concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the remand as to Holiday Inns. I dissent, however, from the assertion of “specific” jurisdiction over Hum-phreys and from the majority’s affirmance that Indiana is a proper forum.
The Wilsons are residents of Illinois. Their trip to the Caymans was a gift from their son. He planned it and paid for it. Neither the son nor the Wilsons had any contacts with Humphreys, in Indiana or anywhere else in the United States. He booked the trip through American, and there is no evidence that he was influenced in any way by anything Humphreys said or did, that he selected Humphreys or even knew that it was to be the hotel. In fact, the record is clear, as the majority recognizes, that “arrangements for the trip were made as a result of advertisements for the tour that appeared in American’s travel bulletin. Arrangements were made with American’s tour subsidiary, Ambassadair, and payment was made to Ambassa-dair....” Majority op. at 1241.
I. Personal Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction over an unwilling, non-resident defendant conforms to the requirements of due process only if the “defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). A defendant who has “purposefully established ‘minimum contacts’ in the forum State” has impliedly submitted to jurisdiction in the forum. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). But merely “ ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ ” contacts with a forum are not enough. Id. at 475, 105 S.Ct. at 2183. Further, any “assertion of personal jurisdiction [must] comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Id. at 476, 105 S.Ct. at 2184, quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). And, finally, in the special case of “specific” jurisdiction, a defendant’s contacts with the forum serve as a basis for personal jurisdiction only for suits “arising out of or related to” those contacts. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1872 n. 8, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984).
Humphreys here had no purposeful contacts with the plaintiffs or with Indiana related to this suit, which arises from acts and events that took place entirely in the Cayman Islands. Humphreys could not reasonably have anticipated being haled into court in Indiana, and forcing Hum-phreys to defend this case in an Indiana courtroom is far from fair or substantially just.
Any and all contacts with the Wilsons’ son in Indiana related to this lawsuit were American’s, not Humphreys’, and American admittedly did not act as Humphreys’ agent. American had no authority to confirm reservations and bind Humphreys and it did not purport to do so. American had *1248to submit all reservations to Humphreys for confirmation.1
I can understand how Humphreys could reasonably have expected to be haled into an Indiana court, state or federal, to resolve a dispute arising from its contract with American Trans Air, which contract was negotiated in Indiana, or if it had sold products in Indiana. But this case arises from a dispute between Humphreys and the Wilsons, not Humphreys and American. Humphreys did not sell products in Indiana, and Humphreys had no contacts whatsoever with the Wilsons in Indiana or anywhere else in the United States.
The majority’s suggestion that Indiana courts have jurisdiction here because “Humphreys established a continuing commercial relationship with an Indiana tour company with the expectations that its services would be purchased by residents of Indiana (and other states),” majority op. at 1244, and “Humphreys reasonably should have anticipated being haled into court in Indiana,” id. at 1244, strikes me as wholly inconsistent with the facts as well as the requirements of due process.
Humphreys undoubtedly serves hundreds or even thousands of U.S. tourist guests each year as the result of reservations made by American and other U.S. tour operators and travel agencies. Every U.S. tour organizer or travel agency has innumerable foreign hotels, bus lines, guide services, etc., with which it maintains continuing commercial arrangements. It would be surprising, however, if Hum-phreys or any other foreign service provider anticipated that, merely as a result of its contacts with U.S. travel agents and without more, it might wind up defending lawsuits brought by its U.S. guests in U.S. courts.
To hold, as the majority does today, that Indiana courts may properly exercise in personam jurisdiction over Humphreys is to hold that any foreign hotel, restaurant, museum or other facility or service provider, which confirms reservations for U.S. travel agents and tour operators and compensates those travel agents and tour operators for arranging reservations (a frequent and typical practice), is subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts and should expect to be haled into them to defend tort suits or any other claims brought by U.S. guests. This, notwithstanding that the hotel or other service provider has had no dealings with the guest in any U.S. forum, that there was no principal/agent relationship between it and the travel agent or tour operator with whom the guest solely dealt, and even though all the acts and events alleged in the guest’s complaint occurred in Timbuktu, Bali, Japan, Australia, Majorca, Tahiti or where-have-you, where, in addition, all the witnesses and relevant records are located.
The kind of global long-arm jurisdiction which the majority endorses, in my opinion, both fails the minimum contacts test and is at odds with the fundamental due process requirement that jurisdiction comport with “fair play and substantial justice.” I believe that compelling Humphreys to litigate in Indiana is unanticipated, unfair and beyond the bounds of due process. Cf. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 1034, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987) (“The unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders.”).
*1249II. Forum Non Conveniens
In addition to holding that Indiana’s long-arm statute reaches Humphreys, the majority also finds, as did the Eighth Circuit, in Lehman v. Humphrey Cayman, Ltd., 713 F.2d 339 (8th Cir.1983), that the fact that the hotel and all the witnesses are located in the Cayman Islands, where all the events giving rise to this case took place, is outweighed by other considerations such as the allegedly limited availability of contingent fee arrangements and jury trials in the Cayman Islands, the necessity of a bond, the plaintiffs’ prerogative to choose their forum, and the hardship for the plaintiffs of litigating in the Cayman Islands (where their alleged cause of action arose). I respectfully disagree.
