dissenting, in which BIRCH, Circuit Judge, joins:
The issue in this case is whether a lawyer who has competently performed in the guilt phase of a capital trial, but does nothing to investigate mitigating evidence, has provided constitutionally effective representation at the sentencing phase. The Supreme Court made clear in Williams v. Taylor, — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), decided on April 18, 2000, that he has not.
To the extent that the majority’s opinion suggests that a defense lawyer has no obligation, independent of his preparation for the guilt phase, to conduct even the most minimal investigation into the existence of mitigating evidence in preparation for the penalty phase of a capital case, it is contrary to and misstates the specific dictates of the Supreme Court as well as this Circuit’s precedent. To the extent that the majority’s opinion suggests that L. Drew Redden, Chandler’s attorney, conducted a reasonable investigation into the availability of mitigating evidence, or that he made a reasonable tactical choice not to investigate or present mitigating evidence, it is in clear conflict with the record,1 which belies the conclusion that Redden conducted any investigation or made any reasoned tactical decisions with respect to the penalty phase of Chandler’s trial.
Although the majority devotes much of its opinion to facts relevant to Redden’s professional qualifications and civic and bar activities as well as his competent representation in the guilt phase, these facts have nothing to do with the issue raised in this case. As to that issue, the majority glosses over the record evidence of Redden’s complete lack of preparation for or effort in the crucial penalty phase. Moreover, rather than remanding the case to the district court judge, who is in the best position to assess testimony, to give him the opportunity to decide first whether Redden’s performance was constitutionally adequate, the majority arrogates this task to itself and, based on speculation, wrongfully holds that Chandler’s sixth amendment right to counsel was not violated and Redden’s performance was constitutionally adequate.2
I. Redden’s performance at the sentencing phase was constitutionally ineffective.
A. Redden does not dispute that he failed to investigate the availability of mitigating evidence.
In Williams v. Taylor, the Supreme Court found ineffectiveness requiring a new sentencing hearing where counsel “did not begin to prepare for [the penalty] phase of the proceeding until a week before the trial.” 120 S.Ct. at 1514. In this case, counsel was even more remiss, failing to think about the penalty phase until the night before the sentencing hearing.3 The guilt-innocence proceeding ended at 2:30 *1345on the afternoon of April 2, 1991, and the penalty phase was set to begin at 9:00 the next morning. That afternoon, Redden “prepared” for the penalty phase by asking Deborah Chandler, the defendant’s wife, to “find” some character witnesses to “stand up for Ronnie” the next morning.4 In addressing the extent to which counsel must prepare for mitigation, our cases require that counsel, at the very least, inform the defendant and the defendant’s relatives about the nature and importance of character evidence in a capital sentencing trial,5 ask them for the names of potential witnesses,6 and then follow up on whatever leads they provide.7
*1346Even if it were appropriate for counsel to delegate the task of uncovering mitigating witnesses to a person without any legal training whose husband had just been convicted and faced the possibility of being sentenced to death the next day, Deborah Chandler hardly had time to comply. On that afternoon, she had to drive approximately two hours to Piedmont where she and Chandler lived, and two hours again the following morning to attend the penalty hearing. She thus had approximately twelve hours to round up mitigation witnesses who would then be called to testify with little or no preparation from trial counsel as Redden never advised Deborah Chandler, or anybody else, regarding the nature of the testimony he hoped to elicit at the penalty stage. See R13-433-364. Redden did not consider or request a continuance in order to prepare for the next day’s penalty phase. Id. at 324.
When asked whether he thought he would have had some opportunity to interview potential character witnesses, Redden responded: “Well, only a hope. And not one that I really spent a lot of time or effort on or felt that there was that much time to spend on.” Id. at 398. The best he could do was suggest that he would have been prepared to listen if anyone had volunteered anything useful. When asked why he had not “done any specific preparation for the death penalty phase,” id. at 395, Redden offered the following explanation:
Well, I guess, number one, you do what’s coming up first, and you do what’s immediately on you. Number two, of course, if something happens in your interviewing of a witness or talking to a particular witness that could be of value ultimately in that, you’d make at least a mental note of that. But there wasn’t, as I’ve testified, anything specifically directed to that at that time and nothing was volunteered to me that I considered of value in there.
Although the majority notes that Redden interviewed 67 witnesses, it is clear that those witnesses were interviewed only for purposes of the guilt phase of the trial and not for purposes of mitigation.8 Moreover, the majority of these interviews were with government witnesses who were unlikely to offer unsolicited favorable character evidence. There is no evidence that Redden asked a single question of these witnesses with mitigation in mind.
The majority insinuates, extrapolating from Redden’s use of the attorney-client privilege as to one issue, that Redden did not investigate because Chandler might not have wished him to do so. Although that suggestion is totally unsupported by the record in this case,9 even if the majority’s interpretation of the facts were correct, this Court has found that an attorney *1347has a duty to investigate possible mitigating evidence even where a defendant has specifically said to his lawyer that he does not want to present any mitigating evidence. Dobbs v. Turpin, 142 F.3d 1383, 1387-88 (11th Cir.1998). “Although the decision whether to use mitigating evidence is for the client, this court has stated, ‘the lawyer first must evaluate potential avenues and advise the client of those offering possible merit.’ ” Id. (quoting Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447, 1451 (11th Cir.1986)); see also Blanco, 943 F.2d at 1503 (finding ineffective assistance where “[tjhe ultimate decision that was reached not to call witnesses was not a result of investigation and evaluation, but was instead primarily a result of counsels’ eagerness to latch onto [the defendant’s] statements that he did not want any witnesses called”). Again, Redden could not have intelligently counseled Chandler about the availability or presentation of mitigating evidence because he had no knowledge of its nature or its extent.
B. A lawyer has an obligation to investigate mitigating evidence.
In Williams v. Taylor, the Supreme Court, citing to the American Bar Association’s Standards for Criminal Justice, specifically stated that a defense lawyer in a capital case is “obligat[ed] to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.” 120 S.Ct. at 1514-15. The ABA standard recognizes the lawyer’s substantial role in raising mitigating factors both to the prosecutor initially and to the court at sentencing, that this task cannot be accomplished simply on the basis of broad general emotional appeals or on the strength of statements made to the lawyer by the defendant, and that investigation is essential to discover facts about the defendant’s background, education, employment record, mental and emotional stability, family relationships, and the like. It concludes that, “without careful preparation, the lawyer cannot fulfill the advocate’s role.” 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1, commentary, p. 4-55 (2d ed.1980).
Dismissing Williams ’ relevance to this ease,10 the majority says that “[investigation (even a nonexhaustive, preliminary investigation) is not required for counsel reasonably to decline to investigate a line of defense thoroughly.” Not only is this statement .contrary to Williams and to prior Supreme Court precedent, but the citations following this statement hold precisely the opposite, as recognized in the parentheticals for the cited cases. Strickland v. Washington states that counsel has a duty either to make a reasonable investigation or to make a reasonable decision that no investigation is necessary. 466 U.S. 668, 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Strickland also states that *1348counsel may make a “less than complete investigation” if “reasonable professional judgment supports the limitations on the investigation.” Id. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052.11 As evidenced by the cases cited herein, as well as those cited by the majority, it is axiomatic that counsel must perform at least a preliminary investigation before he or she is able to make an informed or “strategic” decision about whether or not to further pursue that investigation.
