dissenting;
At stake on this appeal is the eligibility of large numbers of federal servants in the Legislative and Judicial Branches for the valuable protections afforded by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.2 It has aptly been noted in other contexts that “Title VII ‘leaves much to be desired in clarity and precision,’ ”3 and the provision at issue here certainly is no excep*437tion. After a far-ranging probe into the legislative history of Section 717(a),4 however, I am satisfied that Congress intended the vast majority, though not all, of federal legislative and judicial employees in the excepted service to enjoy the same equal employment opportunity that Title VII accords to all competitive service personnel. I must, then, respectfully dissent.
I
A brief recitation of the facts will aid the analysis. In August, 1976, JePhunneh Lawrence was hired by the General Accounting Office (GAO) as an attorney-adviser,5 an excepted-service position in the federal civil service.6 In May, 1977, after receiving a work evaluation rating his performance as unsatisfactory,7 and without registering a grievance with his agency,8 he instituted this litigation in the District Court, alleging that GAO had engaged in racially discriminatory employment practices against him and other black workers.9 Lawrence founded his claim on both Title VII10 and the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.11 The defendants, GAO and the Civil Service Commission—the appellants here—moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that Title VII was Lawrence’s sole avenue for relief and that his suit was barred because he had failed to pursue his Title VII administrative remedies with GAO and the Civil Service Commission.12 The District Court disagreed, held that employees of GAO are not covered by Title VII, and accordingly denied the motion to dismiss.13 Lawrence was prepared to amend his complaint and continue to press *438those of his grievances which were constitutionally based.14
Appellants thereupon moved for reconsideration of the ruling or, in the alternative, for certification of the accompanying order for immediate interlocutory appeal.15 The District Court granted the latter request,16 thus enabling appellants to bring here the question whether GAO employees are included within the provisions of Title VII. In its memorandum opinion, the court stated that the decision on the certified issue could be dispositive of the case because, if Title VII is found to be applicable to Lawrence, it would feel constrained on remand to dismiss the action for nonexhaustion of administrative remedies.17
Two inquiries thus become vital: Is Lawrence, as an excepted-service employee of GAO, entitled to the protections of Title VII? If so, can he still prosecute his claim in the District Court despite his failure to file a complaint with either GAO or the Civil Service Commission? The District Court felt that the language of Title VII compels the conclusion that GAO as a whole is excluded.18 I agree with my colleagues19 that, on the contrary, the statute is ambiguous, and that the legislative history points to a different result.20 We part ways, however, respecting the exact scope of coverage extended to GAO. The court today interprets the law as encompassing only competitive-service personnel,21 and thus as excluding Lawrence. I would, instead, hold that Title VII extends to any GAO employee appointed subject to the civil service laws, regardless of competitive status.22 Under that theory Lawrence should have sought relief from his agency, with an optional appeal to the Civil Service Commission, before seeking judicial action. Because he did not do so, his suit would ordinarily be considered premature,23 and the passage of time would now preclude utilization of administrative mechanisms.24 I think, however, that the somewhat peculiar circumstances presented here warrant a different result. I would thus remand to the District Court with directions to grant Lawrence leave to invoke GAO’s Title VII grievance procedures, and to retain jurisdiction until the conclusion of any administrative action.25
II
As originally enacted in 1964, Title VII offered no aid to employees of the Federal Government.26 At the time, Congress simply declared that “it shall be the policy of the United States to insure equal employment opportunities for Federal employees without discrimination because of race, col- or, religion, sex or national origin and the President shall utilize his existing authority to effectuate this policy.”27 The President *439thereafter promulgated an executive order implementing this policy in federal employment and placing primary responsibility for oversight on the Civil Service Commission.28
By 1972, it became very clear that if equal employment opportunity was to become a reality in federal agencies, more stringent measures were needed.29 Consequently, in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 197230 Congress added a new section to Title VII designed to spur the Government’s antidiscrimination drive and to set an example for the private sector.31 Section 717(a), the new provision, specifies in pertinent part:
All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment ... in executive agencies (other than the General Accounting Office) as defined in section 105 of title 5 ..., in those units of the Government of the District of Columbia having positions in the competitive service, and in those units of the legislative and judicial branches of the Federal Government having positions in the competitive service, and in the Library of Congress shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.32
Save with respect to the Library of Congress, the Civil Service Commission retained primary responsibility for achieving equal opportunity in the federal workforce.33 Each covered agency was required to promulgate regulations establishing a program to promote equal opportunity, including a procedure for handling discrimination complaints.34 The difficulty with which we are confronted lies in determining exactly which federal agencies are covered by Section 717(a) and, more particularly, whether some or all of GAO employees are among its beneficiaries.
A
At first blush, the language of Section 717(a) appears clearly to exclude GAO, since it purports to cover “all personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment ... in executive agencies (other than the General Accounting Office . ...”35 Indeed, that was the conclusion reached by the District Court.36 But Section 717(a) in terms also embraces all per*440sonnel actions “in those units of the legislative and judicial branches of the Federal Government having positions in the competitive service,”37 and GAO both is part of the Legislative Branch38 and has many positions in the competitive service39 The apparent conflict between these two specifications of the same statutory clause forces us to look beyond the Act itself for an explanation of congressional intent.40 And consideration of the legislative history of the Act’s 1972 amendments41 as well as the pattern of federal-employee coverage as a whole42 convinces me that most GAO employees, including Lawrence, are entitled to the protections of Title VII.
