dissenting:
Appellants complain very correctly that my colleagues’ original holding1 is at odds with an amendment to Title VII recently, but earlier, enacted by Congress.2 On that ground, appellants petition for rehearing. The petition is denied on the theory that application of the amendment here, though the course normally to be followed, would work an injustice on Lawrence.3 In my view, adherence to the new legislation not only is the single response consonant with congressional intent, but also is a course portending no unfairness to anyone. So, I respectfully dissent.
I
The events precipitating this litigation have been detailed sufficiently in our earlier opinions to eliminate any need for further recitation here.4 Developments subsequent to oral argument but prior to issuance of those opinions, however, form the basis for the petition for rehearing, and thus require brief explication. By the General Accounting Office Personnel Act of 1980,5 6Congress established an independent personnel system for GAO employees, and in the process effected a small but significant amendment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.® Section 717(a) of Title VII7 previously had provided that
[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment ... in executive agencies (other than the General Accounting Office) as defined in section 105 of title 5 .. . shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.8
The amending provision deleted “(other than the General Accounting Office)”9 in order to remove any doubt that the benefits of Title VII extended to all GAO employ*1261ees, whether in the excepted or the competitive service.10 Because my brethren had read Section 717(a) as affording Title VII coverage at GAO only to competitive-service employees,11 appellants seek rehearing.
My colleagues concede that courts ordinarily should honor newly-enacted legislation in cases pending at the time it takes effect.12 Nonetheless, although the 1980 Act became operative four months prior to issuance of our opinions,13 they cast this principle aside on the ground that to abide by it is to inflict a “manifest injustice” upon Lawrence.14 They say that were we to apply the 1980 Act, Lawrence would be confined to his Title VII remedies and his Fifth Amendment challenge 15 would perforce be lost.16 They then reason that Lawrence’s Title VII claim also would be vulnerable to dismissal because he did not exhaust administrative remedies, “despite the fact,” they add, “that [he] was not required to exhaust such remedies at the time he filed suit.”17 They conclude:
The unfairness presented by this scenario need not be belabored. If the motion to dismiss were granted, Lawrence would be deprived of his sole judicial remedy merely because he did not comply with procedural requirements which did not exist until almost four years after he filed suit. Even if Lawrence were permitted now to pursue the available administrative remedies, his access to the courts, the forum he originally and properly sought, would be delayed until he spent the time and money necessary to wend his way through the administrative process. Given that Lawrence filed suit almost four years ago, and has yet to receive a hearing on the merits of his claim, we consider it would constitute manifest injustice to impose retroactive roadblocks in the form of new procedural impediments to a hearing on his cause of action.18
With all due respect, I think my brethren misapprehend not only the remedial scheme Title VII effectuates for federal employees, but also Lawrence’s obligation and continuing ability to resort to the remedies Title VII affords. I think, too, they are mistaken in their belief that somehow Lawrence need not seek administrative redress of his grievance so long as he predicates his effort solely on the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, I am unable to perceive any “manifest injustice” in relegating Lawrence to Title VII procedures, or any improvement in his lot by undertaking to excuse him from respecting them.
II
At least until recently,19 effective remedies — administrative and judicial — for discriminatory practices in federal employment were “far from sure.”20 This was one of the considerations prompting Congress in 1972 to add Section 717 to Title VII.21 As even a bare reading discloses, this provision proscribes four types of employment dis*1262crimination in the federal sector, and establishes a comprehensive scheme of administrative and judicial remediation. Indeed, the “balance, completeness, and structural integrity” of Section 71722 was a principal factor leading the Supreme Court to conclude that Congress designed Title VII as the exclusive remedy statutorily available to federal employees complaining of job-related discrimination.23
My colleagues assert, nonetheless, that to require Lawrence now to utilize the remedies Section 717 confers would interpose “new procedural impediments to a hearing on his cause of action.”24 That assumes that GAO’s excepted-service employees were excluded from Title VII’s benefits, and thus freed from its constraints, until Congress acted in 1980. But the legislative history of the pertinent statutory prescription of that year,25 though scant26 indicates much more strongly that it was merely a much-needed clarification of an original congressional intent that all GAO employees were to be covered by Title VII. The Senate Report informs us that the 1980 provision “amends the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to make it clear that GAO is covered;” 27 similarly, the House Report declares that it “makes it clear that the GAO is covered by title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, forbidding discrimination in employment.”28 During hearings before the Senate subcommittee, the Comptroller General, in the only reference to that provision, explained:
The bill would also resolve a particularly critical concern in the equal opportunity area. We had assumed, and operated as if, we were covered by the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. In October 1977, in a civil suit filed by a former GAO employee, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that GAO is not covered by the Act.29 The Justice Department appealed that ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. A 3-judge panel heard the case in December 1978. We are awaiting their decision. Regardless of that decision, we believe it is essential to eliminate any question about Congressional intent and employee protection. This proposed legislation includes an amendment to the Civil Rights Act which will achieve these objectives.30
Additionally, Representative Schroeder, the bill’s sponsor, explained on the floor of the House that “[t]he bill makes clear that the General Accounting Office is covered by title 7 of the Civil Rights law of 1964, forbidding employment discrimination. Up until now, GAO’s coverage under this law was unclear.”31
*1263In light of this history, I cannot agree with my brethren that Lawrence faces the “new procedural impediments” in the sense of requirements that Congress had not previously contemplated. But even if they are correct on that score, it does not follow that remedies available within the employing agency can be by-passed. That Title VII intercepts as well as benefits GAO excepted-service employees like Lawrence became explicit while this appeal remained pending, and “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary.”32 Neither of the latter two exceptions is applicable here nor, in my judgment, is it unjust to insist that Lawrence initiate his Title VII effort at the administrative rather than the judicial level.
