Affirmed by published opinion. Judge HAMILTON wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Judge WILKINSON and Judges RUSSELL, WIDENER, WILKINS, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS joined. Judge MURNAGHAN wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Judges HALL and MICHAEL joined.
OPINION
HAMILTON, Circuit Judge:Under Maryland law, as a prerequisite to obtaining a free trial transcript in connection with an appeal, an indigent criminal defendant must first apply for legal representation with the Public Defender’s Office. See Maryland Rule l-325(b).1 A trial transcript is provided to an indigent criminal defendant if, following his application for legal representation with the Public Defender’s Office, the Public Defender’s Office represents the indigent criminal defendant or the Public Defender’s Office declines to represent the indigent criminal defendant. See Md. Ann. Code art. 27A; Maryland Rule l-325(b). Following his convictions in Maryland state court, petitioner, Bernard Miller, moved the state trial court to order the State of Maryland to pay the cost of preparing his trial transcript in connection with his appeal even though he refused to apply for legal representation with the Public Defender’s Office. Miller refused to apply for legal representation with the Public Defender’s Office because he retained the services of a private attorney willing to handle the appeal pro bono. Pursuant to Maryland Rule l-325(b), the state trial court denied Miller’s request for a trial transcript. The issue presented in this appeal is whether the state trial court’s denial of Miller’s motion for a trial transcript violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice and his rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. For the reasons stated below, we conclude Miller’s constitutional rights were not violated in this ease.
I
Miller was one of two men charged with the kidnapping, robbery and murder of Pamela Basu. Prior to trial, Miller, as an indigent, was offered representation through the Public Defender’s Office, but declined. He was represented at trial by Laurack Bray, an attorney whom he privately engaged. Bray agreed to represent Miller pro bono. Following a jury trial, Miller was convicted of several offenses, including felony murder. He was sentenced to life plus ten years. Miller noted a timely appeal.
While his appeal was pending, Miller filed a motion in the state trial court requesting the State of Maryland to pay the cost of preparing his trial transcript. Because Miller had not requested representation through the Public Defender’s Office and because Bray refused to seek appointment by the Public Defender’s Office, the state trial court *1139denied the motion pursuant to Maryland Rule 1 — 325(b). Miller timely appealed the denial of his motion for a trial transcript to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, contending that Maryland Rule 1 — 325(b) violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice and his rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court of Special Appeals reversed. The Court of Special Appeals held that, under Maryland Rule l-325(b), “where an indigent appellant who would otherwise qualify for representation by the Public Defender chooses to be represented by a qualified private attorney and that attorney elects to represent the appellant without fee of any kind or from any person, strictly on a pro bono basis, the Public Defender is obliged to provide the necessary transcript.” Miller v. State, 98 Md.App. 634, 635 A.2d 1, 6 (1993). In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Special Appeals interpreted the legislative history of Maryland Rule 1 — 325(b) as evincing an intent to provide a transcript under the circumstances of this case. Id. Because the statutory question was dispositive, the Court of Special Appeals did not address Miller’s constitutional arguments.
The State of Maryland then appealed to the Court of Appeals of Maryland. That court reversed. The Court of Appeals disagreed with the Court of Special Appeals’ interpretation of Maryland Rule l-325(b), concluding that Maryland Rule l-325(b) required Miller to “apply to the Public Defender and be represented by, or refused representation by, that office before he can receive a free transcript.” State v. Miller, 337 Md. 71, 651 A.2d 845, 849 (1994). The Court of Appeals also rejected Miller’s Fourteenth Amendment claim, reasoning that there could be no Fourteenth Amendment violation “when an individual is denied a right simply because of his own failure to comply with reasonable state procedures and regulations.” Id., 651 A. 2d at 852. Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected Miller’s Sixth Amendment argument. The court concluded that, “[i]n the absence of[a constitutional right to counsel of choice], there is no constitutional violation when the State requires that an indigent defendant avail himself of the services of the Office of the Public Defender in order to obtain a free transcript.” Id., 651 A.2d at 853.
