(dissenting);
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the district judge found all of the facts necessary to convict defendants Bishop George Lynch and Christopher Moscinski (also known as Brother Fidelis) of criminal contempt under the correct legal standard, and found them not guilty based solely on legal error. As a result, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not *741bar the government’s appeal because no further factual proceedings would be required on remand in order to establish Lynch and Moscinski’s guilt. I would thus allow the appeal. Reaching the merits, I would vacate the district court’s judgment and remand the case to the district court for entry of a judgement of conviction.
I. Factual Background
The procedural posture of this case is highly unusual. Defendants have a history, going back to 1990, of blocking access to the Women’s Medical Pavilion (“Clinic”) in Dobbs Ferry, New York. For doing so, each has been convicted several times in local criminal courts of violating criminal statutes. One such incident, a May 1995 driveway “sit-in” that impeded vehicular access to the Clinic, led the government to file a civil complaint against Lynch and Moscinski alleging that their conduct violated the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE), 18 U.S.C. § 248. The government also moved for a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from coming within 15 feet of the Clinic and from further violating the statute. The hearing on the injunction was consolidated with a trial on the merits in the district court pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a)(2). In February 1996, the court found that Lynch and Moscin-ski had violated FACE by sitting in the Clime’s driveway and thus making access unreasonably difficult, and issued a permanent injunction (the Injunction) enjoining them from committing further violations, including “impeding or obstructing automotive or any other form of ingress into, or egress from, the [Clinic].” The Injunction was affirmed on appeal. See United States v. Lynch, 104 F.3d 357 (2d Cir.1996), cert. denied, Lynch v. United States, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1436, 137 L.Ed.2d 543 (1997).
Within a matter of weeks after the district court issued the Injunction in February 1996, Lynch disregarded it and obstructed access to the Clinic by sitting against its doors. On August 24, 1996, the district court found Lynch in civil contempt of the Injunction, but denied the government’s request for damages because of what the judge saw as possible First Amendment entanglement problems that would be created by an attempt to collect the statutory fine. He repeatedly suggested to the government that the appropriate way to enforce the injunction would be a charge of criminal contempt.
Also on August 24, 1996, the conduct that led to this appeal took place. Lynch and Moscinski once again sat in the Clinic’s driveway and prevented several cars from entering the Clinic’s parking lot. They were arrested and charged with criminal contempt. The judge stated that he would impose a prison sentence of less than six months if the defendants were found guilty on the criminal contempt charge; accordingly, the case was tried without a jury.
At the trial, Lynch stated on direct examination that he lacked “any respect for the laws, by whomever made, that would forbid [him] to express [his] contempt for legalized abortion.” On cross-examination, he stated that he sat in the Clinic’s driveway deliberately. Similarly, when Moscinski was asked by the judge why he thought it was necessary to block the driveway, he stated that “a woman ... going into the [Clinic] ... [who] sees people willing to be arrested, might think twice about the seriousness or gravity of the situation.” In addition, the parties stipulated that on the day in question (1) Lynch and Moscinski were sitting in the driveway of the Clinic; (2) several vehicles unsuccessfully attempted to enter the Clinic’s parking lot; (3) Lynch and Moscinski were informed by police that they were violating the law; (4) Lynch and Moscinski acknowledged the warning and refused to leave; (5) they knew of the Injunction that had been entered against them; and (6) they knew that the Injunction enjoined them from “impeding or obstructing automotive or any other form of ingress into, or egress from, the [Clinic].”1 The judge specifically incor*742porated the stipulation into his findings of fact.
Despite this record, in January 1997 the district court found the defendants not guilty of criminal contempt and dismissed the charges against them. See United States v. Lynch, 952 F.Supp. 167, 172 (S.D.N.Y.1997). The stated ground for the court’s decision was that it had found “beyond a reasonable doubt that neither Lynch nor Moscinski acted with the willfulness which criminal contempt requires.” Id. at 170. The court defined “willfulness” to require “deliberate conduct done with a bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law,” and held that defendants’ “sincere, genuine, objectively based and, indeed, conscience-driven religious belief, precludes a finding of willfulness.” Id. The court further held that, even if Lynch and Moscinski had acted willfully, it would still have found them not guilty by exercising “the prerogative of leniency which a fact-finder has to refuse to convict a defendant, even if the circumstances would otherwise be sufficient to convict.” Id. at 171. This appeal by the government followed.
