with whom
JOHNSON and JERRE S. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting:Believing the majority opinion to be at odds with the principles underlying strict liability, I respectfully dissent. Though mindful of Justice Holmes’ observation that the law is grounded in experience, not logic, Holmes, The Common Law, p. 1 (1881), I am not convinced that this case obliges us to ignore the logic underpinning the tort principles pertinent to the issue before us. I perceive strict liability and comparative fault as incompatible concepts.
Strict Liability
Strict liability is not a development in the law of negligence; it evolved separately. See, Prosser, The Law of Torts § 98 (4th ed. 1971). See also, Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 Tex. L.Rev. 777 (1983). Strict liability for goods derives from the law of warranty. See McPherson v. Buick, 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), and its progeny. Strict liability for unseaworthiness in maritime law arose from the concept of an implied warranty of seaworthiness by the owner of the ship: “It is essentially a species of liability without fault ... the liability is neither limited by conceptions of negligence nor contractual in character ... [i]t is a form of absolute duty owing to all within the range of its humanitarian policy.” Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 94-95, 66 S.Ct. 872, 877, 90 L.Ed. 1099 (1945). The concepts of maritime strict liability and products strict liability are both based on the concern that the injured party cannot adequately protect himself from the potential harm. Compare Sieracki with Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
Strict liability is based on a theory of responsibility which requires no finding of fault. The law of strict liability, applicable in some form in most American jurisdic*1434tions, is succinctly stated in Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A (1965).1 The Comments to the Restatement note that “the rule applies although [the party] has exercised all possible care.” Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, Comment a, p. 348. The Comments further note that this action is an alternative to negligence. The elements of a strict liability action are (1) injury, (2) defect, and (3) a causal tie between the two. Burks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 633 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir.1981).
A negligence action focuses on conduct, specifically the quality of the act causing the injury; a strict products liability action focuses on the product itself. The moving force behind the strict products liability concept is the determination to reduce the risks defective products impose on society. The rise of strict liability in products liability actions results from the perception that the manufacturing enterprise can best carry the cost of injuries occasioned by defective products as an element of product cost.2 Strict liability concerns itself with the relationship between the manufacturer and society as a whole. The relationship between specific plaintiffs and defendants is of secondary importance; it is considered subservient to the interest of the public as a whole.3 No fault automobile insurance is an example of the operation of this policy outside the area of products liability. See e.g., Calabresi, Costs of Accidents (1971).
Comparative Fault
Fault is blameworthiness. “ ‘Fault’ in legal literature is the equivalent of negligence.” Continental Insurance Co. v. Sabine Towing Co., 117 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir.1941). The concept of fault in negligence law presupposes a particular duty or obligation to conform to a certain standard of conduct and focuses upon the nature of the act itself. It notes only inferentially the instrument the actor uses to bring about the result and the result itself.
That the fault of two parties in an action can be compared is well accepted in the law, serving as the basis for both comparative negligence and contribution statutes. The latest wisdom on the subject is the Uniform Comparative Fault Act (1977). Courts have had no particular difficulty determining relative degrees of fault between multiple parties when the liability for all parties is based in negligence. See, e.g., Shows v. Jamison Bedding, Inc., 671 F.2d 927 (5th Cir.1982); Cruthirds v. RCI, Inc., 624 F.2d 632 (5th Cir.1980). The addition of a strictly liable party to the calculus of responsibility significantly changes the problem. It becomes necessary to devise an equitable method for apportioning liability.
*1435 Fault Comparison Dilemma
Although fault may be present, there is no requirement of traditional fault in a strict liability situation. The theory of strict liability does not lend itself to a comparison of fault. Some courts and commentators have characterized the attempt as involving “apples and oranges.”4 A more accurate analysis might characterize the effort as an attempt to measure the amount of water in an empty glass. I find it simply illogical to attempt to quantify fault where admittedly none exists.
