Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge MICHAEL wrote the opinion, in which Judge GOODWIN joined. Judge TRAXLER wrote a dissenting opinion.
OPINION
MICHAEL, Circuit Judge.Ethel Louise Hill sued her former employer, Lockheed Martin Logistics Management, Inc. (Lockheed), claiming that she was fired because of her sex and age and that she was reprimanded and ultimately fired in retaliation for her complaints of discrimination. Hill asserts her claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; and the New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq. Hill appeals the district court’s award of summary judgment to Lockheed on all of her claims.1 We conclude that Hill has proffered direct evidence of sex and age discrimination in the statements of her safety inspector, who substantially influenced the company’s decision to fire her. We also conclude that Hill has proffered sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact about whether certain reports by her inspector — reports that led to her reprimands and discharge — were issued in retaliation for her discrimination complaints against the inspector. We therefore reverse the summary judgment entered in *660favor of Lockheed and remand the case for trial.
I.
Because Ethel Hill was the nonmovant in the summary judgment proceedings, we state the facts in the light most favorable to her, drawing all justifiable inferences in her favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). When Lockheed fired Hill in May 1998, she was almost fifty-eight years old and had worked for Lockheed as a sheet metal mechanic for over eleven years. Hill is a high school graduate who received additional training at technical schools in the areas of airframe construction and the x-raying of aircraft. Hill Dep. at 9-10. When Lockheed hired Hill in April 1987, she had over thirteen years of experience as a sheet metal mechanic in the aircraft industry. Hill Dep. at 13-19. During her eleven years with Lockheed, Hill was assigned to contract field teams that were responsible for working on government jobs. J.A. 61. These field teams traveled to various military bases to perform modification work on military aircraft. J.A. 62, 64-65. Over the years, Lockheed assigned Hill to work at a number of military bases, including ones at Savannah, Georgia (Hunter Army Airfield); Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Eustis, Virginia; and Fort Drum, New York. She also worked at National Guard installations in New Jersey and Puerto Rico. J.A. 230. Most of the jobs lasted for less than six months, and Hill was assigned to some of these bases several times. J.A. 230-31. Hill traveled so much for Lockheed that she eventually bought a recreational vehicle, using it as her home while she was on job assignments. Id.
Hill’s last job for Lockheed was at Fort Drum, New York, beginning in January 1998 and ending in May 1998 when she was fired. Hill performed her work on this assignment without incident for about a month, but trouble began when a man named Edward Fultz was designated as her safety inspector sometime in February 1998. Hill had worked under Fultz on a £t Fort Drum job just three years earlier. On the earlier job Hill overheard Fultz say that he did not like to have women working under him. J.A. 234. And during the three months in 1998 when Fultz was her inspector at Fort Drum, Fultz made many derogatory comments about Hill’s sex and age. On several occasions Fultz referred to her as a “useless old lady.” J.A. 240A. One time he said that Hill was a useless old lady and that she needed to go home and retire. J.A. 240B. Another time Fultz said that Hill was “useless and they need[ed] to retire her.” Id. He also called her a “damn woman,” J.A. 241A, and “a troubled old lady,” J.A. 245. Fultz was responsible for disciplinary action against Hill that led directly to her dismissal by Lockheed.
Lockheed contends that it fired Hill under its Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). The SOP allows for, but does not require, termination when an employee receives three written reprimands within one year and at least one of the reprimands involves a suspension. Hill received a written reprimand in September 1997, another with a three-day suspension in April 1998, and a third in May 1998. Hill was fired after the third reprimand. She contends that she was fired because of her sex and age and that she was also reprimanded and discharged in retaliation for making complaints to her supervisor, Richard Dixon, about Fultz’s discriminatory conduct.
Hill does not challenge her first written reprimand, which she received in September 1997 while working on a job at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. She does take *661issue with the second and third ones, which were issued at Fort Drum in 1998. Sometime before her second written reprimand (the first one at Fort Drum), Hill made the first of several verbal complaints to Dixon about Fultz. J.A. 242-43. When Hill specifically mentioned Fultz’s sex and age discrimination during her second complaint, Dixon told her he did not want to hear about it and that she should ignore Fultz and go back to work. J.A. 242-43. Discrimination complaints at Lockheed are supposed to be investigated because the company’s SOP prohibits an employee from discriminating against or harassing fellow employees. J.A. 112,195. The first violation of the anti-discrimination policy results in a written reprimand, the second a three-day suspension, and the third subjects the violator to termination. J.A. 112. Hill’s discrimination complaints were not investigated, apparently because Dixon claims that Hill did not mention discrimination, but only complained that Fultz was yelling at her and picking on her.
