OPINION OF THE COURT
A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, Jr., Circuit Judge.In recent years, much attention has been paid on the national level to the methods by which political parties finance their partisan activities and by which political leaders choose individuals for certain high-ranking positions. This case involves the relationship, on a local level, between the financing of political parties and the choice of individuals for certain not-so-high-ranking but sometimes lucrative work. Appellants Egidio Cerilli, Maylan Yackovich, Ralph Buffone, and John Shurina have been convicted and sentenced for conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 19511 and for sub*418stantive violations of that Act. We will affirm the respective judgments of sentence.
I. FACTS
The appellants are employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) in Westmoreland County, District 12-5. Cerilli occupied the position of Superintendent while Buffone, Yackovich and Shurina were Assistant Superintendents.
In order to fulfill its snow removal and general road maintenance and repair responsibilities, PennDOT leases equipment from private owners. The leasing is accomplished at the discretion of the local superintendent and all such leases must be approved by the superintendent or his designee. The superintendent has the authority to negotiate rates for these leases up to a maximum rate set by the Department of Highways. Once a lease is signed, the amount of work for which a lessor’s equipment is used is also determined at the county level.
A number of lessors testified at trial that one or more of the defendants required that payments be made as condition to the lessors’ equipment being used.
Appellants do not challenge these basic facts. Instead they attack their convictions primarily on the theories that these facts do not constitute violations of the Hobbs Act and that the evidence was not sufficient to warrant conviction under the Hobbs Act because appellants’ participation in a conspiracy was not proved and because there was an insufficient effect on interstate commerce.2
II. IS THE COERCIVE SOLICITATION OF POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS A VIOLATION OF THE HOBBS ACT?
Appellants contend that the payments they obtained were political contributions. The indictment does not specify for what purpose the payments were used. Testimony at trial established that some of the payments were in the form of checks made out to political committees. We will assume for the purpose of this discussion that these payments did constitute political contributions.
Appellants argue that since the Hobbs Act defines extortion as the “wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear,” (emphasis supplied), if the force, violence or fear is used for a lawful purpose, the use is not wrongful and extortion is not committed. Appellants submit that the solicitation of political contributions is not only lawful, but is protected by the First Amendment.3 Appellants also argue that extortion “under color of official right” is likewise restricted to situations where the purpose for the obtaining of the payments is unlawful.
Appellants urge that their theory is supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in U. S. v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 93 S.Ct. 1007, *41935 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973). In that case, the indictment charged certain members and officials of labor unions with committing acts of violence and destruction against the property of the Gulf States Utilities Company in the course of a strike against that company in order to force that company to agree to a contract providing for higher wages and other benefits. The Court stated that “wrongful” as used in the Hobbs Act “limits the statute’s coverage to those instances where the obtaining of the property would itself be ‘wrongful’ because the alleged extortionist has no lawfúl claim to that property.” 410 U.S. at 400, 93 S.Ct. at 1009-1010. The Court concluded that where violence is used “to achieve legitimate union objectives . . . there has been no ‘wrongful’ taking of the employer’s property; he has paid for the services he bargained for, and the workers receive the wages to which they are entitled in compensation for their services.” Id.
In reaching this conclusion the Court relied heavily on the legislative history of the Hobbs Act. Section 2 of the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 979, while similar to the Hobbs Act, contained an exception for the payment of wages by an employer to an employee. On the basis of this language, the Court in U. S. v. Local 807, 315 U.S. 521, 62 S.Ct. 642, 86 L.Ed. 1004 (1942) held that a scheme by New York City teamsters to coerce payments from out-of-town drivers and owners for allowing their trucks to enter the city did not violate the Anti-Racketeering Act. In response, Congress passed what became the Hobbs Act. The legislative history made it clear that the new act reached extortion by union members “under the guise of obtaining wages.” 91 Cong.Rec. 11900 as quoted in U. S. v. Enmons, 410 U.S. at 403, 93 S.Ct. at 1011. That history also made it clear that the new act “does not have a thing in the world to do with strikes.” 91 Cong.Rec. 11912 as quoted in U. S. v. Enmons, 410 U.S. at 404, 93 S.Ct. at 1012. The Court was quite explicit in stating its reluctance to construe the Hobbs Act as a method of regulating strike actions:
[I]t would require statutory language much more explicit than that before us here to lead to the conclusion that Congress intended to put the Federal Government in the business of policing the orderly conduct of strikes. Neither the language of the Hobbs Act nor its legislative history can justify the conclusion that Congress intended to work such an extraordinary change in federal labor law or such an unprecedented incursion into the criminal jurisdiction of the States.
