concurring in part, dissenting in part:
I write separately because, although I concur in the conclusion reached by Judge Wiener that-we must reverse Lipscomb’s conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand for a new trial, I cannot join his method of getting there. I adopt Judge Wiener’s factual and procedural background sections; concur in the result but not the reasoning of Part III; dissent from Parts IV, V, and VI; and concur in Part VII. I begin with an overview of the appropriate analytical framework.
I. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Judge Wiener’s opinion merges analysis of jurisdiction with analysis of the constitutionality of § 666. In Part IV of his opinion, Judge Wiener writes that the term “federal jurisdiction” is ambiguous, and defines it for purposes of this case as encompassing (a) the question whether we have subject matter jurisdiction under § 666 over Lipscomb’s conduct (which Judge Wiener calls “adjudicative jurisdiction”), and (b) the question whether Congress had the authority to enact § 666 (which Judge Wiener terms “legislative jurisdiction”, and we term constitutionality). In this manner, Judge Wiener reaches the constitutionality of § 666, joy calling it a jurisdictional question. With all due respect, this is a categorization with no support.
Jurisdiction is discussed in terms of “legislative” and “adjudicative” in only one context in American law — native American law.1 This case does not arise in that context, so we must follow the generally applied definition of “federal jurisdiction”.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “federal jurisdiction” as “powers of federal courts founded on United States Constitution (Article III) and Acts of Congress (e.g. Title 28 of United States Code)”.2 Federal jurisdiction is not defined as the power of *350Congress to enact a statute. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky’s treatise on the subject, widely regarded as comprehensive, not once mentions .legislative jurisdiction or the power of Congress to enact statutes.3 The only discussion of congressional authority is Congress’ authority to control federal jurisdiction, and congressional power to create courts.4 Neither of these questions is before us.
Moreover, Lipscomb explicitly asked that we find no subject matter jurisdiction. “The alleged bribery here had no connection to a federally funded program and, thus, the court below was without subject matter jurisdiction to proceed.”5 Even if Judge Wiener’s categorization can find support in the law, Lipscomb explicitly seeks a determination of adjudicative, not legislative jurisdiction.
Judge Wiener’s categorization fails when extended to its logical conclusion, which he affirmatively does in his opinion. He writes: “[A] federal forum must lack adjudicative jurisdiction to hear a case based on a federal statute that Congress lacked the legislative jurisdiction (translation: constitutional power or authority) to apply to the situation in question.” This implies that federal courts must always consider constitutionality, even raising it sua sponte, when interpreting a statute. This elevates constitutionality to a category of claims over which we always have jurisdiction, and this is unsupported by our jurisprudence.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully submit that Judge Wiener’s is an erroneous analytical framework, and leads to inappropriate consideration of the constitutionality of § 666. For this reason, I believe it necessary to outline the appropriate analytical framework.
As a threshold matter in all cases, we are faced with the question whether we have personal and subject matter jurisdiction.6 If we find that we do, we then address whatever substantive issues are before us. This is an abstract description of our task — what it means here is that we must first determine whether Lipscomb’s actions fall within the jurisdiction of § 666, and if our answer is “yes,” then address the merits of his appeal. It is at this second step that, were constitutionality at issue, it would arise. Constitutionality is an issue on the merits, not a jurisdictional one.
Our governing precedent interpreting § 666 does exactly this. We have first answered the jurisdictional question, and have not taken it upon ourselves to consider the constitutionality of § 666 if it was not appropriately before us on the merits.7
*351In United States v. Westmoreland,8 a county supervisor appealed her conviction under § 666 for accepting kickbacks in purchases of county materials. A panel of this court affirmed her conviction. Judge King’s carefully crafted opinion first considers the jurisdictional scope of § 666. After finding that § 666 did apply to Westmoreland’s conduct, and thereby answering the jurisdictional question in the affirmative, the opinion addresses the substantive issues of the case.