In any case, Hill received her second written reprimand (and the resulting three-day suspension) on April 22, 1998, after she had complained to Dixon about Fultz. This second disciplinary action against Hill was based on a misplaced pair of four-inch diagonal cutters. Under Lockheed’s tool control policy, an employee must account for her tools at all times and must report missing tools to her immediate supervisor. Hill had three pairs of identical four-inch cutters, and an Army employee found a pair of Hill’s cutters on a maintenance stand on April 14, 1998. J.A. 125. The Army employee took the cutters to Fultz, who then gave them to Dixon. J.A. 249A-50. Later that same day, Fultz reported something to Dixon that (according to Hill) was untrue, and this led Dixon to believe that Hill was lying about the misplaced cutters. Fultz told Dixon that he checked Hill’s toolbox at the end of her shift and asked her where her extra cutters were. According to Fultz, Hill replied, “I told Richard [Dixon] I took [them] home.” J.A. 125, 250 51. Hill, however, asserts that she did not have any such encounter or exchange with Fultz. J.A. 261. Dixon, who had only Fultz’s report, believed that Hill had lied to Fultz because she had not said anything to Dixon about her cutters. J.A. 250. Fultz’s report also made Dixon think that Hill was less than forthcoming the next morning when he showed her the misplaced cutters and asked if they were hers. Believing that all of her cutters were accounted for, Hill simply acknowledged that the cutters had her number on them. J.A. 77-78. Because Fultz had not questioned her about missing cutters, she was blindsided by Dixon’s question. Specifically, when Dixon asked her about the cutters, she was not aware that her third pair had been mislaid at the jobsite. J.A. 77. In sum, Fultz’s report to Dixon, which was untrue according to Hill’s evidence, led Dixon to believe that Hill had lied about the misplaced cutters. This belief prompted Dixon to give Hill a written reprimand and a three-day suspension. Dixon admits that he took this disciplinary action against Hill only because he thought she had lied about the cutters. J.A. 251A, 253.
After Hill returned from her three-day suspension at the end of April 1998, she complained again to Dixon that Fultz was discriminating against her. Dixon then talked to Fultz about Hill’s complaints, J.A. 246A-46B, and Fultz reacted with noticeable anger towards Hill, J.A. 245. Immediately, Fultz began writing a series of discrepancy reports on Hill, issuing at least one every workday. These discrepancy reports, known as “201s,” document worker error, classifying it as minor, major, or critical. Fultz wrote up Hill twice on Thursday, April 30, 1998, three times *662on Friday, May 1, 1998, and once on Monday, May 4, 1998. Fultz himself marked each of Hill’s errors as “minor,” and Hill said they were “nit-picky and trivial.” J.A. 83. The discrepancy reports were for matters such as failure to burnish low voltage power supply mounting holes and using the wrong screws in an antenna fairing assembly. J.A. 127. (With respect to the screws, Hill contends that she was instructed to use the only long screws left in the supply kit. J.A. 83-84.) Dixon, the supervisor, had no control over whether a discrepancy report was written. Dixon Dep. at 29-30. Dixon could, however, check a report for accuracy, and he refused to endorse one of the reports that Fultz issued against Hill. Hill Dep. at 110, J.A. 130.
The flurry of discrepancy reports that Fultz issued against Hill triggered her third written reprimand on May 4, 1998. J.A. 127. With three reprimands, Hill was now subject to discharge, and she was sent home to await word. J.A. 84. She was fired within the next few days. J.A. 239, 278. The Lockheed officials who made the formal decision to fire Hill were Archie Griffin, the east coast senior site representative, and Thomas Prickett, the program manager in charge of contract field teams. (Neither Griffin nor Prickett was located at Fort Drum; Griffin was in Georgia, and Prickett was in Texas.) According to Griffin, the decision to fire Hill was based entirely on information provided by Fultz and Dixon, especially Fultz. J.A. 256. Griffin talked with Fultz about Hill several times prior to the termination decision, and Fultz provided Griffin with a written statement of his observations about Hill’s work performance. J.A. 255-56. Griffin did not talk with Hill while she was being considered for termination, nor did he ever examine her work. J.A. 256-57. Prickett, who also did not talk with Hill or have any firsthand knowledge, said that the decision to fire Hill was “based entirely on information ... gathered from people that work[ed] at the [Fort Drum] site.” J.A. 260. Finally, Fultz wrote and signed Hill’s termination statement, which explains that Hill was fired because Fultz found her work to be unsatisfactory. J.A. 170-72. When Hill was fired, she was the only woman and the oldest employee on her eight-person work team. J.A. 279. Hill’s work was initially assigned to a thirty-one-year-old man, and she was ultimately replaced by a man who was forty-seven.
In June 1998 Hill filed a charge of discrimination and retaliation with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the EEOC issued her a right-to-sue letter dated April 19, 1999. Hill then filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina alleging that she had been wrongfully discharged because of her sex and age in violation of Title VII, the ADEA, and the New York Human Rights Law. Hill also alleges that she was terminated in retaliation for complaining about the discriminatory behavior of Fultz, her inspector. Lockheed moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the company’s motion. First, the court held that Hill did not proffer any direct evidence of discrimination. Fultz’s many derogatory comments about Hill’s sex and age do not count, the court said, because Fultz did not make the final decision to fire Hill. Second, the district court concluded that Hill did not proffer sufficient circumstantial evidence to withstand summary judgment on the discrimination claims. Finally, with respect to the retaliation claim, the district court concluded that Hill had established a prima facie case, but the claim failed because Hill could not show that Lockheed’s claim of poor job performance was pretext for a retaliatory discharge. Hill appeals.
