dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s analysis and treatment of appellant’s claim under Michigan law. I would hold that the broadcast was privileged as a report on a matter of public interest concerning a private plaintiff.
The majority cites Clark v. ABC, 684 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir.1982), as requiring the plaintiff to have sufficient connection to the matter of public interest which is the subject of the broadcast in order to fall within Michigan’s qualified privilege, indeed, as requiring the plaintiff to be the focus of the public interest publication. Assuming the correctness of such an interpretation of Michigan law,1I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that appellant Bichler had insufficient connection to the contro*1069versy surrounding the closing of the Theater.
In newspaper articles regarding the Theater, Bichler assumed a prominent role as spokesperson for the Theater. He was described in many articles as owner and general manager, and was quoted extensively. He was closely associated with the Theater; his views on the Theater’s operations were actively solicited by and freely given to the media. The majority attaches much significance to the fact that the Theater was operated by a corporation in which Bichler was merely a majority stockholder. It is clear, however, that Bichler was the virtual personification of the Theater so far as the public was concerned. His financial investment made the Theater run, his decisions governed the operation of the Theater, he spoke on behalf of the Theater and he actively sought publicity for it. The success or failure of the theatre was of vital import to him.
Bichler’s “nexus” with the controversy surrounding the closing of the Theater may be compared with that in Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir.1978). In Orr, the plaintiff was an attorney who was president of a development company that proposed to build a shopping mall in Owasso, Michigan. A newspaper article alleged that he had been indicted for fraud in connection with efforts to attract investors in the mall project. This court found that there was “no doubt” that the development of the mall was of interest and importance to the community, just as the Theater in the instant case, as the only dinner theater in the area, was of interest to the Grand Rapids community. The court found that the Michigan qualified privilege applied and additionally that the plaintiff was a public figure for a limited purpose under First Amendment analysis. It noted that the defendant newspaper had previously published, with the plaintiff’s cooperation, a front page story about the proposed mall and its developers. The court observed that the plaintiff had voluntarily sought publicity for his project and then found himself at the center of a public scandal. Thus, Bichler’s actions prior to the broadcast in question are quite analogous to the activities of the plaintiff in Orr, found by this court to be sufficient to fall within the Michigan privilege. See also Schultz v. Newsweek, 481 F.Supp. 881 (E.D.Mich.1979) aff’d 668 F.2d 911 (6th Cir.1982). The facts in this case with regard to Bichler’s nexus and reasonable connection with the matters concerning the controversy with Moore and the closing of the theatre differ materially from the tenuous connection between the plaintiff and the public controversy in Clark v. ABC, supra. Clark, it should be emphasized, never sought any kind of publicity.
I do not understand that the majority has decided that there is no “public controversy” in this case within the meaning of the First Amendment. The majority opinion, rather, acknowledges that even under Clark v. ABC, supra, upon which it principally relies, “the exact nature of a public controversy for First Amendment purposes is not clear.” The majority determined that it was not necessary to “dispose of that issue.” I agree with the latter conclusion, but would not concur with the statement, made by way of dictum, that “the matters here do not constitute a public controversy within the Gertz standard.”
Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s entry of summary judgment against appellant.
. A reading of Michigan caselaw reveals little basis for the Clark court’s addition of this requirement to Michigan’s qualified privilege. See Clark v. ABC, 684 F.2d 1208, 1223 (6th Cir.1982) (Brown dissent).