concurring.
This case presents a very unique situation. It calls for a very narrow disposition if we are to avoid unnecessary and questionable twists in difficult areas of law that ought to be decided only when squarely presented by the record. Here, the State of Illinois cannot come close to demonstrating that it has a sufficiently concrete and particularized injury to satisfy the injury prong of Article III standing analysis. See Bennett v. Spear, — U.S. -, -, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 1163, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997). First, the problem Illinois presents is one of its own making and, as matters stand now, entirely within its own powers to remedy. The City of Chicago was only able to create the alleged assault on Illinois’ sovereignty because of the explicit authorization granted to it by Illinois in the IAAA. Because Chicago is a subordinate entity of the State, Illinois may revoke Chicago’s authority to enter into such agreements by repealing the IAAA or by taking some other legislative action.
Perhaps more importantly, Illinois can point to no specific action by the Authority that contravenes its laws or threatens, in any immediate way, a concrete interest of. the State. Although the Compact appears to claim the authority to take such action,1 as my colleagues note, “a claim of authority differs from an exercise of authority.” Ante at 477. In this setting, that difference is fatal to Illinois’ case. The injury alleged here, an abstract assault on Illinois’ sovereignty by the Authority, is simply too hypothetical at this stage to constitute injury.
The suggestion in the majority’s discussion that Illinois could never allege sufficient injury to have standing is far too speculative to warrant, or permit, definitive adjudication at this time. Had the Authority taken irreversible action, ostensibly preemptive of state law2 and detrimental to the sovereignty of the State of Illinois, the State might well have the sort of injury that would give it standing to obtain a declaration of its rights in federal court. See Illinois Dep’t of Transp. v. Hinson, 122 F.3d 370, 372 (7th Cir.1997) (citing Alaska v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 443 (D.C.Cir.1989) for the proposition that a state has standing where it “complains that a federal regulation will preempt one of the state’s laws”); see also Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607-08, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 3269, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982) (stating, in the context of state' standing in parens patriae actions, that states have an “interest in securing observance of the terms under which it participates in thé federal system”).
Because the disposition of this case properly rests on the threshold issue of standing, it is unnecessary to reach the important and delicate question of whether Illinois would have, given the appropriate injury, a cause of action under the Compact Clause and 49 U.S.C. § 40121. We ought to leave that nuaneed issue for another day when it is presented in more concrete form and when it is necessary for the adjudication of the case before us.
To the extent that my colleagues rest their decision on the absence of a justiciable question because Illinois lacks standing, I join the judgment of the court.
. The Compact states that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Compact, all laws of the State of Illinois that would apply to the Authority as an Illinois political subdivision, municipal corporation and unit of local government shall not apply to the Authority.” R.1, Ex. at 37.
. See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438, 101 S.Ct. 703, 706-07, 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981).