There are a number of serious problems with trying this case in Indiana. First, the site of the alleged tort, the defendant, all the witnesses other than the plaintiffs and all the records are in the Cayman Islands. The inconvenience to Humphreys far outweighs any inconvenience to the Wilsons to try the case where it arose.
Second, Indiana citizens undoubtedly have an interest in a convenient home forum. And, if due process permits, Indiana may have an interest in providing such a forum for its citizens who choose to litigate there. But it is difficult to conceive of what real interest either Indiana or its citizens have in this ease. The Wilsons are citizens of Illinois. In Lehman, by contrast, the plaintiffs were, at least, citizens of the forum state.
Third, while it would undoubtedly be to the Wilsons’ advantage to try this case under Indiana law (and before an Indiana jury) — which is, presumably, why they chose to file it there — the differences the parties have identified between Indiana law and the law of the Cayman Islands are not in themselves a justification either for Indiana courts to assert due process long-arm jurisdiction or for finding that the balance of inconvenience in this case favors an Indiana trial. Both the majority and the district court have given too much weight to these differences. “The possibility of a change in substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry.” Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 247, 102 S.Ct. 252, 261, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981) (availability of strict liability in Pennsylvania but not in Scotland did not, by itself, bar dismissal for forum non con-veniens). See also id. at 252 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. at 264 n. 19.
I would note, in addition, that although the Wilsons have apparently been assuming that in Indiana, local law would apply, that may or may not be true. Although the majority does not discuss the issue, it is an important conflict of laws question, and possibly a difficult one, whether Cayman Islands or Indiana law should govern at trial. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 251, 102 S.Ct. at 263 (“The doctrine of forum non conveniens ... is designed in part to help courts avoid conducting complex exercises in comparative law.”). The answer to that question, which depends on Indiana’s choice-of-law rules, may determine not only the applicable law of liability and the right to a jury but also Mr. Wilson’s right to sue. If the majority is holding, as it seems to suggest by referring to trial by jury, not only that Indiana courts have jurisdiction but also that Indiana substantive law applies, then I believe the opinion ought not to assume it, but should say so and explain why.
A fourth problem with allowing this case to proceed in Indiana is that it is likewise unclear and troubling to me how an Indiana judgment against Humphreys, should that be the outcome, would be enforced — an issue which, again, the majority’s opinion overlooks. I would certainly hope that Humphreys, desiring to continue to attract U.S. tourists, would recognize and respond to any judgment that might be entered against it. But asserting jurisdiction over and entering judgments against foreign entities, many of whom have no assets in the United States, is at best a speculative practice.
III. Conclusion
It is worth noting the probable consequences of the majority’s decision. Many *1250Americans are frequent foreign travelers. If U.S. courts have jurisdiction every time an American tourist has a dispute with a foreign service provider which has an ongoing contact with an American tour organizer or travel agent, we are going to see a lot more lawsuits such as this one, and foreign service providers will likely protect themselves from their increased exposure by charging higher rates and/or insisting on exculpatory provisions in their contracts with Americans.
I recognize that finding no U.S. jurisdiction in cases like this might require American travelers like Mrs. Wilson to return to places where they have had traumatic experiences in order to pursue remedies for alleged wrongs. Those are not considerations, however, that are relevant to jurisdiction, which can only be stretched so far as due process allows and has, I believe, been stretched far too far in this case.
It is undisputed that U.S. tourists traveling voluntarily in foreign countries are subject to the laws and jurisdiction of the courts of those countries. Consistent with that principle, the long-arm jurisdiction of the fifty states cannot be applied globally so as to give U.S. courts specific jurisdiction over foreign defendants in tort cases arising from events that took place entirely on foreign soil and are unrelated to the defendants’ contacts with any U.S. forum.
Believing that the bounds of due process have been far exceeded in this case, I would reverse the finding of jurisdiction as to Humphreys. I believe, in addition, that denying Humphreys’ motion for a dismissal for forum non conveniens constituted an abuse of discretion and would also reverse on that basis, even if Humphreys’ contacts with Indiana satisfied due process. I concur, however, with the majority’s conclusions as to Holiday Inns.
. See Fordyce v. Round Hill Developments, Ltd., 585 F.2d 30 (2d Cir.1978) (Jamaican hotel did not subject itself to jurisdiction of New York courts by contracting with a travel agent, where the travel agent was an independent contractor which leased rooms from the hotel at its own risk); Kopolowitz v. Deepdene Hotel & Tennis Club, 464 F.Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (Bermuda hotel did not submit to jurisdiction of New York courts by engaging a sales representative to promote the hotel and handle inquiries and requests for reservations, in New York and elsewhere in the United States, where the sales representative did not have the power to confirm reservations). Compare Gelfand v. Tanner Motors Tours, Ltd., 385 F.2d 116 (2d Cir.1967) (involving a nonforum defendant whose agent in New York had power to confirm reservations).