dissenting:
After the Jumaras filed their petition and their motion to appoint arbitrators, State Farm filed its answer in opposition. The panel majority has now concluded that the district court erred by failing to transfer the Jumaras’ proceeding to the Middle District Of Pennsylvania. It does so by using some judicial alchemy to transform State Farm’s answer to the Jumaras’ motion to appoint arbitrators into a motion to transfer venue under the federal venue statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391, 1404 and. 1406.
It so holds even while it agrees that the district court judge was eminently correct when he denied the Jumaras’ petition to appoint arbitrators. Despite this admission, the majority directs that the district court’s order denying appointment of arbitrators must be vacated. It also requires that the district court transfer the Jumaras’ petition to the Middle District of Pennsylvania — a transfer sought by neither of the parties and certainly not desired by the Jumaras.
Because I believe that we should not vacate a district court’s order when the substantive order that it entered was unquestionably correct in light of the issues raised by the parties, and because no party in this case ever sought a § 1404(a) transfer of venue, either on appeal before us, or even more importantly, before the district court, I am compelled to dissent.1
L
It should be remembered that the Jumar-as’ counsel only petitioned the district court *884for the appointment of arbitrators and to compel arbitration. He did so by invoking those portions of the Jumaras’ insurance contract and the sections of the Pennsylvania Uniform Arbitration Act referred to by the majority. It was this motion that the district court denied, and properly so, on the basis of the factual and legal contentions before it.
There can be no question that the majority is correct in pointing out that under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the district court when faced with a motion challenging venue, is limited to either retaining jurisdiction over the proceeding, or transferring jurisdiction to the district where it should have been brought. In this case, the most appropriate venue lay in any court of competent jurisdiction of Luzerne County, which would include the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gammon, 838 F.2d 73, 77 (3d Cir.1988) (holding that district courts are included within the meaning of “any court of competent jurisdiction of [the] Commonwealth”).
I have no problem with the majority’s analysis of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and § 1406. Nor do I have a problem with the majority’s ultimate determination that the factors relevant to retaining jurisdiction under § 1404(a) or transferring a proceeding to another locality under § 1404(a) favor giving predominant weight to the forum selection clause in the parties’ contract. Thus, I do not dispute the majority’s view that the Middle District was one venue open to the parties, as was the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County.
Nor do I quarrel with the majority’s analysis of the federal venue provisions. In this case, of course, the forum selection clause unquestionably required any application for arbitrators to be made in Luzerne County and not in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The majority so holds, and if it were not for the fact that §§ 1404 and 1406 were never raised nor presented as an issue in the Ju-maras’ proceedings, I would have joined the majority opinion. However, at no time, and in no court, did either the Jumaras or State Farm seek a venue change under § 1404(a) or even mention § 1404(a) in their respective arguments or briefs.
I emphasize first and foremost that neither party — neither the Jumaras nor State Farm — ever invoked, referred to, cited or argued that 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (venue generally), or § 1404 (change of venue), or § 1406 (cure or waiver of defects [in venue]) should be considered by any court.2 The motion made by the Jumaras was purely and simply a substantive motion to “Appoint Neutral and Defense Arbitrators and to Compel Underin-sured Motorist Arbitration.” It was that motion, and only that motion, that the district court considered and denied. It did so properly and correctly, and the majority of the court does not argue otherwise.
The record does not reveal that either party ever raised the issue of § 1404 venue before the district court. At no time did the district court ever advert to the subject of § 1404 venue. The district court’s opinion makes no reference to § 1404 venue. The briefs before us did not raise any issue of § 1404 venue. The argument before us never touched on any of the federal venue statutes. Indeed, the first time that § 1404 or § 1406 surfaced was when the majority, relying upon those statutes, took the occasion to vacate the district court’s order and to direct the district court to order a transfer of the Jumaras’ proceedings to the Middle District of Pennsylvania pursuant to § 1404(a).
Had the issue of venue under § 1404(a) been raised, I could not fault the majority for holding that § 1404 required a transfer. However, where the issue of § 1404(a) venue *885was never raised and where the district court judge was presented only with the substantive issue of appointing an arbitrator, I cannot find fault, and I suggest the majority should not find fault, with the district judge’s disposition of the matter. In my opinion, counsel have an obligation to specifically inform the judge exactly what it is that they desire and they must then support that request for relief with appropriate authority. Here, the district court was asked only to appoint arbitrators. It was never asked to consider a venue change under § 1404 or § 1406, and indeed, despite the majority’s claim that the district court considered venue, it did not consider or analyze the federal venue provisions. It was the issue of appointing arbitrators, and that issue only, that the district court decided.
It is true that the district court in its footnote to its order referred to Luzerne County as the proper place to seek relief. But, the district court did not order transfer to Luzerne County because it was obviously never asked to do so. The Jumaras never asked for a transfer of venue. Quite to the contrary, the Jumaras’ counsel has persistently argued that the Jumaras do not desire venue in Luzerne County. Why not? Because arbitrators selected from Luzerne County might not be as liberal with an insurance company’s dollars as the arbitrators appointed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
For this reason, as candidly expressed by counsel, application was made by the Jumar-as to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. We were informed that an arbitrator appointed from within the geographical scope of the Eastern District was likely to award a higher amount of damages than an arbitrator appointed from Luzerne County.3
The record just does not reveal that State Farm asked the district court to exercise its § 1404(a) discretion to transfer the matter to Luzerne County. State Farm took the position that the Jumaras’ petition should be denied outright — as it was. How then can we direct the district court to order a transfer in conformity with relief that it was never asked to grant and which neither of the parties sought?