In Williams, the Supreme Court emphasized that, regardless of whether counsel’s failure to conduct a thorough background investigation was sufficiently prejudicial to have affected the outcome of sentencing, it “clearly demonstrated that trial counsel did not fulfill their obligation.” 120 S.Ct. at 1514-15. Likewise, this Court previously has recognized that a defense attorney has a duty “to conduct a reasonable investigation, including an investigation of the defendant’s background, for possible mitigating evidence.” Porter v. Singletary, 14 F.3d 554, 557 (11th Cir.1986).
It is true that an attorney may, under some circumstances, make a strategic choice to curtail a particular investigation. But the Supreme Court has tied the reasonableness of such a choice to the amount of investigation backing that choice:
[Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Dobbs, 142 F.Sd at 1387-88 (advising that “a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments”) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052).12 Thus, *1349counsel’s failure to conduct a thorough or complete investigation may be excused only where a preliminary investigation has reasonably informed counsel’s determination that further investigation is not warranted. “[T]he mere incantation of ‘strategy1 does not insulate attorney behavior from review; an attorney must have chosen not to present mitigating evidence after having investigated the defendant’s background, and that choice must have been reasonable under the circumstances.” Stevens, 968 F.2d at 1083 (emphasis added); see also Horton, 941 F.2d at 1462 (“[0]ur case law rejects the notion that a ‘strategic’ decision can be reasonable when the attorney has failed to investigate his options and make a reasonable choice between them.”).
In Baxter v. Thomas, we said that the first step in assessing a claim of failure to investigate mitigating evidence is to “determine[ ] whether a reasonable investigation should have uncovered the mitigating evidence. If so, then a determination must be made whether the failure to put this evidence before the jury was a tactical choice by trial counsel.” 45 F.3d 1501, 1513 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Blanco, 943 F.2d at 1500). Thus, we may not simply assume that Redden’s failure to investigate was a strategic decision deserving of deference. We must determine whether the failure to investigate mitigating character evidence was an unreasonable omission or a reasonable strategic choice.
C. Redden’s failure to investigate and present the available mitigating evidence did not result from a strategic decision.
Notwithstanding a complete absence of evidence in the record that Redden knew of or considered the existence or nature of mitigating evidence, the majority assumes that he made a “strategic choice” not to investigate it.
1. Lingering doubt
The majority first excuses Redden’s failure to investigate by positing that he chose instead to “focus[ ] on obtaining an acquittal and then at sentencing on lingering doubt.” That choice, says the majority, “was a reasonable one.” The majority errs in several respects in reaching that conclusion. First, it is mere conjecture on the part of the majority that Redden “chose” to pursue a strategy of lingering doubt. This gloss, which the majority has superimposed on Redden’s actions in hindsight, is again not supported by the record. Redden himself never suggested that he pursued any such strategy. Nor did the government suggest he had pursued such a strategy until after the issuance of the panel opinions. The sum total of the evidence on which the majority depends for its conclusion that Redden pursued a strategy of lingering doubt is his testimony at the Section 2255 evidentiary hearing that he “did not feel that a reasonable minded jury would impose the death penalty” on Chandler. That’s it. Redden did nothing at the sentencing hearing to communicate to the jury that, because they harbored lingering doubts regarding Chandler’s culpability, they should not recommend the death penalty.13
*1350Second, even if we credit the majority’s assertion that trial counsel, albeit clumsily, pursued a lingering doubt theory, it was unreasonable for him to limit his presentation to that approach without first investigating how fruitful additional mitigating strategies might be. As noted earlier, courts may not simply assume that a failure to investigate was a strategic decision deserving of great deference. Although it is beyond peradventure that a strategic decision implies knowledge of the options, the majority says:
Trial counsel stated that he did not need to know what a witness would say to determine whether the witness would be compelling at mitigation. He stated that you assume what a piece of testimony might be and “assume the most favorable testimony that you might get and then form some judgment, not the most reliable judgment in the world, but some judgment about how compelling it might be.” We [the majority] agree.
No court has ever found that merely imagining what a witness might say on the stand constitutes effective assistance of counsel when that is the sum total of a defense attorney’s investigation into the existence of mitigating evidence in a capital case. “In order for counsel to make a professionally reasonable decision whether or not to present certain mitigating evidence[,] ... that counsel must be informed of the available options.” Jackson v. Herring, 42 F.3d 1350, 1367 (11th Cir.1995). “An attorney’s decision to limit his investigation ... must ‘flow from an informed judgment.’ ... ‘[0]ur case law rejects the notion that a “strategic” decision can be reasonable when the attorney has failed to investigate his options and make a reasonable choice between them.’ ” Baxter v. Thomas, 45 F.3d 1501, 1514 (11th Cir.1995) (quoting Harris v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 756, 763 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1011, 110 S.Ct. 573, 107 L.Ed.2d 568 (1989), and Horton, 941 F.2d at 1462). Moreover, Redden simply could not have “imagined” the actual mitigation in this case. He did not know Chandler, he did not know Chandler’s community, and there is no basis for believing that he would have imagined all the supporting factual evidence of Chandler’s good deeds and good character that was presented at the Section 2255 hearing.
Finally, the assumption that Redden “chose” to focus on lingering doubt to the exclusion of mitigating evidence makes no sense because the mitigating evidence here does not conflict with a fingering doubt argument. On the contrary, mitigating evidence of the kind available here would have enhanced such an argument. The kind of available evidence regarding Chandler’s good deeds and character (see section II.A, infra) could only have enhanced the jury’s doubts regarding Chandler’s participation in the murder.
Factually, Redden did not make any “strategic decision.” Legally, a lawyer who does absolutely nothing to prepare for the penalty phase even if he adequately prepares for the guilt phase of the trial is constitutionally ineffective.14 The forego*1351ing cases clearly establish that preparation for the guilt phase does not in any way alleviate a lawyer’s obligation to prepare for sentencing. No reasonable civil defense lawyer would argue that it would be justifiable to give no shrift, or short shrift, to preparation on damages because the case against liability was strong. Such an omission would be considered malpractice. A comparable omission certainly falls below objective standards of reasonableness where the risk of inadequate preparation is not just monetary damages but death.15 Consequently, we have rejected the assertion that an attorney’s “good faith expectation of a favorable verdict” somehow excused his failure to prepare for the penalty phase of a capital case. Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523, 535 (11th Cir.1985). In Blake, the Court concluded that counsel “made no preparations whatsoever for the penalty phase,” id. at 533, notwithstanding the fact that counsel had interviewed the defendant’s father several times and met with the father and mother together on one occasion before trial in order to learn of “character evidence which might be used for mitigation at a penalty proceeding,” id. at 534. Moreover, if counsel believes that there is inadequate time to provide effective assistance, it is counsel’s responsibility to seek a continuance from the trial court.16
2. Possibility of harmful rebuttal
The second after-the-fact justification suggested by the majority for Redden’s “strategic decision” not to investigate or present mitigating evidence derives from Redden’s “[mjisgivings about hurtful cross-examination and rebuttal witnesses.” Again, we are left to speculate what negative cross-examination or rebuttal witnesses would have been available to counter the mitigating evidence that could have been presented in this case. Redden certainly had no knowledge of what that (hypothetical) cross-examination or those *1352(imagined) rebuttal witnesses would reveal.17 Indeed, he had no idea what his own potential mitigation witnesses might aver. Nor does the record indicate what that possible adverse evidence would have been. Chandler had no criminal record.