Beyond this pragmatic question of comparison, the exercise erodes the theory of strict liability. If a defendant liable under a strict liability rule can mitigate damages by showing the plaintiff’s fault, then the plaintiff will be forced to show the defendant’s “fault” in order to lessen by comparison his own. This inappropriately reintroduces the element of fault into a strict liability action.
Courts and commentators have consistently emphasized the discreteness between remedies in strict liability and in negligence.5 Not infrequently, different remedies result in different recoveries. That a plaintiff might recover more damages in a strict liability suit than he would in a negligence suit does not justify impressing negligence concepts on a strict liability action.6
Strict liability, as I perceive it, allows a plaintiff in certain situations to escape his own negligence, a reality factored into the construct of the policy. The panel opinion in this case, now vacated, would have limited the type and extent of negligence which would be so held for naught.7 The adoption of § 402A or some variation of it, implicitly includes the determination, as a matter of policy, that the risk of damages should fall upon the strictly liable party. At the peril of oversimplification, I suggest the real decision we face today is whether to accept strict liability, specifically strict products liability, as meritorious and apply it without reducing plaintiff’s recovery for simple negligence, or to signal the demise of strict liability as a basis for legal accountability in tort.
Comparative Fault and Strict Liability Maritime Actions
Admiralty law allows two distinct remedies for injury: negligence and unseaworthiness, a type of strict liability. Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 74 S.Ct. 202, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953). Admiralty law also recognizes the concept of comparative fault. That comparative fault is applicable to all cases of strict liability in admiralty is not set forth in bright letters. Generally, in cases where comparative fault has been applied in admiralty, the defendant has been found negligent instead of or in addition to being found strictly liable for unseaworthiness. This was true in both cases cited by *1436the majority for the proposition that comparative fault is applied in unseaworthiness cases. Id. at 408, 74 S.Ct. at 204; Gay v. Ocean Transport & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir.1977).
The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit to face squarely the issue of comparative fault in strict liability admiralty cases. Pan-Alaska v. Marine Construction & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.1977). The majority endorses this opinion. I do not believe this case comports with the underlying principles of strict liability reflected in § 402A, a section oft cited in maritime opinions. See, e.g., McCune v. F. Alioto Fish Co., 597 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir.1979); Lindsay v. McDonnell-Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631 (8th Cir.1972). The Pan-Alaska court cites several cases to support its conclusion. I find those cases at variance with § 402A strict liability.
In Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967), the Wisconsin Supreme Court was confronted with the application of Wisconsin’s comparative negligence statute as a defense to strict liability. The court analyzed strict liability as “akin to negligence per se.” Id. 155 N.W.2d at 64. This analysis, however, stands at odds with the standard definition of strict liability which assumes that no determination of fault is necessary. This decision has not commanded a broad following.8
In Sun Valley Airlines v. Avco-Lycoming, Inc., 411 F.Supp. 598, 602 (D.Idaho 1976), the court found that, “[a] concept fundamental in tort law is that in order for liability to lie, there must be a wrongdoer whose actions violate a duty owed ... whether it be labeled negligence or strict liability, is blameworthy or culpable conduct ... [a] violation of that duty constitutes blameworthiness or culpability or sense of legal fault.” Obviously the court implied the element of fault in strict liability. I find this implication at odds with the generally accepted view of strict liability.
In Hagenbuch v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 339 F.Supp. 676 (D.N.H.1972), the court found assumption of risk to be a defense to strict liability. The plaintiff there was injured when a hammer chipped and the chip pierced his eye. The plaintiff was aware that the hammer had chipped previously. This case involves assumption of risk, an altogether different animal from comparative negligence. In the traditional assumption of risk situation, the plaintiff, “aware of a risk already created by the negligence of the defendant, proceeds voluntarily to encounter it.” Prosser, The Law of Torts, p. 440 (4th ed. 1971). That is not the factual situation presented in the case at bar.
In Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976), the Supreme Court of Alaska applied comparative negligence in a strict liability case, stating “[ajlthough it is theoretically difficult for the legal purist to balance the seller’s strict liability against the user’s negligence, this problem is more apparent than real.... It is not anticipated that the trier of fact will have serious difficulties in setting the percentage that the damages would be reduced as a result of the comparative negligence of the plaintiff.” Id. at 45-46. I cannot agree. This is more than simply a problem of “legal purity.” It presents a very practical problem which the court does not address. Comparative fault assumes a real comparison. The percentage of the plaintiff’s fault is determined in relation to the defendant’s fault. The amount of fault of a plaintiff is not determinable in a vacuum; it can only be measured as against the culpability of the defendant. I struggle to understand how the fact-finder can appreciate and apply the concept of liability without fault and, at the same time, compare relative percentages of fault when one of the parties is perhaps free of fault. It appears that the fact-finder will be forced to make an ad hoc determination of presumed fault on the part of the strictly *1437liable party and then factor this into a calculus of relative responsibility.
The final case cited in Pan-Alaska is our decision in Edwards v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (1975). In Edwards we found no error in jury instructions which permitted a reduction in recovery commensurate with the decedent’s contributory negligence. Edwards has been viewed by some courts and commentators as standing for the proposition that comparative fault is applicable in strict liability cases.9 In Edwards we may have been intuitively groping for something else — perhaps the embryonic formulation of a causal apportionment standard.
I am persuaded, as earlier stated, that Pan-Alaska is inconsistent with the purpose and rationale of strict liability. I would not make its holding the law in this circuit. To do so further exacerbates the problem courts have had in distinguishing strict liability from negligence.
The Sea and Comparative Negligence
The court today is of the opinion that the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 688, and the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U.S.C. § 766, permit, perhaps invite, the application of comparative negligence principles in a strict liability case. I cannot agree.
The doctrine of unseaworthiness has been a part of our maritime law since The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 23 S.Ct. 483, 47 L.Ed. 760 (1903). Whether this concept was based on strict liability, negligence, or a hybrid of the two was the subject of a lengthy, intense debate. It was not until 1943 that the Supreme Court ended the confusion by holding that the doctrine of unseaworthiness exists independent of the doctrine of negligence. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 64 S.Ct. 455, 88 L.Ed. 561 (1943). Until 1958, unseaworthiness was an alternative remedy to a Jones Act negligence action and a plaintiff was obliged to opt between the two. McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 78 S.Ct. 1201, 2 L.Ed.2d 1272 (1958). Today a plaintiff may plead both, but as separate actions. In recent times, the Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of seaworthiness as a derivative remedy under DOHSA. Moragne v. State Marine Life, 398 U.S. 375, 396 n. 12, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 1785 n. 12, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970), affirming earlier dictum in Kernan v. American Dredging Company, 355 U.S. 426, 430 n. 4, 78 S.Ct. 394, 397 n. 4, 2 L.Ed.2d 382 (1958). In 1920, during the period of confusion and uncertainty, DOH-SA and the Jones Act were enacted. It cannot be gainsaid that the remedies made available by the Jones Act and DOHSA have been largely the product of judicial articulation. An examination of these statutes reflects that comparison of fault in strict liability maritime actions is not statutorily ordained. That we would now formulate a standard in maritime law consistent with general tort principles, one that rejects comparative fault in strict liability products cases, to me would be neither inconsistent nor untidy. I find nothing implicit in maritime law compelling the opposite result.
In maritime torts, courts have traditionally applied common law rules, Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 94 S.Ct. 806, 39 L.Ed.2d 9 (1974), with an awareness of the solutions to similar problems by other courts, see Watz v. Zapata Off-shore Company, 431 F.2d 100 (5th Cir.1970). While an occasional opinion may doubt whether admiralty will enforce strict liability, see, e.g., Richards v. Blake Builders Supply, Inc., 528 F.2d 745 (4th Cir.1975), the pervasive trend in American admiralty law is to acknowledge and incorporate it. I am convinced that we should adopt, in admiralty law, tort principles consistent with the general law.