Section 717(a) draws its definition of “executive agency”—from which it then excludes GAO—from 5 U.S.C. § 105, which states:
For the purpose of this title, “Executive agency” means an Executive department, a Government corporation, and an independent establishment43
“Independent establishment,” in turn, is defined in 5 U.S.C. § 104 as
(1) an establishment in the executive branch ... which is not an Executive department, military department, Government corporation, or part thereof, or part of an independent establishment; and
*441(2) the General Accounting Office.44
So, at least for purposes of Title 5, which codifies the bulk of the laws dealing with governmental organizations and employees, GAO is clearly to be treated as an executive agency. If Congress had simply incorporated into Section 717(a) the Title 5 definition, GAO would just as plainly be an executive agency within the meaning of Title VII.
The only complication is that, after adopting the Title 5 definition, Section 717(a) expressly excepts GAO.45 But this may well mean no more than that, for the purposes of Title VII, GAO is not to be treated as an executive agency, but rather as something else. Surely if other phraseology indicates an intention to include GAO in its proper character—as an agency of the Legislative Branch46—Title VII coverage is not precluded by the preceding limiting language. The fact is that in Section 717(a) Congress made Title VII applicable to “those units of the legislative ... branch . . . having positions in the competitive service,” 47 and GAO certainly fits that description.
It may be that this general reference to inclusion of certain legislative units is not, standing on its own, compelling enough to overcome the specific exclusion of GAO appearing earlier. That possibility need not be explored, however, for the legislative history of Section 717(a) offers additional and persuasive evidence that exclusion of GAO from its provisions was not intended. The section-by-section analysis of the bill as reported by the Conference Committee and as finally enacted tells us that “[ijncluded within [Section 717] coverage are executive agencies, . . . certain departments of the District of Columbia Government, the General Accounting Office, Government Printing Office and the Library of Congress.”48 Similar statements were made on two occasions during floor debate in the Senate. When Senator Cranston introduced an amendment to add an express reference to the Library of Congress in the statutory text, he justified the proposal by pointing out that the “legislative branch coverage in the bill is limited to ‘positions in the competitive service’ [which] would apply to both the General Accounting Office and the Government Printing Office—which are agencies of the Congress,” but not to the Library of Congress, which has no competitive service positions.49 GAO again merited mention when Senator Javits, during discussion of a proposed amendment seeking to bar coverage of state and local governmental workers “as long as Congress exempts its employees and the employees of its Members,”50 stated that “employees of the General Accounting Office and the Printing Office, and perhaps some other housekeeping employees, are included within the ambit of the bill as it now stands” by virtue of the coverage of competitive service personnel in the Legislative Branch.51
B
This analysis strongly indicates that Congress most likely intended to bring GAO employees under Title VII, and the statutory language is amenable to that result. Nonetheless, the fact that Section 717(a) refers at all to GAO in an exclusionary manner invites some explanation of why Congress effectuated its intent in precisely *442this manner. An inquiry into the origins of the language used52 and the scope of the coverage accorded GAO53 serves to elucidate why the suggested construction is not only permissible but most reasonable.
The principal model Congress had before it in drafting Section 717(a) was the executive order earlier promulgated to prod federal action to ensure equal employment opportunity for federal workers.54 That order itself distinguished between Executive Branch agencies on the one hand and Legislative and Judicial Branch agencies on the other in language closely similar to that which Congress adopted in Section 717(a):
This Order applies ... [to] executive agencies (other than the General Accounting Office) as defined in section 105 of title 5 ... [and] to those portions of the legislative and judicial branches of the Federal Government . . . having positions in the competitive service and to the employees in those positions,55
The President thus had exercised his authority to liberate all executive-agency employees from discrimination, but had chosen to restrict coverage of employees in the coordinate branches to those holding positions in the competitive service, perhaps out of a desire to avoid undue interference with operation of the other arms of the Government. Because, aside from Government corporations, GAO was the only entity outside the Executive Branch included in the Title 5 definition of “executive agency,”56 the executive order expressly, and quite logically, omitted GAO from the broader coverage granted employees in the Executive Branch, thus presumably leaving it for inclusion in the narrower protection accorded those in the Legislative and Judicial Branches.57 Though by my reading Section 717(a) widens the scope of protection for these two branches,58 the important point is that its provisions maintained a definitional distinction first appearing in the executive order.
Moreover, by first excluding GAO as an executive agency and then including it as part of the Legislative Branch, Congress was not simply engaging in a meaningless semantic exercise. What Congress did was grant GAO more restricted protection than it would have acquired had it been covered as though it were an executive agency. By the clear language of Section 717(a), all Executive Branch employees are protected from discrimination, no matter how they are appointed or whether they are assigned to competitive- or excepted-service positions.59 In contrast, in my view only those employees in the Legislative and Judicial Branches who are appointed in accordance with the civil service laws—a category that includes personnel in both the competitive and the excepted services—receive Title VII protection.60 In GAO, the Comptroller General and Deputy Comptroller General— the two highest officials61 and thus the two *443most directly responsible to Congress62 —would fall outside the purview of Title VII,63 but all other employees would be covered. If, as I believe, Congress chose thus to insulate those most clearly acting as instrumentalities of legislative or judicial power, it is no wonder that Congress first expressly mentioned GAO in order to exclude it from the blanket coverage accorded “executive agencies” that are actually part of the Executive Branch.