Nine years later, the Supreme Court decided Salinas v. United States,9 an appeal of the conviction of a Texas county sheriff for accepting bribes in exchange for allowing a federal prisoner housed in the county jail to receive conjugal visits. There, the Court affirmed the sheriffs conviction, holding that federal jurisdiction under § 666 is not limited to cases in which the bribe has a demonstrated effect upon federal funds. The Court later asserted the constitutionality of § 666 as applied to that case. The' Salinas decision followed the two-step approach — first determine jurisdiction, and then address whatever substantive issues are before the court. The Court decided Salinas on jurisdictional grounds, and then went on to mention that § 666 was constitutional as applied.
Since Salinas, this circuit has been faced with questions of the jurisdictional reach of § 666 twice before the case at bar. Both times we followed the “jurisdiction-merits” two-step.
In United States v. Phillips,10 we reversed the conviction under § 666 of a parish tax assessor, holding that he was not an agent of the parish for purposes of the statute. Thus, the statute’s jurisdiction did not extend to his actions. No discussion of the merits was required; and the ensuing discussion on potential constitutional issues is entirely dicta, because this court was without jurisdiction to hear the case.
Our most recent holding on the applicability of § 666 was in United States v. Reyes,11 where we affirmed the § 666 conviction of a city councilman for accepting kickbacks on city contracts. We held that whatever nexus is statutorily required for jurisdiction under § 666, existed in that situation. We then went on to address the evidentiary and sentencing issues before us.
Our analytical approach here should be exactly like that in the above-cited line of cases. We must satisfy ourselves of our jurisdiction, and then go on to address whatever issues are before us on the merits. For the foregoing reasons, the constitutionality of § 666 is a question on the merits that we will only address if (a) we find we have jurisdiction over this case, and (b) we find it appropriately before us.
II. STEP ONE — JURISDICTION
Our first step in the analytical two-step is to satisfy ourselves of our jurisdiction over this case. Lipscomb argues that we do not have subject matter jurisdiction, because his actions do not fall within those governed by § 666. He argues that jurisdiction under § 666 does not extend to cases of local bribery such as his, where the underlying conduct does not directly *352involve federal funds. A detailed review of Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent demonstrates that his argument fails as a matter of statutory construction.12
(A) Early Fifth Circuit Precedent
We first interpreted § 666 in United States v. Westmoreland.13 There, the defendant was a county supervisor convicted of accepting bribes in purchases of materials for the county’s highway construction projects.14 The district court found that the federal funds received by the county were not spent by Westmoreland,15 and nonetheless convicted her under § 666.
Westmoreland argued on appeal that her bribery did not fall under the jurisdiction of § 666, because it did not concern federal funds.16 We rejected this argument, concluding through statutory interpretation that federal funds need not be traceable to the “tainted transactions” in order for those transactions to be punishable under the statute:
[W]e find the relevant statutory language plain and unambiguous. By the terms of section 666, when a local government agency receives an annual benefit of more than $10,000 under a federal assistance program, its agents are governed by the statute, and an agent violates subsection (b) when he engages in the prohibited conduct “in any transaction or matter or series of transactions or matters involving $5,000 or more concerning the affairs of’ the local government agency. 18 U.S.C. § 666(b) (Supp. 1984) [emphasis added]. Subsection (b) contains nothing to indicate. that “any transaction involving $5,000” means “any federally funded transaction involving $5,000” or “any transaction involving $5,000 of federal funds,” and other subsections of the statute contain no inconsistent provisions that might suggest such a qualification.17
We next reviewed the jurisdictional reach of § 666 in United States v. Moeller.,18 There, the government appealed the dismissal of § 666 claims against employees of the Texas Federal Inspection Service, state workers empowered to conduct federal inspections.19 We held that jurisdiction under § 666 extended to the employees’ actions, because the Texas Department of Agriculture, a “government agency” within § 666, received more than $10,000 a year in federal funds; and the defendants were “agents” of that federally-funded agency for purposes of § 666.20
In United States v. Marmolejo,21 we upheld the conviction of a sheriff who accepted bribes in return for permitting conjugal visits to a federal prisoner whom Texas, in return for a fee from the federal government, housed in a facility constructed with *353federal funds.22 In holding that these actions came under the jurisdiction of § 666, we referenced our earlier statutory decisions: “[w]e have previously held that § 666(a)(1)(B) does not require the government to prove that federal funds were directly involved in a bribery transaction, or that the federal monies funded the corrupt transaction.”23 We went on to conclude that conjugal visits are “anything of value” under the statute.
