concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that the district court was correct in granting summary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiffs' state law tort claims. However, I cannot agree with its conclusion that George Ford's Title VII claim for retaliatory discharge should have survived summary judgment.
The district court made two crucial findings in dismissing the Title VII action: (1) that no adverse employment action had occurred, and (2) that even if an adverse employment action could be shown, the plaintiff had presented no evidence tending to show a causal connection between his filing of the EEOC complaint and the purported adverse employment action. If the district court was correct on either basis, the plaintiff's attempt to establish a prima facie case fails.
The record must, of course, be reviewed in the light that is most favorable to the non-movant, the plaintiff in this case. There is nothing to suggest that the district court did otherwise. Moreover, the evidence to support the district court's findings was ably set out in the memorandum opinion filed by the court on December 7, 2000, as follows:
First, nothing in the record tends to show that Mr. Ford suffered any adverse employment action, and in fact, his own testimony suggests quite the opposite. After being suspended and then *557terminated for assaulting a co-worker, Mr. Ford was reinstated as an employee. When he returned to work, he was given a position favored by many employees. He complained that his workload was too great, and his supervisors arranged to lighten his duties (adding additional duties — cleaning the stainless steel — only if Mr. Ford completed his other tasks). When that position ended, he was able to bump a fellow worker from another job due to his seniority under union rules. And when he had difficulty in that job, his supervisor arranged for other workers to help him, and even stepped in himself on one occasion to assist Mr. Ford. This is not adverse.
Mr. Ford portrays the adverse employment as being the “overload of work” he was given while in Drive Off. However, as Mr. Ford’s deposition testimony reveals, he complained of work overloads in virtually every position he held during the times relevant to this lawsuit, both before and after the filing of the EEOC complaint:
• Mr. Ford’s initial problems, as Inspector in Department 71, involved King and Milling “getting together making [him] work harder than they was working.”
• Mr. Ford testified that his next primary job, Porter in Department 41, “was too much work.”
• Mr. Ford testified that in his final primary job, Drive Off in Department 71, he “didn’t have enough time to get it all done what was being done.”
Thus, there is no evidence that there was any period here — either before or after the filing of the EEOC complaint — that Mr. Ford did not believe that he had too much work. And there is no evidence in the record that the workload he was given in Drive Off was in any way different from that of the previous person in that position (a white female).
Nor can his suggestion that he was being “watched” while in Drive Off be construed as an adverse employment action. He admitted that he would at times get behind in this position — even with additional help — and that the Corvettes coming off of the assembly line would occasionally bump into the ones he had left in front of them. There is nothing inappropriate about a company watching an employee, especially one who is having admitted difficulties performing his assigned duties.
Second, even assuming that Mr. Ford had demonstrated an adverse employment action, he has not shown that there was a causal connection between the filing of the EEOC complaint and the adverse employment action. Mr. Ford “must establish that the decision complained about as retaliatory would not have been made ‘but for’ the protected status of the plaintiff.” Canitia [v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. 903 F.2d 1064, 1068 (6th Cir.1990) ] (numerous citations omitted). The Plaintiff has failed to show any reason why the Defendant would terminate him (or, in this case, would want to make him quit or retire) for filing the EEOC complaint.
Mr. Ford claims that the causal relationship is shown because “George’s adverse treatment began almost as soon as he was put back under Reiser’s supervision on the [Drive Off] job.” Even if this were true, and for the purposes of summary judgment the Court treats it as such, the Defendant received notice of the EEOC complaint around May 4, 1998. Mr. Ford did not begin the Drive Off job until October 5, 1998. This six-month lapse does not give rise to an inference of causation. And even if six months were indeed a “short period” as urged by Mr. Ford, the close proximity of the protected activity and adverse action, although certainly a factor *558that must be weighed, can in no case, standing alone, be the basis for a finding of causation. While the proximity in time between engaging in a protected activity and adverse employment action may give rise to an inference of causal connection, “temporal proximity alone will not support an inference in the fact of compelling evidence” to the contrary. See Moon v. Transport Drivers, Inc., 836 F.2d 226, 229 (6th Cir.1987).
There is no evidence showing that Defendant’s actions against Mr. Ford were motivated by a desire to retaliate for filing the EEOC complaint (or to retaliate for anything else, for that matter), nor are there any inferences to be drawn which support such a finding. See Cambia, 903 F.2d at 1066. “Simply, plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendant had a retaliatory motive.” Id. There was no motive for the defendant to retaliate, as there was no discrimination charge for it to fear. The Plaintiffs implicitly recognize this by failing to pursue harassment or hostile work environment claims.
As the majority notes, our decision in Hollins v. Atlantic Co., 188 F.3d 652 (6th Cir.1999), holds that in order to establish an adverse employment action, a plaintiff must show more than merely “an alteration of job responsibilities.” The record must indicate such actions as “termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation.” Id. at 662. An increase in workload, such as the one pleaded here, would have to be more substantial and onerous than it appears on this record, and it would have to come only after the plaintiffs formal complaint of discrimination in order to constitute retaliation on the part of the employer. The facts in this record simply do not show that to be the case.
For the reasons stated in the district court’s opinion, I would affirm the judgment entered by that court. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to remand this case for trial. My position should not be taken as condonation of the treatment that the plaintiff received from his co-workers. Their racial animus is apparent, and it is as shameful as it is contemptible. But I do not believe that the record supports imputation of the same reprehensible attitude or offensive conduct to the plaintiffs employer.