II. Double Jeopardy and Prosecution Appeals
The Double Jeopardy Clause generally bars appellate review of verdicts of acquittal. Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 64, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977). However, the Clause is principally meant not as a general ban on appeals by the government, but as a safeguard against the threat of multiple prosecutions. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) (citing Ex Parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 21 L.Ed. 872 (1874) and In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 9 S.Ct. 672, 33 L.Ed. 118 (1889)). Indeed, a clear theme of the Supreme Court’s Double Jeopardy Clause jurisprudence is that the Clause does not bar further proceedings that can be accomplished without subjecting the defendant to subsequent factfinding by a trier of fact. See, e.g., Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 230, 114 S.Ct. 783, 127 L.Ed.2d 47 (1994) (“the prohibition against multiple trials is the controlling constitutional principle”); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 132, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980) (same); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 n. 7, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978) (pointing out that “a judgment of acquittal could be appealed where no retrial would be needed on remand”); United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 366-67, 95 S.Ct. 1006, 43 L.Ed.2d 250 (1975); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336-39, 346, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 43 L.Ed.2d 232 (1975). It is trae that the Court has emphasized the finality of an acquittal. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, *74341, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982). However, as already indicated, the Court has also made clear that a judgment of acquittal may be appealed where no further factfind-ing would be needed on remand. See Scott, 437 U.S. at 91 n. 9, 98 S.Ct. 2187; Jenkins, 420 U.S. at 366-67, 95 S.Ct. 1006; Wilson, 420 U.S. at 336-39, 346, 95 S.Ct. 1013; see generally 15B Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3919.5 (2d ed.1992).
A. The Jenkins Test
Two of the aforementioned cases, Jenkins and Wilson, bear directly on the matter before us. In Wilson, the district court dismissed criminal charges against the defendant on speedy trial grounds after a jury found the defendant guilty of embezzling funds from a labor organization. The Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause posed no bar to the government’s appeal of the dismissal, noting that “the constitutional protection against Government appeals attaches only where there is a danger of subjecting the defendant to a second trial for the same offense.” 420 U.S. at 336, 95 S.Ct. 1013. Elaborating, the Court stated that “a defendant has no legitimate claim to benefit from an error of law when that error could be corrected without subjecting him to a second trial before a second trier of fact.” Id. at 345, 95 S.Ct. 1013.
The Court applied Wilson in its opinion in Jenkins, issued the same day. In Jenkins, a defendant charged with failing to submit to induction into the armed forces was acquitted by a district judge after a bench trial on the merits. The judge held that defendant was-wrongfully denied a postponement by his local draft board that would have permitted consideration of his conscientious objector claim. The government appealed, arguing that the basis for the acquittal was incorrect as a matter of law. Faced with the question of whether the government’s appeal constituted double jeopardy, the Court discussed the application of Wilson to appeals that follow bench trials:
In a case tried to a jury, the distinction between the jury’s verdict of guilty and the court’s ruling on questions of law is easily perceived. In a bench trial, both functions are combined in the judge, and a general finding of‘not guilty” may rest either on the determination of facts in favor of a defendant or on the resolution of a legal question favorably to him. If the court prepares special findings of fact, either because the Government or the defendant requested them, or because the judge has elected to make them sua sponte, it may be possible upon sifting those findings to determine that the court’s finding of “not guilty” is attributable to an erroneous conception of the law whereas the court has resolved against the defendant all of the factual issues necessary to support afind-ing of guilt under the correct legal standard.
