concurring in part and dissenting in part.
This case is troubling on several levels. But the most troubling problem is that the defendant suffered from the clearly and unreasonably ineffective assistance of his counsel, Mr. Freeman. Mr. Freeman’s failure during the sentencing stage to introduce evidence that Mr. Bryan — who had been found incompetent to stand trial for a previous crime — had a long and difficult battle with mental illness, a battle made all the more difficult by disabling diabetes, no doubt caused prejudice to the defendant. In light of Mr. Bryan’s previous history, I cannot conclude that his attorney’s failure to present this evidence at the sentencing hearing, and even more egregious, his attorney’s failure to understand that these mental defects could be considered as mitigating circumstances, is anything less than unreasonable ineffective assistance of counsel. As such, I must respectfully dissent.
I. Additional Background on Competence
First, as the majority opinion notes, Mr. Bryan is severely afflicted with diabetes and presented significant evidence at a “procedurally disfavored” retrospective competency hearing that he suffered from *1180a paranoid delusional condition resulting from organic brain damage. He had also previously been determined to be incompetent to assist his counsel in a separate criminal investigation. Mr. Bryan’s written correspondence and statements recount incredible stories, offer implausible accounts of events, and indicate the gravity of his dementia. In addition, before us are reams of evidence, including Mr. Bryan’s hospitalization records and reports from mental illness experts, detailing Mr. Bryan’s continuing battles with a grave mental disorder. His disorder was apparently so grave in fact that one expert stated it “place[d] into serious question his competency to stand trial, as well as his legal culpability in the crimes for which he is charged.” O.R. at 270.
Mr. Bryan’s illness manifested itself in his deluded and tragic actions in the case at hand. Mr. Bryan repeated the most significant portions of his earlier attempted crime, using the same location to conceal the body that he had revealed to the police in his earlier crime and the same tactic of seeking to use unsigned and forged checks to repay his so-called business losses. The agreements he forged were literally unbelievable, stating that his aunt owed him millions of dollars. In spite of the impossible nature of his claims, Mr. Bryan at one point proudly displayed one of these checks to the car dealer from whom he rented the car.
The majority, citing our admittedly restrictive standard of review, says the argument can be made that we must defer to the jury’s finding of competence in what our cases call the “procedurally disfavored” retrospective competency hearing. Yet, the results of this hearing suggest why they are disfavored.
As the majority relates, two mental health experts, Drs. Murphy and Smith, testified that Mr. Bryan was procedurally incompetent at the time of trial. Four defense attorneys testified that Mr. Bryan was unable to assist them due to his irrational beliefs. For example, he was obsessed with a completely fictional “revolutionary” idea for food processing that he consistently argued — as he did in the previous case as well — that people had stolen from him.
The state introduced its own experts. Dr. Richard Kahoe, Ph.D., evaluated Mr. Bryan a year before trial and concluded, after a brief interview, that he was competent. The prison psychologist also concluded that Mr. Bryan was competent. In spite of the state’s evidence, it is difficult to imagine how a jury could find Mr. Bryan competent. Yet, under our standard of review, I agree we are held to reviewing this under a reasonableness standard, and although I cannot in good faith imagine how the result was reached, I must defer to the standard of review as the majority has applied it. However, as we evaluate assistance of counsel under the totality of the circumstances, we must not close our eyes to this troubling evidence.
II. Standards of Review
Although, as stated above, some of the majority’s conclusions are quite troubling, the major issue that requires remand is Mr. Bryan’s ineffective assistance of counsel. I believe that counsel was ineffective in the guilt phase, but I will concentrate on Mr. Bryan’s best argument: that he received unreasonably ineffective assistance in. the all-important “second” or “sentencing phase.”
I realize that our standard of review again is strict. Mr. Bryan is entitled to habeas relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel only if he can establish that (1) Mr. Freeman’s performance was constitutionally deficient and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but *1181for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Mr. Bryan “must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
As to his claims that Mr. Freeman was ineffective for not presenting evidence of his organic brain damage at the sentencing, this issue was decided by the state court on the merits, so we must determine that the state court’s adjudication of those claims “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Ultimately, there must be “a reasonable probability that the result of the sentencing proceeding would have been different if competent counsel had presented and explained the significance of all the available evidence.” See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III. Discussion
“The sentencing stage is the most critical phase of a death penalty case. Any competent counsel knows the importance of thoroughly investigating and presenting mitigating evidence.” Romano v. Gibson, 239 F.3d 1156, 1179 (10th Cir.2001). The Supreme Court consistently has held that “the sentencer may not refuse to consider or be precluded from considering ‘any relevant mitigating evidence.’ ” Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982)). Accordingly, “the sentence imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant’s background, character, and crime.” California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987) (emphasis in original) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Mayes v. Gibson, 210 F.3d 1284, 1288 (10th Cir.2000) (stating that mitigation evidence “affords an opportunity to humanize and explain — to individualize a defendant outside the constraints of the normal rules of evidence”). “Consideration of such evidence is a ‘constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.’ ” Brown, 479 U.S. at 541, 107 S.Ct. 837 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality)).