Ill
With GAO not entirely excluded from Title VII, it next must be determined exactly which employees within legislative and judicial agencies, including GAO, are entitled to invoke Title VII. Section 717(a) extends Title VII’s protections to “[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees ... in those units of the legislative and judicial branches of the Federal Government having positions in the competitive service ....”64 Appellants argue that this language includes all employees of a “unit” of the Legislative Branch—entire agencies such as GAO and the Government Printing Office—if any employees of that unit are in the competitive service.65 Lawrence, on the other hand, contends that at most Section 717(a) covers only competitive-service personnel, and that as an employee in the excepted service he could not have benefited from Title VII.66
The phraseology of Section 717(a) tends to support appellants’ interpretation since it speaks of “units,” not “employees,” “having positions in the competitive service.” But “unit” is not an unambiguous term, and no conclusion can be safely drawn without further inquiry. After considering the legislative history of Section 717(a) and other relevant factors, I do not believe that either of the constructions proffered accurately reflects the statutory scheme. I conclude that “unit” refers to legislative or judicial employees whom Congress has placed as a group under the civil service laws, and with respect to whom Congress delegated to the Civil Service Commission 67 the responsibility for categorizing the positions as within either the competitive or the excepted service.68 More particularly with regard to GAO, Congress has ordained that appointments of all of its employees, with the exception only of the Comptroller General and the Deputy Comptroller General, be made “in accordance with the civil service laws and regulations.” 69 Pursuant to this directive, the positions of all but these two GAO employees could have been placed in the competitive service; instead, the Civil Service Commission has excepted certain GAO positions from the competitive service exactly as it has done for agencies in the Executive Branch.70 Indeed, the regulation *444that makes Lawrence an excepted service employee is the very same one excepting employees in like positions elsewhere in the civil service.71 Because, save for GAO’s two top officials, Congress has thus treated all of its employees as a single “unit” in delegating personnel authority to the Civil Service Commission, the most logical reading of Section 717(a) is that Congress intended Title VII coverage for these “units,” in their entirety, and not a coverage dependent upon the fortuity of the Commission’s service classifications of their personnel.
An examination of the legislative history demonstrates that Congress did, indeed, intend Section 717(a) to encompass employees other than those in the competitive service. This can be seen by tracing the progress through Congress of the bill that ultimately became the Equal Opportunity Employment Act of 1972. It originated in the House of Representatives72 and, as introduced and reported from committee, expressly provided that only competitive service positions in any of three Branches would receive Title VII coverage.73 On the floor, even this limited protection was deleted when the House substituted the text of another bill, primarily in order to change the enforcement mechanism for Title VII claims against private employers.74 The Senate bill,75 which, as amended, later replaced in its entirety the version passed by the House,76 provided much wider coverage for federal employees. As introduced, it included noncompetitive service personnel in *445the Executive Branch,77 and, also in contrast to the plainly more restrictive language of the original House bill,78 seemed to protect noncompetitive personnel in the Legislative and Judicial Branches as well:
All personnel action affecting employees .... in those portions of the Government of the District of Columbia, and the legislative and judicial branches of the Federal Government having positions in the competitive service, shall be made free from any discrimination .... 79
This can be seen yet more clearly by comparing the language in the Senate bill with that in the executive order upon which it appears to have been modeled,80 which by its terms applied to “those portions of the legislative and judicial branches of the Federal Government ... having positions in the competitive service and to the employees in those positions.”81 While the executive order thus constrained coverage in the Legislative Branch to employees actually holding competitive service positions, the limiting language was omitted from the version proposed in the Senate.
As reported out of committee, Section 717(a) was largely unchanged; although the word “units” had been substituted for “portions,” the sense of the bill remained constant.82 It was amended one more time— on the floor of the Senate—when Senator Cranston proposed changes to expand it to include the Library of Congress, characterizing the bill offered by the committee as confining “legislative branch coverage . .. to ‘positions in the competitive service.’ ”83 While this statement, standing alone, might be taken as support for a restrictive interpretation, the Senator went on to say that “[although this would apply to both the General Accounting Office and the Government Printing Office—which are agencies of the Congress, it would not apply to the Library of Congress which does not have positions in the competitive service and is not generally bound by the Federal personnel manual.”84 His references to GAO and the Government Printing Office appear to encompass their entire complements of employees, or at least those in positions “generally bound by the Federal personnel manual,” and not simply competitive service employees.85 Indeed, it would be puzzling if Congress chose to include all Library of Congress employees under Title VII, but restrict coverage at GAO and the Government Printing Office to competitive service personnel alone.
While I thus would find that Congress did not intend to exclude all excepted service employees, a number of other concerns expressed by Senator Cranston, and evident in *446the adoption of the amendments concerning the Library of Congress, indicate why Congress also may not have intended to include all of them. Because the Library of Congress is an instrumentality of Congress, that body was loathe to yield to the Civil Service Commission—an executive agency—control over employment practices in the Library.86 Thus the Librarian himself was given final authority over equal opportunity efforts so as not to “inva[de] ... the statutory authority of the Librarian to appoint employees of the Library ‘solely with reference to their fitness for their particular duties.’ ”87 Most GAO employees, in contrast, are to be appointed “in accordance with the civil service laws and regulations,”88 a procedure that narrows the discretion of the appointing authority.89 In the exceptional instances in which Congress did not delegate authority to the Civil Service Commission in this manner, it may be supposed that Congress preferred to treat the affected officials and employees—like the Library of Congress staff—as representing most directly the will of the Legislative and Judicial Branches, and accordingly sought to insulate them from intrusion by the Executive Branch, even with respect to Title VII enforcement. In GAO, this category would include only the Comptroller General and Deputy Comptroller General, who are appointed by the President but are subject to removal only by joint resolution of Congress or by impeachment.90 Similar divisions of authority appear in statutes establishing other legislative and judicial units having some employees under the control of the Civil Service Commission.91
Support for this distinction is found in the report accompanying the Senate bill when it left committee, which stated that “[a]ll employees subject to the executive branch and Civil Service Commission control or protection are covered by this section.”92 By providing that certain appointments in the Legislative Branch are to be made in accordance with civil service laws and regulations, as are the hiring decisions *447at GAO, Congress subjected these employees to the authority normally exercised by the Civil Service Commission, whether the positions themselves are ultimately classified as competitive or excepted service.93 A holding that all of these GAO employees are protected by Title VII would thus be fully consistent with the intent expressed in the Senate report.