Unlike cases in which putting on good character evidence might have opened the door for the government to introduce evidence of prior convictions of which the jury-had been unaware, Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 186, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986), or in which “cross-examination might ... have revealed matters of historical fact that would have harmed [the defendant’s] chances for a life sentence,” Burger, 483 U.S. at 792, 107 S.Ct. 3114, there is nothing in the record suggesting that the government possessed such lurking, damaging evidence against Chandler. In fact, it appears that the government had already managed to get that kind of evidence before the jury in the form of allegations that Chandler was responsible for the suspicious “disappearances” of two individuals, conduct for which Chandler was not charged.18
The only “bad” rebuttal evidence that the government suggests might have been available in this case was Redden’s testimony that he knew that some individuals in the Piedmont community “considered Ronald Chandler to be a drug dealer,” and that “the law enforcement community in Piedmont ... was hostile to him.” R13-433-399. In light of the fact that Chandler had just been convicted of orchestrating a murder-for-hire in connection with his leadership role in a marijuana-growing enterprise, the fact that some people in the community deemed Chandler a drug dealer and that the police were antagonistic toward him could hardly come as a surprise to the jury during the penalty phase. In any case, Redden’s concerns regarding the possible consequences of presenting witnesses who would testify to Chandler’s good character did not inform his decision not to present such witnesses. He did not even know of the existence of these witnesses because he had never undertaken any investigation into the availability of mitigating evidence. Redden also testified that, after balancing the favorable and unfavorable factors, the existence of potential for cross-examination on such matters “normally doesn’t back you off putting on a character witness.” R13-433-415-16. He also acknowledged that, other than his in-articulable fears, he had no reason not to pursue “the kindness aspect of Mr. Chandler’s death penalty phase.” Id. at 400.
The Supreme Court in Williams is instructive on this issue as well. There, the Court acknowledged that the presentation of that evidence would lead to the introduction of “evidence that was not favorable to” the defendant, including evidence that he “had been thrice committed to the juvenile system.... ” Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1514. The Court found counsel in that ease to be ineffective because “the failure to introduce the comparatively voluminous amount of evidence that did speak in Williams’ favor was not justified by a tactical decision.... ” Id. In this case, there is also no evidence that Redden made a tactical decision, and the record contains no indication that there was any rebuttal evidence unfavorable to Chandler.
3. Purpose of mitigating evidence
The majority’s final post hoc rationalization for Redden’s failure to present mitigating evidence appears to be that Redden *1353“questioned whether evidence of [Chandler’s] specific good acts would have been compelling, considering that the Government was not arguing that [Chandler] was in all ways a bad man, but arguing that he had committed specific criminal acts.” This surprising pronouncement contradicts every holding of the Supreme Court relating to the purpose of mitigating evidence. The purpose of mitigating evidence is precisely to show that the defendant is a good person.19 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602-06, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). “[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record.” Id. at 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954. The very task before a sentencing jury is to weigh the circumstances and severity of the crime committed against the goodness and qualities of the convicted defendant. At that stage of the trial “in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.” Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (internal citation omitted); see also Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1516 (“Mitigating evidence unrelated to dangerousness may alter the jury’s selection of penalty, even if it does not undermine or rebut the prosecution’s death-eligibility case.”); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (finding that the sentencer in a capital case must “treat[ ] the defendant as a ‘uniquely individual human bein[g]’ and [make] a reliable determination that death is the appropriate sentence” (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304-05, 96 S.Ct. 2978)). “A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind.” Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2978; see also Pennsylvania ex rel Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55, 58 S.Ct. 59, 82 L.Ed. 43 (1937) (“For the determination of sentences, justice generally requires consideration of more than the particular acts by which the crime was committed and that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender.”). By failing to present mitigating evidence during the penalty stage of Chandler’s trial, Redden denied Chandler his constitutional right to present to the jury evidence of his character and record. In Williams, the Court said that “it is undisputed that Williams had a right — indeed, a constitutional right — to provide the jury with the mitigating evidence that his trial counsel either failed to discover or failed to offer.” 120 S.Ct. at 1513. Ronnie Chandler is entitled to the same right in this case.
The Supreme Court has stated unequivocally that a defense lawyer in a capital case is “obligatefd] to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.” Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1514-15. It cannot be gainsaid that Redden’s investigation of Chandler’s background was nonexistent. Applying Williams, we are bound to conclude that Redden’s failure to undertake even the most preliminary investigation into the availability of mitigating evidence, as well as his utter failure to *1354present the available evidence, fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Moreover, the manner in which he presented the testimony of the only two penalty phase mitigation witnesses, Chandler’s mother and wife, was itself less than effective, perhaps even harmful. The kinds of questions Redden asked and the brevity of his examination left the jury with the impression that the two women who theoretically knew Chandler best had little or nothing to say about him other than the fact that he liked to participate in building houses.20 Redden’s performance in the penalty phase was constitutionally ineffective.
II. But for Redden’s failure, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the penalty proceeding would have been different — a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the sentence of death in this case.
Just as Williams dictates a finding of ineffective assistance on the basis of Redden’s performance, it dictates a reversal on the basis of the prejudice Chandler suffered as a result of that deficient performance. Indeed, this case provides a more compelling case for finding prejudice than did Williams as, even upon conviction, Chandler was a much less likely candidate for the death penalty than was Terry Williams.
A. The available mitigating evidence for Chandler
Had Redden investigated and presented the case to which Chandler was constitutionally entitled, he would have given the jury the opportunity to know Chandler’s character as his community knew it. Ha-beas counsel discovered in one afternoon at Chandler’s church 40 witnesses who had specific knowledge and examples of Chandler’s good character traits, including compassion,21 generosity,22 love for children,23 respect for the elderly,24 strong religious *1355beliefs,25 patriotism,26 a strong work ethic,27 and a non-violent disposition.28 They also backed up their opinions with specific and telling examples of Chandler’s behavior.
Chandler freely gave his time and support to a wide array of members of his community. Joseph Fortenberry, who had grown up with Chandler and had worked with him in construction, testified that Chandler’s daily visits inspired him to walk after he had been told that his injuries in a traffic accident would prevent him from ever walking again. Rita Sue Smith, who estimated that she had known Chandler for 25 to 30 years, told of how Chandler and his wife had allowed Thomas Montgomery and his wife to stay with him while Montgomery was out of work. Chandler provided groceries for the couple and counseled Montgomery to confront his alcoholism and straighten out his life. Chandler transported Montgomery to and from Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. Montgomery confirmed all this and added that he had later sued Chandler due to an injury he had sustained while working for Chandler. They settled their differences and Chandler took him back as an employee because, Montgomery testified, although he would often miss work because of his alcoholism, Chandler never gave up on him and “always put [him] right back to work.” Montgomery summarized his experience with Chandler by saying that “[h]e helped me more than anybody I know of.”
