dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that Vaughn established a prima facie case and that Westinghouse articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Vaughn’s disqualification. However, I disagree that the evidence in the record demonstrates that Vaughn met her burden *140of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Westinghouse’s reason was a pretext for discrimination. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at 252-53,101 S.Ct. at 1090-91.
The following evidence supports the conclusion that Vaughn’s disqualification was not the result of discrimination. The district court found that there was no evidence that Vaughn was verbally abused or harassed on account of her race or for any other reason. At the time of her disqualification, Vaughn was working the graveyard shift, 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m., under the supervision of Turnage. Vaughn testified that Turnage gave her assistance to help her become a better sealex operator. Near the end of March, Vaughn communicated her dislike of her job to Turnage and said she wanted to bid off. Turnage explained that she could not bid off because she had not been on the job a sufficient length of time and he encouraged her to put more effort into the job she presently held. Tur-nage was unable to motivate her, he believed she had no interest in the job of sealex machine operator, and the district court found no reason to disbelieve any of his testimony.
Additionally, there is undisputed evidence of Vaughn’s poor production. Her burnt wires causing waste were documented by Turnage. As a sealex operator, Vaughn’s production was important because a sealex operator paces the production output of a group of six other employees. Turnage warned Vaughn on five separate occasions from March 9,1971, to April 15,1971, about her production problems. He discussed with her the fact that her rate of burnt wires was much higher than that of the other sealex operators. Turnage testified that after the warnings Vaughn would have short periods of improvement but that there was no overall improvement.
Turnage disqualified Vaughn on April 19, 1971. At that time he told Vaughn, in the presence of the union shop steward, that her disqualification was due to her obvious dislike for her job, her high number of burnt wires, and her failure to improve her production to a satisfactory level after repeated talks and warnings. Turnage was a supervisor for Westinghouse for four years. During that entire time he disqualified or failed to qualify only three employees, Vaughn and two white males. The record contains no evidence that Turnage was aware of Brazil’s prior reports or that he had conferred with Brazil about Vaughn’s work performance. Under the record the finding is inescapable that Turnage’s disqualification decision was based on Vaughn’s performance on the graveyard shift and was not influenced by Brazil’s impression of Vaughn’s ability.
The focus of this case is on the graveyard shift and the evidence is one-sided in favor of Westinghouse: Turnage was an objective supervisor; Turnage counted her burnt wires and told her to reduce her waste, but her performance did not improve; Vaughn did not complain that Turnage’s production expectations were unreasonable; Vaughn had no complaints with Turnage’s administration of the graveyard shift and she did not contend that his criticism of her work was laced with racial overtones; moreover, no proof was offered that a white employee with a work record comparable to Vaughn’s was kept on the job. Although the district court noted that Westinghouse had not established production criteria; although Tur-nage was not asked specifically if Vaughn’s race was a factor in his decision; although Vaughn may have been unhappy with the conduct of a supervisor on a different shift; and although Vaughn introduced general statistics; none of this evidence addresses the employment action in dispute. Based upon the record, I feel we are obliged to find that Vaughn disliked the late shift, she was underachieving on the sealex machine, and she was not motivated to improve upon an unsatisfactory performance notwithstanding the wasteful and costly consequences to her company.
In my view Vaughn failed to meet her burden of persuasion that a discriminatory reason was the basis for her disqualification and transfer to a lower paying job and the *141district court’s ruling to the contrary is clearly erroneous. When this case made its initial appearance before the court Judge Floyd R. Gibson filed a dissenting opinion that is equally applicable to the case as it now pends before the court:
These facts are devoid of any connotation whatsoever of racial discrimination. The only discrimination against Vaughn was because of her poor and sloppy work. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not thought to have been passed to preserve sinecures for people, regardless of their race, who do not want to perform reasonably satisfactory work. Vaughn’s productivity record was the worst of any of the operators. The Act here is being utilized as a shield to protect and reward substandard performance.
Vaughn v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., supra, 620 F.2d at 662 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
I would reverse.