Two other references to coverage for Legislative and Judicial Branch agencies appear in the legislative history. The section-by-section analysis of the final Senate bill, prepared by Senator Williams, its primary sponsor, declares that “[a]11 employees of any agency, department, office or commission having positions in the competitive service are covered by” Section 717.94 The corresponding analysis accompanying the bill when it emerged unchanged from conference similarly states that it includes “executive agencies, .. . certain departments of the District of Columbia Government, the General Accounting Office, Government Printing Office and the Library of Congress.”95 Though neither is precise enough to pinpoint the proper interpretation of Section 717(a), both indicate a broad sweep to intended coverage of agencies such as GAO.
Because Congress thus chose to treat some groups of legislative and judicial employees exactly as Executive Branch employees are treated,96 I would hold that all of these employees, whether excepted or competitive service, are covered by Title VII. The legislative history, though inconclusive at some points, is much more consistent with this reading. And while a few decisions have touched on the point in passing and have indicated a construction that would exclude excepted-service employees, none was called upon to make a critical examination of the issue, and none relied on such an interpretation to reach its holding.97
I remain advertent to “the oft-repeated statement that Title VII is remedial in character and should be liberally construed to achieve its purposes.”98 The legislative history of the 1972 amendments to Title VII is replete with references to the crucial importance of eradicating employment dis*448crimination from the Federal Government.99 Although some federal workers are clearly left without Title VII protection—notably employees of Members of Congress themselves 100—for me the conclusion is inescapable that, with few exceptions, Congress intended to accord all federal employees “the same rights and impartial treatment which the law seeks to afford employees in the private sector.”101 I believe the interpretation expounded herein best serves that end.
IV
That brings me to the one problem remaining. Federal employees must exhaust available administrative remedies before taking their Title VII claims into court,102 and Lawrence did not seek an administrative solution. Arguably, then, his suit was premature and, to make matters worse, presentation of his grievance to his agency is now time-barred.103 While it undoubtedly would have been safer to lodge an administrative complaint, I am not persuaded that Lawrence has forfeited his Title VII judicial remedy for the alleged discrimination.
In Bethel v. Jefferson,104 we concluded that the parallel administrative filing requirements for state and local government employees105 are not jurisdictional in the strict sense, and that equitable considerations might play an alleviating role in deserving cases.106 There was grave uncertainty in Bethel as to the proper route to administrative redress and, unfortunately, the employees there complaining had chosen and carefully followed the path we later found to be wrong.107 We held that, in those circumstances, the time limit for compliance by the employees was tolled until the appropriate procedure was first made clear.108
Lawrence’s situation did not differ essentially from that in Bethel. The language of Section 717(a) was equivocal, and on its face seemed as likely to deny as to confer Title VII rights.109" Before Lawrence brought his action, the Civil Service Commission had instructed GAO, as well as at least one of its employees, that its excepted service personnel were not among those secured by the Commission’s regulations implementing Title VII,110 and GAO had so informed its equal employment opportunity counsel*449ors.111 Lawrence was aware of this interpretation at the time he sought judicial redress,112 and although GAO continued to argue the contrary position,113 the Commission did not change its mind until after the suit was instituted.114 After meticulous examination of the legislative history of Section 717(a) I am now prepared to say that Lawrence is covered by Title VII, and therefore could have sought relief from GAO under that provision, but that was far from clear when he really needed to know.
No less here than in Bethel, it would better suit the remedial purposes of Title VII to now afford Lawrence the opportunity to pursue his claim before GAO.115 It is noteworthy that, during the course of proceedings in the District Court, counsel for GAO offered to do just that.116 I need not go so far as to say that, because the deadline for an administrative filing of that sort is imposed by regulation,117 and not as in Bethel by statute, GAO is in position to waive it.118 The important thing for me is that the agency’s willingness to do so strengthens my conviction that equitable factors militate against any time-barring of an effort to procure administrative relief. Accordingly, I would remand to the District Court with directions to grant Lawrence leave to promptly invoke GAO’s Title VII grievance procedure, and to retain jurisdiction pending exhaustion.119
. Pub.L.No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
. Pub.L.No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972), codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
. Bethel v. Jefferson, 191 U.S.App.D.C. 108, 114, 589 F.2d 631, 637 (1978), quoting Cunningham v. Litton Indus., 413 F.2d 887, 889 (9th Cir. 1969); accord, Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228, 1232 (8th Cir. en banc 1975).
. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 717(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1976), quoted in relevant part in text infra at note 32.
. Joint Appendix (J. App.) 7-8.
. The federal civil service consists of all appointive positions in all three branches of the Government except the uniformed services, 5 U.S.C. § 2101 (1976). All such positions are categorized under either the competitive or excepted service. The excepted service is denoted in 5 U.S.C. § 2103 (1976) as all positions not in the competitive service, which itself is defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2102 (1976):
(a) The “competitive service” consists of—
(1) All civil service positions in the executive branch except—
(A) positions which are specifically excepted from the competitive service by or under statute; and
(B) positions to which appointments are made by nomination for confirmation by the Senate, unless the Senate otherwise directs;
(2) civil service positions not in the executive branch which are specifically included in the competitive service by statute; and
(3) positions in the government of the District of Columbia which are specifically included in the competitive service by statute.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section, the “competitive service” includes positions to which appointments are made by nomination for confirmation by the Senate when specifically included therein by statute.