For reasons I already have expressed fully,33 I do not share my brethren’s concern that an administrative assertion of Lawrence’s Title VII claims would expose it to dismissal as time-barred.34 To begin with, we could eliminate any apprehension in that regard simply by directing GAO — an appellant here — to entertain Lawrence’s grievance if presented.35 Nor do I discern any “unfairness”36 in requiring Lawrence to follow the procedural route Title VII prescribes. My colleagues say that his “access to the courts ... would be delayed until” the administrative phase reaches completion.37 That, of course, is true, but this observation betrays several underlying premises I am unwilling to accept.
First is the assumption that Lawrence ultimately must come into court for vindication of the Title VII rights he presses. But GAO officials, as much as judges, are duty-bound to honor Title VII, and the legal presumption is that they will.38 Surely Congress intended administrative consideration of Title VII complaints to be an efficacious procedure, not just a useless preliminary to an inevitable lawsuit. And should Lawrence prevail before GAO, there obviously would be no need to resort to the judicial process.
Also implicit in my brethren’s argument is the notion that Title VII reflects a preference for a judicial tribunal to an administrative forum. I cannot believe that Congress chose informal, conciliatory agency treatment as the mode in the first instance 39 without the expectation that many Title VII problems would achieve satisfactory resolution right there. And certainly there is no basis for supposing that Law*1264rence’s claim would not be heard administratively as expeditiously as it could be judicially. Given the comprehensive scheme that Congress chose to employ in extending Title VII coverage to federal employees,40 and the Supreme Court’s ruling that Title VII is the only statutory avenue to redress for federal job discrimination,411 see no escape from the conclusion that Lawrence must utilize its administrative mechanism.
Lastly, I think my colleagues err in presupposing that even if out of “fairness” the 1980 amendment to Title VII should not be retroactively applied to Lawrence, he can directly pursue his Fifth Amendment claim without first exhausting available administrative grievance procedures. Exhaustion of such remedies seems to me to be as much a precondition to an action on constitutional grounds as it is to a Title VII lawsuit,42 and Lawrence never sought to ventilate his grievance before GAO. What, then, can he gain by shunning Title VII in favor of the Fifth Amendment?
I would grant appellants’ petition for rehearing and remand the case to the District Court with directions to grant Lawrence leave to invoke. GAO’s Title VII grievance procedure suitably and promptly, and to retain jurisdiction pending the outcome.
. Lawrence v. Staats, 205 U.S.App.D.C. 341, 640 F.2d 427 (1981).
. General Accounting Office Personnel Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-191, § 8(g), 94 Stat. 34 (1980), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1976).
. Majority Opinion (Maj. Op.) at 1258.
. See Lawrence v. Staats, supra note 1, 205 U.S.App.D.C, at 342, 640 F.2d at 427-428; id. at 351, 640 F.2d at 437-438 (dissenting opinion).
. Pub.L. No. 96-191, 94 Stat. 27 (1980).
. Pub.L. No. 88-352, titl. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
. This section was enacted in 1972. See note 8 infra.
. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 717(a), as supplemented by Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1976).
. Section 8(g) of the 1980 Act specifies:
Section 717(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16) is amended by striking out “(other than the General Accounting Office).”
94 Stat. 34 (1980). This provision was but a tiny part of the 1980 legislation. The parties, though directly and radically affected thereby, did not bring the change to our attention, nor did we come upon it. in our own extensive research.
. See Part II infra.
