dissenting.
From this day forward, passengers thrown from a vehicle due to an alleged structural defect are precluded from pursuing crash-worthiness claims under Minnesota law. In my view, this result is mandated by neither the seat belt gag rule nor the decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The Minnesota seat belt gag rule, enacted in 1963, precludes introduction of any evidence pertaining to seat belt use or nonuse in a suit involving “ ‘personal injury resulting from the use of a motor vehicle.’ ” Olson v. Ford Motor Co., 558 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn.1997) (quoting Swelbar v. Lahti, 473 N.W.2d 77, 79 (Minn.Ct.App.1991)). Five years after the legislature enacted the seat belt gag rule, this court recognized the crashworthiness doctrine, which imposes liability for injuries exacerbated, rather than caused, by defective design or manufacture of a vehicle. See Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir.1968). In Larsen, we held that an automobile manufacturer “is under a duty to use reasonable care in the design of its vehicle to avoid subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision.” Id. at 502. We explained:
Any design defect not causing the accident would not subject the manufacturer to liability for the entire damage, but the manufacturer should be liable for that portion of the damage or injury caused by the defective design over and above the damage or injury that probably would have occurred as a result of the impact or collision absent the defective design.
Id. at 503. In Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, AG, we elaborated:
[T]he extent of the manufacturer’s liability depends upon whether or not the injuries involved are divisible such that the injuries can be clearly separated and attributed either to the manufacturer or the original tortfeasor. If the manufacturer’s negligence is found to be a substantial factor in causing an indivisible injury such as paraplegia, death, etc., then absent a reasonable basis to determine which wrongdoer actually caused the harm, the defendants should be treated as joint and several tort-feasors.
669 F.2d 1199, 1206 (8th Cir.1982) (citing Mathews v. Mills, 288 Minn. 16, 178 N.W.2d 841 (Minn.1970)).
When the seat belt gag rule was enacted, there “was still considerable debate as to the efficacy of seat belts as a safety device.” Olson, 558 N.W.2d at 495. In 1986, the Minnesota legislature formally ended the debate by enacting legislation requiring seat belt use. See Minn.Stat. Ann. § 169.686 (West Supp.1999). The Minnesota Supreme Court has noted that the legislature may not have solely intended “to protect a plaintiff from being penalized for contributory negli*1164gence for failure to wear a seat belt” by enacting the seat belt gag rule. Olson, 558 N.W.2d at 495. Instead, the legislature intended to strike a balance between car crash victims and auto manufacturers. See id. Contrary to the majority’s holding, there is no evidence suggesting that the legislature intended the seat belt gag rule to preclude all crashworthiness claims when a passenger is thrown from a vehicle and alleges structural defect.2 In fact, by construing the seat belt gag rule so broadly, the majority ignores the balance struck by the legislature and, instead, virtually immunizes auto manufacturers from crashworthiness claims as long as seat belts were installed in the vehicle.
Here, Carlson wishes to amend her complaint to assert that the opening created when the roof of her car peeled off during the crash stated a cause of action under the crashworthiness doctrine. She argues that she-would have been thrown from the vehicle regardless of whether she was wearing a seat belt. The majority asserts that since Carlson cannot introduce evidence stating that the seat belt system was in use and failed to prevent ejection and since “the alleged defects in the Hyundai seat belt system and door frame were inseparably intertwined in causing Carlson’s increased injuries,” she “cannot prove that Hyundai failed to use reasonable care to prevent accident injuries in its vehicle design as a whole.” I do not read “as a whole” so narrowly nor do I see the logical or legal necessity in raising the seat belt issue to determine whether Hyundai was negligent in the design of the vehicle.3 In short, the facts of each car crash will vary, and the jury, rather than a federal court of appeals sitting in a diversity action, is the proper body to determine whether an auto manufacturer exercised reasonable care in the design or manufacture of a vehicle. It is entirely inappropriate for this court to decide the issue as a matter of law.
' Under these circumstances, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Carlson’s proposed second amended complaint must be rejected as futile and would remand the case so the district court could entertain her motion to amend her complaint. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
. While the court of appeals’ decision in Schlotz may suggest a contrary result, we are not bound by that decision, see Horstmyer v. Black & Decker, Inc., 151 F.3d 765, 773-74 n. 10 (8th Cir.1998), and I do not read it as a final statement of the law by Minnesota’s highest court. In fact, the Minnesota Supreme Court decision in Olson came out almost a full month after Schlotz, yet did not even refer to Schlotz and its expansive interpretation of the seat belt gag rule. I therefore do not believe that the Minnesota Supreme Court would adopt the view endorsed by the majority.
. I concede that, absent the seat belt gag rule, knowing whether a passenger was wearing her seat belt may be relevant in determining whether her injuries were exacerbated by the defective design or manufacture of the vehicle. It is possible, however, that a design defect would exacerbate injury regardless of whether a seatbelt mechanism exists or is in úse.