This case is before this court for the second time on an appeal by the defendant Westinghouse from a decision by Judge Arnold, sitting by designation, again finding Westinghouse liable for a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In the initial proceeding before the trial court, ap-pellee Vaughn prevailed on her claim that she was disqualified as a sealex machine operator because of her race. Vaughn v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 471 F.Supp. 281 (E.D.Ark.1979). Westinghouse appealed to this court alleging that the district court misapplied the burden of proof, and that the factual findings were clearly erroneous. This court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Vaughn v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 620 F.2d 655 (8th Cir.1980). On March 9, 1981, the Supreme Court, 450 U.S. 972, 101 S.Ct. 1504, 67 L.Ed.2d 808 granted defendant’s petition for certiorari, summarily vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to this court for further consideration in light of Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). This court then remanded to the trial court with directions to reconsider in light of Burdine. On remand, the trial court held that it erred on the Burdine issue but held that, after reviewing the record as a whole, it reaffirmed its finding that Vaughn was disqualified from her job in substantial part because of her race. On appeal Westinghouse alleges that the district court erred in finding that its legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for disqualifying Vaughn was pretextual. We affirm.
Christine Vaughn, a black woman, was hired by Westinghouse on July 13, 1970, as a sealex machine operator, labor-grade-four, at $2.20 per hour. On November 16, 1970, she was transferred to a second shift *139position under the supervision of O.D. Brazil and was earning $2.54 per hour. On January 25,1971, she was transferred to the third shift due to a reduction in force. She continued as a sealex operator under the supervision of C.T. Turnage and was earning the top wage rate of $2.69 per hour. On April 19, 1971, she was disqualified as a sealex operator by Turnage and placed on an open labor-grade-one job of bulb-loader earning $2.45 per hour.
At the time Vaughn was transferred from the second shift to the third shift, Brazil, as her supervisor, was required to complete an employee evaluation form concerning Vaughn’s job performance. At trial, however, two forms were found in Vaughn’s personnel file. One form was dated January 20,1971, and stated that the quality and quantity of production were poor, that he would not rehire her for that reason, and that she got along well with others including her supervisors. The second form was dated January 18, 1971, and stated that Vaughn had had previous satisfactory experience as a sealex machine operator under Brazil on the second shift. From these forms, the district court concluded that Vaughn’s work under Brazil presented some problems, but not serious enough to label her performance unsatisfactory.
Under Turnage’s supervision on the third shift, Vaughn was verbally warned on five occasions that she was having production problems. Turnage made notes of these verbal warnings which were introduced at trial. On April 19, 1971, Vaughn was disqualified from her job as sealex operator. Vaughn disputed that she had any prior warnings of this action, and testified that she felt she was disqualified under orders from the front office for unknown reasons.
The district court held that Vaughn had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination under the rationale of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The court then held that Westinghouse articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Vaughn’s disqualification: poor production. However, the court found that the proffered reason was pretextual after considering the record as a whole. In its finding of pretext, the district court focused on the following facts: almost all supervisors at Westinghouse are and have been white; most of the labor-grade-four sealex operators in 1971 were white; basically all labor-grade-one bulb-loaders were black; plaintiff Vaughn, according to Brazil, performed satisfactorily on the sealex machine before her transfer to third shift; and that Vaughn had progressively been given pay increases, until, several months before her disqualification, she had reached the top rate of pay available for a sealex operator. The court then held that even though Vaughn had some production problems, it felt that her disqualification was motivated in substantial part by her race.
This is a close case and it may well be that the panel, if sitting as the trial judge, might have found that Westinghouse’s proffered reason for plaintiff’s disqualification was not pretextual. However, we may not substitute our views for that of the district court unless we are able to say that the findings of fact in this case are clearly erroneous as is required by Fed.R. Civ.P. 52(a). The factual findings of the district court should not be overturned unless the reviewing court is left with the definite conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525,. 541, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). We cannot say, after a review of the record, that we are left with a definite conviction that a mistake was committed in the district court’s findings of fact. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment that Vaughn was unlawfully disqualified from her job as a sealex operator is affirmed.