After an adverse jury verdict on her Rehabilitation Act claim, Marjorie A. Meester appeals, claiming the district court2 erred in, among other things, granting her employer’s motion for partial summary judgment before trial. We affirm.
1. BACKGROUND
Meester, a long-term employee of the United States Postal Service, developed work-related chronic tendinitis. This condition eventually developed into carpal tunnel syndrome, requiring surgery. Meester filed workers’ compensation claims for these injuries under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA). See 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-*8568193. The Department of Labor, which administers FECA see 5 U.S.C. § 8145, awarded Meester benefits under the Act.
In addition to providing certain compensatory benefits, FECA requires federal employers to allow injured employees to return to their old positions or, if they can no longer perform their original duties, to offer them reasonable alternative positions. See 5 U.S.C. § 8151(b); 20 C.F.R. § 10.123(d). Meester suffered from a partial permanent impairment affecting twenty-five percent of her upper extremities, and could not perform her old job. The Postal Service therefore offered to create several different limited duty positions for Meester, all of which she rejected as beyond her limitations. Mees-ter’s doctor eventually approved one of the proposed positions which provided two nonconsecutive days off per week. The doctor informed the Postal Service that it would be “helpful” if Meester could have two consecutive days off. The Postal Service responded that because Mondays and Saturdays are its busiest days, it could not grant this request. Of the more than seventy employees who work at the same post office as Meester, only five routinely have Saturday and Sunday off. After reviewing the proposed position, Mees-ter’s medical records, and her doctor’s recommendations, the Department of Labor concluded that the proposed position was fully consistent with Meester’s physical limitations. It therefore directed Meester to accept the position or.lose her FECA benefits. Meester returned to work, but continued to maintain that the job was not sufficiently accommodating of her injuries. She asserted that the position was inappropriate because it did not provide two consecutive days off or sufficient rest time.
Meester eventually filed suit claiming that the Postal Service had violated the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), by (1) treating her unfavorably because of her disabled status; (2) failing to adequately accommodate her disability; and (3) harassing and retaliating against her. The Postal Service moved for summary judgment. The district court initially denied the motion, but upon reconsideration granted summary judgment to the Postal Service on the accommodation claim. The court reasoned that because Meester had received this position as part of her FECA claim, her only remedy as to disputes about the nature of the job was under FECA The disparate treatment and retaliation claims proceeded to trial. After Meester had presented her ease-in-chief, the district court granted the Postal Service judgment as a matter of law on the retaliation claims. The disparate treatment claim was submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict for the Postal Service. Meester appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
Meester argues that the district court erred in granting the Postal Service summary judgment on her failure to accommodate claim. We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. See Lang v. Star Herald, 107 F.3d 1308, 1311 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Court. 114 (1997). Summary judgment is proper if, taking all facts and reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
FECA is the exclusive remedy for workplace injuries suffered by federal employees. See 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c). Several courts have held, however, that this workers’ compensation statute does not bar federal employees from suing their employers under the anti-discrimination laws. See, e.g., Miller v. Bolger, 802 F.2d 660 (3d Cir.1986) (Title VII claim not barred by FECA); Callarian v. Runyun, 903 F.Supp. 1285, 1296 (D.Minn.1994) (Postal Service employee not precluded by FECA from suing under Title VII), aff'd on other grounds, 75 F.3d 1293 (8th Cir.1996). Meester asserts that the district court departed from this line of cases and held that FECA precludes federal employees from suing under the Rehabilitation Act. Meester miseharacterizes the district court’s ruling. The court did not hold that all discrimination claims are barred under FECA; indeed, it allowed her disparate treatment and retaliation claims to proceed to trial. Rather, the district court held that Meester’s *857unique failure to accommodate claim was barred by FECA. We are convinced that this ruling was correct.3
Meester is not claiming that she could perform her old job with reasonable accommodation. Instead, she seeks accommodations in performing the alternative position she was awarded under FECA. The Department of Labor is charged with determining whether an alternative position offered under FECA constitutes “suitable work.” 5 U.S.C. § 8106(c). The Department, acting pursuant to that authority, reviewed the alternative position proposed by the Postal Service and concluded it was within Meester’s abilities. Meester is essentially asking us to hold that the Department of Labor was wrong in directing her to accept this position. Such a holding would contravene FECA’s prohibition against judicial review of compensation decisions. See 5 U.S.C. § 8128; Brumley v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 28 F.3d 746, 747 (8th Cir.1994) (holding that Congress intended to bar judicial review of FECA decisions altogether). We will not allow Meester to use the Rehabilitation Act to circumvent Congress’s intent. If Meester’s current position is not “suitable work,” her remedy is in an appeal of the Department’s decision under the statute. See 5 U.S.C. § 8124.
Thus, we hold that a frustrated FECA claimant cannot secure judicial review of a FECA compensation decision by claiming that the Rehabilitation Act entitles her to accommodation in performing an alternative position approved by the Department of Labor when the claim is predicated upon the same illness or injury that gave rise to the Department of Labor’s initial decision. Our decision is consistent with the opinions of other courts that have been confronted with this type of claim. See, e.g., Stubler v. Runyon, 892 F.Supp. 228, 229-30 (W.D.Mo.1994), aff'd, 56 F.3d 69 (8th Cir.1995) (unpublished table decision); Alexander v. Frank, 777 F.Supp. 516, 523-24 (N.D.Tex.1991); see also Reidy v. Runyon, 971 F.Supp. 760, 771 (E.D.N.Y.1997) (distinguishing Stubler on ground that Reidy’s disability discrimination claim was not strictly related to his original injury).
Meester also claims that the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law to the Postal Service on her retaliation claims was error. We have painstakingly reviewed Meester’s arguments, the trial transcripts, and the district court’s ruling, and are convinced that the district court did not err.
Finally, Meester alleges numerous errors regarding her disparate treatment claim, from the district court’s denial of leave for Meester to amend her complaint to its denial of her post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law. We have carefully reviewed each of Meester’s arguments and find them to be without merit.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court is affirmed.
. The Honorable Karen K. Klein, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of North Dakota, presiding by consent of the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
. The dissent either misconstrues or misunderstands the limited breadth and depth of both the district court’s opinion and today’s holding. Therefore, it is virtually impossible to respond concisely and with precision. Lacking the common ground necessary to formulate a focused discussion, we do not attempt a reply.