concurring in the judgment.
I write separately because, in my opinion, FOIA Exemption 3 provides a basis for withholding the documents Meyerhoff requested, but Exemption 6, upon which Judge Kozinski relies, may not.
Exemption 6 applies to materials that, if disclosed, “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). This exemption requires a balancing of “the individual’s right of privacy” against FOIA’s purpose to make documents public. See Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372-73, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 1604, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976); United States Dep’t of State v. Ray, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 541, 116 L.Ed.2d 526 (1991). Under Judge Kozinski’s approach, no court will have performed any such balancing, and there is no indication that Congress has done so, either.1 The 1985 amendment to subsection 207(a) merely states that the information at issue in this case “shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed to the public,” Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1985, Pub.L. No. 99-190, § 148(b)(3), 99 Stat. 1185, 1324, 1325 (1985); Congress “never said boo,” see Z Channel Ltd. Partnership v. Home Box Office, Inc., 931 F.2d 1338, 1345 (9th Cir.1991) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 875, 116 L.Ed.2d 780 (1992), about balancing individual rights against the public’s need to know. Without any such guidance, we ought not simply to presume that Congress had a particular balancing result in mind.2
Congress has done nothing more than merely declare, without expressing its reasons, that henceforth certain information should not be disclosed. When Congress makes such a declaration, we need not perform an independent balancing under Exemption 6, because we must defer to that congressional policy under Exemption 3.3 Exemption 3 applies to material “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); Congress need give no reason explaining why it chooses to exempt a particular class of documents from disclosure. Simply declaring documents exempt makes them so. That is what Congress has done here.
The reports Meyerhoff wants were filed pursuant to 5 U.S.C.App. 4 § 207(a). The 1985 amendment modified subsection 207(a), stating that “[a]ny information required to be provided by an individual under this subsection shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed to the public.” I interpret “this subsection” to mean subsection 207(a), not (a)(2). Because the information at issue in this case was filed under subsection 207(a) and the amendment applies to documents filed under subsection 207(a), the amendment applies.
*1506For this reason, I agree that the district court’s decision should be affirmed.
.Nor did the EPA balance the interest of board members in personal privacy against the public interest in disclosure. Cf. Rose, 425 U.S. at 372, 96 S.Ct. at 1604; Ray, 112 S.Ct. at 550 (Scalia, J., concurring). Also missing is the kind of record that allowed the Court in Ray to evaluate whether the agency has discharged its burden of demonstrating that the requested disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy. See Ray, 112 S.Ct. at 548-50. Further, to accept a congressional declaration in lieu of balancing writes off the hooks the burden Rose, Ray, and United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 755, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 1472, 103 L.Ed.2d 774 (1989), place on the agency to justify the withholding of requested documents. Finally, while it may be appropriate to consider congressional policy in undertaking the balancing of personal interests against the public interest in disclosure, to defer entirely abdicates judicial responsibility.
. I note, without deciding whether Exemption 6 would apply after a judicial balancing, that given the limited nature of Meyerhoffs request, the government might have a difficult time showing that the privacy right here outweighs disclosure in this case.
. Judge Kozinski would turn every Exemption 3 case into an Exemption 6 case by presuming a balancing result in the face of congressional silence. We should avoid such a construction because it would render Exemption 3 superfluous.