Miller then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Following the recommendation of a magistrate judge, the district court denied the petition. Miller appealed to this court, and a divided panel of this court reversed. See Miller v. Smith, 99 F.3d 120 (4th Cir.1996). Thereafter, a majority of the active circuit judges on this court voted to vacate the panel opinion and rehear this case en banc.2 We now affirm.
II
Miller contends that the state trial court’s denial of his motion for a trial transcript pursuant to Maryland Rule l-325(b) violated his rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. We disagree.
Over the past forty years, the Supreme Court has, on numerous occasions, addressed the appellate rights of indigents. The landmark case, of course, is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956) (plurality). Griffin involved an Illinois rule allowing a convicted criminal defendant to present claims of trial error to the Supreme Court of Illinois only if he procured a transcript of the testimony adduced at his trial. Id. at 13 n. 2, 76 S.Ct. at 588 n. 2. The Illinois rule provided no exception for an indigent defendant, other than one sentenced to death. Id. at 13-14 and n. 2. Consequently, a defendant who was unable to pay the cost of obtaining a transcript could not obtain appellate review of the asserted trial error. The Supreme Court invalidated the Illinois rule because once a state establishes appellate review, the state cannot “bolt the door to equal justice.” Id. at 24, 76 S.Ct. at 593 *1140(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment).
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court invalidated similar financial barriers to appellate review, while at the same time reaffirming the principle established in McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 14 S.Ct. 913, 38 L.Ed. 867 (1894), that a State is not obligated to provide appellate review for criminal defendants. See Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 482-85, 83 S.Ct. 768, 771-774, 9 L.Ed.2d 892 (1963) (invalidating an Indiana rule that, on appeal from the denial of a writ of error coram nobis, only the public defender could obtain a free transcript of the lower court’s hearing on the coram nobis application; if the public defender refused to represent the applicant, no transcript was provided, and, as a result, the applicant had no appeal at all); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 497-500, 83 S.Ct. 774, 779-781, 9 L.Ed.2d 899 (1963) (invalidating rule that an indigent criminal defendant could only obtain a free trial transcript if he demonstrated to the trial court that his contentions on appeal would not be frivolous); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 256-58, 79 S.Ct. 1164, 1168-1169, 3 L.Ed.2d 1209 (1959) (invalidating rule requiring $20 filing fee in order to move the Supreme Court of Ohio for leave to appeal from a judgment of the Ohio Court of Appeals affirming a criminal conviction).
The Supreme Court has also applied Griffin beyond the transcript and fee context to cases involving the adequacy of an indigent’s access to the appellate system. For example, in Douglas v. California, the Court held unconstitutional California’s requirement that appellate counsel be appointed for an indigent only if the appellate court determined that such appointment would be helpful to the defendant or to the court itself. 372 U.S. 353, 357-58, 83 S.Ct. 814, 816-817, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963). The Court observed that the California requirement at issue lacked the “equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel’s examination into the record, research of the law, and marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent ... is forced to shift for himself.” Id. at 358, 83 S.Ct. at 817. The California requirement, according to the Court, left an “indigent, where the record is unclear or the errors are hidden,” with “a meaningless ritual, while the rich man [enjoyed] a meaningful appeal.” Id.
But, the Supreme Court has also recognized limits on the principle of protecting indigents in the criminal justice system. For example, in Britt v. North Carolina, the Court held that an indigent criminal defendant was not entitled to a transcript of his first trial in preparation for his retrial where “he had available an informal alternative which appeared] to be substantially equivalent to a transcript.” 404 U.S. 226, 230, 92 S.Ct. 431, 435, 30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971). In Boss v. Mojfitt, the Court held that indigents had no constitutional right to appointed counsel for a discretionary appeal. 417 U.S. 600, 615-19, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 2446-2448, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974). In United States v. MacCollom, the Court rejected a challenge to a federal statute which permitted a district court to provide an indigent with a free trial transcript only if the district court certified that the challenge to the conviction was not frivolous and the transcript was necessary to prepare the § 2255 motion. 426 U.S. 317, 328, 96 S.Ct. 2086, 2093, 48 L.Ed.2d 666 (1976). In Bounds v. Smith, the Supreme Court addressed whether indigent prisoners must be provided access to a law library so that they can file petitions for post-conviction relief. 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). The Court, after discussing an indigent’s right to meaningful access to the courts, noted that alternative systems of providing constitutionally-required resources are acceptable:
It should be noted that while adequate law libraries are one constitutionally acceptable method to assure meaningful access to the courts, our decision here ... does not foreclose alternative means to achieve that goal_ Among the alternatives ... [is] the use of full-time staff attorneys, working either in new prison legal assistance organizations or as part of the public defender or legal services offices.