The dissent in Mamolejo argued that Westmoreland interpreted § 666 to reach “only those acts of bribery that could somehow be traced, directly or indirectly, to the integrity of federal program funds.”24
(B) The Supreme Court Weighs In
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Marmolejo on whether § 666 is “limited to cases in which the bribe has a demonstrated effect upon federal funds.”25 Under the caption Salinas v. United States, the Court stated that “[t]he statute’s plain language fails to provide any basis for limiting § 666(a)(1)(B) to bribes affecting federal funds” and that the legislative history “forecloses this type of limitation.”26 The Court therefore decided that as a statutory matter, federal funds need not be directly involved in a violation of § 666.27 The Court then in passing asserted the constitutionality of § 666 as applied to the case at bar.28
Since Salinas, the Supreme Court has decided only one other case involving § 666 — Fischer v. United States.29 There the Court affirmed the conviction of a defendant who defrauded a city hospital authority that participated in the federal Medicare program.30 The Fischer analysis, however, is not relevant to this case.
(C) Recent Fifth Circuit Cases
The first Fifth Circuit panel to interpret § 666 post -Salinas decided United States *354v. Phillips.31 There, we reversed the conviction of a parish tax assessor, holding that he was not an “agent” of St. Helena Parish for purposes of the statute. Thus, the statute’s jurisdiction did not reach his activity. This has little bearing on our case, as city couneilmen are clearly “agents” under the statute.32
The two most recent Fifth Circuit § 666 cases demonstrate our continued commitment to applying § 666 to members of city councils, like Lipscomb, and support our finding of jurisdiction here.
In United States v. Reyes33 we affirmed the § 666 conviction of a city councilman for accepting kickbacks on city contracts. We held that whatever nexus is statutorily required for jurisdiction under § 666, existed in that case.34
More recently, we decided United States v. Williams35 without discussing jurisdiction at all. Williams, a former city councilman, was convicted under § 666 of “aiding and abetting others in the corrupt solicitation and acceptance of bribery payments”.36 We affirmed his conviction.
(D) The Bottom Line
Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent alike construe the’jurisdictional reach of § 666 broadly. Federal funds need not be directly involved in a violation of § 666. The Phillips panel construed the term “agent” narrowly, and reversed the conviction, but that is irrelevant to our case, because the term “agent” plainly includes city council members. The Westmoreland view of § 666 therefore continues to be the law in this circuit, and precludes us from more narrowly construing the statute here. Because Lipscomb’s actions satisfy the jurisdictional requirements found in the language of § 666, we conclude that the district court had jurisdiction to try Lipscomb under § 666, and turn to the issues which the parties put before us on the merits.
III. STEP TWO — MERITS
Before reaching the issues raised by Lipscomb, I must address the issue of the constitutionality of § 666 — an issue raised not by the Appellant, but by the opinions of my colleagues on this panel. This issue is not properly before us, but because my colleagues have raised it, I respond.
(A) Constitutionality of § 666
There do exist troubling constitutional issues under the surface of this case. Whether Congress had the authority it claimed to enact § 666 under the Spending Clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, is a close question. However, although my colleagues hold otherwise, it is not our question today. We may only decide those issues properly before us, and the constitutional question is not such an issue. It was argued neither at trial nor on appeal, and there is no legal justification for us to raise it sua sponte.
*355(1) Not Argued at Trial
The record shows that despite mention of potential constitutional issues, Lipscomb never argued at trial that § 666 was unconstitutional as applied to him. Following is discussion of the four motions by which he made the jurisdictional argument, and where any constitutional discussion at all (not sufficient to raise the issue of constitutionality) exists.
