Dissenting:
I dissent because I conclude that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. Despite the Governor’s claim to the contrary, I am convinced that his “Motion for Clarification, or in the alternative, for a Stay” was in fact a timely motion to alter or amend the judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). As such, the Governor’s notice of appeal, filed on February 14, 1984, became a nullity. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4); Griggs v. Providence Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61, 103 S.Ct. 400, 403, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982). Because the Governor failed to file a timely notice of appeal after the district court’s disposition of the motion for clarification, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4); Griggs, 459 U.S. at 61, 103 S.Ct. at 403; Bestran Corp. v. Eagle Comptronics, Inc., 720 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir.1983); Brodigan v. McCormack, 704 F.2d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir.1983).
The correctness of my view that this appeal must be dismissed hinges upon the proper interpretation of the Governor’s post-judgment motion. The Governor did not label his motion as one taken under Rule 59(e). Labels, however, do not control our reading of the substance of a motion. Miller v. Transamerican Press Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 527 (9th Cir.1983); Sea Ranch Ass’n v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm’n, 537 F.2d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir.1976).
The Governor asserts that he did not seek a substantive change in the district court’s judgment but rather simple clarification of an inherently ambiguous state-*1104merit in the judgment.1 If the Governor is correct, his motion for clarification may properly be characterized as one taken under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(a) and our jurisdiction over this appeal would be unaffected. Cf. Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d at 527; Huey v. Teledyne, Inc., 608 F.2d 1234, 1237 (9th Cir.1979) cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1106, 102 S.Ct. 3484, 73 L.Ed.2d 1367 (1982).
The Governor’s assertion must be considered in the context of the fundamental issue of this lawsuit. The controversy which gave rise to this action was control over the Guam Visitors Bureau (the Bureau), as it was established in 1983 under Public Law 17-32, the new Guam Visitors Bureau Act. The Governor insisted that the Bureau was an agency within the executive branch and therefore subject to his control. He intended to exercise control over the Bureau by his power of appointment over the Bureau’s board of directors.
Under section 9106(a) of the new Act, however, the legislature diluted the Governor’s power to control the Bureau’s board of directors by directing him to nominate only a minority of its members. The validity of this section is the heart of this dispute.
Concluding that the Bureau was not an agency within the executive branch, the district court upheld the validity of section 9106(a) and with unmistakable clarity ordered the Governor to make the nominations to the Bureau’s board of directors required under section 9106(a). These nominations were essential to constitute a quorum in order to permit the Bureau to discharge its legislated functions.
In his post-judgment motion for clarification, the Governor asked the district court to reverse its ruling by merely authorizing, and not compelling, the nominations. Through this post-judgment motion, the Governor sought a fundamental alteration in the terms of the judgment which went to the heart of the lawsuit. The district court refused to amend its judgment as requested by the Governor; instead, it “clarified” its judgment by setting a specific date for submission of the Governor’s nominations of the appointed board members.
To dismiss this appeal when no substantive change resulted in the district court’s judgment as a consequence of the filing of the motion for clarification may seem harsh and, indeed, it is. Nonetheless, Fed.R. App.P. 4(a)(4) clearly requires dismissal, and for good reasons.
Rule 4(a), as amended in 1979, provides in relevant part:
If a timely motion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the district court by any party ... under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment ... the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order ... granting or denying ... such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of [the Rule 59(e) motion] shall have no effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order disposing of the motion as provided above. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4).
Prior to the 1979 amendment to Rule 4(a), a condition existed which demanded reform. See generally Griggs, 459 U.S. at 58-60, 103 S.Ct. at 402-403; 9 J. Moore, B. Ward, J. Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice 11204.12[1] at 4-63 to 4-65 (2d ed. 1983). The former version of Rule 4(a) recognized that the district court should retain authority to make substantive changes in its judgment upon a motion filed within ten days of the entry of judgment. A post-judgment motion under Rule 59(e) was an appropriate vehicle to request such substantive corrections in the district court judgment “without implicating the appellate process.” Clipper Express v. Rocky Mountain Mo*1105tor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240, 1249 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227, 103 S.Ct. 1234, 75 L.Ed.2d 468 (1983). However, the law was also firmly established that the filing of a notice of appeal transferred jurisdiction over the case from the trial court to the appellate court. See generally Griggs, 459 U.S. at 58, 103 S.Ct. at 402. This latter rule served the obvious purpose of fixing responsibility in one court for the control and disposition of a case, and foreclosing the possibility of continued tinkering with a judgment by a district court after an appeal from that judgment had been properly filed. Id.
As a consequence, under the pre-1979 procedures, if a notice of appeal were filed before a timely motion to alter or amend the judgment, the district court was divested of jurisdiction to rule on the motion in the absence of a remand from the court of appeals. See id. 58-59, 103 S.Ct. at 402 and cases cited therein. If, however, a timely motion to alter or amend the judgment was filed prior to a notice of appeal then both the district court and the appellate court could simultaneously exercise their respective powers over the same case. See id.