410 U.S. at 411, 93 S.Ct. at 1015.
We are thus confronted with the question of whether the political contributions here are sufficiently similar to the wage payments in Enmons to bring this case within Enmons’ precedential orbit. We conclude that they are not.
Once a collective bargaining agreement is reached, it is generally impossible to determine what portion of the benefits, if any, are the result of violent action. Thus the Court in Enmons could properly conclude that the defendants there had a “lawful claim” to the wages they received. It is clear from this record, however, that the contributions were, in substantial if not total measure, a result of appellants’ extortionate actions. Thus, although the solicitation of political contributions is not inherently “wrongful,”4 the solicitations here were “wrongful” in that neither the appellants nor any political committee had a “lawful claim” to those contributions.
More importantly, Enmons is a labor case. The Court’s reasoning was obviously and explicitly tied to the labor context and more specifically to the strike context. Any application of Enmons to cases outside of that context must be done with caution. Otherwise there is a danger that Enmons, if read as the appellants read it, could effectively repeal the Hobbs Act. The receipt of money whether by a political party, a charitable institution or by an individual is generally *420not inherently wrongful. The wrong under the Hobbs Act is the manner in which it is obtained. Thus we understand Enmons as not relying primarily on the legitimacy of the union’s objectives but rather on the clear Congressional intent, as expressed both in the legislative history of the Hobbs Act and the entire federal scheme regulating labor-management relations, that violence during labor strikes not be punishable as extortion under the Hobbs Act. There is no corresponding intent to exempt the type of activity here from the ambit of the Act.5
It is well-established that a person may violate the Hobbs Act without himself receiving the benefits of his coercive actions. See U. S. v. Green, 350 U.S. 415, 420, 76 S.Ct. 522, 100 L.Ed. 494 (1956), U. S. v. Trotta, 525 F.2d 1096, 1098 n.2 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971, 96 S.Ct. 2167, 48 L.Ed.2d 794 (1976); U. S. v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678, 686 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 947, 85 S.Ct. 440, 13 L.Ed.2d 544 (1964). U. S. v. Trotta itself involved political contributions and the court there held that this fact did not alter the defendant’s criminal liability.6 This court in U. S. v. Homer, 545 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954, 97 S.Ct. 2673, 53 L.Ed.2d 270 (1977), which involved the conviction of a state legislator under the Hobbs Act, stated that evidence that the defendant delivered the money he had extorted to the local party treasurer was not probative of the extortion charge and was therefore properly excluded. On the basis of this well-established line of case law, we conclude that the appellants’ conduct here constituted extortion regardless of whether the payments went into appellants’ pockets or their party’s coffers.