Lesha McBrayer has known Chandler since around 1980. Like many others, she testified that Chandler and his wife had provided food and transportation for her family while her husband was out of work. When McBrayer’s husband became abusive, the Chandler family would take her in. Chandler assured her that he and his family would support her decision, whether it was to stay with her husband or to leave him. As McBrayer testified, Chandler kept his word: “I had moved to Colorado. My husband had been in prison and he got out. And I had talked to Ronnie about it and Ronnie told me if I thought I could make it with him to go on up there, and that if it didn’t work that he would try his best to get me home, and he did.” When McBrayer’s husband again became abusive, she contacted Debbie Chandler, and Chandler sent someone to get her. She *1356testified that she would not have been able to return to Piedmont without Chandler’s help.
Kenneth Ricky Chasteen, who testified that he had known Chandler “all his life,” offered the following anecdote:
I know Ronnie was a mason, a carpenter, and he know people that had lost their jobs before, when he found out about it, he would make sure they got some work. And I know one occasion personally that he took money out of his own pocket and gave it to a guy that had just lost his job had three or four kids and I personally know that Ronnie didn’t have the money to give away but he did any way.
Elaine Freeman, who has known Chandler since high school, testified that, when one of Chandler’s neighbors lost a son in a car accident, “Ronnie took money and gave to them because they didn’t have insurance to bury the boy and took money to them to help them bury him.” Two other witnesses confirmed this anecdote and noted that, at the time this incident occurred, Chandler could ill afford to pay for the boy’s burial. When Freeman’s husband died, Chandler offered to let her “stay in [his] house as long as I wanted to. It was mine to do with and just as long as I always had a place to stay, not to worry about it.” He never asked her to pay rent and would not accept payment when she offered. She also testified that when one of his workers needed a car, Chandler cosigned the loan and made all of the payments, never attempting to seize the vehicle and never uttering a harsh word. Billy Russell testified that Chandler had paid utility bills and rent for him when he was injured in a fire and could not work. Chandler visited Russell almost every day, making sure that he had food and that everything was alright. When Russell recovered enough to return to work, Chandler drove him there and back.
Fortenberry testified that Chandler had helped his family buy groceries: “I remember several occasions and he would bring vegetables by the house and leave them and I remember a time or two ... [when] Ronnie wouldn’t hesitate to leave three or four, five dollars, whatever he had, there for to see the kids got their lunch.” Chandler went out of his way to care for the people in his community. As Tina Stokes, who knew Chandler from school and church, testified, “I’ve known of him buying groceries for folks who he thought needed it ... [Once he] [s]topped on the way home from Georgia one night and he knew of some folks that needed some groceries and stopped in and bought a couple of bags of groceries.” Henry Lawler testified that when he was out of work and his wife was pregnant, Chandler gave him a deer that he had killed. Ruby McFry, who had known Chandler since his father first brought him to church as a child, recalled that Chandler, without having been asked, had brought her groceries when she could not afford to buy any.
Marsha Dale Heath had known Chandler for approximately ten years, had met him at church, and knew his family. She testified about Chandler’s generosity towards her son:
[M]y son [Tony] didn’t have any shoes and Ronnie was out at a neighbor’s behind us and he saw Tony and he made a statement to Tony ... about [his] shoes and, Tony said I don’t have any. It wasn’t long after that the neighbors that was there that Ronnie was visiting that day brought Tony two pair of shoes, instead of one it was two.
Harbert McCord had known Chandler all of his life. He testified that Chandler would often buy a pair of cleats for people who needed them. According to Mary Dobbs, Chandler’s wife’s best friend, Chandler even bought new shoes for the pastor when he noticed that the pastor had holes in his shoes. He also said that Chandler routinely donated twenty-dollar bills for the local emergency rescue squad. Billy Russell, one of Chandler’s neighbors and employees, confirmed that Chandler donated whatever he had in his pocket when asked for charity. He also told of *1357how Chandler paid the utility bills for needy families and cut wood and hauled it to people who could not get any for themselves.
Many witnesses stressed Chandler’s generosity, both in terms of donating his time and labor, and in terms of caring for his employees. Several witnesses testified that Chandler had helped to build a church fellowship hall and to renovate the parsonage without pay. Sharon Kelley, who had known Chandler for 27 years, described how he cut the grass of a friend of hers who was unable to do so himself due to a heart condition. Chandler’s older brother, Charles, told of how Chandler had, without being asked, built a porch for a handicapped man so that he could get into his house more easily. Chandler asked nothing for his labor or the materials. Henry Lawler explained that Chandler had helped him to build his house, laying the foundation and doing the masonry work on the fireplace. Chandler built a barbeque grill for Hubert Masters. According to Sharon Kelley, “There was a time when we needed some work done on the house and we had the money for supplies but we didn’t have money for labor. And Ronnie came and done the work for nothing just as a friend[] because we were friends.” Sharon Robertson, Chandler’s sister, told of how Chandler did brick work for her so that her house would be protected from the on-coming winter. “It was in the wintertime and it was very cold, but he worked in the cold to get it done. And I know it wasn’t pleasant for him, but he did it any way because our house needed to be bricked and out of the weather. And he didn’t really expect to be paid for it either.”
Fortenberry stressed Chandler’s generosity towards his employees. As Forten-berry put it, “If there was somebody on [Chandler’s construction] crew right there that was a working man and he came up there and tell him he didn’t have dinner, money would buy his dinner with, Ronnie would see that that man ate if he worked.” Don Matthews, who worked in Chandler’s construction business, confirmed this from personal experience. “I was out of work and needed work real bad and Ronnie found out about it and hired me.” Kerry Chasteen, who had known Chandler for over 25 years, testified that Chandler never turned away anyone who needed work. Marsha Dale Heath told of how Chandler, after hearing that Heath needed money, had suggested to his wife that they hire Heath to help clean their home, even though they did not really need the help.
Several witnesses testified that Chandler had a particularly kind way with children. Fortenberry testified that “[children] loved Ronnie. I mean, he’d play with them and, I mean, I’m not talking about five minutes. I mean he would spend 30, 45 minutes there just on the spur of the moment kind of playing. And you could tell he really enjoyed it.” Jerry Masters had been Chandler’s next-door neighbor for four years. He described his relationship with Chandler as follows: “Ronnie was a very earing person, a very giving person.... [M]y dad worked all his life, didn’t have time to spend with us, so Ronnie kind of took us in and taught me the sport of hunting and fishing.” Kenneth Chasteen added, “He was fantastic [with children]. He took his children and several other children that couldn’t get out, take them riding, would introduce them to sports, shooting a bow, things of that nature.” Kerry Chasteen described how Chandler had given all of the money in his wallet to a woman after overhearing her mention that she could not afford to buy Christmas presents for her children. Children appreciated Chandler’s efforts. Wendy Twilley, who was only 14 years old when Chandler was arrested, testified that he was like a father to her.
Chandler also loved to share his knowledge with others. Jerry Masters testified that Chandler had taught him to hunt and to fish. He taught Joy McCoy’s husband how to hunt deer. He also taught Masters’ father-in-law how to do brick work and block work. “He was the type that would like to share what he knew.” Ken*1358neth Chasteen also noted that Chandler was always willing to teach people masonry and carpentry skills. Don Matthews also learned carpentry skills from Chandler, and he noted, “[ajnd I’m not the only one that he’s done that for.”