. See Lawrence v. Staats, supra note 1, 205 U.S.App.D.C. at 345, 640 F.2d at 431.
. Maj. Op. at 1258.
. The 1980 Act became effective on October 1, 1980. Our opinions were announced on February 5, 1981.
. Maj. Op. at 1258.
. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979).
. Maj. op. at 1258. But see note 19 infra.
. Maj. op. at 1259 (emphasis omitted).
. Id. (footnote omitted).
. See Davis v. Passman, supra note 15; see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980).
. Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 825, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 1964, 48 L.Ed.2d 402, 407 (1976). See also Lawrence v. Staats, supra note 1, 205 U.S.App.D.C. at 353, 640 F.2d at 439 (dissenting opinion).
. See Brown v. GSA, supra note 20, 425 U.S. at 825-829, 96 S.Ct. at 1964-1966, 48 L.Ed.2d at 407—409.
. Id. at 832, 96 S.Ct. at 1968, 48 L.Ed.2d at 411.
. Id. at 835, 96 S.Ct. at 1969, 48 L.Ed.2d at 413.
. Maj. Op. at 1259.
. Quoted supra note 9.
. The principal goal of the 1980 Act was an independent personnel system for GAO. Re-sultantly, the bulk of the Act’s legislative history relates to concern over potential conflicts of interest stemming from GAO’s oversight of Executive Branch programs and financial activities on the one hand, and executive regulation of GAO personnel matters through the Office of Personnel Management on the other. See S.Rep. No. 96-540, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979). The 1980 provision amending § 717(a), though by no means unimportant, nevertheless appears to have been a subsidiary concern of the Act’s draftsmen, and occasioned little comment during its progress through Congress.
. Id. at 10 (emphasis supplied).
. H.R. Rep. No. 96-494, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1979) (emphasis supplied).
. The reference here obviously is to the District Court’s decision in this case — Lawrence v. Staats, Civ. No. 77-913 (D.D.C. July 28, 1977) —holding that GAO employees are not covered by Title VII.
. General Accounting Office Personnel Act of 1980: Hearings on S. 1879 Before the Sub-comm. on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services of the Senate Comm, on Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1979) (statement of Elmer B. Staats).
. 125 Cong.Rec. H9182 (1979) (remarks of Representative Schroeder) (emphasis supplied).
. Bradley v. School Bd. of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711, 96 S.Ct. 2006, 2016, 40 L.Ed.2d 476, 488 (1974). See also De Rodulfa v. United States, 149 U.S.App.D.C. 154, 164-165, 461 F.2d 1240, 1250-1251 (1972), and cases there cited.
. Lawrence v. Staats, supra note 1, 205 U.S. App.D.C. at 362, 640 F.2d at 448-449 (dissenting opinion).
. See text supra at note 17.
. See Lawrence v. Staats, supra note 1, 205 U.S.App.D.C. at 362, 640 F.2d at 448-449 (dissenting opinion). This step would appear to be unnecessary, for GAO’s counsel has offered to afford Lawrence the opportunity of administrative consideration of his Title VII claim. Joint Appendix 15b-17b.
. See text supra at note 18.
. See text supra at note 18.
. FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 296, 85 S.Ct. 1459, 1470, 14 L.Ed.2d 383, 395 (1965); Anni-ston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 357, 57 S.Ct. 816, 825, 81 L.Ed. 1143, 1156 (1937); National Lawyers Guild v. Brownell, 96 U.S.App. D.C. 252, 255, 225 F.2d 552, 555 (1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 927, 76 S.Ct. 778, 100 L.Ed. 1457 (1956).
. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976), the provision applicable to federal employees, “provides for a careful blend of administrative and judicial enforcement powers,” including “its rigorous administrative exhaustion requirements” and “[t]he crucial administrative role that each agency . .. was given by Congress in the eradication of employment discrimination....” Brown v. GSA, supra note 20, 425 U.S. at 833, 96 S.Ct. at 1968, 48 L.Ed.2d at 411. And this provision “evidences a congressional preference for the informal processes of conciliation and persuasion over formal court proceedings as the means for correcting employment discrimination.” Richerson v. Jones, 572 F.2d 89, 95 (3d Cir. 1978).
. See Brown v. GSA, supra note 20, 425 U.S. at 829-833, 96 S.Ct. at 1966-1968, 48 L.Ed.2d at 409-412.
. Id. at 824-825, 96 S.Ct. at 1964-1969, 48 L.Ed.2d at 407-413.
. See Lawrence v. Staats, supra note 1, 205 U.S.App.D.C. at 363 n.119, 640 F.2d at 449 n.119 (dissenting opinion).