with whom HANSEN, Circuit Judge, joins, concurring specially.
I agree with and concur in the opinion, but would like to clarify a point concerning the discussion of whether Wind’s 1987 conviction should be used for purposes of sentence enhancement.
The fact that the order of discharge itself did not contain an express limitation on the right to possess firearms is not controlling. This court has held that even if the discharge certificate itself does not include the express limitation required by § 921(a)(20), a prior conviction is used for sentence enhancement if the defendant may not legally possess the firearm in the state that convicted him. Davis v. United States, 972 F.2d 227, 231 (8th Cir.1992).
Consequently, to determine whether a defendant’s prior conviction can be used for sentence enhancement, this court must: (1) determine whether the order of discharge itself contains an express limitation on the right to possess firearms, and if it does not; (2) determine whether the defendant is prohibited by state law from possessing firearms.
Although Wind’s order of discharge does not contain an express limitation, we still must determine whether Minnesota law prohibits him from possessing the rifle at issue. If Minnesota law did prohibit him from possessing the rifle, his 1987 conviction would be considered for purposes of sentence enhancement even though the order of discharge did not contain an express limitation. However, Minnesota law does not prohibit felons from possessing rifles. See Minn.Stat. § 624.713 subd. 1(b) (prohibiting a felon only from possessing a pistol).
Therefore, because the order of discharge from Wind’s 1987 conviction did not contain an express limitation on his right to possess firearms, and Minnesota law does not prohibit Wind from possessing a rifle, Wind’s 1987 conviction cannot be considered for purposes of sentence enhancement.