420 U.S. at 366-67, 95 S.Ct. 1006. A court’s resolution of facts against the defendant may be express or implied, see id. at 367, 95 S.Ct. 1013, and the resolution may be made “in form or in substance.” Id. at 368, 95 S.Ct. 1013. In Jenkins, the Court applied the rule quoted above and held that, because further proceedings would have been required to resolve the factual issues relating to the elements of the offense charged, the appeal was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Jenkins was partially overruled three terms later by Scott, which held that the Double Jeopardy Clause poses no obstacle to the re-prosecution of a defendant who successfully moves to dismiss an indictment in the middle of trial on a ground unrelated to the defendant’s actual guilt or innocence, despite the fact that further factual proceedings would be required on remand. Scott, in other words, broadened the government’s ability to appeal and indicated that the assumption in Jenkins “that a judgment of acquittal could be appealed where no retrial would be needed on remand” remained good law. Scott, 437 U.S. at 91 n. 7, 98 S.Ct. 2187; see also Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 146 n. 9, 106 S.Ct. 1745, 90 L.Ed.2d 116 (1986) (Scott “overrules Jenkins only insofar as Jenkins bars an appeal by the government when a defendant successfully moves for dismissal on a ground ‘unrelated to factual guilt or innocence.’ ”).
*744This court applied the rule in Jenkins more than two decades ago in an appeal similar to the one now before us. In United States v. Fayer, 523 F.2d 661 (2d Cir.1975), defendant Fayer, an attorney, was charged with corruptly endeavoring to influence a witness in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503. The case was tried as a bench trial, and the district judge made special findings of fact pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 23(c). The prosecution’s evidence included a tape-recorded conversation between Fayer and a cooperating witness (Goodwin) in which, among other things, Fayer urged Goodwin not to testify before a grand jury. In his defense, Fayer testified that he was simply trying to give Goodwin legal advice because he felt that Goodwin’s attorney was inexperienced and unqualified. The district court acquitted Fayer. It found that one of Fayer’s motives for approaching Goodwin and urging him not to testify was to protect two clients who were targets of investigation into Federal Housing Authority corruption, but the court also found Fayer’s testimony worthy of belief. The government attempted to appeal the acquittal, correctly arguing that, as a matter of law, Fayer’s bad motive was sufficient to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 despite the simultaneous presence of a good motive.
In Fayer, we defined “[t]he Jenkins test” of appealability as
whether it is “clear that the court, in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, expressly or even impliedly found against the defendant on all issues necessary to establish guilt under even the Government’s formulation of the applicable law.” Put another way, the question is whether “further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged, would have been required upon reversal and remand.”
Id. at 663-64 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Ceccolini, 542 F.2d 136, 140 (2d Cir.1976). Applying the Jenkins test as the governing rule of law, we then held that for two reasons the district court had not implicitly found against the defendant as to all issues necessary to establish guilt under the correct legal standard. First, we were “constrained,” 523 F.2d at 662, to hold that the findings were “ambiguous as to ... whether [Fayer’s conduct] was innocent protection of a client or a cover-up of crimes of the clients.... ” Id. at 664. Second, the district judge had credited Fayer’s testimony which “explicitly contradicted] ... an implicit reading of the findings as to motive.... ” Id. Accordingly, because the trial judge’s findings were sufficiently ambiguous, id. at 662, we were “forced to conclude”, id. at 664, that the Jenkins test had not been met and that the acquittal could not be appealed.
B. Application of the Jenkins test.
Thus, the key to proper application here of the Jenkins test is whether, after “sifting” through the judge’s findings of fact, we can say that he expressly or impliedly resolved against Lynch and Moscinski all of the factual issues necessary to support a finding of criminal contempt under the correct legal standard. The government was required to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the court entered a reasonably specific order; (2) [the defendants] knew of that order; (3) [the defendants] violated that order; and (4) [their] violation was willful.” United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 834 (2d Cir.1995). There can be no doubt that the judge resolved the first three elements in favor of the prosecution when he incorporated the parties’ stipulation into his findings.