Id. at 830-31, 97 S.Ct. at 1499.
The judicial underpinnings of Griffin and its progeny are the Due Process and *1141Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., — U.S. -,-, 117 S.Ct. 555, 566, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996) (noting that Griffin and its progeny “reflect both equal protection and due process concerns”); Ross, 417 U.S. at 608-09, 94 S.Ct. at 2443 (“The precise rationale for the Griffin and Douglas lines of cases has never been explicitly stated, some support being derived from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and some from the Due Process Clause of that Amendment.”). The equal protection analysis focuses on “whether the State has invidiously denied one class of defendants a substantial benefit available to another class of defendants.” Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 2069, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983); see also M.L.B., — U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 566 (“The equal protection concern relates to the legitimacy of fencing • out would-be appellants based solely on their inability to pay core costs.”). On the other hand, the due process analysis focuses on “the fairness of relations between the criminal defendant and the State.” Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665, 103 S.Ct. at 2069; see also M.L.B., — U.S. at-, 117 S.Ct. at 566 (“The due process concern homes in on the essential fairness of the state-ordered proceedings anterior to adverse state action.”).
A definitive analytical framework has been elusive because “cases of this order ‘cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis.’” M.L.B., — U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 566 (quoting Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666, 103 S.Ct. at 2069). However, “[m]ost decisions in this area have rested on an equal protection framework,” Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665, 103 S.Ct. at 2068, because “due process does not independently require that the State provide a right to appeal,” M.L.B., — U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 566. Because equal protection and due process principles “converge” in the Griffin line of cases, the Supreme Court has explained that we should “inspect the character and intensity of the individual interest at stake, on the one hand, and the State’s justification for its exaction, on the other.” M.L.B., — U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 566.
Ultimately, the “basic question is one of adequacy of [a defendant’s] access to procedures for review of his conviction, ... and [this question] must be decided in light of avenues which [the defendant] chose not to follow as well as those he now seeks to widen.” MacCollom, 426 U.S. at 326, 96 S.Ct. at 2092. The Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from “arbitrarily cutfting] off the appeal rights for indigents while leaving open avenues of appeal for more affluent persons.” Ross, 417 U.S. at 607, 94 S.Ct. at 2442. A state which provides appellate review, therefore, cannot adopt procedures which leave an indigent criminal defendant “entirely cut off from any appeal at all,” by virtue of his indigency, Lane, 372 U.S. at 481, 83 S.Ct. at 771, or extend to such an indigent criminal defendant merely a “meaningless ritual” while the more affluent have a “meaningful appeal,” Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358, 83 S.Ct. at 817. In short, the Fourteenth Amendment ensures that “indigents have an adequate opportunity to present [their] claims fairly within the adversary system.” Ross, 417 U.S. at 612, 94 S.Ct. at 2444-2445.
The question presented in this ease is whether the State of Maryland’s system, which requires an indigent criminal defendant to apply for legal representation with the Public Defender’s Office as a prerequisite to obtaining a free transcript in connection with an appeal, gives indigent criminal defendants an adequate opportunity to present claims on appeal. We believe it does.
The policy and the legislative intent of the Maryland Public Defender Act (the Act), Md. Ann.Code art. 27A, is
to provide for the realization of the constitutional guarantees of counsel in the representation of indigents, including related necessary services and facilities, in criminal ... proceedings within the State, and to assure effective assistance and continuity of counsel to indigent accused taken into custody and indigent defendants in criminal ... proceedings before the courts of the State of Maryland, and to authorize the Office of the Public Defender to administer and assure enforcement of the provisions of this article in accordance with its terms.