*663II.
We turn first to the question of whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to Lockheed on Hill’s sex and age discrimination claims. Section 703 of Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s ... sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The ADEA contains a parallel prohibition: “It shall be unlawful for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
There are two methods for proving intentional sex or age discrimination in the employment setting. See Brinkley v. Harbour Recreation Club, 180 F.3d 598, 606-07 (4th Cir.1999). Specifically, “[ijnten-tional discrimination in employment cases fall within one of two categories: ‘pretext’ cases and ‘mixed-motive’ cases. The distinction is critical, because plaintiffs enjoy more favorable standards of liability in mixed-motive cases, and this is even more so after the Civil Rights Act of 1991.” Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1141 (4th Cir.1995) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The more commonly used method of proving discrimination is by the use of circumstantial evidence under the three-step, or burden shifting, “pretext” method laid out by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under that framework the plaintiff-employee must first prove a prima facie case of discrimination in her employment. If she succeeds, the defendant-employer must respond with evidence showing that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. At that point, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination. The plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuading the factfinder that she was the victim of discrimination. See Brinkley, 180 F.3d at 607.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989), which recognized that an employment decision may be motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate considerations, established the framework for the second, or “mixed-motive,” method of proving employment discrimination. The plaintiffs initial burden is heavier under the Price Waterhouse framework. Instead of starting with the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, which relies on circumstantial evidence to set up a presumption of discrimination, the plaintiff proceeding under Price Waterhouse must offer evidence of discrimination that is more direct. If the plaintiff crosses this evidentiary threshold, both the burden of production and “the burden of persuasion shift[ ] to the employer to prove that it would have reached the same determination [even if it had been] without any discriminatory animus.” Taylor v. Virginia Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 232 (4th Cir.1999) (en banc) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Once the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer under Price Waterhouse, the employer may escape liability only if it proves that it would have made the same employment decision based on purely legitimate reasons. “ ‘[A]n employer may not meet its burden in such a case by merely showing that at the time of the decision it was *664motivated only in part by a legitimate reason. The very premise of a mixed-motive case is that a legitimate reason was present. ... The employer instead must show that its legitimate reason, standing alone, would have induced it to make the same decision.’ ” Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1236 (4th Cir.1995) (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 252, 109 S.Ct. 1775).
Section 107(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 modified the Price Waterhouse framework, “making mixed-motive treatment more favorable to plaintiffs.” Fuller, 67 F.3d at 1142. The 1991 Act provides that “an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e~2(m). “The bonus for [Title VII] plaintiffs able to invoke the standard applicable in mixed-motive cases [after the 1991 Act] is that the proof by the employer that it would have reached the same determination without any discriminatory animus does not allow the employer to avoid liability altogether. Rather, such proof only limits the remedies available to the plaintiff.” Taylor, 193 F.3d at 232. In other words, Congress decided that an employer breaks the law if an illegitimate criterion was a “motivating factor” in the employment decision, even if the employer would have made the same decision based solely on legitimate factors. “[E]mployers now violate [Title VII] when [a forbidden factor] plays an actual role in an employment decision, regardless of other considerations that may independently explain the outcome.” Fuller, 67 F.3d at 1142. See also Pilditch v. Bd. of Educ., 3 F.3d 1113, 1118 n. 2 (7th Cir.1993) (“[T]he Civil Rights Act of 1991 overrules Price Waterhouse ... and makes an employment decision illegal if it was motivated at all by an illegitimate motive.”).2
A plaintiff claiming sex or age discrimination need not rely on the McDonnell Douglas pretext method of proof if she is eligible to use the alternative Price Waterhouse mixed-motive method. As the Supreme Court recently repeated, “McDonnell Douglas ... is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (internal quotations omitted). See also Wilhelm v. Blue Bell, Inc., 773 F.2d 1429, 1434 (4th Cir.1985) (“[D]irect evidence of age [or sex] discrimination obviated the need for an independent showing by plaintiffs that [the employer’s] articulated reasons for their discharges were ‘pretextual.’ ”).
A.
The first question before us, then, is whether Hill has proffered evidence of sex and age discrimination that is sufficiently direct to enable her to use the mixed-motive method of proof. “A plaintiff qualifies for the more advantageous standard of liability applicable in mixed-motive cases if [she] presents ‘direct evi*665dence that decisionmakers placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion.’ ” Taylor, 193 F.3d at 232 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). Justice O’Connor, whose Price Waterhouse concurrence is controlling in this circuit, see id., did not specify what constitutes direct evidence. She did, however, list what does not: “stray remarks in the workplace, ... statements by nondecision-makers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself.” Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Our court understands Price Waterhouse to mean that the direct evidence threshold is met with “evidence of conduct or statements that both reflect directly the alleged discriminatory attitude and that bear directly on the contested employment decision.” Taylor, 193 F.3d at 232. In other words, Hill “must produce evidence that clearly indicates a discriminatory attitude at the workplace and must illustrate a nexus between that negative attitude and the employment action.” Brinkley, 180 F.3d at 608.3
1.