(a) Motion to Dismiss the Indictment or, Alternatively, for an Evidentiary Hearing Requiring the Government to Establish Federal Jurisdiction
On September 3, 1999, Lipscomb filed a Motion to Dismiss the Indictment or, Alternatively, for an Evidentiary Hearing Requiring the Government to Establish Federal Jurisdiction.37 It is worth noting that the title of the Motion shows that it seeks proof of federal jurisdiction, and does not challenge the constitutionality of § 666. Moreover, Lipscomb crafts his arguments in support of the Motion in terms of challenging federal jurisdiction. “In this case ... no sufficient jurisdictional basis is evident.”38 “On its face, this indictment fails even to allege an appropriate basis for the exercise of federal jurisdiction. .. ,”39
Lipscomb does mention the potential constitutional problems that could arise if § 666 is applied to his conduct. He goes so far as to say “[sjeetion 666 is being unconstitutionally applied in this case,” and mentions possible Tenth Amendment consequences of applying § 666 to Lipscomb’s conduct.40 Moreover, one of Lipscomb’s attorneys signed the Motion as “Special Counsel for Tenth Amendment purposes only”.41 However, this discussion arises in the context of a challenge to jurisdiction, not as a challenge to the constitutionality of the statute as applied (which would arise under the Spending Clause, not the Tenth Amendment). Even the statement “[sjeetion 666 is being unconstitutionally applied in this case”42 stands alone, and is not supported by any argument.
The District Court denied Lipscomb’s motion:
Came to be considered the motion of the defendants to dismiss the indictment for lack of federal jurisdiction, and after due consideration thereof, as well as a plain reading of the statute, and the briefs and arguments of counsel, this court is of the opinion that the motion should be DENIED.43
Judge Kendall declined to dismiss the indictment because he found that federal jurisdiction did exist. He neither mentioned nor considered the constitutionality of § 666. His Order includes the handwritten addition of the phrase “as well as a plain reading of the statute,” further supporting the conclusion that his analysis was a statutory and not a constitutional one.
(b) Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 29(A), Following the Government’s Case in Chief
Following the government’s case, Lipscomb moved the District Court for Judg*356ment of Acquittal.44 Lipscomb argued that some nexus between the bribe and the federally-funded program must exist in order for there to be jurisdiction, and that here, no such connection exists.45 He couched his argument in terms of “get[ting] this case in federal court properly,” which is clearly a jurisdictional concern.46 Later in the colloquy Lipscomb’s attorney told Judge Kendall that “666 doesn’t cover this”,47 another argument about the scope of jurisdiction under § 666.
The Government’s response follows the same approach, citing cases that analyze the jurisdictional reach of § 666, not its constitutionality.48 The District Court denied the Motion.
(c) Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 29(A), Following the Jury Verdict
On February 8, 2000, following the jury verdict, Lipscomb again moved the District Court for Judgment of Acquittal.49 He argued that the Government failed to present evidence of a connection between the alleged bribes and a federally-funded program.50 Lipscomb asks the court again to find a failure of jurisdiction due to the lack of nexus.
The Government’s response cites case law analyzing the jurisdictional reach of § 666.51 The Government makes no argument that § 666 is constitutional as applied, suggesting that it did not consider a constitutional argument raised. Further, the District Court’s denial of Lipscomb’s Motion makes no mention of a constitutional issue.52
(d) Conditional Motion for Voluntary Surrender Date and Bond Pending Appeal
Lipscomb filed a Conditional Motion for Voluntary Surrender Date and Bond Pending Appeal on April 26, 2000.53 He sought bond pending appeal because:
it is legitimately predictable that the Fifth Circuit in light of the Salinas [sic] opinion and its subsequent interpretation by the other federal circuits will revisit its past positions regarding the necessary connection between the federal funds and the alleged bribes.54
Lipscomb seeks bond because he thinks the Fifth Circuit on appeal will find a nexus requirement for jurisdiction under § 666. This is a pure question of statutory interpretation. Nowhere does Lipscomb seek bond pending appeal because he thinks the Fifth Circuit might find § 666 as applied to his conduct unconstitutional.' That is because he never made such an argument.
(2) Not Argued on Appeal
Even assuming arguendo that constitutionality was argued at trial, it was certainly not preserved on appeal, which is required if we are to consider it. The record shows that despite mention of potential constitutional issues, Lipscomb did not ar*357gue on appeal that § 666 was unconstitutional as applied to him.
Lipscomb’s Appellate Brief repeatedly uses the vocabulary of jurisdiction, not constitutionality, to define his claim. In his request for oral argument, Lipscomb writes that “[t]his appeal involves a substantial jurisdictional question,” and never mentions a constitutional question.55 Moreover, Lipscomb defined the issue as follows:
The fact that the City of Dallas received federal funds in excess of $10,000 in a given year does not, without more, establish federal jurisdiction to prosecute a City Councilman for bribery under 18 U.S.C. 666[sic].56
Constitutionality is not mentioned.