B. This mitigating evidence compels reversal in accordance with Williams v. Taylor.
David Ronald Chandler was convicted of offering $500 to Charles Ray Jarrell to kill Marlin Shuler. Although any murder is to be condemned, it is indisputable that Terry Williams was convicted of committing a much more heartless and heinous crime. He was found to have killed a drunken elderly man in his bed by beating him to death with a mattock after the man refused to lend him a couple of dollars. Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1499-1500. He then went on a crime spree in which he savagely beat an elderly woman who was left in a “vegetative state” and was not expected to recover, set a fire outside a man’s house before stabbing him during another robbery, and stole two cars. Id. at 1500. After his arrest, Williams set fire to the jail, for which he was convicted of arson, id., and “confessed to having strong urges to choke other inmates and to break a fellow prisoner’s jaw,” Williams v. Taylor, 163 F.3d 860, 868 (4th Cir.1998). In contrast, it was never disputed that Chandler was not present when the victim died, and that the actual shooter and the victim were both intoxicated and engaged in target practice with firearms.
Moreover, as the majority points out with regard to Chandler, “the evidence of guilt was not overwhelming.” There was a question as to whether Chandler was even involved in the murder. Jarrell, the man who actually shot Shuler, clearly had his own motivations for committing the murder — reasons wholly independent of any inducement Chandler may have provided. Shuler had abused Jarrell’s sister and mother, Jarrell had attempted to murder Shuler on a previous occasion, and Jarrell consumed nearly a case of beer before shooting Shuler. Even if the jury believed that Chandler had seriously offered $500 to Jarrell to murder Shuler, it could well have doubted that that offer had motivated Jarrell to kill Shuler. Indeed, Jarrell himself — the government’s star witness as to the murder charge — had made numerous inconsistent statements regarding Chandler’s role in the murder. In contrast, there was no doubt in Williams that the defendant confessed to having committed the crimes of which he was convicted.
There is also great contrast between the prior criminal histories of Chandler and Williams. Chandler had no prior criminal background and no history of incarceration. Williams, on the other hand, had an extensive criminal history and had been constantly incarcerated throughout his life. Furthermore, substantial evidence of Williams’ criminal history and history of incarceration was presented to the jury at both the guilt and sentencing phases of his trial, as was expert testimony that “there was a ‘high probability’ that Williams would pose a serious continuing threat to society.” 120 S.Ct. at 1500. Mitigating evidence offered on behalf of a defendant who has no prior criminal background is especially pertinent to the jury’s determination of whether a defendant is sufficiently susceptible to rehabilitation such that a death sentence is unwarranted.
Finally, whereas the mitigating evidence for Williams could have opened the door to negative rebuttal evidence, the nature of Chandler’s mitigating evidence made it significantly less susceptible to such an attack. Mitigating evidence can serve different purposes. In Williams’ case, the mitigating evidence addressed the degree of his culpability for his confessed crime. It consisted of evidence that Williams had been committed at the age of 11, and that he had been the victim of “mistreatment, abuse, and neglect during his early childhood,” and was “bordérline mentally retarded.” Evidence was also presented that he would not pose a future danger to society if kept in a structured environment. Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1501. The mitigating evidence in this case addressed Chandler’s good character as a person, *1359consisting primarily of evidence of prior good acts which were unrebutted by the government. As the Court noted, “not all of the additional evidence was favorable to Williams,” because it could not have been introduced without both revealing more of Williams’ previous bad acts and reminding the jury of Williams’ long history of prior criminal detention. Id. at 1514. Such is not the case with Chandler.
In light of all the foregoing, the district court erred in concluding that, notwithstanding the extraordinary testimony detailed above, Chandler had not been prejudiced by counsel’s failure to elicit this testimony. The trial judge based this conclusion on three reasons, none of which are legally valid: (1) all of the witnesses showed a strong bias in favor of Chandler; (2) the good character evidence related to a time remote from that of Chandler’s crimes; and (3) many of the witnesses were ignorant of Chandler’s criminal activities and thus had no real insight into his character. None of these reasons is legally sufficient to support such a conclusion.29
First, if the fact that the mitigating character witnesses “showed a strong bias in favor of Chandler” was enough to “severely undercut the mitigating value” of the testimony of 40 such witnesses and to render their testimony “of tenuous value,” then no mitigation witnesses would ever have a meaningful effect in any capital trial. All mitigation witnesses have a bias. By its very nature and definition, mitigating character evidence evinces a “bias” in favor of the defendant; this is particularly true of mitigating character evidence that might persuade a jury not to impose a death sentence.
The district court imagined that these witnesses “believed that drug dealing and violent crimes were irrelevant to a person’s character,” and therefore concluded that their testimony would be “of little moment to the jury.” In fact, however, not a single witness expressed such a view.30 Their purpose in offering character evidence was to try to persuade the jury that, in spite of the crimes he may have committed, Ronnie Chandler did not deserve to be put to death. As noted earlier, the purpose of presenting mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of a capital trial is to allow the jury to perform its constitutional function by considering “any aspect of a defendant’s character or record.” Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954; see also Collier, 177 F.3d at 1201-02 (“Counsel presented no more than a hollow shell of the testimony necessary for a ‘particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of [a] convicted defendant before the imposition upon him of a sentence of death.’ ”) (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. 2978).
Second, the district court summarily dismissed and discounted the value of the mitigation witnesses because “this good character evidence related to a time period that was separated from Chandler’s crimes” and was therefore “of little mitigating value.” Although this Court previously has observed that in some circumstances character evidence relating to *1360events remote in time from the conduct for which the defendant has been convicted may carry less weight when balanced against aggravating factors, see Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d 955, 969 (11th Cir.1983), the evidence at issue in this case was neither general nor temporally remote from the criminal conduct of which Chandler was convicted. Much of the testimony concerned personal interactions with Chandler that occurred within five years of the time that the government claims Chandler became a marijuana grower and dealer. Other witnesses testified that they continued to have contact with Chandler up until the time of his arrest.31
Finally, the trial court concluded that mitigation witnesses who “were unaware of Chandler’s marijuana operation would have shown themselves to be ignorant of Chandler’s character, so their testimony would have carried little or no mitigating weight.” Again, this statement conflicts with all the case law requiring that a defendant have the opportunity to present mitigating evidence as to the type of person the defendant has shown himself to be through his actions and behavior. This required mitigating evidence does not go to a defendant’s culpability for the crimes of which he was convicted. As has been repeated, the purpose of presenting character witnesses is to offer a complete view of the defendant, one that presents positive aspects of his humanity and individuality, so that the jury can weigh his good qualities against the nature of the crime committed to determine whether death is the appropriate sentence for this individual. Had Chandler been able to present the testimony that he introduced and sought to introduce at his Section 2255 evidentiary hearing, the jury would have been able to perform its constitutional function by giving a “ ‘reasoned moral response to the defendant’s background, character, and crime,’ ” Penry, 492 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S.Ct. 2934, (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 184, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment), and California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring)), and by considering “the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense,” Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978. Given the quality and quantity of the evidence that was available at the time of trial, viewed against the backdrop of the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors the jury was required to consider,32 there is a reasonable probability that, but for Redden’s failure to present any of the available mitigating evidence, Chandler would not have been sentenced to death.33 *1361Accordingly, I find that Chandler suffered prejudice as a consequence of Redden’s ineffective assistance during the penalty phase.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has recognized that the “qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed.” Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954. In Woodson, a plurality of the United States Supreme Court concluded that “in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.” Id. at 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978.