One would think that we would affirm a district court’s order where the district court did not err in its substantive disposition and where the district court was asked to do nothing more than to decide the motion brought before it by the plaintiff.4 Here, the Jumaras sought the appointment of arbitrators. The district court properly denied that motion. The district court was never asked about, or even became acquainted with, the venue considerations that the majority has today, by hindsight, now developed and analyzed. However, the majority, without discussing the sua sponte responsibilities of a district court to supply that which counsel has not supplied, asked for, or even referred to, nevertheless has now vacated the district court’s order and has directed it to transfer the proceeding to Luzerne County.
*886I cannot condone reversing a district court judge when he has done no more than rule correctly on the issue as formulated by the parties. I do not think that an appellate court can or should convene months later and evolve analyses and theories that neither the district court nor counsel ever considered and then, for the first time, impose them upon the district court.
The majority in its footnotes 3 and 4 seeks to excuse its gratuitous discussion of federal venue under §§ 1404 and 1406 by noting that the district court in the footnote to its April 4, 1994 order, states that the Jumaras’ proceeding should be conducted in Luzerne County. There is no question but that the district court was aware of a venue defect. But there is also no question that the venue issue, if addressed at all by the parties, was addressed under the terms of the State Farm contract and the Pennsylvania venue statutes, and not under the federal venue statutes. Thus, the majority is plainly disingenuous when it states, at page 879, footnote 4, that “... the district court clearly did consider the sort of venue analysis upon which we base our holding.” The district court at no time considered a venue analysis which drew on the federal venue statutes, §§ 1404, 1406 and 1391, the very statutes on which the majority bases its holding.
II.
Our decision in this case was crystal clear. We should have affirmed the very correct decision made by the district court judge. We did not. I therefore respectfully dissent.
. A question arose early on in this case whether the district court was ever presented with a justi-ciable case or controversy within the meaning of Article III. Under the ripeness doctrine, federal courts "will not decide a case where the claim involves contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all." Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 3333, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985).
The Jumaras seek ultimately to recover under-insurance benefits from State Farm. By definition, and by the terms of the insurance contract between the parties, underinsurance coverage becomes available only after (1) it is determined that the individual responsible for the harm complained of is liable and unable to fully compensate the insured, or (2) the limits of the tortfea-sor’s coverage has been offered.
Unless and until these conditions have been satisfied, any judicial pronouncement on the matter is necessarily speculative and vain. If for instance it is later found that the alleged tortfea-sor's liability is within the limits of her own liability coverage (or indeed that she is not liable at all), then the exertions of counsel and arbitrators, with their associated costs to the parties, as well as the efforts of the courts, will have been for nought.
We have been informed by counsel for the Jumaras that on October 20, 1994, the Jumaras' action against Reynolds, the alleged tortfeasor, was settled for the limits of Reynolds’ vehicle policy and that State Farm had waived its subro-gation rights. This, of course, triggered the Ju-maras' rights under the provisions of the Jumar-as' own policy.
. I note that venue is a privilege provided to the defendant, that this privilege may be waived, and that it is waived if it is not expressly asserted. See generally, A. WRIGHT ET AL. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 3829, at 309-318 (2d ed. 1986). Moreover, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3) requires that a defense of improper venue be raised in the responsive pleadings or by motion, or it will be deemed waived.
In light of the record before us, which is totally devoid of any mention of § 1406, § 1404, or § 1391 (the general federal venue statute) in any pleading or motion, it is surprising to me that the majority has ignored all waiver jurisprudence and has gratuitously embarked on a venue analysis which the parties and the district court have evidently abjured.
. At oral argument counsel for the Jumaras explained the rather parochial practice of Philadelphia arbitrators in underinsurance cases. They apparently determine what a case is “worth” and then make an underinsurance award of the amount by which the claimant's "damages” exceed the policy limits of the putative tortfeasor’s insurance. They do so seemingly in disregard of the contractual conditions precedent referred to in note 1, supra. Counsel also represented that it is the practice of Scranton arbitrators, as contrasted with arbitrators appointed in the Eastern District, to refrain from making an award until the underlying claim has been resolved.
Together with both counsel, I share an inability to explain how an arbitral award of underin-surance coverage may properly be made prior to determining the extent (or even the existence) of the alleged tortfeasor’s liability.
. It is obvious to me, if not to the majority, that the district court contemplated that the Jumaras would bring a new action in Luzerne County after they were denied the appointment of arbitrators in the Eastern District. The majority states that, to implement this, ”... it [the district court] would have to consider transferring the case pursuant to § 1404.” Maj.Op. p. 877, n. 3. The difficulty with the district court considering such a transfer was that neither the district court nor the parties ever considered § 1404. The district court considered such a transfer, if at all, only under the Commonwealth's statutes, which could not in any event have been employed in a federal court’s venue analysis, as the majority makes clear in its analysis of Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 108 S.Ct. 2239, 101 L.Ed.2d 22 (1988).