Lipscomb writes that “it is incumbent upon federal courts — trial and appellate— to constantly examine the basis for jurisdiction .... ”57 “A nexus between the expenditure of federal funds and the illicit conduct, bribery, is inherent in the statutory scheme and consistent with the legislative history.”58 He goes on to say:
Federal jurisdiction was entirely contrived here. The alleged bribery was unrelated to any expenditure of federal monies. Accordingly, Federal [sic] jurisdiction did not and does not exist.59
Lipscomb’s argument is it is a jurisdictional requirement of § 666 that there be some connection between the bribe and the federal funds.60
Lipscomb concludes his argument on this issue with the words “[t]he alleged bribery here had no connection to a federally funded program and, thus, the court below was without subject matter jurisdiction to proceed.”61 I can imagine no clearer statement that his claim is jurisdictional, unless you consider Lipscomb’s conclusion and plea for relief:
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant-appellant, ALBERT LOUIS LIPSCOMB, respectfully requests that this Court reverse these convictions and remand the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the indictment for lack of federal jurisdiction.62
Lipscomb’s Appellate Brief also sheds light on his District Court arguments, and exposes them as purely jurisdictional, not constitutional. He writes that he “objected to the absence of federal jurisdiction before, during and after trial.”63 Not once does he claim to have objected at trial on the basis that the statute was unconstitutional. Moreover, had he thought that he had argued constitutionality at trial, we would expect him on appeal to challenge the District Court’s failure to decide that issue. Lipscomb makes no such challenge, further showing that he never made an argument regarding the constitutionality of § 666.
Lipscomb does mention that contrary statutory interpretation could raise constitutional concerns.64 However, as before the District Court, this is mere mention of potential constitutional concerns in the *358context of a jurisdictional challenge; it is not a challenge to the constitutionality of § 666. Moreover, Lipscomb mentions the potential constitutional issue in order to exhort us to avoid it.65
The Government’s Brief continues the dialogue in jurisdictional terms.66 It does not defend the constitutionality of § 666, strongly suggesting the Government did not consider that issue raised. Appellant’s Reply Brief follows suit.67
(3) No Legal Basis to Reach Constitutional Issue
Despite the urgings of my colleagues to the contrary, no facts exist to support the contention that Lipscomb ever argued the constitutionality of § 666, or preserved that issue on appeal. However, assuming for sake of argument only the allusions to a potential constitutional issue found in the record are sufficient to raise the issue and preserve it for appeal, we still may not decide the issue. There exists no legal support for the constitutional determinations made by my colleagues today.
(a) Court of Error
Our jurisdiction is exclusively appellate,68 and we are not endowed with any original jurisdiction except in aid of our appellate jurisdiction.69 These rules embody the policy that legal issues should be developed initially before the district courts. As a panel of this circuit put it, “[generally speaking, we are a court of errors and appeals.”70 The trial court cannot have erred as to matters which were not presented to it, nor decided by it.71 This is black letter law.
Here, the district court did not consider the constitutionality of § 666. Thus, we have no decision on constitutionality to review.72 Moreover, it was not error for the district court not to consider the constitutional issue, because that issue was never presented to it.
Of course, there are some situations in which appellate courts have jurisdiction to raise issues on their own.73 For example, if parties do not raise the issue of jurisdiction, or even if they contend that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, we still must determine, sua sponte, whether we have jurisdiction in a particular case.74 However, constitutional questions are not among those which we can raise sua sponte..