Derogatory remarks may constitute direct evidence of a discriminatory attitude in the workplace. See Brinkley, 180 F.3d at 608. Fultz, the man responsible for inspecting Hill’s work at Fort Drum, regularly made derogatory comments about her age and sex. Several times Fultz referred to Hill as a “useless old lady.” J.A. 240A. Once Fultz said that Hill was a useless old lady and that she needed to go home and retire. J.A. 240B. On another occasion Fultz said that Hill was “useless and they need to retire her.” J.A. 240B. Fultz also called Hill “a troubled old lady,” J.A. 245, and a “damn woman,” J.A. 241A. Fultz’s statements, which were all directed at Hill while she was on the job, clearly demonstrate that Fultz had a discriminatory attitude towards Hill at the workplace.
We note parenthetically that Fultz’s comments cannot be characterized as ambiguous or open to alternate interpretation. They are therefore distinguishable from other comments about age and sex that we have rejected as direct evidence of a discriminatory attitude. For example, Fultz’s comments were not humorous, jocular, or general “commentary on the fact that all people age.” O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 549-50 (4th Cir.1995), rev’d on other grounds, 517 U.S. 308, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996). Nor can Fultz’s state-*666mente be discounted because they are not sufficiently connected to Hill. See Taylor, 193 F.3d at 232. Fultz said plenty that was specifically directed at Hill. In short, his statements describing Hill as a useless old lady who needed to go home and retire directly reflect a discriminatory attitude towards Hill.
2.
Hill must also proffer evidence that clearly shows a nexus between Fultz’s discriminatory attitude and the contested employment decision. In other words, Hill must establish that Fultz’s negative attitude about her sex and age bore directly on her termination. The district court concluded that Hill could not make this showing because Fultz did not have the authority to fire her. Instead, the final decision to terminate her was made by Griffin and Prickett. In her Price Water-house concurrence, Justice O’Connor distinguishes- between “decisionmakers” and “nondecisionmakers,” noting that comments by the latter cannot constitute direct evidence of discrimination. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Lockheed urges us to adopt the district court’s narrow concept of “decisionmaker,” which would limit a decisionmaker to someone with the power to make the final decision with respect to terms of employment. We reject this approach because by limiting-direct evidence of discrimination to the statements and actions of formal decision-makers, it overlooks discrimination by subordinates who are actual decisionmakers, that is, subordinates who lack formal authority but who nevertheless exercise substantial influence in employment decisions.
a.
In deciding whether a subordinate is a decisionmaker in a Price Waterhouse mixed-motive case, the focus must be on the subordinate’s actual influence rather than his formal role in the adverse employment decision. The reason for this is simple: if a biased subordinate has substantial influence over the employment decision, the subordinate’s bias can bear directly on the decision. If we refused to recognize this, it would mean that the statement, “I’m going to get you fired because you are old and female,” made by a subordinate who was an actual (but not a formal) decisionmaker could not count as direct evidence of discrimination. That cannot be right, for if it was, a wily employer could prevent a plaintiff from ever taking advantage of the Price Waterhouse framework. The employer could create a position of manager in charge of firing, and that manager could make formal firing decisions based solely on the recommendations of subordinates with no official authority. Because the manager would not conduct independent investigations, the subordinate would be making the actual firing decisions. Yet the employer would not be subject to the plaintiff-friendly standard of Price Waterhouse even if the subordinate clearly recommended a discharge based on his expressed bias toward the targeted employee. It should not be so easy to eliminate the Price Waterhouse option for proving violations of Title VII and the ADEA. Cf. Wells v. New Cherokee Corp., 58 F.3d 233, 238 (6th Cir.1995) (making similar points in a pretext case).