*1438If strict liability is a socially justifiable method of allocating responsibility, then the results flowing from it for the assessment of damages should be accepted as concomitantly just.10
Comparative Causation as a Basis of Apportioning Responsibility
I am not persuaded to the majority’s view, but I would agree that some assessment of comparative responsibility may be made in this case. I find that causal apportionment 11 offers a fair and equitable resolution of this thorny issue. The operative element in every strict liability action, after the defective product, hazardous activity, or unseaworthiness is found, is the causal connection between that fact and the injury. If the plaintiff’s actions are blameworthy and helped cause the result, an appropriate reduction in recovery would seem in order. The focus of the inquiry should be the causal relationship between the plaintiff’s conduct and the injury, not on the normative aspects of the plaintiff’s conduct.
In an action against a strictly liable defendant, there must be an equitable reason for mitigating a plaintiff’s recovery when the policy for allowing it in the first place is a belief that the enterprise should bear the costs for the injuries it inflicts through its products. I would suggest that a threshold assessment of the plaintiff’s fault be made as part of the determination whether damages should be mitigated. The actual comparison for mitigation purposes would be based on how much the plaintiff contributed to the cause of the accident, not on how blameworthy the plaintiff was. If the plaintiff is found free of fault there would be no reduction and the strictly liable party would bear all of the costs, despite a shared causation. This approach would equitably apportion responsibility consistent with the policies of strict liability.
There is nothing novel or unusual about using causation to gauge liability. See, e.g., In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Company, 3 K.B. 560 (1921). The civil law has long recognized causation as a basis for allocating responsibility. See Lawson & Markesinis, Tortious Liability for Unintentional Harm in the Common Law and the Civil Law, pp. 106-142 (1982). Moreover, the use of causal influence as an element of comparative responsibility is acknowledged in the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, see Comment to § 2(b) of UCFA (1977).
Can the average fact-finder apportion causation? I think so. I am convinced that judges and juries would have no more difficulty determining causation than they do *1439with culpability.12 I am aware, however, of an academic debate of substantial proportions on this question.13
I would not reduce the plaintiff’s recovery based on an evaluation of his negligence in the use of the faulty product. But I would not be adverse to permitting the manufacturer to reduce the amount of damages by first showing plaintiff’s fault and then showing the extent to which Lewis’ actions actually caused the injuries he sustained. This may be viewed as a mere difference in semantics from the holding of the majority; I do not think so and respectfully dissent.
. § 402 A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
. “... the purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injury resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.” Greenman v. Yuba, 59 Cal. 57, 63, 27 Cal.Rep. 697, 701, 377 P.2d 897, 901 (1963).
. As a policy matter, strict liability in products cases deals with enterprise responsibility; “public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed on those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be obtained.” Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, Comment L. See also, Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal.2d 578, 70 Cal.Rptr. 652, 451 P.2d 84 (1969); Klenne, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Facts, 47 U.Colo.L.Rev. 153; Traynor, The Ways and Means of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 Tenn.L.Rev. 363 (1965).
. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725, 762-63, 575 P.2d 1162, 1184, 144 Cal.Rptr. 380, 403 (1978, Mosk, J., dissenting); Robinson, Square Pegs (Products Liability) In Round Holes (Comparative Negligence), 52 Cal. St.B.J. 16 (1977); Note, Products Liability, Comparative Negligence, and the Allocation of Damages Among Multiple Defendants, 50 S.Cal.L.Rev. 73, 102 (1976).
. This is clearly expressed in the comments to Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, Comment a (1965). See also, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697 (1963); 1 R. Hursh & H. Bailey, American Law of Products Liability § 4.41 (2d ed. 1974); Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) § 4016 (1981).