(b) Issue Not Briefed
Appellant’s brief must contain the “appellant’s contentions and the reasons for *359them”.75 Issues that are not clearly designated in the appellant’s brief are normally deemed abandoned.76 This is especially true in the context of constitutional issues. We generally do not anticipate constitutional questions, but wait until a ease is presented that requires a decision of a constitutional issue.77 There is also established Supreme Court precedent declining to address constitutional questions not put in issue by the parties.78
This Circuit held last year that “[c]iting cases that may contain a useful argument is simply inadequate to preserve that argument for appeal,”79 in Clyde Bergemann, Inc. v. The Babcock & Wilcox Co., 250 F.3d 955 (5th Cir.2001). Bergemann was a creditor who objected to a financing arrangement between the debtors and a bank which would let the debtors continue operating. On appeal he argued, inter alia, that the financing arrangement was a fraudulent conveyance of assets. However, his brief to the bankruptcy court referred to that issue only in passing. Although he quoted two cases in that brief, neither quotation identified the issue of fraudulent conveyance sufficiently for the bankruptcy court to rule on it, nor was there any discussion of how the theory applied. We held the issue waived.
Here neither party raised the constitutionality of § 666 in its briefs or arguments before us. Thus, it is beyond the scope of our review.
(c) Avoidance of Constitutional Questions
Even assuming everything else away, and considering the constitutional issue adequately raised, we still have the duty to decline to decide that issue unnecessarily. It is a well-established canon of construction that federal courts avoid addressing constitutional questions when possible, even those that are raised by the parties.80 As stated by Justice Brandéis in his well-known and oft-cited concurring opinion (dissenting in part) in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-47, 56 S.Ct. 466, 483, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936):
The Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. It is not the habit of the court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case. ... The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.... Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statuto*360ry construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter.81
The Fifth Circuit has agreed that we will not take a constitutional question for decision if there is some other legitimate ground on which the case can be decided.82
Because this case can legitimately be decided on jurisdictional grounds (in fact, that is the issue briefed and argued), we must avoid any constitutional decision.
(4) Conclusion
It is quite likely that a case will someday arise that squarely challenges the constitutionality of § 666, but this is not that case. Until that day, we must answer only those questions before us. Because the constitutionality of § 666 was not argued at trial or on appeal, and there is no legal justification for our reaching it, I must respectfully dissent from the entire discussion of constitutionality found in the opinions of both Judge Wiener and Judge Smith.83
(B) Transfer
I concur in Judge Wiener’s discussion and conclusions on the transfer issue.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in part and dissent in part, but share Judge Wiener’s conclusion that we must reverse Lipscomb’s conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand for a new trial.
. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 440, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 1406, 137 L.Ed.2d 661 (1997); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 12, 107 S.Ct. 971, 974, 94 L.Ed.2d 10 (1987); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Farley, 115 F.3d 1498, 1507 n. 6 (10th Cir.1997); Louis v. United States, 967 F.Supp. 456, 459 (D.N.M.1997). Judge Wiener cites Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 113 S.Ct. 2891, 125 L.Ed.2d 612 (1993) as support for his contention that the term 'jurisdiction” can mean both legislative and adjudicative jurisdiction. However, Justice Scalia's words do not support Judge Wiener's application. In Hartford Fire, Justice Scalia was faced with determining the extraterritorial reach of a statute — a constitutional issue placed by the parties before the Court — and to do so he had to consider whether Congress had the power to enact the statute with application outside our borders. This, he termed "legislative jurisdiction”. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 813-14, 113 S.Ct. at 2918-19. He did not term it "jurisdiction” as a means of raising extraterritoriality sua sponte, in an end-run around our requirement that parties argue those issues they wish before us.
. Black's Law Dictionary 612 (1990).
. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction (1994).
. See id. at 167-246.
. See App. Brief at 28.
. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1012, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) ("On every writ of error or appeal, the first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction ...”) (qtg. Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 453, 20 S.Ct. 690, 691-92, 44 L.Ed. 842 (1900)). See also United States v. Texas Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 287 (5th Cir.1999).
.See, for example, United States v. Reyes, 239 F.3d 722 (5th Cir.2001) (affirming a conviction under § 666 and making no constitutional ruling), cert. denied, Maldonado v. United States, 533 U.S. 961, 121 S.Ct. 2618, 150 L.Ed.2d 772 (2001); and cert. denied, Reyes v. United States, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 156, 151 L.Ed.2d 106 (2001); United States v. Phillips, 219 F.3d 404 (5th Cir.2000) (reversing a conviction under § 666 but making no constitutional ruling); United States v. Westmoreland, 841 F.2d 572 (5th Cir.1988) (affirming a conviction under § 666 and making no constitutional ruling).