Thus, a criminal defendant who is charged with a capital offense has the right to present virtually any evidence in mitigation at the penalty phase. See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 399, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987) (citing Skipper, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1). “We are therefore compelled to insure the sentencing jury makes an individualized decision while equipped with the ‘fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics,’ and must scrutinize carefully any decision by counsel which deprives a capital defendant of all mitigation evidence.” Mayes 210 F.3d at 1288 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 603, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978)). When examining the counsel’s investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence, we have recognized that “the right to present mitigating evidence to the jury is constitutionally pro*1182tected,” id., and that there is a corresponding “need to apply even closer scrutiny when reviewing attorney performance during the sentencing phase of a capital case.” Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1226 (10th Cir.2001) (quoting Cooks v. Ward, 165 F.3d 1283, 1294 (10th Cir.1998)).
In light of these admonitions, I will examine Mr. Freeman’s performance. First I shall consider Mr. Freeman’s performance overall, and then I shall address why Mr. Freeman’s deficient performance prejudiced his client.
A. Deficient Performance in the Sentencing Phase
Mr. Freeman’s performance exhibited several deficiencies, most importantly his failure to (1) prepare mitigation evidence relating to Mr. Bryan’s history of mental illness for, or present this mitigation evidence at, the sentencing phase; (2) comprehend the nature of the compelling and substantial mitigation evidence in the record; and correspondingly, (3) articulate and explain to his client the purpose that presentation of Mr. Bryan’s mental history would serve at the sentencing stage. The cumulative effect of these factors amounted to deficient performance on the part of Mr. Freeman.
a. Mitigation Evidence Related to History of Mental Illness
During the sentencing stage, Mr. Freeman presented brief testimony from Mr. Bryan, his sister and his mother. First, Mr. Bryan testified to offer an explanation for an alleged assault that took place while he was incarcerated. Next, Mr. Bryan’s mother and sister testified that Mr. Bryan had high moral standards, was nonviolent, and was a caring family member. This is the extent of evidence that Mr. Freeman believed he could present to counter the government’s evidence of aggravators. See Vol. VII, at 1695-1734 (trial transcript).
“Mitigating evidence plays an overwhelmingly important role in the ‘just imposition of the death penalty.’ ” Romano, 239 F.3d at 1180 (quoting Mayes, 210 F.3d at 1288). “ ‘As a practical matter, the defendant probably has little or no chance of avoiding the death sentence unless the defense counsel gives the jury something to counter both the horror of the crime and the limited information the prosecution has introduced about the defendant.’ ” Id. (quoting Jonathan P. Tomes, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: The Use of Mitigation Experts in Death Penalty Litigation, 24 Am. J.Crim. L. 359, 364 (1997)). Similarly, our case law is consistent with that of our sister circuits in rejecting the notion that a strategic decision can be reasonable when the attorney has failed to investigate his options and make a reasonable choice between them.1
Here, Mr. Freeman admits that he did no other investigation or preparation for *1183the second stage apart from talking to Mr. Bryan, Mr. Bryan’s family and a doctor who had treated Mr. Bryan for diabetes. Mr. Freeman incorrectly believed “that’s all [he] had” and he sought out nothing further. Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 108.
Mr. Bryan’s unrefuted testimony likewise confirms that “there just wasn’t any” preparation made for the penalty phase. Mr. Bryan was told minutes before he was called to the witness chair that he would be testifying. Mr. Bryan never discussed with Mr. Freeman the possibility of using mental health evidence in the second stage of the trial. Id. at 36-37.
b. Counsel’s Failure to Comprehend Compelling and Substantial Mitigation Evidence
It is remotely conceivable that the decision not to extensively investigate a defendant’s background may be, in exceptional cases, tactical. However, before an attorney can insulate his “strategic” behavior from review by claiming that a decision to forego mitigation evidence was tactical, “an attorney must have chosen not to present mitigating evidence after having investigated the defendant’s background, and that choice must have been reasonable under the circumstances.” Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1369 (10th Cir.1994) (quoting Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547, 1558 (11th Cir.1994) (emphasis in original)). Mr. Freeman could not have weighed the risks and benefits of presenting the testimony regarding Mr. Bryan’s mental capacity where he did not even realize that he could present that testimony. He was apparently unable to articulate to Mr. Bryan any purpose mitigation evidence might serve and never considered any impact the mitigating evidence would have upon Mr. Bryan’s moral culpability. Cf. Battenfield, 236 F.3d at 1229 (holding counsel’s performance ineffective and noting “there was no strategic decision at all because [counsel] was ignorant of various other mitigation strategies he could have employed”).