When a lawyer does absolutely nothing to investigate whether mitigating evidence exists, he cannot be said to have made a strategic decision not to present that evidence. When that evidence does exist and it is reasonably probable that its presentation would have made a difference in the outcome, or conversely, that its absence “undermines confidence in the outcome,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, that lawyer cannot be said to have been “functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,” id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. This is such a case. Accordingly, Ronald Chandler is constitutionally entitled to a new sentencing hearing.
. Notwithstanding the majority's assertion, supra note 41, that the disagreements in this case are about the law and not about factual matters, I in fact do take issue with the majority's reading of the record as well as its interpretation of the law.
. This dissent is in a different format than the majority's 12 "principles and presumptions.” I note that, while some of those principles and presumptions are accurate statements of the law, others are extrapolations from dicta that cannot be reconciled with the guidance provided in Strickland. Many, as pointed out infra, are totally inapplicable to the facts of this case.
.When asked what he did to prepare for sentencing, Redden admitted, "I would say basically not anything explicitly. I mean, what I was preparing to do was to try to defend the case and there was not volunteered at that — in any of that among the peo-*1345pie I talked with or presented to me anything that I considered would be helpful on a sentencing phase if that came to pass.” R13-433-331.
At a later point, Redden again testified:
Q. You testified earlier today that prior to trial, I think your exact words, you had done essentially nothing to prepare a mitigation case in the event that your client was convicted of the murder charge. Murder in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise. At the — during trial, what, if any, efforts did you do to try to put together a mitigation case?
A. In connection with sentencing?
Q. Mitigation case in connection with sentencing, yes, sir....
A. Very little.
R13-433-359.
. Deborah Chandler testified that Redden first asked her to find character witnesses for the sentencing hearing on the afternoon that Chandler was convicted. See Exh.12 at 19. Redden explicitly corroborates Chandler’s testimony on this point:
Q. Did you go — when did you go prepare their testimony?
A. We talked probably some that afternoon, I'm not sure, and probably the morning.
Q. So it would have been after — sometime alter 2:30 before you talked to her?
A. It might have been, I don't recall now.
Q. Okay. Or it would have been sometime before 9:00 a.m. in the morning?
A. We started at nine and we talked to them that morning, it would have been before then.
Q.... [H]ow much time did you have to prepare Ms. Irene Chandler and Ms. Deborah Chandler for their testimony?
A. Not much.
R13-433-371-72.
. Tyler v. Kemp, 755 F.2d 741, 744-45 (11th Cir.1985) (finding that, although counsel contacted relatives, his performance was deficient because he "did not tell them that their testimony was needed on any subject other than guilt or innocence and did not explain the sentencing phase of the trial or that evidence of a mitigating nature was needed”), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479, 1494 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (en banc).
. Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1445, modified on other grounds, 833 F.2d 250 (11th Cir.1987) (stating that counsel must "at least interrogate [the defendant’s] relatives”); see also Cargill v. Turpin, 120 F.3d 1366, 1386 (11th Cir.1997) (finding effective assistance where counsel "obtained names” of potential witnesses from defendant and defendant's mother and sister); Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547, 1558 (11th Cir.1994) (counsel effective where he "interviewed relatives concerning [defendant’s] family background”); White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1224-25 (11th Cir.1992) (counsel effective where he "spoke[] with family members in preparing for the penalty phase”); cf. Stevens v. Zant, 968 F.2d 1076, 1083-84 (11th Cir.1992) (counsel effective where he tried to secure in-court presence of defendant's relatives by telling defendant of importance of this, asking him for names, and speaking with the two relatives defendant mentioned).
. Compare Jackson, 42 F.3d at 1367 (deficient performance where counsel aware of some "possible” mitigating evidence regarding defendant’s background but failed to investigate); Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d at 1500-01 (11th Cir.1991) (deficient performance where counsel left messages with relatives mentioned by defendant but neglected to contact them); Middleton v. Dugger, 849 F.2d 491, 493 (11th Cir.1988) (deficient performance where counsel learned of mitigating personal histoiy evidence from defendant but failed to investigate); with Cunningham v. Zant, 928 F.2d 1006, 1015-16 (11th Cir.1991) (not deficient performance for failing to locate more character witnesses where counsel interviewed the three people defendant identified as well as several others). But cf. Singleton v. Thigpen, 847 F.2d 668, 670 (11th Cir.1988) (counsel not deficient for failing to interview neighbors where he “asked [defendant’s] mother and girlfriend to identify individuals who could testify on behalf of [defendant], but they could not name anyone” and where defendant failed to proffer evidence which counsel would have found had he searched neighborhood).
. Q. Mr. Redden, on cross-examination you mentioned that there was some interviews of witnesses prior to trial and during trial, and though you don’t have an independent recollection of how many were interviewed, you have been told by Ms. Brotherton that y'all have 67 files, witness files, with information regarding some contact with a witness; is that correct?
A. I believe she said 67.
Q. 67. And all of those witnesses, however, were witnesses that dealt with the guilt/innocence issues in the trial, is that not correct?
A. Those were.
Q. All 67 were guilt/innocence type witnesses.
A. I would say that's correct.
R13-433-406.
. The majority speculates that Redden censored himself at the Section 2255 evidentiary hearing and that the district court shielded attorney-client conversations from examination. On the contrary, the court did nothing to prevent the prosecution from asking Redden whether he had discussed the existence or presentation of mitigating evidence with Chandler. Indeed, when the prosecution requested permission to ask Redden whether he had discussed certain topics with his client, the district court instructed Redden to testify as to the fact of the conversations but not to reveal what was said. R13-433-385. Far from halting such inquiries or even chilling prosecutors from asking questions along those lines, the court merely stated that it would make rulings on questions that might touch on the attorney-client privilege "on a situation by situation, case-by-case basis.” Id. Clearly, the prosecution could have asked Redden whether he had ever had conversations with Chandler or his family members regarding possible mitigating evidence. When the prosecution did ask Redden whether he had failed to mention any preparation he had done for Chandler's case, he indicated *1347that all of his preparation had been covered during direct examination:
Q. A number of things that were described by [appellate counsel] Mr. Martin or you were questioned by Mr. Martin concerning a number of things that you did in preparation for this case. Were there any matters that, or any preparation that you did that was not covered on direct examination that you can think of that would be of significance or do you feel like you covered everything?
A. I guess the nature of everything was covered. I don’t suggest that each act of preparation was covered.
Id. at 386. The effect, if any, that invocation of the attorney-client privilege should have on review of counsel’s effectiveness at the trial level is prematurely addressed and decided by the majority, as the issue was not briefed or argued in this case. Such an important question needs to be fully addressed prior to any decision by this Court.
. The majority's treatment of Williams is at odds with the well-established judicial practice of drawing general principles from specific cases as the majority has done throughout its opinion. We certainly agree that Williams does not establish a per se rule that “a defense lawyer must present character witnesses at the sentencing phase or that a defense lawyer (no matter what his client may have informed or instructed him) must in every case investigate purely to see if character witnesses might exist who might be of help at the sentencing phase." Supra note 21. We do however read Williams as reinforcing the established rule that defense counsel’s decision not to present mitigating evidence must be reasonable.