Appellants argue that the passage of 18 U.S.C. § 601 indicates that Congress did not view the type of activity involved here as violating the Hobbs Act. § 601(a) provides:
Whoever, directly or indirectly, knowingly causes or attempts to cause any person to make a contribution of a thing of value (including services) for the benefit of any candidate or any political party, by means of the denial or deprivation, or the threat of the denial or deprivation, of—
(1) any employment, position, or work in or for any agency or other entity of the Government of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a State, or any compensation or benefit of such employment, position, or work; or
(2) any payment or benefit of a program of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a State;
if such employment, position, work, compensation, payment, or benefit is provided for or made possible in whole or in part by an Act of Congress, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
The primary concern of Congress in passing § 601 was obviously with preventing government employees from having to *421make political contributions in order to obtain or retain their jobs. See S.Rep.No.94-1245, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in (1976) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 2883; H.R.Rep.No.94-986, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1976). It is doubtful whether appellants could be prosecuted under this section since they obtained payments from lessors not employees. Section 601 is clearly not jurisdictionally co-extensive with the Hobbs Act. The jurisdictional basis for § 601 is that the employment, position, work, etc. must have been provided at least in part by an Act of Congress. This is in contrast to the Hobbs Act’s jurisdictional requirement of an effect on commerce. We conclude that § 601 is Congress’ attempt to deal with a problem related to but not identical with the problem at which the Hobbs Act is aimed. The passage of § 601 thus does not indicate that activities such as those in which appellants have engaged are not proscribed by the Hobbs Act. We hold therefore that the coercive solicitation of political contributions is within the realm of actions that are illegal under the Hobbs Act.7
III. ADEQUACY OF THE EVIDENCE
A. Strictissimi Juris
Having concluded that the relationship between appellant’s actions and the political process does not insulate them, as a matter of substantive law, from Hobbs Act liability, we face their argument that this relationship at least affords them a measure of procedural protection. Appellants’ contention is that since their “allegedly criminal conduct was inextricably linked to protected political activity . . . [t]he doctrine of strictissimi juris . . . requires the highest standard of proof to be applied to every question of sufficiency arising at the trial.” Appellants’ Brief, p. 51.
This doctrine, which literally translated means “of the strictest right,” apparently arose out of two Supreme Court cases reviewing convictions under the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385. In Scales v. U. S., 367 U.S. 203, 232, 81 S.Ct. 1469, 1487-88, 6 L.Ed.2d 782 (1961), the Court stated that “Smith Act offenses involving as they do subtler elements than are present in most other crimes, call for strict standards in assessing the adequacy of the proof needed to make out a case of illegal advocacy.” The Court in Noto v. U. S., 367 U.S. 290, 299-300, 81 S.Ct. 1517, 1522, 6 L.Ed.2d 836 (1961) ruled that the individual defendant’s criminal intent like other elements of a violation of the membership clause of the Smith Act,8 “must be judged strictissimi juris, for otherwise there is a danger that one in sympathy with the legitimate aims of such an organization, but not specifically intending to accomplish them by resort to violence, might be punished for his adherence to lawful and constitutionally protected purposes, because of other and unprotected purposes which he does not necessarily share.”
The doctrine was applied in U. S. v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969), where defendants who had been involved in the formulation and distribution of “A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority,” were convicted of conspiring to aid others in refusing or evading registration of service in the armed forces in violation of 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a). Partially as a result of the application of this doctrine, the convictions were vacated. The Seventh Circuit, in U. S. v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 392 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970, 93 S.Ct. 1443, 35 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973) which involved convictions under the Federal Anti-Riot Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2101, 2102, described the application of the doctrine in the following terms:
*422When the group activity out of which the alleged offense develops can be described as a bifarious undertaking, involving both legal and illegal purposes and conduct, and is within the shadow of the first amendment, the factual issue as to the alleged criminal intent must be judged strictissimi juris. This is necessary to avoid punishing one who participates in such an undertaking and is in sympathy with its legitimate aims, but does not intend to accomplish them by unlawful means. Specially meticulous inquiry into the sufficiency of proof is justified and required because of the real possibility in considering group activity, characteristic of political or social movements, of an unfair imputation of the intent or acts of some participants to all others.
The coercive solicitation of appellants here is not the type of “bifarious undertaking . . . within the shadow of the first amendment” that warrants the application of the strictissimi juris doctrine. We need not sort out the subtle shadings of intent involved in Scales, Noto, Spock, and Dellinger. We need not seriously fear that convictions in cases such as this will chill the legitimate exercise of first amendment rights. Appellants have not been indicted for membership in a political party nor have they been indicted for their personal political preferences. They have been indicted for extortion. We are satisfied that the traditional standards of proof and of judicial review are fully adequate to protect appellants’ rights without application of the doctrine of strictissimi juris.
