concurring.
I join in the “Continuing Jurisdiction in Texas” portion of the Court’s opinion and in the holding there made that under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, and the Texas Family Code, the Texas court had continuing exclusive jurisdiction to modify, or refuse to modify, the visitation provisions of the Texas divorce decree, subject to presently inapplicable possible exceptions for emergency orders. This ruling requires the Court to determine whether by virtue of the PKPA the district court had jurisdiction to enjoin continuation of the previously commenced proceedings in the Louisiana court, there being no impasse such as that present in Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303 *1144(3d Cir.1984).* I agree with the Court’s holding on this question and hence with its judgment of reversal. I would not reach the question of what the district court’s powers would be in a Flood -type impasse, and hence do not join in the “Jurisdiction” portion of the Court’s opinion. See Hazen Research, Inc. v. Omega Minerals, Inc., 497 F.2d 151, 153 n. 1 (5th Cir.1974); 28 U.S.C. § 2283; Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3563 at 50; id. § 4222 at 317 & n. 14.
Except as the PKPA may be read to modify the "domestic relations” exception to federal court jurisdiction, see Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1042-44 (D.C.Cir.1982); Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486 (5th Cir.1978), and to bring the case within one of the exceptions to 28 U.S.C. § 2283, the diverse citizenship of the parties did not suffice to empower the court below to enjoin the Louisiana proceedings.