. 841 F.2d 572 (5th Cir.1988).
. 522 U.S. 52, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997).
. 219 F.3d 404 (5th Cir.2000).
. 239 F.3d 722 (5th Cir.2001), cert. denied, Maldonado v. United States, 533 U.S. 961, 121 S.Ct. 2618, 150 L.Ed.2d 772 (2001); and cert. denied, Reyes v. United States, - U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 156, 151 L.Ed.2d 106 (2001).
. Because Article III of the United States Constitution authorizes federal courts to hear matters arising under all federal laws, and § 666 is a federal law, we may turn directly to whether there is statutory jurisdiction. U.S. Const., Art. III. The question whether § 666 is a valid exercise of congressional authority is not before us when we determine our jurisdiction.
. 841 F.2d 572 (5th Cir.1988).
. See id. at 574-75.
.See id.
. See Westmoreland, 841 F.2d at 575.
. Id. at 576.
. 987 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir.1993).
. See id.
. See id. at 1137-38.
. 89 F.3d 1185 (5th Cir.1996), aff'd sub nom. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997).
. See Marmolejo, 89 F.3d at 1188-89, 1201.
. Id. at 1191 (citing Westmoreland, 841 F.2d at 578).
. Id. at 1203. "Turning to the precise legislative history, I find that it clearly reveals that Congress did not intend for § 666(a)(1)(B) to be applied to conduct such as the acceptance of bribes to allow conjugal visits. Instead, Congress was only concerned with protecting the federal monies disbursed to non-federal entities.” Id.
. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 54, 118 S.Ct. 469, 471-72, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997).
. Id. at 57, 59, 118 S.Ct. 469.
. See id. at 56-57, 118 S.Ct. 469.
. See Salinas, 522 U.S. at 61, 118 S.Ct. 469. Judge Wiener cites this as evidence that we too should consider the constitutionality of § 666 here. However, the Supreme Court's assertion in passing that § 666 was constitutional as applied does not bind us to rule on the constitutionality of § 666 as applied to Lipscomb here. First, we are not the Supreme Court and have different limitations on our jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, unlike us, is the definitive voice in interpreting federal statutes. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 571 (1994). Second, the Supreme Court in Salinas declined to avoid the constitutional question because it considered it a greater disservice to "rewrite language enacted by the legislature” than to fail to avoid the issue. Salinas, 522 U.S. at 59, 118 S.Ct. 469. This reasoning does not compel us to reach the constitutionality of § 666 here; if anything, it counsels against that. We are not rewriting § 666 — we are faithfully reading the language of the statute, and recognizing that in order to question the congressionally-en-acted language, the issue of constitutionality must be explicitly before us.
. 529 U.S. 667, 120 S.Ct. 1780, 146 L.Ed.2d 707 (2000).
. See id., 529 U.S. at 669-70, 681, 120 S.Ct. at 1782-83, 1788-89.
. 219 F.3d 404 (5th Cir.2000).
. See United States v. Reyes, 239 F.3d 722 (5th Cir.2001), cert. denied, Maldonado v. United States, 533 U.S. 961, 121 S.Ct. 2618, 150 L.Ed.2d 772 (2001); and cert. denied, Reyes v. United States, - U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 156, 151 L.Ed.2d 106 (2001); United States v. Williams, 264 F.3d 561 (5th Cir.2001).
. 239 F.3d 722 (5th Cir.2001), cert. denied, Maldonado v. United States, 533 U.S. 961, 121 S.Ct 2618, 150 L.Ed.2d 772 (2001); and cert. denied, Reyes v. United States, - U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 156, 151 L.Ed.2d 106 (2001).
. See id. at 734.
. 264 F.3d 561 (5th Cir.2001).
. Id. at 567.
. See R. at 60.
. R. at 62.
. R. at 63.
. Id.
. R. at 66.
. R. at 63.
. Id.
. SeeR. Vol. 13 at 32.
. See id. at 36-9.
. Id. at 37.
. Id. at 40.
. See id. at 41-2.
. SeeR. at 556.
. See R. at 560.
. SeeR. at 600, 617-19.
. See R. at 644.
. See R. at 898.
. R. at 901.
. App. Brief at ii.