B. Evidence of Conspiracy
According to appellants, the evidence at trial “showed that the county superintendent of PennDOT and his assistants were committed to aggressive fundraising for the Democratic Party, but no agreement to extort, whether express or implied, was shown.” Appellants’ Brief, p. 39. We agree with the government that the evidence showed a great deal more than a commitment to aggressive fundraising.
“Participation in a criminal conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; a common purpose and plan may be inferred from a ‘development and collocation of circumstances’.” Glasser v. U. S., 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), quoting U. S. v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1938) cert. denied, 309 U.S. 664, 60 S.Ct. 590, 84 L.Ed. 1012 (1940). Accord, U. S. v. Schoenhut, 576 F.2d 1010, 1027 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 964, 99 S.Ct. 450, 58 L.Ed.2d 421 (1978).
At trial, eleven lessors testified to the demands made of them by the appellants. Although the “shake-down” techniques were not always identical,9 the basic pattern of appellants’ demanding a specific amount, generally based on a percentage of the lessors’ income under the lease, remained essentially constant. Particularly persuasive evidence of joint action is the testimony of several lessors who dealt with two or more of the appellants.
One lessor, Mr. James C. Poole, testified that Cerilli demanded $2,000 in cash from him and that Poole made this payment at Cerilli’s home in the presence of Yackovieh. William Ramaley testified that he met with Buffone who demanded $700 and that, during this meeting, Cerilli entered the room and was introduced to him. The following year Yackovieh contacted him and demanded 5% of the amount Ramaley had received under his PennDOT lease in the last year.
Walter Seigfried testified that he met with Buffone who told him, “I am the hatchet man, we want 3% of what you made last year.” After some argument, Seigfried agreed, but determined that 3% of his earnings came to $525 rather than the $750 that Buffone demanded. He, therefore, called Yackovieh to make sure that the $525 figure was adequate. Yackovieh, after coming to Seigfried’s home and reviewing his records, accepted a check for $525. *423Seigfried then met with Cerilli to determine when his equipment would be put back to work.
Paul Caletri testified that after Buffone or another assistant superintendent had demanded $125, he went to see Buffone, but was taken into Yackovich’s office because Buffone was not in. Caletri complained that he had not earned $125 in the previous year and Yackovich looked at a ledger to determine how much Caletri had earned and when money was last demanded of him. Yackovich told him that he would have to discuss the matter with Cerilli and took Caletri into Cerilli’s office. After a discussion with Cerilli, Caletri agreed to pay $75. At this meeting, Yackovich explained the initial $125 demand by stating that Buffone “had things all screwed up,” but that the following year “things would be better.”
There was also testimony from another Assistant Superintendent, Mario Bidese, that Cerilli, Yackovich and Buffone had given him instructions with respect to obtaining money from lessors. On another occasion, Yackovich instructed him to sell certain tickets that Cerilli had given Bidese, but not to sell them to the lessors because, according to Yackovich, “we’ll take care of that.” Bidese also testified that during 1971 and 1972 there were meetings between the superintendent and the assistant superintendents every week or every other week, that fundraising was. discussed at these meetings, and that Cerilli, Buffone and Yackovich made statements at these meetings to the effect that “the contractors weren’t coming up with the money like they used to under the Republicans.”
This evidence more than supports the finding of a conspiracy to extort money from the lessors and the participation of Cerilli, Yackovich and Buffone in this conspiracy.
The evidence of Shurina’s participation in the conspiracy came primarily from Harry Graham, a PennDOT lessor, who testified that Shurina called Graham at his home and asked Graham to meet with him. At this meeting, Shurina told Graham that he owed $470. After Graham complained, Shurina replied, “Well, I know what you made ... I know how much your truck worked, and I know how much you made.” Shurina then looked at something in his briefcase and repeated the demand for $470. Graham stated that he agreed to pay that amount “because I wanted to work.” This testimony is clearly adequate to support Shurina’s conviction on the substantive Hobbs Act count. We hold also that, because this transaction fits so closely into the pattern of extortion already described, it is an adequate basis upon which the jury could find that Shurina was a member of the conspiracy.