Mr. Freeman’s own testimony makes this clear. Mr. Freeman admitted that he characterized Mr. Bryan’s stories and events regarding the farm and business ventures as fantastic and delusional. He does not dispute the conclusions of the various medical reports that state Mr. Bryan was confused, depressed, delirious, paranoid, psychotic and delusional and that he had suffered brain atrophy and organic brain damage. He admits that multiple medical records indicated there was substantial evidence from competent professionals regarding his client’s organic and mental problems. See Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 90-93, 100-03, 112. He acknowledges that Dr. Murphy concluded “Mr. Bryan suffers from a serious mental disorder which places into serious question his competence to stand trial, as well as his legal culpability in the crimes for which he is charged.” Id. at 95. It is almost unbelievable that Mr. Freeman did not seek to introduce this evaluation, which is appended to this dissent. See id. at 90-99.
Most important is not what Mr. Freeman admitted he knew, but what he admitted he did not know about mitigation. Mr. Freeman clearly testified that he “saw no use for the experts’ mental testimony, except to prove either insanity or incompetence.” Id. at 105. Mr. Freeman “ethically and honestly” believed that he could not present evidence of mental defects at the sentencing stage simply because the experts “were not going to say [Mr. Bryan] was insane.” Id. at 86-87. Because he believed the experts could not testify as to Mr. Bryan’s insane or incompetent state, Mr. Freeman did not consider any other use he could have made from the testimony. Rather he simply assumed that the testimony “would not have been relevant at all.” Id. at 106,108.
*1184c. Counsel’s Failure to Explain Importance of Evidence to His Client
Mr. Freeman also admits that if Mr. Bryan was organically brain damaged and mentally ill at the time of trial, he might not have received the death penalty. See id. at 110. Given Mr. Freeman’s unsound investigation “which, in turn, hampered his ability to make strategic choices regarding the second-stage proceedings and competently advise his client regarding those proceedings,” Battenfield, 236 F.3d at 1234,1 believe there was no informed decision by counsel or client in this case. The OCCA held that defense counsel conducted a reasonable investigation but concluded that the failure to present the psychiatric mitigating evidence was tactical. If so, it was tactical surrender. I believe this was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. See Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1522.
The OCCA relied upon Mr. Freeman’s purported residual doubt strategy: to present the evidence might focus the jury on future dangerousness rather than moral culpability. There is no question that “[t]he guilt phase may ... provide the opportunity to sow the seeds of ‘residual’ doubt concerning the defendant’s guilt, enhancing the chances of a life sentence.” James M. Doyle, The Lawyer’s Act: Representation in Capital Cases, 8 Yale J.L. & Human. 417, 449 (1996). Counsel may further attempt to stir up any lingering doubt concerning the guilt of the defendant during the sentencing phase hoping to cause the jury to decide against the imposition of the death penalty. However, to read such a strategy into Mr. Freeman’s actions is not reasonable. There was no testimony regarding Mr. Bryan’s potential innocence. Mr. Freeman’s closing argument, rather than suggesting that the circumstantial evidence may not point to his client, stated “Leroy should not have killed,” Vol. VII, at 1753 (trial tr.), and asked the jury not to impose the death penalty here because the underlying crime did not warrant the penalty. See id. at 1748-1754.
In contrast to the majority, I would hold that Mr. Freeman’s failure first to understand the purpose of such mitigating evidence and second to persuade his client to let him present the only evidence that could help him at the sentencing phase was deficient under Strickland.2 I believe that presentation of the overwhelming evi*1185dence of Mr. Bryan’s mental defects would have rebutted evidence that Mr. Bryan might “commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.” Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 701.12.