(c) As used in other Acts of Congress, “classified civil service” or “classified service” means the “competitive service”.
. J. App. 8, 82-83.
. In a conversation with his supervisors concerning his performance rating, Lawrence suggested that their judgment might have been influenced by his earlier activities with the GAO’s equal employment opportunity advisory council, J. App. 10, 82-83, but he did not file a grievance. At that time, GAO and the Civil Service Commission maintained that excepted-service employees of GAO were not covered by Title VII. Both agencies have since reversed their stance on this point. See Part IV infra.
. J. App. 5-13. Lawrence’s employment was terminated as of July 15, 1977. J. App. 81.
. J. App. 5. Section 717 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976), extends to the bulk of the federal workforce the provisions previously ensuring equal employment opportunity only in the private sector. See, e. g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 n.14, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 2728 n.14, 53 L.Ed.2d 786, 799 n.14 (1977); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 547, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 2481, 41 L.Ed.2d 290, 293 (1974).
. See, e. g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-499, 74 S.Ct. 693, 694, 98 L.Ed. 884, 886-887 (1954).
. J. App. 19. These agencies have not always subscribed to their present position that GAO employees are entitled to the benefits of Title VII. See note 8 supra; Part IV infra.
. Lawrence v. Staats, Civ. No. 77-913 (D.D.C. July 28, 1977), J. App. 42-43.
. J. App. 8b-9b, 17b-18b.
. J. App. 44—45. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).
. Lawrence v. Staats, Civ. No. 77-913 (D.D.C. Oct. 11, 1977), J. App. 66-69.
. Id. at 4, J. App. 69.
. Id. at 3, J. App. 68.
. See Majority Opinion (Maj. Op.) at 429-431; Concurring Opinion (Cone. Op.) at 432-433, 434-435.
. See Part II infra.
. See Maj. Op. at 431; Cone. Op. at 431, 436.
. See Parts II, III infra.
. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1976); Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 832, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 1967, 48 L.Ed.2d 402, 411 (1976).
. A federal employee alleging discrimination proscribed by Title VII must file a complaint with his or her agency within 30 days of the date of the protested action. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.-214(a)(l)(i) (1979).
. See Part IV infra.
. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-716(c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1976).
. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.L.No. 88-352, § 701(b) (2d proviso), 78 Stat. 254 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7151 (1976), renumbered at 5 U.S.C. § 7201 and amended by Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub.L.No. 95-454, §§ 310, 703(a)(1), 92 Stat. 1152, 1216).
. Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed.Reg. 12319 (1965). This was superseded in 1969 by Exec. Order No. 11478, 3 C.F.R., 1966-1970 Compilation, p. 803, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e note at 1236 (1976).
. See S.Rep.No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12-17, reprinted in Legislative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, at 421-426 (Committee Print 1972) [parallel references hereinafter cited as Legislative History].
. Pub.L.No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
. S.Rep.No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12, Legislative History, supra note 29, at 421.
. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 717(a), as added by Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1976).
. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 717(b), as added by Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b) (1976). After submission of this appeal, the Civil Service Commission, as part of a reorganization of the Executive Branch, was replaced by the Office of Personnel Management and its duties with respect to nondiscrimination divided between the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the new Merit Systems Protection Board. See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub.L.No. 95-454, § 7702, 92 Stat. 1140; Exec. Order No. 12067, 43 Fed.Reg. 28967, reprinted in 42 U.S. C.A. § 2000e note (West Supp.1979). Regulatory protections have not been substantively affected, however; the preexisting regulations have simply been readopted and redistributed, without significant change, in new sections of the Code of Federal Regulations. See 43 C.F.R. 60900 (1978). For ease of reference, I will cite to regulations as currently codified, but will continue to refer to the Civil Service Commission, since that is the body with which Lawrence would have dealt.
. 5 C.F.R. §§ 713.201-713.222 (1978). These regulations now appear at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.-201-1613.222 (1979), as the function of overseeing agency efforts in this area now resides in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See note 33 supra.
. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 717(a), as added by Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1976) (emphasis supplied), quoted in relevant part in text supra at note 32.
. Lawrence v. Staats, supra note 16, at 3, J.App. 68.
. See text supra at note 32.
. Nowhere is this expressly stated, but GAO’s position in the Legislative Branch is clear from its structure and responsibilities. GAO is an establishment “independent of the executive departments and under the control and direction of the Comptroller General of the United States.” 31 U.S.C. § 41 (1976). Though appointed for 15-year terms by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, 31 U.S.C. § 42 (1976), unlike executive officers both are removable solely by joint resolution of Congress or by impeachment. 31 U.S.C. § 43 (1976). The debates preceding enactment of the legislation establishing the GAO make it clear that Congress intended to create an auditing agency that would serve as an arm of Congress and would not be answerable to the Executive. See, e. g., 61 Cong.Rec. 975 (1921) (remarks of Representative Snell); id. at 977 (remarks of Representative Fess); id. at 982 (remarks of Representative Good); id. at 985-986 (remarks of Representative Byrns); id. at 986 (remarks of Representative Bankhead); id. at 987 (remarks of Representative Sisson); id. at 1080 (remarks of Representative Good); id. at 1081, 1856 (remarks of Representative Byrns). In appropriating funds, Congress has consistently classified GAO as part of the Legislative Branch. See, e. g., Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, Pub.L.No. 95-94, 91 Stat. 680 (1977).