. Similarly, in Williams v. Head, this Court noted that a strategic decision can be reasonable even if not preceded by a thorough investigation. 185 F.3d 1223, 1236-37 (11th Cir.1999). As the majority points out, that Court also held that counsel need not "pursue every path until it bears fruit or until all hope withers.” Id. However, that statement does not support the conclusion that counsel is not obligated to conduct any investigation at all. This Court has established that defense counsel has a duty to undertake reasonable investigations. Failure to conduct any investigation "because of the mistaken notion that mitigating evidence is inappropriate is indisputably below reasonable professional norms.” Dobbs, 142 F.3d at 1388 (quoting Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449, 1462 (11th Cir.1991)). Redden did not fail to present some of the available mitigating evidence; he failed to present any of it. He did not make a strategic decision not to "stack defenses”; he did not "winnow out” certain arguments, witnesses or evidence. Redden failed completely to investigate the availability of mitigating evidence and then presented no case for mitigation at all. He relied on Chandler's wife to locate mitigation witnesses at the eleventh hour, and his abbreviated examination of the two people who should have known Chandler the best, his wife and mother, was so deficient as to have been detrimental. See footnote 20, infra, addressing the prosecution’s use of their testimony. No prior decision of this Court or the Supreme Court has held that such a performance is constitutionally effective.
. The majority suggests that experienced criminal trial lawyers are entitled to some heightened standard of deference. Although counsel’s experience may be relevant in assessing, for example, how he viewed a particular strategy, it cannot carry over to excuse a case of incompetent performance, notwithstanding his capable representation in any other case, or even in the guilt phase of this one. The majority attempts to parlay the respect for the professional judgment of an experienced trial lawyer that we expressed in Provenzano v. Singletary, 148 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir.1998), into a general principle of enhanced deference. But in Provenzano, we stated only that "[o]ur strong reluctance to second guess strategic decisions is even greater where those decisions were made by experienced criminal defense counsel.” Id. at 1332 (emphasis added). In this case, Redden made no strategic decision. Rather, he completely failed to investigate or to discover readily available mitigating evidence. Defer*1349ence is due to Redden's "strategic decision” only if evidence indicates that he made one. The majority’s reliance on Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 779-80, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987), is likewise misplaced. The Burger Court merely mentioned in reviewing the facts that the defense counsel at issue in that case had a good deal of trial experience. That passing reference was in no way connected to the Court’s conclusion that that counsel’s performance was not ineffective, and the Court did not opine, as the majority’s citation of Burger implies, that a counsel’s extensive trial experience entitles him to enhanced deference. This was not Reddent’s first capital case. It was, however, his first since 1976, and his first with the new bifurcated guilt and penalty phases. See R13-316-17; R15-1-28.
. The majority relies on Tarver v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 710 (11th Cir.1999), to support its contention that counsel may reasonably decide to pursue a strategy of lingering doubt to the exclusion of all other strategies during the penalty phase of a capital case. That case, however, is not analogous. In Tarver, counsel let the jury in on his strategy of lingering doubt so they could apply it at sentencing:
*1350I would hope that the evidence presented both in the case-in-chief last week and anything that you have heard today might be sufficient to raise in your mind at least a shadow of a doubt about the defendant's guilt, and if that doubt exists in your mind, I would pray that you would resolve it in favor of the defendant.
169 F.3d at 715. In addition, Tarver's attorney called a polygraph examiner who had interviewed Tarver. The polygraph examiner testified at Tarver's sentencing hearing that Tarver did not lie when he said that he had not killed the victim in that case. Id. The jury heard no comparable appeals in this case. More importantly, in Tarver, counsel’s unambiguous decision to pursue a lingering doubt strategy was an informed one. Unlike Redden, counsel in that case first "interviewed every witness Tarver thought would be helpful as mitigation witnesses, including Tarver's mother, grandmother, aunt, cousin, girlfriends, former employer, and members of the community,” Id. at 714. Redden did nothing.
. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Williams that looking for mitigating evidence a week before sentencing falls below the objective standard of reasonableness, the majority not only fails to find Redden’s behavior wanting, but rather finds it appropriate:
Moreover, the evidence of a request to the wife — at least, as strongly — shows the laud*1351able fact that trial counsel, like most good trial lawyers, was flexible and opportunistic: he did not think character witnesses would be helpful or a good use of his time to pursue, but a reasonable lawyer would not foreclose himself altogether from considering some if they were presented to him. In fact, one such character witness was presented to trial counsel; counsel did not use him.
Redden testified that he did not put Chandler's former minister on the stand because “I felt that in the absence of some number of witnesses that would not be a wise thing to do.” R13-433-398-99. As Redden had not investigated, he did not know that, in fact, a large number of witnesses was available. He therefore was incapable of making an informed judgment. It is unclear why Redden would think that these character witnesses would not be helpful; nor does the record contain any testimony that Redden in fact rejected these witnesses. Indeed, the quantity and quality of the available mitigating evidence utterly undercuts the proposition that character witnesses would not have been helpful.
. In finding ineffectiveness, this Court has previously condemned such a passive approach to gathering mitigation evidence. See Blanco, 943 F.2d at 1501-02 ("To save the difficult and time-consuming task of assembling mitigation witnesses until after the jury’s verdict in the guilt phase almost insures that witnesses will not be available.”).
. It is undisputed that Redden failed to seek a continuance at any point during Chandler's trial:
Q. Given the circumstance that prior to trial you didn't have, I think your word was, you had done little or nothing regarding the penalty phase. Did you consider moving for a continuance?
A. At what time?
Q. Prior to trial?
A. No, not in that, no.
R13-433-332.
Nor did Redden ask for or consider asking for a continuance between the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. Id. at 324. He did, however, request a continuance to postpone commencement of the trail so he could attend a convention. "I had committed myself by word and by money to attend the Convention of the International Society of Barristers.” Id. at 322. Redden felt that "the Court had set the agenda and that the court had, I’d say, acted to my client's benefit in requiring the other cases to be disposed of first and then had granted that extension. I didn’t put my mind to thinking about asking for a further continuance or a further break at that time.” Id. at 324.
. The majority asserts that Redden did not need to articulate a reason for failing to present additional mitigation witnesses, because, in regard to potential cross-examination or rebuttal of those witnesses, "fear of the unknown may itself be reasonable.” This statement flies in the face of the Supreme Court's holding in Williams that defense counsel must investigate and discover the substance (and corollary risks) of such mitigation testimony before deciding whether or not to use it. Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1514-15.
. Again, even if there was a risk that introducing mitigating character evidence would invite damaging rebuttal, Redden still had a duty to weigh both the value of the mitigating evidence and the force of the available rebuttal evidence in order to reasonably assess his choices.
. Furthermore, examination of the government's closing argument demonstrates that the government did argue that Chandler was a bad man. “His presumption of innocence has been stripped away.... You are now allowed to look at the man himself.” Ex. 15, R12-37-64. “Jack the Ripper had a mother. Charles Manson had a mother. That does not mean that ... the son is not guilty or is not deserving of the death penalty.” Id. at 73-74. “He caused the misery. He lived off of other people’s misery and their deaths.” Id. "Marty Shuler's death was formulated by a single, diabolical mind of somebody who was possessed with the idea that marijuana and money was more important than life.” Id.