C. Interstate Commerce
The evidence established that all the lessors had bought fuel for their equipment that had travelled in interstate commerce. Most of the lessors also testified that they had purchased equipment and/or supplies that had travelled in interstate commerce. Appellants argue that this evidence is insufficient to meet the interstate commerce component of the Hobbs Act. The Act punishes anyone who “in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion. . . ”
The Supreme Court has stated that this language manifests a Congressional purpose “to use all the constitutional power Congress has to punish interference with interstate commerce by extortion, robbery or physical violence.” Stirone v. U. S., 361 U.S. 212, 215, 80 S.Ct. 270, 272, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1959). In Stirone, a proprietor of a ready-mixed concrete business in Pennsylvania who brought sand from outside of Pennsylvania was the victim of extortion. The Court stated:
Had Rider’s business been hindered or destroyed, interstate movements of sand to him would have slackened or stopped. The trial jury was entitled to find that commerce was saved from such a blockage by Rider’s compliance with Stirone’s coercive and illegal demands. It was to *424free commerce from such destructive burdens that the Hobbs Act was passed.
Id.
This court has held, “It is not necessary that the purpose of the extortion be to affect interstate commerce, . . . but only that one of the natural effects thereof be an obstruction of that commerce.” U. S. v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 77 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936, 92 S.Ct. 949, 30 L.Ed.2d 812 (1972). “[W]here the resources of an interstate business are depleted or diminished ‘in any manner’ by extortionate payments, the consequent impairment of ability to conduct an interstate business is sufficient to bring the extortion within the play of the Hobbs Act.” U. S. v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d at 642; U. S. v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d at 77; U. S. v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678, 692-93 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 379 U.S. 997, 85 S.Ct. 440, 13 L.Ed.2d 544 (1964). “[A]ll that is required to bring an extortion within the statute is proof of a reasonably probable effect on commerce, however minimal, as result of the extortion.” U. S. v. Spagnolo, 546 F.2d 1117, 1119 (4th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909, 97 S.Ct. 2974, 53 L.Ed.2d 1093 (1977); U. S. v. Santoni, 585 F.2d 667, 672 (4th Cir. 1978). See also, U. S. v. Nakaladski, 481 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1064, 94 S.Ct. 570, 38 L.Ed.2d 469 (1973); Carbo v. U. S., 314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953, 84 S.Ct. 1625, 12 L.Ed.2d 498 (1964). “Congress was as much concerned with the threatened impact of the prohibited conduct as with its actual effect.” U. S. v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837, 96 S.Ct. 65, 46 L.Ed.2d 56 (1975).
The evidence presented at trial meets these tests. The payments made here clearly resulted in a depletion of resources thereby reducing the lessors’ capacity to make their purchases of fuel and supplies in interstate commerce. Appellants contend that the “depletion of resources” test should only be applied where the victim of the extortion is itself an interstate business.
We reject such a limitation as being inconsistent with Congress’ purpose “to use all the constitutional power Congress has to punish interference with interstate commerce . . . .” Stirone v. U. S., 361 U.S. at 215, 80 S.Ct. at 272. We perceive no meaningful distinction between the effect on interstate commerce in the Stirone situation where money was extorted from a concrete supplier who bought sand from out of state and the situation here where fuel and supplies are purchased from out of state. This Court has already held that extorting money from a tavern owner has the natural effect of diminishing the owner’s ability to purchase liquor originating in interstate commerce and this natural effect is a sufficient basis for conviction under the Hobbs Act even though there was no evidence of a decline in actual liquor purchases. U. S. v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1975).10 In U. S. v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1969), the court held that extortion from rubbish collection business limited that business’ ability to purchase receptacles and trucks originating from out of state and that this was a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to support a Hobbs Act conviction. Although the effect on interstate commerce proven here is certainly not very large, the Hobbs Act does not proscribe only those extortions that have a large effect on commerce. Because there is adequate evidence to establish that there was some effect on commerce, the convictions here were properly supported.11
*425IV. UNDER COLOR OF OFFICIAL RIGHT
The dissent argues that this court and others have improperly held that, where extortion under color of official right is charged, one need not prove that the payment was obtained by force, fear or duress. See U. S. v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1972). Since the district judge instructed the jury on the basis of this circuit’s well-settled law in this regard, the dissent contends that the appellants’ conviction must be reversed.