It is clear that under the former Rule 4(a), despite the filing of a timely motion to alter or amend the judgment, a district court could be stripped of the initial opportunity to make substantive corrections in its judgment which might obviate the need for an appeal. Furthermore, the potential for an overlap in the respective jurisdictions of a court of appeals and a district court created the possibility of an inefficient and wasteful use of judicial resources. In order to ensure that the district court had the initial opportunity to correct its own errors, if any, and to prevent unnecessary appellate review, Rule 4(a)(4) was amended to its present form. See Griggs, 459 U.S. at 60 n. 2, 103 S.Ct. at 403 n. 2 (quoting the explanation given by the Advisory Committee for Appellate Rules for the amendment to Rule 4(a)(4)).
Rule 4(a)(4) clearly sets forth the effect of a timely motion to alter or amend the judgment. It nullifies any notice of appeal filed prior to the disposition of such a motion. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4); Griggs, 459 U.S. at 60-61, 103 S.Ct. at 403. To perfect an appeal litigants must file a timely notice of appeal after the disposition of the motion. Id.
Rule 4(a)(4) requires a certain rigidity to serve its purposes. If a district court were to grant a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend, the amended judgment would supplant the original judgment. An appeal from the original judgment would lose its vitality. Any work on the appeal from the original judgment would have been wasted. Because it is impossible to foresee how a district court will rule on a 59(e) motion, Rule 4(a)(4) expressly eliminates appellate jurisdiction upon the filing of a timely Rule 59(e) motion, rather than upon its disposition. In this manner precious judicial resources are economized. By the same token, if the nature of the post-judgment motion is in doubt, our inquiry into the substance of the motion must focus upon its true purpose when it was made rather than upon the district court’s disposition of the motion.
I have no hesitancy in concluding that the Governor’s motion for clarification, when made, was intended to work a substantive change in the district court’s original judgment. That the motion was denied does not alter the fundamental character of the motion itself.
In my view, this circuit has suffered from an inconsistent application of Rule 4(a)(4). From a survey of cases in which we addressed similar jurisdictional problems, it appears that our primary concern may be saving our appellate jurisdiction rather than serving those important policy interests which prompted the amendments to Rule 4(a)(4). For example, in cases where no notice of appeal was filed from the original judgment but such a notice was timely filed after the disposition of a post-judgment motion that was filed within ten days of the entry of judgment, we have been quick to save our jurisdiction by construing the post-judgment motion as one *1106under Rule 59(e). See e.g., Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd., 652 F.2d 808, 811-12 (9th Cir.1981) (motion filed two days after entry of judgment seeking a new trial and relief from summary judgment under Rules 59 and 60 construed as a Rule 59(e) motion); Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 520-21 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981) (motion to retax costs construed as timely Rule 59(e) motion); Sea Ranch Ass’n, 537 F.2d at 1061 (motion filed three days after entry of judgment which sought reconsideration and clarification under Rule 60(b) deemed to be a motion under Rule 59(e)).
On the other hand, we have also construed a post-judgment motion, which was filed within ten days of the entry of judgment, as a Rule 60(b) motion so as to save our jurisdiction where an appellant filed a notice of appeal from the original judgment but neglected to file a new notice of appeal after the disposition of the post-judgment motion. See United States v. 1982 Sanger 24 Spectra Boat, 738 F.2d 1043 1045-46 (9th Cir.1984).
It is often difficult to draw a tenable distinction in these two categories of cases on the basis of the substance of the motions made.
Our cases are guidelines for litigants and district courts alike. It is regrettable that we have given both inconsistent guidance in measuring the effect of post-judgment motions on our jurisdiction. Indeed, the impression may exist that there is something to be gained by inartful motions because, upon appellate review, we will construe them “liberally” so as to preserve our jurisdiction.
Litigants should be encouraged to file precise motions which specify the authority for the relief requested and to articulate with particularity the arguments in support of their motions. Such precision would eliminate many of the jurisdictional problems that have arisen under Rule 4(a)(4). By inconsistent adjudications of cases which present this jurisdictional issue, however, we encourage imprecision and sloppy motion practice.
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the Governor’s motion for clarification in this case is one falling within the ambit of Rule 59(e). Because the Governor failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 4(a)(4), the appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
. The Governor sought clarification of the third paragraph of the district court's judgment. The paragraph reads in relevant part:
... pursuant to the provisions of Section 9106(a) of Article I, four (4) members of the Board of Directors of the Guam Visitors Bureau, designated as "appointed directors” shall be appointed by the Governor of Guam with the advice and consent from the Guam Legislature.