. With the exception of a few initial, informational questions and answers, the entirety of Deborah Chandler's and Irene Chandler’s testimony is reproduced in the now-vacated panel opinion, Chandler v. United States, 193 F.3d 1297, 1301-02, nn. 6, 7 (11th Cir.1999), reh'g en banc granted and opinion vacated, Dec. 3, 1999. The prosecution used the brevity of the testimony to his advantage. “We didn't ask [either woman] one question because what they had to say, ladies and gentlemen ... was just that he’s my child and he’s my husband and here’s his background. I submit probably everyone of you have a husband or wife. If not, you probably will. Every one of you had a mother.... Jack the Ripper had a mother. Charles Manson had a mother. That does not mean that ... the son is not guilty or is not deserving of the death penalty.” Ex. 15, R12-37-74.
. See, for example, the testimony of Herbert McCord ("compassionate”); Ruby McFiy ("a caring man”); Jerry Masters ("caring”); Marsha Dale Heath ("good-hearted,” "giving”); Kenneth Ricky Chasteen ("He has a reputation for being an extremely caring person.”); Elaine Freeman ("He's one of the most compassionate, generous caring people I’ve ever met.”); Henry Lawler ("good caring person”); Tina Stokes ("genuinely cared about people”).
. See, for example, the testimony of Joseph Fortenberry ("generous”); Jerry Masters (same); Elaine Freeman (same); Joy McCoy ("He’s a generous person. He'd just give you the shirt off of his back, even if it was his last one.”); Sharon Robertson ("he’s always been giving and generous”).
. See, for example, the testimony of Joseph Fortenberry (loved children); Kenneth Ricky Chasteen ("fantastic" with children); Rita Sue Smith (particularly caring for fatherless children); Elaine Freeman ("like a second dad [to her children] after their dad passed away”); B. Russell ("very good role model [to children], encouraging] them to stay in school, to go to church”); C. Chandler ("loves children”); Kerry Chasteen (very good with children).
. See, for example, the testimony of Billy Russell (elderly residents of community "were very special to him .... [H]e would treat them just like he was treating his own family”); Rita Sue Smith ("always had a compassion for the elderly people”); R.M. Trammell (age 82) ("always wanting to help me with something”; ”[H]e's about the greatest friend I ever had.”); Ruby McFry (age 75) ("always treated [her] with love and respect”); Ruth Trammell (Chandler's grandmother) (Chandler always visited once or twice a week to see if she needed anything).
. See, for example, the testimony of Kenneth Chasteen (Chandler would stop his car and pray for people); Don Matthews (Chandler is a religious person); Billy Russell (Chandler "very religious"); Sharon Robertson (same).
. See, for example, the testimony of Joseph Fortenberry ("He was real patriotic”); Kenneth Chasteen (Chandler sang "God Bless America” at the top of his voice from the peak of a mountain); Rita Sue Smith (Chandler a "very patriotic person,” would pull his car over to the side of the road and sing "God Bless America”).
. See, for example, the testimony of Joseph Fortenberry (Chandler was hard-working, "an excellent carpenter and an excellent brick layer, if not one of the best in the state”); Jerry Masters ("Ronnie will get up from daylight and work until dark and he wouldn’t quit until the job is done.”); Kenneth Chasteen ("[Hje’s always been conscientious, hard worker.”); Don Matthews (Chandler a hard worker, "one of the most skilled I’ve ever worked with”); Joy McCoy ("He’s a very hard-working person”); Kenneth Charles Kelley (Chandler was hard working and ”[h]e was a real good brick mason, and carpenter, too.”) Ruth Trammell (hard working); Kenneth McCord ("Ronnie has always worked hard.”); Hubert Masters ("he was a hardworking man”).
.See, for example, the testimony of Joseph Fortenberry (not violent); Ruby McFry (same); Jerry Masters (not violent or hot-tempered); Kenneth Chasteen (not violent, never fought, never held grudges); Don Matthews (not violent); Rita Sue Smith (Chandler had paid up-front to have his house painted, but the painter had quit half-way through. Chandler had not gotten angiy but had quoted the Bible: "Ronnie just said, well the Bible said if they take your coat to give him your cloak.”); Kenneth Charles Kelley (never known him to be violent or hateful); Kenneth McCord (not violent, seemed easy-going); Billy Russell (remembered Chandler once getting angry at someone but Chandler later apologized: "It takes a lot to get him upset.”) Deborah McFry (not violent); Sharon Kelley (same); Charles Thomas Chandler (same); Mary Dobbs (same).
. In addition, the district court’s analysis of the prejudice issue is not as clear as the majority suggests. "[T]he Court acknowledges that the prejudice question in this case is a close one, and that reasonable people could disagree about whether Chandler was prejudiced.” United States v. Chandler, 950 F.Supp. 1545, 1569 (N.D.Ala.1996).
. Although many witnesses said that their personal views of Chandler would not change even if the government's allegations were true, others either refused to believe the government’s allegations or said that, if what the government alleged were true, their views of Chandler would change. See, for example, Marsha Dale Heath (asked if she would change her opinion, she replied, “I don’t know. I don’t — I haven't heard this, so I don’t know.”); Don Matthews (probably would change opinion); Joy McCoy (opinion might change: "I would still need to know the circumstances because I do not know a Ronnie Chandler like that.”). The question was not posed to the last four witnesses, Sharon Robertson, Lesha McBrayer, Kerry Chasteen, and Thomas Montgomery.
. The witnesses who testified on Chandler’s behalf often did not specify when the good acts had occurred. However, many witnesses testified that they remained in contact with Chandler up until his arrest and that his character was unchanged.
. In determining whether to impose life imprisonment or a death sentence, the jury must consider and weigh the balance or imbalance of statutory aggravating and mitigating factors. These factors form an important backdrop to our evaluation of whether the presentation of the omitted mitigating character evidence would have created a reasonable probability of a different result. In Chandler’s case, there were three aggravating factors presented to the jury: 1) that Chandler intentionally engaged in conduct intending that Shuler be killed and resulting in Shuler’s death, 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(l)(C); 2) that he procured Shuler's killing by promising lo pay something of pecuniary value, 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(6); and 3) that he committed Shuler’s murder after "substantial planning and premeditation,” 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(8). The jury rejected the "substantial planning and premeditation” factor, leaving only two aggravating factors against which to compare the two statutory mitigating factors introduced by stipulation: 1) that Chandler had no prior criminal record, 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(6); and 2) that the actual killer, Jarrell, would not be punished by death, 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(8). Redden’s failure is all the more prejudicial in this case because the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors in this case were in essential equipoise.
.As noted supra in footnote 29, the district court considered the prejudice issue a close one. "[T]he jury [must] unanimously recommend a death sentence, [otherwise,] the district court shall impose a sentence, other than *1361death, authorized by law.” United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 1088 (11th Cir.1993). Just one juror would have to be swayed by the mitigation evidence not presented in order for the death penalty to be eliminated as a sentencing option.
. If, as the record shows here, a lawyer simply fails "to investigate and to present substantial mitigating evidence to the sentencing jury,” he falls below the objective standard of reasonableness required for effective representation. Williams v. Taylor, - U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1511, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).