At least five circuits hold that a plaintiff may establish direct evidence of employment discrimination through the statements or conduct of a person who lacks formal authority to hire or fire but who nonetheless influences an employment decision.4 See Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. *667Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d Cir.1992) (a Price Waterhouse mixed-motive instruction must be given “if the plaintiff presents evidence of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decisionmaking process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude”); Rose v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 257 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir.2001) (the discriminatory comments of plaintiffs supervisor, who did not have formal firing authority but who “had enormous influence in the decisionmaking process,” constituted direct evidence); Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 514-15 (3d Cir.1997) (a person is in the decisionmaking process for Price Waterhouse purposes when he has direct access to the formal decision-maker and his discriminatory animus is “linked to [the formal decisionmaker’s] specific decision to fire the plaintiffs”); Simpson v. Diversitech Gen., Inc., 945 F.2d 156, 160 (6th Cir.1991) (the plaintiff met his burden under Price Waterhouse by proving that his supervisor’s racial bias “led substantially to [his] dismissal, [and] the fact that [the supervisor] did not ‘pull the trigger’ is of little consequence”); Stacks v. Southtvestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1323 (8th Cir.1994) (the discriminatory remarks of a manager, who was the fired plaintiffs supervisor and who was “closely involved in the decision-making process,” constituted direct evidence under Price Waterhouse); Bergene v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir.2001) (a manager’s comment was direct evidence of retaliation because “[e]ven if the manager was not the ultimate decisionmaker [in denying the plaintiff a promotion], that manager’s motive may be imputed to the company if the manager was involved in the ... decision”).5
*668Because pretext cases are much more common than mixed-motive cases, courts have had more opportunity in pretext cases to explore the relevance of evidence showing the discriminatory attitude- of a person who lacks formal authority to hire and fire but who nonetheless influences the employment decision. We recognize, of course, that pretext cases do not require direct evidence of discrimination. Yet the question of who counts as a relevant deci-sionmaker is the same in both pretext cases and mixed-motive cases. Specifically, in determining whether discrimination actually motivated an employment decision, do you focus on the attitude of the formal decisionmaker only, or may you also consider the attitude of a person who influenced the formal decisionmaker? Again, this is not a question about the type of evidence used, which differs in mixed-motive and pretext cases. Rather, this is a question about whose discrimination counts in determining if discrimination motivated the adverse employment decision, regardless of the type of evidence used to prove the discrimination. Because the same question must be answered in both pretext and mixed motive cases — whether discrimination motivated the adverse employment decision — the answer to the question of whose discrimination counts should be the same in both cases. That is, the answer to the question of who qualifies as a decisionmaker should be the same. In pretext cases our court and most other courts of appeals have rejected the view that the only relevant decisionmakers are those with final or formal authority. These pretext cases support the proposition that the discriminatory attitude of someone who is an actual, but not a formal, decisionmaker may prove that discrimination motivated the employment decision.
The focus on a person’s actual influence on a decision rather than his formal authority is consistent with the Supreme Court’s approach in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151-53, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000), an ADEA pretext case. The plaintiff in Reeves claimed that he was terminated because of his age, and as evidence of pretext he offered the derogatory remarks of his supervisor who had recommended his dismissal to the company president. The supervisor had made comments such as “[the plaintiff] was so old [he] must have come over on the Mayflower.” Id. at 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (second alteration in original). Because the supervisor was not the formal decisionmaker, the appeals court had discounted these comments because they were “not made in the direct context of [the plaintiffs] termination.” Id. at 152, 120 S.Ct. 2097. The Supreme Court rejected this analysis. Instead, it examined the supervisor’s actual role in the termination decision and concluded that the plaintiff had “introduced evidence that [the supervisor] was the actual decisionmaker behind his firing.” Id. The Court concluded that the supervisor’s comments helped establish pretext be*669cause they showed that the supervisor “was motivated by age-based animus and was principally responsible for [the plaintiffs] firing.” Id. at 151.
In one of our own ADEA pretext cases, Tuck v. Henkel Corp., 973 F.2d 371 (4th Cir.1992), we expressly rejected “the proposition that a fired employee cannot rely on demonstrating the prejudice of a supervisor who is not the ultimate decisionmaker to prove that discrimination motivated the employer’s termination decision.” Id. at 377 n. 6. Instead, we said that the relevant question is whether the supervisor had actually influenced the decision to fire the plaintiff. In reversing a summary judgment for the employer, we noted that the plaintiff had “presented] some probative evidence that [his] former supervisor ... was biased against older workers and that [the supervisor] influenced the decision to fire [him].” Id. at 376-77. As a result, we held that whether the supervisor had actually influenced the decisionmakers was “an open [factual] question” that would have to be decided by a jury. Id. at 377.