. This point has bothered at least one court, and apparently significantly contributed to its finding of a basis of comparison: “[I]t would be anomalous in a products liability case to have damages mitigated if the plaintiff sues in negligence, but allow him to recover full damages if he sues in strict liability.” Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 46 (Alaska 1976).
. I go no further than those situations in which the plaintiff’s “fault” is grounded in simple negligence. 697 F.2d at 1255. This is an altogether different situation from one where the plaintiff “assumes the risk” and voluntarily and unreasonably proceeds to encounter a known danger. The position of the Restatement is that contributory negligence is not a defense to strict liability whereas assumption of risk is. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, Comment n (1965).
. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reiterated this analysis in Powers v. Hunt Wesson Foods, 64 Wis.2d 532, 219 N.W.2d 393 (1974). Only two other courts have favorably commented on this case. Haney v. International Harvester Co., 294 Minn. 375, 201 N.W.2d 140 (1976); Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 109 R.I. 176, 283 A.2d 255 (1971).
. It should be noted further that in this case we made the assumption that Mississippi law would follow the urgings of Professor Wade in his article “Strict Tort Liability” 44 Miss.L.J. 825, 850 (1973), which advocated the use of comparative fault principles to strict liability actions. However, since Professor Wade based his contention on the Wisconsin case of Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967), a case which does not command a wide following and has been rejected outright by some courts, it is at least somewhat questionable whether Professor Wade’s analysis would be followed by the Mississippi court today.
. Whether strict liability is a fair and just standard of allocating responsibility is the subject of a lively debate. See, e.g., Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151 (1973); Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. Legal Stud. 165 (1974); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Harv.L.Rev, 537 (1972); Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 Ga.L.Rev. 963 (1981). Unless, however, we determine to abolish strict liability as a basis of liability, we should accept the logical conclusions of its results as just.
. I do not share the majority’s view that fault and causation are the same thing and consider it important to distinguish between them. Fault relates the specific act to responsibility. See, generally, Prosser, The Law of Torts, (4th ed. 1971) ch. 5. The question posed is whether the act itself is less than the standard required by law. Causation relates the act to the result. See, generally, Hart and Honore, Causation in the Law, 1959; Becht and Miller, The Test of Factual Causation, 1961; Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 Stan.L.Rev. 60 (1956); Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 Mich.L.Rev. 543 (1962). Questions of causation are not based on the normative analysis of the quality of the act, but are focused on whether there is a nexus between the act and the result. Fault and causation are not interchangeable terms. Prosser, The Law of Torts, (4th ed. 1971) p. 142.
The possible jury instructions suggested by the majority reflect the inherent confusion in the two concepts. Under the charge the jury would be asked “was plaintiffs fault a cause of plaintiffs injury?” I perceive the appropriate question to be “was plaintiffs act or forbearance which you find blameworthy part of the cause of the injury? If so, what percentage of the cause do you find.?” The focus should be on the act itself, not on a normative evaluation of the quality of the act.
. Psychologists have determined that causality is one of the first concerns the human mind learns to grasp, and that this is developed before the intellectual development of the understanding of moral culpability. See, e.g., Piaget, The Child’s Conception of Physical Causality (1960).
Although sophisticated academic formulations have been devised, see, e.g., Rizzo & Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts: Am Economic Theory, 80 Col.L.Rev. 1199, legal scholars acknowledge that ordinary people make such determinations in their normal course of life, Hart & Honoré, Causation in the Law, ch. II (1959).
. See, e.g., Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J.Leg.Stud. 151 (1973); Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J.Leg.Stud. 165 (1974); Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J.Leg.Stud. 391 (1975); ¡Sorgo, Causal Paradisms in Tort Law, 8 J.Leg. Stud. 419 (1979); Note, Comparative Causation, Indemnity, and the Allocation of Losses Between Joint Tortfeasors in Products Liability Cases, 10 St. Marys L.J. 587 (1979); Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: Inquiry into the Emerging Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29 Mercer L.Rev. 403 (1978).