*1142Id. at § 1. Under the Act, the Public Defender is charged with the duty of providing legal representation to any indigent criminal defendant eligible to receive services under the Act, see id. at § 4(a), and must provide this representation in “all stages in the proceedings, including custody, interrogation, preliminary hearing, arraignment, trial, ... and appeal.” Id. at § 4(f). “Legal representation may be provided by the Public Defender, or, subject to the supervision of the Public Defender, by his deputy, by district public defenders, by assistant public defenders, or by panel attorneys.” Id. at § 4(a).
The Act, however, does not deprive a state trial court from exercising its authority to appoint counsel:
where there is a conflict in legal representation in a matter involving multiple defendants and one of the defendants is represented by or through the Office of the Public Defender, or where the Office of the Public Defender declines to provide representation to an indigent entitled to representation under this article.
Id. at § 6(f). Indeed, a state trial court “must conduct its own inquiry as to whether the defendant qualifies for a court-appointed counsel” when the Public Defender’s Office declines to represent the defendant. Davis v. State, 100 Md.App. 369, 641 A.2d 941, 947 (1994); see also Thompson v. State, 284 Md. 113, 394 A.2d 1190, 1198 (1978) (“[Tjhere is the clear duty imposed on the court, in order to decide whether it should appoint counsel, upon the Public Defender declining to do so, to make its own independent determination whether a defendant is indigent and otherwise eligible to have counsel provided.”). According to the Davis court, “[tjhe necessity for this independent court evaluation stems from the judiciary’s role as the ‘ultimate protector’ of the rights awarded under the Constitution, including the right to counsel.” 641 A.2d at 947 (quoting Baldwin v. State, 51 Md.App. 538, 444 A.2d 1058, 1067 (1982)). Thus, if the Public Defender’s Office cannot provide legal representation, due, for example, to a conflict of interest, an attorney is appointed by the Public Defender or the state trial court.
With respect to the costs related to presenting an appeal, including the preparation of a trial transcript, the Public Defender’s Office shoulders the financial responsibility when it or a panel attorney represents an indigent criminal defendant. See Md. Ann. Code. art. 27A, § 1. In the event the Public Defender’s Office declines to represent the defendant, Maryland Rule l-325(b) requires the state trial court to order the State to pay the costs of the appeal, provided the Public Defender’s Office is authorized to represent the indigent criminal defendant and the defendant is financially unable to pay the costs.
The facts of this case show that Miller would have received legal representation (via the Public Defender’s Office or by order of the state trial court) and a trial transcript had he applied for legal representation with the Public Defender’s Office. We do not believe it can be said, therefore, that a defendant in Miller’s circumstances is denied meaningful access to the Maryland appellate courts simply because the State of Maryland requires the defendant to apply for legal representation with the Public Defender’s Office. This is particularly true in view of the fact that the State of Maryland has a vested interest in ensuring that its funds are not abused or wasted and that appellate counsel is effective. At the time Miller declined to apply, he had the power to avail himself of the assistance of counsel and a trial transcript, but chose not to. The fact that Miller had these tools — legal representation and a trial transcript — at his disposal afforded him an adequate opportunity to attack his convictions on appeal. Ross, 417 U.S. at 616, 94 S.Ct. at 2446-2447.
As noted earlier, the basic question is the adequacy of an indigent’s access to the state’s appellate system. Unlike the indigents in Griffin, Lane, Draper, and Burns, Miller was not “entirely cut off from any appeal at all,” by virtue of his indigency. Lane, 372 U.S. at 481, 83 S.Ct. at 771. Furthermore, unlike the indigent in Douglas, Miller was not provided with a “meaningless [appellate] ritual.” Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358, 83 S.Ct. at 817. Rather, like the indigents in Britt, Ross, MacCollom, and Bounds, Miller was provided with adequate access to the *1143state adversary system — he would have had legal representation and a trial transcript had he applied for legal representation with the Public Defender’s Office. Because Miller was provided adequate access to the State of Maryland’s appellate system, his Fourteenth Amendment rights were not violated in this case.
It may be, as Miller suggests, that Bray, as Miller’s trial counsel, was best suited to represent Miller on direct appeal. In this sense, Miller was less fortunate than a wealthy counterpart who could have employed the attorney of his choosing. But, as the Supreme Court noted in Ross, “[t]he question is not one of absolutes, but one of degrees.” 417 U.S. at 612, 94 S.Ct. at 2445. As the Supreme Court explained in Ross:
[T]he fact that a particular service might be of benefit to an indigent defendant does not mean that the service is constitutionally required. The duty of the State under our cases is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the State’s appellate process.