Because this contention was not advanced by the appellants either in their briefs or at oral argument, we would generally not consider it on our own initiative. Also, the proof of coercion in this case is overwhelming. Moreover, as a panel, we are not free to overrule what the dissent recognizes to be the clear law of this circuit. Since we believe that this circuit has properly decided the question in issue here, we do not believe that rehearing in banc is necessary.
The Hobbs Act definition of extortion explicitly includes the obtaining of property by any of the following: “wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.”12 Since the dissent argues that extortion under col- or of official right (at least outside of the context of an improper fee) requires proof of some element of coercion, it is essentially arguing that a disjunctive reading of the relevant statutory language is incorrect. Professor Ruff, upon whose writing the dissent heavily relies, states:
This task [of asserting that a disjunctive reading of the Hobbs Act is improper] is complicated, however, by the necessity of arguing not that an alternative interpretation of the operation language is more consistent with the legislative intent, but that the language, in effect, should be struck from the Act. If one adopts the usual course and attempts to give meaning to all the statutory language, it is hard to challenge the result reached by the courts.13
The argument that these words should be, by judicial fiat, “struck from the Act,” is based on the Hobbs Act’s legislative history. Yet the dissent concedes that there is no explicit discussion anywhere in the legislative history of the “under color of official right” language. The dissent asserts, however, that the statutory language was in large part derived from New York’s extortion statute and that New York courts have drawn a sharp distinction between bribery and extortion. The cases cited by the dissent on this point, however, were decided after the enactment of the 1934 statutory predecessor to the Hobbs Act that is the source of the “under color of official right” language and, therefore, these cases shed no light on the congressional purpose behind this language. While it is true that the New York statute defined extortion under color of official right rather narrowly, we are not prepared to incorporate that narrow definition at this time. Before a court decides that such broad language was intended to have so constricted a meaning, more explicit direction must be available either in the form of actual statutory language or persuasive legislative history. We have neither here. Moreover, all the circuit courts that have addressed the issue have agreed with this court’s interpretation in Kenny. See cases cited by the dissent at p. 427 n.5. Although modern theories of statutory construction have advanced the state of the art significantly in recent years, we believe that it is still proper for a court to construe an unambiguous statute according to the clear meaning of its terms particularly where every other appellate court has so construed it and where, despite the dissent’s assertions, the legislative histo*426ry is silent as to any contrary congressional intent. If language is to be “struck from the Act,” this is work for the Congress, not for the courts.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, appellants’ judgments of sentence will be affirmed.
. The Hobbs Act provides:
§ 1951. Interference with commerce by threats or violence
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(b) As used in this section—
(1) The term “robbery” means the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property, or property in his custody or possession, or the person or property of a relative or member of his family or of anyone in his company at the time of the taking or obtaining.
(2) The term “extortion” means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.
(3) The term “commerce” means commerce within the District of Columbia, or any Territory or Possession of the United States; all commerce between any point in a State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and any point outside thereof; all commerce between points within the same State through any place outside such State; and all other commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction.
(c) This section shall not be construed to repeal, modify or affect section 17 of Title 15, sections 52, 101-115, 151-166 of Title 29 or sections 151-188 of Title 45.