Most appeals courts have adopted a similar approach in their pretext cases and have held that the ultimate decision-maker’s lack of bias cannot shield the employer from liability if the employment decision was tainted by the bias of a subordinate.6 The courts differ only in how much influence they require of the subordinate who lacks formal authority before his discrimination is imputed to the employer. Some circuits require that the formal decisionmaker rely entirely on the biased subordinate, so that the employer is not liable, for example, if the formal de-cisionmaker conducts an independent investigation. See, e.g., Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405-06 (7th Cir.1990) (When a committee has “acted as a conduit of [a supervisor’s] prejudice — his cat’s paw — the innocence of its members would not spare the company from liability”).7 Other circuits require only that the *670biased subordinate play some role in the decision. See, e.g., Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of New Jersey, 260 F.3d 265, 286 (3d Cir.2001) (internal quotations and citation omitted) (“Under our case law, it is sufficient if those exhibiting discriminatory animus influenced or participated in the decision to terminate ... [because] an evaluation at any level, if based on discrimination, [may] influenee[ ] the decision-making process and thus allow[ ] discrimination to infect the ultimate decision.”).8 A few circuits have not yet worked out the precise standard for the degree of influence required on the part of the subordinate, but as a general proposition they accept as evidence of pretext the discriminatory comments of a subordinate who influences, but who does not make, the final employment decision. Compare Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 226 (5th Cir.2000) (“If the [plaintiff] can demonstrate that others had influence or leverage over the official decisionmaker ... it is proper to impute their discriminatory attitudes to the formal decisionmaker.”), with Rios v. Rossotti, 252 F.3d 375, 382 (5th Cir.2001) (“[T]o prevent employers from insulating themselves from acts of subordinates ... when the ultimate decisionmaker’s action is merely a ‘rubber stamp’ for the subordinate’s recommendation ... the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer.”).9
Like the mixed-motive cases cited earlier, the pretext cases demonstrate that in addressing the question of whose discriminatory animus counts as evidence of discrimination in an employment decision, the courts generally agree on two points. First, in evaluating whether a person is a decisionmaker, what matters is his actual role rather than his formal role in the adverse employment decision. Second, an employer should not be able to insulate itself from liability by hiding behind a formal decisionmaker. These points lead us to conclude that a biased subordinate who does not make the final or formal employment decision may still count as a decisionmaker in a Price Waterhouse mixed-motive case. In short, we hold that a subordinate is a decisionmaker for Price Waterhouse purposes if he has a substantial influence on the employment decision. Consequently, evidence of the subordinate’s discriminatory animus may constitute direct evidence in a mixed-motive case.
b.
We pause here to acknowledge that our standard for deciding when a subordinate *671counts as a decisionmaker is based on the same principles that Judge Traxler articulates so well in his dissent. We agree with him that “an employer should not be allowed to insulate itself from liability [for discrimination] by hiding behind ... formal decisionmakers,” post at 684, and that we need an “appropriate means to prevent employers from unfairly insulating themselves from the consequences of adverse employment actions that are in reality based upon the discriminatory motives of a subordinate employee,” id. Our disagreement, insofar as the standard is concerned, is about the degree of influence that a subordinate must have on the employment decision before his discrimination counts. Judge Traxler reads Reeves to mean that if the subordinate is not the “actual deci-sionmaker” behind the employment action, he must be at least “principally responsible” for the action before liability attaches to the employer. See post at 682-83, 686. We respectfully suggest that Reeves should not be read so narrowly. In Reeves the Supreme Court simply determined that the facts permitted the jury to find that the biased subordinate was “principally responsible for [the plaintiffs] firing.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097. The Court did not say that a subordinate’s involvement in the employment decision must rise to the level of “principal responsibility” before the subordinate’s discrimination can be imputed to the employer. Reeves does not articulate a standard for identifying a decisionmaker, and nothing in Reeves suggests that the subordinate who substantially influences an employment decision cannot qualify as a deci-sionmaker. Reeves in fact focuses on the subordinate’s influence, even pointing out that the subordinate was married to the formal decisionmaker, the company president. Id. at 152, 120 S.Ct. 2097; cf. Russell, 235 F.3d at 227 (noting the case’s factual similarity to Reeves and concluding that “it is appropriate to tag the employer with an employee’s age-based animus if the evidence indicates that the worker possessed leverage, or exerted influence, over the titular decisionmaker”).
The biased subordinate must have a substantial influence on the employment decision because we agree with Judge Traxler that employers must not be “unfairly tagg[ed] ... with the discriminatory motives of subordinate employees who have not been entrusted with formal decision-making authority.” Post at 684 (emphasis added).10 Accordingly, under the standard we adopt today, a subordinate lacks substantial influence over the final employment decision when the formal de-cisionmaker conducts an independent investigation and exercises independent judgment that is free of discrimination. See infra at 673 n. 11.
c.
In this case Hill has proffered considerable evidence to show that Fultz is an actual decisionmaker because he had a substantial influence on Lockheed’s decision to fire her. The two formal decisionmakers— Griffin who was in Georgia and Prickett who was in Texas' — did not conduct an independent investigation of Hill. Nor did they exercise independent judgment in reaching the termination decision. They never observed Hill’s work or questioned her about the events leading to her reprimands. Instead, they relied entirely on *672information provided by Fultz and Dixon, especially Fultz. The extent of Dixon’s influence is unclear. Prickett does not remember any conversations with Dixon, and Dixon does not tell a consistent story about his conversations with Griffin. At one point in his deposition, Dixon said he told Griffin that he did not think Hill could do the job anymore. J.A. 150. At another point, however, Dixon testified that he submitted Hill’s file without any recommendation about discharge. J.A. 147. According to Dixon, when Griffin asked him for a recommendation, Dixon said, “that’s up to you.” Id. When the facts are taken in the light most favorable to Hill, Dixon’s role was limited to the two reprimands he issued. But these reprimands, which led to Hill’s termination, were based on information (some of it false, according to Hill) provided by Fultz.
