specially concurring:
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that this appeal is controlled by this court’s decision in Lane v. Celotex Corp., 782 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir.1985). Faced with this binding precedent, I agree that the district court’s grant of summary judgment should be reversed. I concur specially to reiterate my dissatisfaction with the Lane holding. See Lane v. Celotex Corp., 782 F.2d 1526, 1533 (11th Cir.1985) (Hill, J., dissenting).
The Lane decision drastically limits this court’s holding in Van T. Junkins & Associates v. U.S. Industries, 736 F.2d 656 (11th Cir.1984). In Van T. Junkins, this court declared: “When a party has given clear answers to unambiguous questions which negate the existence of any genuine issue of material fact, that party cannot thereafter create such an issue with an affidavit that merely contradicts, without explanation, previously given clear testimony.” Id. at 657. The purpose of this rule is to spare the party requesting summary judgment the needless pain and costs of a law suit when a party’s prior statements show no factual dispute exists. This rule further assures that frivolous law suits will not deluge the federal court system, otherwise consuming scarce judicial resources which would best be allocated to meritorious claims. The life of a frivolous suit should not be extended merely by a last minute affidavit which is contrary to a party’s or an interested witness’ admissions, unless there is some tangible basis for explaining the blatant inconsistencies.
If I were writing on a clean slate, I would conclude that Frank McIntyre was an interested witness due to the fact that, like William Tippens, he filed a similar suit seeking recovery for his exposure to asbestos and is represented by the same counsel that represents Mrs. Tippens. I would also conclude that McIntyre’s affidavit was inherently inconsistent with his later disposition. The facts of this case, however, cannot be meaningfully distinguished from those in Lane v. Celotex Corp. Therefore, I concur.