As to the fourth element — willfulness—a sifting of the findings unmistakably shows that the judge found beyond a reasonable doubt all of the facts necessary to establish willfulness, properly defined as “a specific intent to consciously disregard an order of the court.” Id. at 837. First, the judge found that Lynch and Moscinski “acted out of a sense of conscience and sincere religious conviction” when they engaged in the conceded conduct at issue. 952 F.Supp. at 169. If Lynch and Moscinski’s religious conviction led them to sit in the Clinic’s driveway, they obviously were not there by mistake or accident. Also, by incorporating the parties’ stipulation, see footnote 1 supra, into his findings, the judge found that (1) Lynch and Moscinski were seated in the Clinic’s drive*745way; (2) they were told by police that they were in violation of the law; and (3) they acknowledged the warning and refused to leave. Unlike the findings at issue in Fayer, these are not at all ambiguous. Lynch and Moseinski did not dispute the government’s factual allegations.2 They raised no legally cognizable defense. The judge heard no legally exculpatory testimony. His findings establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Lynch and Moseinski acted willfully when they deliberately violated the specific terms of the court’s order, of which they were aware.
The majority3 and concurring opinions appear to suggest that, in their view, this matter would have been appealable in a factual situation slightly different from the one now before us. The hypothetical situation they appear to contemplate is one where the district judge (1) incorrectly considered bad motive or purpose to be a “fifth element” of criminal contempt separate from and in addition to the four, and only four, correct elements of that crime; (2) found against Lynch and Moseinski on the four correct elements (including willfulness); (3) found in favor of Lynch and Moseinski on the fifth element because they lacked a bad motive or purpose; and (4) found Lynch and Moseinski not guilty because of their lack of a bad motive or purpose. The majority and concurrence seem to agree that, in this situation, the district judge’s finding on the incorrect fifth element could, in effect, be severed from the four correct elements and the government’s appeal could go forward. I contrast this hypothetical situation with the situation presented by this case, in which the district judge (1) incorrectly considered bad motive or purpose to be an “extra factor” separate from and in addition to the one, and only one, correct factor required to prove the element of willfulness — deliberateness rather than mistake; (2) expressly found against Lynch and Moseinski on three of the four elements of criminal contempt, and impliedly but undoubtedly found against them on the one, and only one, correct factor (deliberateness rather than mistake) required to prove the element of willfulness; (3) found in favor of Lynch and Moseinski on the incorrect, extra factor of bad motive or purpose, and thus found no willfulness; and (4) found Lynch and Moseinski not guilty because of their lack of a bad motive or purpose. The difference between these two situations is the difference between, on the one hand, calling bad motive or purpose a separate and incorrect “fifth element” added to the four correct elements of criminal contempt and, on the other, calling bad motive or purpose a separate and incorrect “extra factor” of one of the four correct elements of that crime. For the majority and the concurrence, this difference is apparently dispositive.
And therein lies the crux of our disagreement. I submit that what my colleagues see as a fundamental difference is one of semantics. It elevates form over substance. It is true, as the majority opinion points out, that the district court’s opinion does not contain an express “finding that the fourth element of criminal contempt — willfulness—was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” However, as just indicated, the judge did impliedly but undoubtedly find that fact. It is also true that the judge held that defendants’ “sincere, genuine, objectively based and, indeed, conscience-driven religious belief ... precludes a finding of willfulness.” 952 F.Supp. at 170. But, as will be seen below, that statement was incorrect and improperly added the extra requirement of a “bad” purpose or motive *746to the government’s burden of proof. Because this extra factor was not necessary to prove Lynch and Moscinski’s guilt, the government’s failure to prove it does not bar this appeal. I agree with (now) Chief Judge Becker’s conclusion in United States v. Maker, 751 F.2d 614 (3d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017, 105 S.Ct. 3479, 87 L.Ed.2d 614 (1985) that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar an appeal where “the district court, as the result of a legal error, determined that the government could not prove a fact that is not necessary to support a conviction.” Id. at 624.
In sum, the district court impliedly found the element of willfulness against Lynch and Moseinski and in favor of the prosecution. Since all four elements of criminal contempt were thus resolved against the defendants, no further factfinding would be necessary on remand. As a result, I conclude that the Double Jeopardy Clause presents no bar to this court’s jurisdiction over this appeal.4
III. The Merits of the Government’s Appeal
As frequently is the case, the issue of our jurisdiction to hear this appeal is more difficult to decide than the merits. The government contends that the district court committed two basic errors in its opinion, to which I now turn.