For administrative reasons, GAO is often treated like an executive agency, and on occasion the distinction between legislative and executive has been blurred. See notes 43-45 infra and accompanying text. At other times, though, Congress has been careful to point expressly to the difference, while bowing to those same administrative necessities. Thus 31 U.S.C. § 46a (1976), which applies Executive Branch compensation provisions to employees of GAO, states (emphasis supplied):
This Act and any other general legislation enacted governing the employment, compensation, emoluments, and status of officers and employees of the United States shall apply to officers and employees of the General Accounting Office in the same manner and to the same extent as if such officers and employees were in or under the executive branch of the Government.
Several comments made during debate on the statutory provisions under construction here also support the position of GAO as a legislative agency. See notes 48-51 infra and accompanying text. Perhaps more important for our purpose, the Civil Service Commission itself has consistently considered GAO as part of the Legislative Branch. See United States Civil Service Commission Fiscal 1977 Annual Report 22 (1978) (listing federal civilian employment by branch and agency); Federal Personnel Manual at 212-3 (Aug. 27, 1979) (describing positions in GAO as “outside the executive branch”).
. Because most GAO employees are appointed subject to the civil service laws, see text at note 69 infra, the Civil Service Commission considers them to be in the competitive service unless a specific exception is made. See 5 C.F.R. § 212.101(a)(2) (1980). Only a few positions have been thus designated. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 212.3102, 212.3202 (1980).
. See, e. g., United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297, 303, 89 S.Ct. 501, 504-505, 21 L.Ed.2d 495, 501 (1969).
. See notes 48-58, 72-95 infra and accompanying text.
. See notes 59-63, 68-71 infra and accompanying text.
. 5 U.S.C. § 105 (1976).
. 5 U.S.C. § 104 (1976).
. See text supra at note 32.
. See note 38 supra.
. See text supra at note 32.
. 118 Cong.Rec. 7169 (1972), Legislative History, supra note 29, at 1850-1851 (emphasis supplied).
. 118 Cong.Rec. 4921 (1972), Legislative History, supra note 29, at 1723-1724 (emphasis supplied). Significantly, Senator Cranston’s amendment was cosponsored by Senator Dominick, who was instrumental in the drafting and adoption of Section 717. 118 Cong.Rec. 4921, 4940 (1972), Legislative History, supra note 29, at 1723 (remarks of Senator Cranston), 1768 (remarks of Senator Williams).
. 118 Cong.Rec. 4494 (1972), Legislative History, supra note 29, at 1635.
. 118 Cong.Rec. 4499 (1972), Legislative History, supra note 29, at 1643 (emphasis supplied).
. See notes 54-58 infra and accompanying text.
. See notes 59-63 infra and accompanying text.
. Exec. Order No. 11478, 3 C.F.R., 1966-1970 Compilation, p. 803, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e note at 1236 (1976); see notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.
. Exec. Order No. 11478, 3 C.F.R., 1966-1970 Compilation, p. 803, § 6, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e note at 1236 (1976) (emphasis supplied).
. See text supra at notes 43-44.
. The executive order gave no express indication whether competitive-service personnel in GAO were covered. The provision defining the scope of the Civil Service Commission’s regulations simply repeats the language of the executive order. See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.201(b) (1979). But since the President extended protection to ail Executive Branch personnel and all competitive-service employees in the other two branches, it would make little sense to read the executive order as excluding everyone in GAO whether in the competitive or the excepted service.
. See Part III infra.
. See text quoted at note 32 supra.
. See Part III infra.
. 31 U.S.C. §§ 41-43 (1976).
. See note 38 supra.
. Because they are not appointed subject to the civil service laws. See notes 38 supra, 69 infra and accompanying text.
. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
. Brief for Appellant at 8-11.
. Brief for Appellee at 10-12.
. As previously mentioned, supra note 33, subsequent to oral argument on this appeal the Civil Service Commission was reorganized, see Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub.L.No.95-454, 92 Stat. 1111, and the classification functions previously exercised by the Commission are now performed by the Office of Personnel Management. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, § 906(a)(2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 5105 (1980).
. See note 70 infra for a description of the authorization and process for making such categorizations.
. 31 U.S.C. § 52(b) (1976).
. Pursuant to delegated authority, 5 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3302 (1976), the Civil Service Commission established rules respecting positions excepted from the competitive service. See generally 5 C.F.R. §§ 6.1-6.8 (1980). Excepted positions are designated according to whether they are “[pjositions of a confidential or policy-determining character” (Schedule C), or positions of different character but “for which it is not practicable to examine” (Schedule A) or “for which it is not practicable to hold a competitive examination” (Schedule B). 5 C.F.R. § 6.2 (1980). Regulations classifying particular jobs in the excepted service according to these schedules appear at 5 C.F.R. pt. 213. Each policy-determining position to be excepted is listed individually. 5 C.F.R. §§ 213.3301-213.-3399 (1980). For Schedules A and B, however, the Commission excepts some positions for the entire executive civil service. 5 C.F.R. §§ 213.-*4443102, 213.3202 (1980). Lawrence, an attorney, is among the generally exempt employees under Schedule A. See 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102(d) (1980).
Under the interpretation I suggest, see text supra at notes 67-69, employees in a “unit” would be covered by Title VII even if the Commission exercised its discretion by placing all positions in that unit in the excepted service. This may appear a bit anomalous since Section 717(a) refers to “units ... having positions in the competitive service" (emphasis supplied). But, as described above, the Commission categorizes jobs according to general regulations applicable to all employees; consequently it is improbable that all would fall within the excepted service. More importantly, Congress chose to consider a particular group of employees as subject to Civil Service Commission jurisdiction exactly to the same extent as a similar group of Executive Branch personnel, and would likely have done so with the expectation that at least some members of the “unit” would, as a result, receive the more extensive protection available to competitive service staff. See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 3302-3322 (1976); Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, § 204(a), 92 Stat. 1134, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 7501-7514 (1980). The exact manner in which the Commission treats the affected individual is less crucial.