Griffin acknowledges that in making the decision to terminate Hill, he received Fultz’s discrepancy reports on Hill and the written reprimands. He also received a written statement from Fultz that detailed Fultz’s observations about Hill’s work performance. J.A. 256. Finally, he talked with Fultz several times about Hill. J.A. 255. Prickett also talked with Fultz, according to Dixon and Lockheed human resources representative, Donald Smith. Smith Dep. at 10. (Prickett said that he was responsible for over 700 employees, Prickett Dep. at 8, and he could not recall whom he consulted about Hill, J.A. 181.)
Fultz claims that he did not talk with Griffin or Prickett about Hill’s termination. That claim, of course, is directly contradicted by Griffin and Dixon, who acknowledge that Fultz was involved. Indeed, it was Fultz who ultimately wrote Hill’s termination statement, a statement that listed the reasons why Hill was fired. J.A. 170-72. Every reason listed was based on Fultz’s dissatisfaction with Hill’s work. Fultz began with the missing tool incident and ended with a discussion of the discrepancy reports he issued during Hill’s last three days of work, after she had complained to Dixon that Fultz was discriminating against her. All of this demonstrates that Hill has proffered sufficient evidence to show that Fultz had a substantial influence on the decision to fire her and that Griffin and Prickett, the formal decisionmakers, were essentially rubber stamps for Fultz, the man on the scene at Fort Drum.
The initial thrust of the dissent’s argument is that Fultz cannot be deemed a decisionmaker for the following reason: the second and third reprimands (which led to Hill’s dismissal) were cleansed of Fultz’s bias because Dixon, the supervisor, reviewed the facts and decided independently to issue the reprimands. The summary judgment record does not permit this conclusion. But even if it did, Lockheed still has a problem because the facts, taken in the light most favorable to Hill, establish that Dixon’s review did not cleanse the ultimate firing decision of discrimination. When it came time to consider termination, Griffin and Prickett, the formal decisionmakers, turned primarily to Fultz for information and evaluation. Griffin and Prickett did not exercise independent judgment. As we have already discussed, they even relied on Fultz to write Hill’s termination statement. The three-page statement begins by noting that it lists “all actions, problems, or rule violations that resulted in [Hill] being terminated.” J.A. 170. The substance that follows is based solely on Fultz’s observations and his evaluation of Hill’s performance. And Fultz — not Griffin or Prick-ett — signed the termination statement. It would thus be reasonable to find that Fultz had a substantial influence on the decision to terminate Hill. Indeed,' it would be reasonable to find under the dissent’s stan*673dard that Fultz was “principally responsible” for Hill’s termination.11
d.
We concluded in part II.A.1, supra, that Fultz’s comments about Hill’s sex and age “clearly indieate[ ] a discriminatory attitude [towards Hill] at the workplace.” Brinkley, 180 F.3d at 608. There must, of course, be “a nexus between [Fultz’s] negative attitude and the employment action” taken against Hill. Id. Fultz’s statements that Hill was a damn woman and a useless old lady who should be retired bear directly on the contested decision for several reasons. As we have just explained, the statements were made by an actual decisionmaker. This is a crucial factor in establishing the required nexus between the discriminatory animus and the adverse employment decision, although this alone is not enough. The content and timing of the statements are also relevant in determining whether there is a sufficient nexus. Here, Fultz’s remarks disparaged Hill’s professional abilities and reflected Fultz’s harsh judgment that such a “useless old lady” should not be allowed to remain at Lockheed. Furthermore, these remarks were made shortly before or at the same time as- the reprimands that triggered Hill’s termination. They thus reflect the decisionmaker’s state of mind at the time he was taking actions that led directly to the adverse employment action. For these reasons, we conclude that Hill presented direct evidence that sex and age played a role in her termination, and she is therefore entitled to pursue a mixed-motive case.
B.
Hill has proffered direct evidence of sex and age discrimination. We must now consider how this affects Lockheed’s motion for summary judgment. Because Hill has proffered direct evidence that discriminatory animus played a role in her termination, the company must be denied summary judgment on her sex discrimination claim. The essential question that remains must be resolved by a factfinder, that is, whether Hill’s direct evidence of sex discrimination is credible. If the fact-finder credits Hill’s evidence and determines that Hill’s sex played a role in her termination, then Lockheed is liable regardless of whether it would have made the same decision absent the discrimination: “an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). In other words, if sex was a motivating factor in Hill’s *674discharge, Lockheed is liable under Title VII. Consequently, even if Lockheed is able to prove that it would have made the same decision despite discriminatory animus, that showing would only limit the relief available to Hill under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). It would not affect Lockheed’s Title VII liability on the sex discrimination claim.