A. Willfulness
The district court held that a benevolent, religious motive precludes a finding of willfulness in a criminal contempt proceeding because willful conduct, in that context, “generally means deliberate conduct done with a bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law.” 952 F.Supp. at 170. I agree with the majority that there is “[n]o doubt” that this understanding of willfulness was legal error. Accordingly, there is no need to labor the point here other than to note again that willfulness in this context requires nothing more than “a specific intent to consciously disregard an order of the court.” Cutler, 58 F.3d at 837 (criminal contempt). Bad intent is not required. See United States v. Remini, 967 F.2d 754, 758 (2d Cir.1992) (criminal contempt). As the government and the amici briefs point out, this error virtually eviscerates FACE by creating a defense for individuals who act out of religious conviction when they intentionally block access to facilities like the Clinic.5 In this context, willfulness cannot be negated by a sincerely held belief, religious or otherwise, in the correctness of one’s actions. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 17, 19 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1004 (4th Cir.1969). It is clear that individuals motivated by sincere religious belief nonetheless commit criminal contempt when they knowingly and deliberately violate a court order.
B. The “Prerogative of Leniency”
The district court similarly erred by claiming for the federal judiciary the power to exercise a so-called “prerogative of leniency” that would allow a judge who sits as a factfin-der to acquit a defendant in the face of apparent guilt. At a pre-trial conference, the judge discussed with counsel whether Lynch and Moseinski were entitled to a jury. He stated:
[A] jury is different than a judge.... [Y]ou could try this contempt to a jury and it could be plain as day that your clients are guilty, but the jury can nullify it. The jury has the power to nullify. They may choose not to convict.... A judge can’t do that; a jury can. I guess a judge can do it too if he is sitting as a trier of the fact[s]. In a criminal case the Court of Appeals doesn’t have the power to review anything I do on a clearly erroneous standard or otherwise in a criminal case.
*747In his opinion, the judge did rely on a jury’s power to nullify the law as an alternative basis for acquitting Lynch and Moscinski. The judge stated that he could find “no authority ... that the Court, when it sits as a fact-finder, does not have the same prerogative of leniency” as that of a jury. 952 F.Supp. at 171.
The authority against this claimed prerogative, however, is clear. It is settled that “it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence.” Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102, 15 S.Ct. 273, 39 L.Ed. 343 (1895). Furthermore, a jury may not lawfully reject stipulated facts. See United States v. Mason, 85 F.3d 471, 473 (10th Cir.1996). Indeed, the Supreme Court has characterized the practice of jury nullification as the “assumption of a power” which a jury has “no right to exercise,” Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393, 52 S.Ct. 189, 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932), and as “the unreviewable power of a jury to return a verdict of not guilty for impermissible reasons.” United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 63, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984). Four months after the district court’s opinion in this case, this court forcefully restated these principles in United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 614-18 (2d Cir.1997). In Thomas, we “categorically” rejected “the idea that, in a society committed to the rule of law, jury nullification is desirable or that courts may permit it to occur when it is within their authority to prevent.” Id. at 614. In his thorough opinion for the court, Judge Cabranes recognized “that nullification may at times manifest itself as a form of civil disobedience that some may regard as tolerable,” id., but pointed out, in language originally employed by Learned Hand, that “the power of juries to ‘nullify’ or exercise a power of lenity is just that — a power; it is by no means a right....” Id. at 615.
Further, in United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899 (2d Cir.1960), Judge Friendly noted that “the historic position of the jury affords ample ground for tolerating the jury’s assumption of the power to insure lenity.” But he immediately went on to say that the judge does not have that power, because “the judge is hardly the voice of the community” even when he sits as factfinder. Id. at 903. Structurally, judicial nullification violates the separation of powers, for “so long as Congress acts within its constitutional power in enacting a criminal statute, [courts] must give effect to Congress’ expressed intention concerning the scope of conduct prohibited.” United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 939, 108 S.Ct. 2751, 101 L.Ed.2d 788 (1988). By refusing to enforce a valid criminal statute, a judge acts as a quasi-legislator and usurps the Article I functions of Congress. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980).
