United States of America, and v. Cheryl Marie Gigley, and Cross-Appellee. United States of America, and Cross-Appellee v. Cheryl Marie Gigley, And

HENRY, Circuit Judge,

dissenting, in part.

The majority concludes that when a defendant is convicted of failure to appear in addition to the underlying offense, courts should group the two offenses pursuant to the Sentencing Guideline grouping rules. The grouping rules instruct the sentencing judge to determine the base offense level from the underlying offense and apply an upward adjustment based on the eonvic*508tion for failure to appear. I respectfully dissent and align with our sister circuits that have held the two offenses should not be combined for sentencing. Like those circuits, I would so hold because-18 U.S.C. § 3146(b)(2) expressly requires any sentence imposed for failure to appear to run consecutive to any sentence imposed for the underlying offense. See United States v. Crow Dog, 149 F.3d 847, 849 (8th Cir.1998); United States v. Stokes, No. 96-6440, 1998 WL 13409, at *4-*5 (6th Cir. Jan.7, 1998) (unpublished), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1112, 118 S.Ct. 1687, 140 L.Ed.2d 823 (1998); United States v. Packer, 70 F.3d 357, 360 (5th Cir.1995).1

As the majority points out, § 3146 provides, “[a] term of imprisonment imposed [for failure to appear] shall be consecutive to the sentence of imprisonment for any other offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b)(2). The majority satisfies the consecutive sentence requirement of § 3146(b)(2) by -following the guideline instructions in USSG § 2J1.6, comment, (n. 3) and § 3Dl.l(b), both of which were amended in 1998 by Amendment 579. See USSG Supp. to App. C, amend. 579 (1998).

Commentary 3 to § 2J1.6 instructs the sentencing judge to group the failure to appear conviction with the underlying conviction, pursuant to the guideline grouping rules, for one total punishment. See USSG § 2J1.6 comment, (n. 3), § 301.2(c). Under the guideline grouping rules, this requires using the higher base offense level of the two offenses, here, the underlying. offense, and using the failure to appear offense as an upward adjustment for obstruction of justice. See USSG § 2J1.6 comment, (n. 3), § 3C1.1. The guideline commentary then instructs the sentencing judge to simply designate a portion of the total sentence as the consecutive sentence for the failure to appear offense. See id. Amendment 579 added language to Commentary 3, “[n]ot[ing] that the combination of this instruction and increasing the offense level for the obstructive, failure to appear conduct has the effect of ensuring an incremental, consecutive punishment for .the failure to appear count, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b)(2).” USSG Supp. to App. C, amend. 579, at 9 (1998).

However, I am unconvinced that Commentary 3, even with the additional language, resolves the direct conflict between applying the guideline grouping rules to a conviction for failure to appear and the consecutive sentence requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b)(2). The intent behind § 3146(b)(2) is clear: “failure to appear for a court ordered proceeding is a serious crime and should be deterred by the imposition of a separate penalty through a consecutive sentence.” Crow Dog, 149 F.3d at 849 (citing Packer, 70 F.3d at 360). Grouping the offenses to arrive at one total punishment, a portion of which is then merely referenced as a consecutive sentence for the failure to appear offense, is, in my mind, not imposing a separate penalty for the failure to appear offense. Downgrading the failure to appear offense into an upward adjustment for obstruction of justice — -which will almost always result in a lesser sentence — cannot satisfy the consecutive sentence requirement in § 3146(b)(2) and is, therefore, not faithful to the congressional directive. See id. (“Contrary to the suggested treatment of a sentence in Commentary 3 to USSG § 2J1.6, [§ 3146(b)(2) ] does not suggest that a sentencing court might determine a total sentence for the underlying offense *509or offenses and the failure to appear and then divide the sentence among the convictions.”)- Thus, § 3146(b)(2) and Commentary 3 to USSG § 2J1.6 are inconsistent. Under such circumstances we are required to apply the former. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (“[C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute_”); see also Packer, 70 F.3d at 360 (“[I]f guideline commentary 2J1.6 n. 3 conflicts with statutory section 3146 we must apply the latter”).

The majority also relies on the amended language of USSG § 3Dl.l(b). See Maj. Op., at n. 3. Prior to Amendment 579, § 3Dl.l(b) provided “[a]ny count for which the statute mandates imposition of a consecutive sentence is excluded from the operation of [the grouping rules of] §§ 2D1.2 — 3D1.15.” USSG § 3Dl.l(b) (1997). Thus, the consecutive sentence requirement of § 3146(b)(2) excluded a failure to appear conviction from the guideline grouping rules, an approach consistent with the language of the statute. However, at that time, § 3Dl.l(b) was in conflict with Commentary 3 to § 2J1.6, which instructed the sentencing judge to group the failure to appear conviction with the conviction for the underlying offense.

Consequently, in 1998, Amendment 579 altered the language of § 3Dl.l(b) to exclude from the grouping rules only those counts “for which the statute (1) specifies a term of imprisonment to be imposed; and (2) requires that such a term of imprisonment be imposed to run consecutively to any other term of imprisonment.” USSG Supp. to App. C, amend. 579, at 10 (1998). Because § 3146(b)(2) does not specify a term of imprisonment to be imposed, the guidelines no longer exempt a failure to appear conviction from the grouping rules. Thus, § 3Dl.l(b) is now consistent with the sentencing approach outlined in Commentary 3 to § 2J1.6.

The majority’s reliance on Amendment 579 is unpersuasive. As the Sentencing Commission concedes, this amendment merely remedies prior inconsistencies within the guidelines. See id. at 12. (“The amendment maintains the current grouping rules for failure to appear ..., but addresses internal inconsistencies among different guidelines... .”).• Despite the Sentencing Commission’s characterization of the amendment as “ensuring] an incremental, consecutive penalty for the failure to appear count,” it does nothing to remedy the inherent conflict, discussed above, between the consecutive sentence requirement of § 3146(b)(2) and the grouping approach outlined in Commentary 3 to USSG § 2J1.6.

For the foregoing reasons, I would instruct the district court not to group the failure to appear with the underlying offense and instead impose separate, consecutive sentences.

. Admittedly, these cases were decided prior to Amendment 579 of the Sentencing Guidelines. Two of the cases cited by the majority in support of its holding, United States v. Magluta, 203 F.3d 1304, 1305 (11th Cir.2000), and United States v. Kirkham, 195 F.3d 126, 130-32 (2d Cir.1999) considered Amendment 579. However, as discussed hereinafter, it is my position that Amendment 579 does not change the analysis of the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Circuits. Further, I do not believe United States v. Bell, 183 F.3d 746, 750 (8th Cir.1999), also cited by the majority in support of its holding, disturbs the persuasive authority of Crow Dog. The Eighth Circuit decided Bell after its decision in Crow Dog and the effective date of Amendment 579, but without mention of either.