Appellants Cerilli, Yackovich and Shurina were tried together. Appellant Buffone’s case was severed from those of the other appellants when he became ill during trial. Buffone subsequently waived his right to a jury trial and entered into a stipulation with the government *418whereby the testimony at the trial of the other appellants as well as the other appellants’ objections and motions and the court’s rulings prior to, at the time of, and post trial were made part of the record with respect to Buffone. Buffone was then found guilty by the district court and was sentenced. We have granted his motion to consolidate his appeal with those of the other appellants. He has adopted the briefs and appendix filed on behalf of the other appellants.
. Appellants also argue:
1. The failure of the evidence to establish that the payors were motivated by fear of economic loss warrants reversal.
2. The failure of the evidence on Counts 6 and 12 to establish an attempt warrants reversal.
3. The district court committed reversible error in admitting co-conspirator hearsay evidence without sufficient independent evidence of conspiracy.
4. The district court committed reversible error in its instructions on specific intent, fear of loss of property and attempt.
5. The district court abused its discretion in denying a continuance in response to Cerilli’s mid-trial hospitalization.
We have considered these arguments and conclude that they are without merit.
. The relationship between the solicitation here and the rights protected by the First Amendment is also the basis of appellants’ claim, discussed infra, that the evidence against them must be scrutinized most closely under the doctrine of strictissimi juris.
. The jury was instructed, “Solicitation of political contributions or the sale of tickets is lawful conduct. Appellants’ Appendix, p. 1256.
. Appellants have suggested that 18 U.S.C, § 601 evidences such an intent. For the reasons given infra, we do not accept that contention.
. In U. S. v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639 (3d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014, 96 S.Ct. 446, 46 L.Ed.2d 385 (1975), payments were obtained in the guise of political contributions, but it was suggested at trial that the defendant might have “pocketed the money.” See U. S. v. Mazzei, 390 F.Supp. 1098, 1106 (W.D.Pa.1975). Likewise, in U. S. v. Rosa, 560 F.2d 149 (3d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 862, 98 S.Ct. 191, 54 L.Ed.2d 135 (1977), what the defendant did with the “donations” he extorted was unclear. Since we have assumed arguendo that the payments here were actually political contributions, we do not rely on Mazzei and Rosa with respect to this point.
Neither do we believe, however, that U. S. v. Sutter, 160 F.2d 754 (7th Cir. 1947), cited by appellants, is relevant to our analysis. In that case, the defendant, a federal employee, obtained money claiming that it would be given to a variety of charitable causes. The court reversed his conviction because “the evidence wholly fails to show that the defendant used his employment to extort, but shows rather that he used appealing causes to defraud.” 160 F.2d at 757. The appellants here clearly used their employment to extort. Therefore Sutter is inapposite.
. The district court’s refusal to instruct the jury to the contrary is, therefore, not error.
. The Smith Act, in relevant part, provides:
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof—
Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction.
. For example, different lessors were asked for different percentages of their income under the leases. Also, lack of coordination among the appellants sometimes led to contradictory demands upon the same lessor.
. There was a decline in the victim’s resales of liquor.
. For the reasons given above, the district judge’s instructions were also correct. The core of those instructions is contained in the following excerpt:
I instruct you instead that you may find interstate commerce with the meaning of these instructions if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim purchased goods in interstate commerce and that the money was extorted from him; then, as a matter of law, commerce was affected.
The district judge’s ruling as a matter of law that commerce was affected if the requisite facts were found by the jury is entirely proper. See U. S. v. Lowe, 234 F.2d 919 (3d Cir.), cert. *425denied, 352 U.S. 838, 77 S.Ct. 59, 1 L.Ed.2d 56 (1956); U. S. v. Augello, 451 F.2d 1167, 1170 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1070, 92 S.Ct. 1518, 31 L.Ed.2d 802 (1972).
. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (emphasis supplied). The full text is set out in note 1, supra.
. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption, 65 Georgetown Law Journal 1171, 1197 (1977) (emphasis supplied).