Additionally, the exercise of nullification by a federal judge — even when termed a “prerogative of leniency” — may create an appearance of injustice that cannot be tolerated by a legal system that strives to resolve cases in a reliable, consistent and objective manner. The arbitrariness of a power that would allow an Article III judge to acquit otherwise guilty defendants if and when the judge sees fit to do so simply cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s admonition that “to perform its high function in the best way ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’ ” In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955) (citation omitted); see also Maybury, 274 F.2d at 903 (2d Cir.1960) (allowing a judge to nullify would not “enhance respect for law or for the courts”).
IV. Conclusion
Because I conclude that the government may bring this appeal and that the verdict of not guilty was the result of gross legal error on the part of the district court, I would vacate the judgment of acquittal and remand to the district court for entry of a judgment of conviction.
. The stipulation was as follows:
It is Hereby Stipulated and Agreed by and between the United States of America, by Mary Jo White, United States Attorney, Nicole A. LaBarb-era, Assistant United States Attorney, George Lynch, the defendant, Christopher Moscinski, the defendant, and their counsel, A. Lawrence Wash-bum, Jr., Esq., that on February 23, 1996, Judge John E. Sprizzo entered an Order Imposing Permanent Injunction in United States v. Lynch, 952 *742F.Supp. 167, and that the Order provided as follows:
"It is Hereby Ordered that defendants George Lynch and Christopher Moscinski, their agents, and all individuals acting in concert with defendants or their agents, are permanently enjoined from violating, or aiding and abetting the violation of, the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 248, in any way, including but not being limited to:
1. impeding or obstructing automotive or any other form of ingress into, or egress from, the Women's Medical Pavilion in Dobbs Ferry, New York; and
2. attempting to take — or inducting [sic], encouraging, directing, aiding, or abetting in any manner others to take — any of the actions set forth in subparagraph 1 of this order.”
It is Further Stipulated and Agreed that on August 24, 1996 at approximately 7:30 a.m., officers of the Dobbs Ferry Police Department were called to the Women's Medical Pavilion (“Clinic”), 88 Ashford Avenue, Dobbs Ferry, New York, where George Lynch and Christopher Moscinski, the defendants, were "seated in the driveway area” of the Clinic. A police officer "observed several vehicles unsuccessfully attempt to enter the parking lot.” At approximately 7:50 a.m. a police officer informed the defendants that "they were in violation of the law and that if they did not leave the area immediately they would be arrested.” The defendants "acknowledged the warning and refused to leave.” The officer then arrested the defendants, both of whom went "limp” and had to be carried to a bus for transport to the police station.
It is Further Stipulated and Agreed that on August 24, 1996, at the time George Lynch and Christopher Moscinski, the defendants, sat in the Clinic's driveway, they knew of the Order Imposing Permanent Injunction in United States v. Lynch, 952 F.Supp. 167, and knew that the Order enjoined them from "impeding or obstructing automotive or any other form of ingress into, or egress from, the Women's Medical Pavilion in Dobbs Ferry, New York.”
. While not a factor in this analysis, a careful examination of the record suggests that Lynch and Moseinski conceded willfulness. At a February 1996 hearing on the issuance of the Injunction (arising out of the defendants’ May 1995 driveway sit-in), the following colloquy took place between the judge and defense counsel A. Lawrence Washburn:
The Court: I am not required to [issue an injunction], but the trouble is that you people have violated the statute and have indicated a willingness to do it more than once.
Mr. Washburn: In terms of peaceful nonviolent civil disobedience, yes, your Honor, we concede that. That is true.
At a September 1996 pre-trial hearing in regard to the criminal contempt charge (arising out of defendants’ August 1996 driveway sit-in) at issue here, Mr. Washburn stated:
Mr Washburn: You asked if there was a question of fact. Not more so than before.
. For convenience, Judge Jacobs’s opinion is referred to as the majority opinion.
. The majority opinion appears to suggest at p. - that there is no precedent for the analysis used in this dissenting opinion. However, Jenkins and Fayer — neither of which is discussed in the majority opinion — are both on point. The former suggests the analysis and the latter applies it.
. This result is particularly ironic since Congress had prior protests at the Clinic in mind when it enacted the statute. See, e.g., House Report at 7, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 704.