. Id. at iii, 2, 19 (emphasis added).
. Id. at 19, qtg. Save the Bay, Inc. v. United States Army, 639 F.2d 1100, 1102 (5th Cir.1981).
. App. Brief at 14.
. Id.
. See id. at 20.
. App. Brief at 28.
. Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
. Id.; see also id. at 19.
. See App. Brief at 14, 20, 22-5, 27.
. See id. at 27-8.
. See U.S. Brief at ii, 2, 31, 33-40.
. See App. Reply Brief at i, 1-5, 16-21.
. See Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U.S. 21, 63 S.Ct. 938, 87 L.Ed. 1185 (1943); United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 35 S.Ct. 16, 59 L.Ed. 129 (1914). See also Charles Alan Wright, Law of Federal Courts 10 (1983).
. See Whitney v. Dick, 202 U.S. 132, 26 S.Ct. 584, 50 L.Ed. 963 (1906); Travis County v. Kind Iron Bridge & Mfg. Co., 92 F. 690 (5th Cir.1899).
. Gabel v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 124, 125 (5th Cir.1988).
. See id.
. Therefore, even assuming, arguendo, that the parties adequately raised the issue of the constitutionality of § 666 before us on appeal, we are without authority to decide that question. Were this question appropriately before us, we would not have the power to rule on constitutionality, as both Judge Wiener and Judge Smith are so eager to do; we would rather be bound to remand the issue to the district court for determination.
. See Charles Alan Wright, Law of Federal Courts 10 (1983).
. See United States v. Garner, 749 F.2d 281 (5th Cir.1985).
. Fed. R.App. P. 28(a)(9)(A).
. See United States v. Miranda, 248 F.3d 434, 444 (5th Cir.2001), cert. denied, Miranda v. United States, - U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 410, 151 L.Ed.2d 312 (2001); and cert. denied, Espinoza v. United States, - U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 823, 151 L.Ed.2d 705 (2002); Fehlhaber v. Fehlhaber, 681 F.2d 1015, 1030 (5th Cir.1982).
. See Texas v. Gmndstrom, 404 F.2d 644, 648 (5th Cir.1968).
. See, for example, Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 406 U.S. 320, 324-25, 92 S.Ct. 1562, 1565, 32 L.Ed.2d 95 (1972) ("The constitutional issue discussed in the dissent was not set forth as a ‘question presented for review' in the petition for certiora-ri, and therefore our [rule] precludes our consideration of it."); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 206 n. 5, 74 S.Ct. 460, 464 n. 5, 98 L.Ed. 630 (1954) ("We do not reach for constitutional questions not raised by the parties.”).
. In re Babcock & Wilcox Co., 250 F.3d 955, 961 (5th Cir.2001).
. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
. Id. (internal citations omitted, emphasis added).
. See Grundstrom, 404 F.2d at 648.
. Judge Smith challenges my analysis of whether the constitutional issue was raised as "hyper-technical,” and “elevatpng] semantics over substance.” While I appreciate the value he places on avoiding hyper-technicality, I cannot agree with elevating that goal over our requirement that parties raise the issues they wish us to decide. I seek no magic words; I wish only that the parties would clearly raise those issues they wish us and tire district court to decide (as our precedent requires). The parties here did not meet even this most-light burden on the issue of the constitutionality of § 666.
In the same vein, Judge Smith accuses me of invoking the "rigid form pleading” that was eliminated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This misunderstands my analysis. To the contrary, I am not concerned with what the parties raise in the complaints and answers that set out in broad brushstrokes the case they intend to bring. However, we must (and our precedent shows we do) require parties to specifically argue before us and the district court, at some point during the adjudication of their dispute, what issues they wish decided. The courts are not required to divine what issues are before them, nor do they have the power to choose what issues they would like to be before them — that is the responsibility of the parties.
The conclusions of Judge Wiener and Judge Smith place a burden on the trial court to read between the lines of the parties’ arguments and ascertain what the parties "should have” or "could have” argued. That is just not the way our judicial system works. The burdendies with the parties to place a case or controversy before the court. On the issue of constitutionality, that burden was not met here. Requiring judges to act as mindread-ers, as Judge Wiener and Judge Smith do here, cannot be an acceptable part of our judicial system.