. See 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102(d) (1979); note 70 supra.
. H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), Legislative History, supra note 29, at 1 (introduced Jan. 22, 1971).
. H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 717(a) (1971); see H.R.Rep.No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 56 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1972, 2137 (1971), Legislative History, supra note 29, at 116. The pertinent section stated:
All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment in the competitive service (as defined in section 2102 of title 5 of the United States Code) ... shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
. The dispute resulting in the substitution centered, not on the nature of equal employment protection for federal workers, but on whether the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission should be given authority to issue cease and desist orders or should instead be required to take cases of discrimination to court in the first instance. See 117 Cong.Rec. 31958-31985, 32088-32113 (1971), Legislative History, supra note 29, at 191-324. The substituted version chose the latter option. H.R. 9247, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), Legislative History, supra note 29, at 141. By not referring to federal employees, the substituted bill would have left authority for promoting equal employment opportunity in the federal workforce with the Civil Service Commission, where it already resided pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(b), and Executive Order 11246, see notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text. The original bill, H.R. 1746, supra note 72, would have transferred this function to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
. S. 2515, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. (1971), Legislative History, supra note 29, at 157.
. 118 Cong.Rec. 4938-4939, 4944, 4948 (1972), Legislative History, supra note 29, at 1764-1766, 1778-1779, 1789-1790.
. S. 2515, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 11 (1971), Legislative History, supra note 29, at 185-186 (barring discrimination with respect to “[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees ... in executive agencies (other than the General Accounting Office) as defined in section 105 of title 5, United States Code”).
. See note 73 supra.
. S. 2515, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 11 (1971), Legislative History, supra note 29, at 185-186.
. See notes 54-55 supra and accompanying text.
. Exec. Order No. 11478, 3 C.F.R., 1966-1970 Compilation, p. 803, § 6, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e note at 1236 (1976) (emphasis supplied).
. S. 2515, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 11 (1971), Legislative History, supra note 29, at 405-406 (as reported from committee):
All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment ... in executive agencies (other than the General Accounting Office) as defined in section 105 of title 5, United States Code ..., in those units of the Government of the District of Columbia having positions in the competitive service, and in the legislative and judicial branches of the Federal Government having positions in the competitive service, shall be made free from any discrimination....
. 118 Cong.Rec. 4921 (1972), Legislative History, supra note 29, at 1723-1724.
. id. (emphasis supplied).
. Even those employees whose positions are designated by the Civil Service Commission as in the excepted service are otherwise under the jurisdiction of the Commission and are subject to the Federal Personnel Manual. See generally Federal Personnel Manual, ch. 302; note 70 supra.
. 118 Cong.Rec. 4921 (1972), Legislative History, supra note 29, at 1724.
. Id., citing and quoting 2 U.S.C. § 140 (1970); see Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 717(b), as amended by Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 11, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b) (1976).
. 31 U.S.C. § 52(b) (1976).
. Except for those requiring advice and consent of the Senate, all appointments made pursuant to the civil service laws, whether to the competitive or excepted service, are subject to restrictions on the manner of selection. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 3308-3318 (1976) (describing selection process for competitive service); 5 U.S.C. § 3320 (1976) (applying §§ 3308-3318 to excepted-service appointments in the executive branch); 5 U.S.C. § 3320 note (1976) (historical and revision notes indicating application of this section to GAO by virtue of 31 U.S.C. § 52 (1976)).
. 31 U.S.C. § 43 (1976).
. For example, the Director and Deputy Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts are appointed and are subject to removal by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 601 (1976). Prior to 1978, all other employees were appointed by the Director “subject to the civil service laws . ..,” 28 U.S.C. § 602 (1976), and thus would have constituted a “unit” covered by Title VII. That provision has now been amended. See Court Interpreters Act, Pub.L.No.95-539, 92 Stat. 2044, 28 U.S. C.A. § 602(a) (West Supp.1980). Similarly, the Director of the Federal Judicial Center is appointed by a Board composed of judges and the Director of Administrative Office of the United States Courts. 28 U.S.C. §§ 621, 624(1) (1976). The Director of the Federal Judicial Center, in turn, hires professional staff without regard to civil service restrictions, 28 U.S.C. § 625(b) (1976), and consequently, under my interpretation of Section 717(a), without Title VII protection. Secretarial and clerical personnel, on the other hand, are engaged “subject to the provisions . .. governing appointments in competitive service and the provisions . .. relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates,” 28 U.S.C. § 625(c) (1976), and they would be included under Title VII.
. S.Rep.No.415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1971), Legislative History, supra note 29, at 454. The report also stated, in even greater breadth, that the section “makfes] clear the obligation of the Federal Government to make all personnel actions free from discrimination .. . . ” Id. at 12, Legislative History, supra note 29, at 421.
. See notes 70-71, 91 supra and accompanying text.
. 118 Cong.Rec. 4943 (1972), Legislative History, supra note 29, at 1777 (emphasis supplied).
. 118 Cong.Rec. 7169 (1972), Legislative History, supra note 29, at 1851 (emphasis supplied).
. See notes 69-71 supra and accompanying text.
. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979), a terminated employee of Congress filed suit against a former Congressman, alleging employment discrimination based on gender and predicating her claim to relief on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court found that she could maintain a cause of action implied from that constitutional provision, in part because “[s]ince petitioner was not in the competitive service ... the remedial provisions of § 717 of Title VII are not available to her.” Id. at 247 n.26, 99 S.Ct. at 2278 n.26, 60 L.Ed.2d at 864 n.26. The Court also noted that “[w]hen § 717 was added to Title VII to protect federal employees from discrimination, it failed to extend this protection to congressional employees such as petitioner who are not in the competitive service.” Id. at 247, 99 S.Ct. at 2278, 60 L.Ed.2d at 864. These statements could be taken as the reflection of a view that only competitive-service personnel receive Title VII coverage. But, unlike the situation with respect to GAO, none of the statutory authorizations for employees of Congress has placed them under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, see generally 2 U.S.C. §§ 60-1 to 130d (1976); consequently, no congressional employees are or could be in the competitive service and § 717(a) thus cannot apply to any of them. Surely the Court did not consider whether treatment would differ for an agency of the Legislative Branch in which some employees do hold positions in the competitive service.
In Bethel v. Jefferson, supra, note 3, the issue facing this court was the relationship between Section 717 and Section 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976), the latter provision pertaining to state and local governmental employment. We observed there that the Act “expressly exempts noncompetitive-service employees of the Judicial and Legislative Branches . ..,” 191 U.S.App.D.C. at 114 n.29, 589 F.2d at 637 n.29, but our decision neither focused nor depended upon that remark.
. Coles v. Penny, 174 U.S.App.D.C. 277, 283, 531 F.2d 609, 615 (1976).
. See, e. g., H.R.Rep.No.238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23, Legislative History, supra note 29, at 82-83, U.S.Code Cong, and Admin.News 2157-2158 (“[t]he Federal service is an area where equal employment opportunity is of paramount significance.... It is therefore imperative that equal opportunity be the touchstone of the Federal system.... Accordingly there can exist no justification for anything but a vigorous effort to accord Federal employees the same rights and impartial treatment which the law seeks to afford employees in the private sector.”); S.Rep.No.415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12, Legislative History, supra note 29, at 421 (“[t]he bill adds ... a new section . .. making clear the obligation of the Federal Government to make all personnel actions free from discrimination. ... [The] policies, actions, and programs [of the Federal Government] strongly influence the activities of all other enterprises, organizations and groups. In no area is government action more important than in the area of civil rights.”).
. See note 97 supra.
. H.R.Rep.No.238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 23, Legislative History, supra note 29, at 83.
. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1976); see Brown v. GSA, supra note 23, 425 U.S. at 835, 96 S.Ct. at 1968, 48 L.Ed.2d at 413.
. See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214 (1979).
. Supra note 3.
. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976) (imposing a deadline of 180 days on filing of charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).
. Bethel v. Jefferson, supra note 3, 191 U.S. App.D.C. at 117-120, 589 F.2d at 640-643. See also Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 185 U.S.App.D.C. 322, 367-368, 567 F.2d 429, 474-475 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086, 98 S.Ct. 1281, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978).
. Bethel v. Jefferson, supra note 3, 191 U.S. App.D.C. at 117-118, 589 F.2d at 640-641.
. Id. at 120, 589 F.2d at 643.
. See notes 35-39 supra and accompanying text; Lawrence v. Staats, supra note 16, at 1-3, J. App. 66-68.
. J. App. 40-41.
. J. App. 86-87. It is true that throughout this period GAO maintained a grievance system for processing discrimination complaints. But as noted in a memorandum to the counselors, employees had no right to a Civil Service Commission hearing or appeal, and it was “a complicated legal question as to whether they can file a civil action” if dissatisfied with GAO’s response to their claims. J.App. 86-87.
. See J. App. 11, 16A.
. After being informed of the Commission’s position, GAO wrote to the Commission, arguing that excepted service workers were entitled to Title VII coverage and requesting a ruling on that issue. J.App. 14b.
. J. App. 25-26.
. Compare Bethel v. Jefferson, supra note 3, 191 U.S.App.D.C. at 119-120, 589 F.2d at 642-643.
. J.App. 15b-17b.
. See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214 (1979).
. The regulation was promulgated by the Civil Service Commission pursuant to authority granted by § 717(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b) (1976). See 37 Fed.Reg. 22717 (1972).
. Faced with GAO’s charge that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies, Lawrence at one point evinced a desire to abandon his Title VII claim and proceed exclusively on his constitutionally-based theories of relief. J. App. 6b. He recognized that he could more easily prove discrimination under Title VII, but seemed inclined to forego that effort in court largely because it was unclear whether he was entitled to Title VII protection, and because he feared that GAO would in any event dismiss his grievance for failure to file it within the 30-day limit. J.App. 9b. Title VII reflects a congressional preference for the more informal conciliation-oriented administrative forum. Richerson v. Jones, 572 F.2d 89, 97 (3d Cir. 1978); see Hackley v. Roudebush, 171 U.S.App.D.C. 376, 404-405, 520 F.2d 108, 136-137 (1975) and it is not at all certain that he can predicate a suit on the Fifth Amendment when he has a parallel remedy under Title VII. See Brown v. GSA, supra note 23. In any event, Lawrence can no more pursue the constitutional than the Title VII course without first exhausting his administrative remedies. “[T]he very fact that constitutional issues are put forward constitutes a strong reason for not allowing . .. suit either to anticipate or to take the place of [agency action],” Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 772, 67 S.Ct. 1493, 1503, 91 L.Ed. 1796 (1947); see Wallace v. Lynn, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 363, 367, 507 F.2d 1186, 1190 (1974); “a strong showing is required, both of inadequacy of the prescribed procedure and of impending harm, to permit short-circuiting the administrative process.” Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, supra, 331 U.S. at 773-774, 67 S.Ct. at 1503-1504, 91 L.Ed. at 1809. Since Lawrence cannot make that showing, he must in any event utilize available GAO procedures before his Fifth Amendment claim would be ripe for judicial consideration.