B. Prejudice
Having concluded that Mr. Freeman’s performance was deficient, I would next determine whether that deficiency caused Mr. Bryan prejudice. “Because the OCCA never addressed this issue, we ... exercise our independent judgment.” Battenfield, 236 F.3d at 1234. A petitioner is prejudiced if “there is a reasonable probability that absent the errors, the sentencer ... would have concluded that the balance of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Psychiatric mitigating evidence “has the potential to totally change the evidentiary picture.” Middleton v. Dugger, 849 F.2d 491, 495 (11th Cir.1988); see also Stephens v. Kemp, 846 F.2d 642, 653 (11th Cir.1988) (stating that “prejudice is clear” where attorney failed to present evidence that defendant spent time in mental hospital). I conclude that the compelling and extensive evidence of Mr. Bryan’s mental history rebuts the continuing threat aggravator and might also be viewed in a mitigating light as to past violent behavior. And here, we do not have to speculate as to what effects calming drugs and other treatment might have, because the record indicates that when Mr. Bryan maintains his anti-psychotic drug regimen, his delusions — and therefore his likelihood to be a threat to other inmates — are significantly reduced.
In sum, this evidence could have materially altered the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors underlying the jury’s sentencing decision. The failure to present the evidence deprived the jury of a “vehicle for expressing its ‘reasoned moral response’ ” to the substantial evidence of Mr. Bryan’s mental illnesses when it rendered its sentencing decision. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). Accordingly, I conclude there is a substantial probability the jury would have determined the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 397-98, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (holding that, in evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel premised on alleged failure to adduce mitigation evidence, courts must “evaluate the totality of the available mitigation evidence — both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding — in reweighing it against the evidence in aggravation”); see also Walker v. Gibson, 228 F.3d 1217, 1234 (10th Cir.2000) (holding that in determining whether petitioner was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to present additional mitigation evidence, this court considers the strength of the state’s case, the aggravating circumstances the jury found, the mitigation evidence defense counsel did present, and the additional mitigation evidence defense counsel might have presented); see generally Mayes, 210 F.3d at 1288 (noting the “overwhelming importance” of mitigation evidence in humanizing a criminal defendant and explaining his conduct). I would therefore reverse the judgment of the district court and remand with instructions that the district court grant the writ as to Mr. Bryan’s death sentence, subject to the state district court conducting a new sentencing trial. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s decision to affirm the order of the district court.
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. See Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1518 (10th Cir.1997); Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1207 (6th Cir.1995) (reversing sentence where "jury given virtually no information on [defendant's] history, character, background and organic brain damage,” because "counsel never took the time to develop it”) (emphasis added); Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449, 1462 (11th Cir.1991) (court "reject[ed] the notion that a 'strategic' decision can be reasonable when the attorney has failed to investigate his options and make a reasonable choice between them”). See also Austin v. Bell, 126 F.3d 843, 849 (6th Cir.1997) (stating that failure to put on mitigating evidence "because [counsel] did not think that it would do any good” was an "abdication of advocacy ") (emphasis added). "In light of its importance, investigation and preparation of a case in mitigation should begin prior to trial, well before any determination of guilt at the first stage.” Romano, 239 F.3d at 1180 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 395, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (noting counsel's deficient preparation for sentencing did not begin until one week prior to trial)).
. I would hold so based in part on Mr. Freeman's inability to recognize, after reviewing "reams and reams” of evidence pointing to his client's mental problems, see Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 98, that Mr Freeman faced a duty to consider, investigate, and explain not only risks in presenting evidence of Mr. Bryan's mental history at the sentencing stage, but also the potential benefits of presenting such evidence. See Battenfield, 236 F.3d at 1229 (counsel's "failure to investigate [defendantl's background, and his failure to explore other readily apparent mitigation possibilities, rendered unreasonable his alleged penalty-phase strategy.... [T]here was no strategic decision at all because [counsel] was ignorant of various other mitigation strategies he could have employed”); Romano 239 F.3d at 1179 ("The sentencing stage is the most critical phase of a death penalty case. Any competent counsel knows the importance of thoroughly investigating and presenting mitigating evidence.”); Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447, 1451 (11th Cir.1986) ("The reason lawyers may not blindly follow [a client’s] commands is that although the decision whether to use such evidence in court is for the client ... the lawyer first must evaluate potential avenues and advise the client of those offering possible merit”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Martin v. Maggio, 711 F.2d 1273, 1280 (5th Cir.1983) (noting that defendant’s "instruction that his lawyers obtain an acquittal or the death penalty did not justify his lawyers’ failure to investigate the intoxication defense” and that such "[u]ncounselled jailhouse bravado, without more, should not deprive a defendant of his right to counsel’s better-informed advice”); Gaines v. Hopper, 575 F.2d 1147, 1150 (5th Cir.1978) ("[M]ean-ingful discussion with one’s client” is one of the "cornerstones of effective assistance of counsel.”).