Id. at 616, 94 S.Ct. at 2447. Here, the State of Maryland may not have duplicated the legal arsenal of a wealthy defendant. Nevertheless, the State of Maryland has created a system in which indigent defendants can fairly present their claims to the appellate court. That is all the Fourteenth Amendment requires.
III
Miller also contends that the state trial court’s denial of his motion for a trial transcript pursuant to Maryland Rule 1-325(b) violated his right to counsel of choice. As his argument goes, Miller had a Sixth Amendment right to have Bray represent him on his appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. We disagree.
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. CONST, amend. VI. The right to counsel confers on a state criminal defendant the absolute right to be represented by counsel at trial, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), and, provided the state has appellate review, on a first direct appeal, see Douglas, 372 U.S. at 360, 83 S.Ct. at 818.3
The Sixth Amendment also protects a criminal defendant’s right to counsel of choice. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1697, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988) (noting that “the right to select and be represented by one’s preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment”). However, unlike the right to counsel, the right to counsel of choice is not absolute. See United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 107 (4th Cir.1988); see also Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159, 108 S.Ct. at 1697 (recognizing that the “right to choose one’s own counsel is circumscribed in several important respects”). Thus, a criminal defendant cannot “insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford,” Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159, 108 S.Ct. at 1697, because the protections of the right to counsel of choice do not extend “beyond ‘the individual’s right to spend his own money to obtain the advice and assistance of ... counsel.’ ” Caplin & Drysdale Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626, 109 S.Ct. 2646, 2652, 105 L.Ed.2d 528 (1989) (quoting Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 370, 105 S.Ct. 3180, 3215, 87 L.Ed.2d 220 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); see also Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159, 108 S.Ct. at 1697 (noting that “the essential aim of the [Sixth] Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant -will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers”). Consequently, an indigent criminal defendant has no constitutional right to have a particular lawyer represent him. Gallop, 838 F.2d at *1144108; see also Green v. Abrams, 984 F.2d 41, 47 (2d Cir.1993) (“indigent defendant has no right to choose the particular counsel appointed”); United States v. Bradley, 892 F.2d 634, 635 (7th Cir.1990) (indigent criminal defendants “cannot pick and choose among members of the district court’s bar”); Thomas v. Wainwright, 767 F.2d 738, 742 (11th Cir.1985) (“indigent criminal defendant has an absolute right to be represented by counsel, but he does not have a right to have a particular lawyer represent him”).
Because the State of Maryland has appellate review, the Constitution requires that the State of Maryland provide indigent criminal defendants, like Miller, counsel on direct appeal. The State of Maryland provides this service through the Public Defender’s Office. In the event that the Public Defender’s Office cannot provide counsel to an indigent criminal defendant, due, for example, to a conflict of interest, counsel is appointed by the Public Defender’s Office or the state trial court. Because the State of Maryland’s statutory scheme provides indigent criminal defendants with counsel on direct appeal and Miller, on account of his indigency, had no constitutional right to demand that Bray, in particular, represent him on appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, Miller’s Sixth Amendment rights were not violated in this case.
IV
For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.4
AFFIRMED.
. Maryland Rule 1 — 325(b) provides:
The court shall order the State to pay the court costs related to an appeal or an application for leave to appeal and the costs of preparing any transcript of testimony, brief, appendices, and record extract necessary in connection with the appeal, in any case in which (1) the Public Defender’s Office is authorized by these rules or other law to represent a parly, (2) the Public Defender has declined representation of the party, and (3) the party is unable by reason of poverty to pay those costs.
. Miller’s direct appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland was dismissed because he failed to provide a trial transcript.
. A state is not required to provide appellate courts or appellate review. McKane, 153 U.S. at 687-688, 14 S.Ct. at 914-915.
. We need not decide whether this appeal is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), because Miller’s claims lack merit under pre-existing standards. Indeed, we are confident the AEDPA is of no help to Miller.