even respecting a state apportionment issue, Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it thus:
. The claim is hypothetical and the assumptions are abstract because the Court does not vouchsafe the lower courts — state and federal — guidelines for formulating specific, definite, wholly unprecedented remedies for the inevitable litigations that today’s umbrageous disposition is bound to stimulate in connection with politically motivated reapportionments in so many States. In such a setting, to promulgate jurisdiction in the abstract is meaningless. It is as devoid of reality as “a brooding omnipresence in the sky,” for it conveys no intimation what relief, if any, a District Court is capable of affording that would not invite legislatures to play ducks and drakes with the judiciary. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267-268, 82 S.Ct. 691, 738, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).
. Cf. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487, 43 S.Ct. 497, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923).
. I will not repetitively cover ground which has been so well treated by my colleagues, Judges Tamm and Wilkey. I find myself in substantial accord with their views. I feel, however, that certain aspects of our problem may further be analyzed.
. Freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas clearly is protected activity. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487, 95 S.Ct. 541, 42 L.Ed.2d 595 (1975). Three concurring justices saw the right of members of a political party to gather in a national political convention to be at the very heart of the freedom of assembly and association, id. at 491, 95 S.Ct. 541. Powell, J., observed, id. at 497, 95 S.Ct. at 552, *593that “[t]he National Convention of the Party may seat whomever it pleases, . .
. Consider results in the 1972 presidential election when the Republican candidate carried Louisiana where 97 per cent of the registered voters were Democrats! Disillusionment with a candidate and his announced program can be an intangible factor.
. A convention, after all, may refuse to seat delegates deemed hostile to a party’s potential candidate and disruptive of the party’s objectives or likely to diffuse support among the voters. Cousins v. Wigoda, supra, 419 U.S. at 488, 95 S.Ct. 541, and see Mr. Justice Powell remarking id. at 497, 95 S.Ct. at 552, that “[t]he National Convention of the Party may seat whomever it pleases . . . conversely, delegates who deem themselves and their views repelled by an inhospitable convention may even “take a walk” from their own party as the Republicans found out in 1912.
. Most of us need not even “look at the record” to recall the two “disaster” years for the presidential nominees, respectively, the Republican in 1964, and the Democratic in 1972.
. Our record is replete with evidence of the Party’s approach. In support of its motion for summary judgment, there appears the Party’s “Statement of Material Facts,” J.A. 187. Additionally, at J.A. 193 is supplied the history of delegate allocations in each presidential year, commencing with the year 1900 through 1972. Various evidentiary materials include the affidavit of Tom Stagg, J.A. 203, with its detailed explanation of the Party’s new Rule 30; the affidavit of William C. Cramer at J.A. 210, supplemented by that of Governor Reagan at J.A. 233, that of Senator Tower at J.A. 237 and that of Gerald R. Ford, Minority Leader of the House, at J.A. 251. Exhibits and statistical tables complete the data, culminating with the affidavit of the Chairman of the Republican National Committee, Senator Robert Dole, J.A. 274, describing the efforts of the Party to achieve a consensus respecting a system of allocation of delegates.
. Even if the courts were somehow to fashion an allocation of delegates, there can be no control over how those delegates will vote. Many will have come to the convention committed to “favorite sons” or even to have been hostile to the nomination of the candidate ultimately to be selected. Realignment of delegates’ votes may follow after consultations among delegations from the different states. Coalitions can eventuate and turn out to be powerful enough to carry the day. In such circumstances, it may seem difficult to ascertain whose vote is being “diluted”!
In Convention Decisions and Voting Records, 2d edition 1973, R. Bain and Parris, it is reported that in the 1952 Republican Convention, after a first ballot, 595 votes had been cast in favor of the nomination of General Eisenhower when 604 votes were necessary for decision. The chairman of the Alabama delegation yielded to the State of Minnesota, the chairman of which delegation thereupon cast 19 votes for General Eisenhower. Nomination was thus achieved.
. But Congress has never done so; and see footnote 3, supra.
. We can readily recognize that “vital interest.” Consider, e. g., that the Democratic National Committee has adopted its rules for the allocation of delegates to the 1976 Democratic National Convention. The Party’s promulgat*595ed table shows that there are to be 3,006 delegates authorized for the 1976 convention. The ten largest states including the nation’s largest cities have been accorded 1,608 delegates. From those states, clearly enough, and reflecting past experience as to the sources of its voting strength, the Democratic Party has allocated those delegates thus:
California 279 Ohio 152
New York 274 Texas 130
Pennsylvania 178 New Jersey 108
Illinois 169 Massachusetts 104
Michigan 133 Florida 81
See The Washington Post, March 13, 1975, “Delegate Plan Outlined by Democrats.”
. And see O’Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 4, 5, 92 S.Ct. 2718, 34 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972).
. In Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, the Court summarized factors to be considered in a determination of nonjusticiability. Merely to hold that Republican Rule 30 violates no rights of the Ripon plaintiffs would seem not to preclude yet other challenges by other groups, irrespective of which of the major parties may be involved. See note 15, supra, where delegates from ten States will constitute more than a convention majority to the exclusion of the delegate strength of the other forty States.
A holding of nonjusticiability, on the other hand, would speak to all and make clear that a delegate-allocation plan, rationally evolved, and reflecting valid and constitutionally protected political objectives is beyond judicial modification. Cf., Frankfurter, J., dissenting, Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S. at 289, 82 S.Ct. 691.