As for Hill’s age discrimination claim, we assume without deciding that section 107(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not change the law for proving mixed-motive cases under the ADEA. See supra note 2. Thus, we assume that the original Price Waterhouse framework applies to Hill’s age discrimination claim. Under this framework, once the plaintiff provides direct evidence of discrimination, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to prove that legitimate factors alone would have led it to make the same adverse employment decision, and the employer avoids liability only if it is successful in making this showing. Thus, with respect to Hill’s age discrimination claim, we must decide whether Lockheed is entitled to summary judgment on its defense that legitimate factors alone would have led it to fire Hill, notwithstanding Fultz’s age discrimination. “[0]nce the plaintiff has presented direct evidence that a forbidden factor contributed to the employer’s decision to take adverse action against her, a trial will normally be necessary in order to determine whether the employer would have taken the same action in the absence of the illicit consideration.” Frobose v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Danville, 152 F.3d 602, 615 n. 12 (7th Cir.1998). See also Adler v. Madigan, 939 F.2d 476, 479 (7th Cir.1991) (observing that mixed-motive cases “are ordinarily not grist for the summary judgment mill”). In other words, once a plaintiff proffers direct evidence that discrimination figured into the adverse employment decision, that evidence normally creates a material factual issue about the validity of the employer’s defense that it would have made the same decision regardless of the discrimination. This is not to say, however, that an employer can never obtain summary judgment on its same-decision defense in a mixed-motive case. But the employer will be entitled to summary judgment only if it proffers evidence that is so one-sided that a rational factfinder could only conclude that the employer must prevail on its same-decision defense. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505; EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 243 F.3d 846, 854 (4th Cir.2001). The proffered evidence must therefore reasonably support only one conclusion — the conclusion that the employer’s legitimate reason, standing alone, would have prompted the adverse employment decision. See Frobose, 152 F.3d at 615 n. 12; Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 279 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 875, 121 S.Ct. 181, 148 L.Ed.2d 125 (2000). As we demonstrate below, the summary judgment record does not indisputably establish Lockheed’s defense. There is a material question of fact about whether Lockheed would have fired Hill in the absence of Fultz’s discriminatory animus.
Because Hill’s termination was triggered by the second and third reprimands she received at Fort Drum, Lockheed’s same-decision defense boils down to the claim that legitimate factors alone would have prompted both of those reprimands, regardless of Fultz’s age discrimination. Again, Hill’s second reprimand was for violating Lockheed’s tool control policy, and the third was for receiving several discrepancy reports.
Lockheed argues initially that Hill cannot challenge the reprimand for the tool control violation because the company *675could have fired her for this violation alone. The first problem with this argument is that Lockheed’s SOP does not require termination for this offense. SOP violations that call for immediate termination include fighting, theft, unauthorized possession of weapons, sleeping on duty, falsification of records, and use of alcohol or drugs at work. J.A. 113-14. Violation of the tool control policy is not specifically listed in the SOP. This violation appears to fall under Rule 15, “Violation of written Company directives/policy.” J.A. 113. Punishment for a violation of Rule 15 can range from a written reprimand, to a three-day suspension, or to termination, depending on the severity of the violation. Id. Here, of course, Lockheed did not fire Hill when she misplaced her cutters. It reprimanded her and imposed a three-day suspension. In any event, the proper question is not whether Lockheed could have fired Hill for misplacing her tool but whether it has proffered undisputed proof that it would have disciplined her even in the absence of Fultz’s discriminatory animus. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (emphasis added) (“[T]he defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiffs [age] into account.”). Lockheed, the party that now has the burden of persuasion, has not offered any proof that it regularly fires employees for misplacing a tool..
Lockheed next argues that Hill would have received the second reprimand even without any discrimination on Fultz’s part. Under Lockheed’s tool control policy, employees must be able to account for their tools at all times and must report missing tools immediately. An Army employee found a pair of Hill’s four-inch cutters on a maintenance stand on April 14, 1998. J.A. 125. The Army employee gave the cutters to Fultz who, in turn, delivered them to Dixon. J.A. 249A 250. Later in the day, Fultz told Dixon that he (Fultz) checked Hill’s toolbox at the end of her shift and asked her where the extra pair of cutters was. According to Fultz, Hill said “I told Richard [Dixon] that I had taken the tool home.” J.A. 125, 250-51. Fultz’s report— a false report, according to Hill — led Dixon to conclude that Hill had lied to Fultz because she had not said anything to Dixon about her cutters. The next morning Dixon concluded that Hill was again dishonest when he showed her the misplaced cutters and asked if they were hers. Because Hill believed that none of her cutters were missing, she said only that the cutters had her number on them. J.A. 77-78. Dixon’s conclusion that Hill was less than candid was based on Fultz’s report that he had already questioned Hill about the misplaced cutters. Hill, however, insists that Fultz did not talk to her about her cutters. J.A. 261. Thus, when Dixon asked her if the missing cutters were hers, she had not been alerted to the fact that any of her cutters had been misplaced. Hill was, of course, subject to discipline because of her misplaced tool. Dixon, however, says unequivocally that he would not have issued the reprimand and three-day suspension to Hill if she had not lied. J.A. 251A, 253. But Dixon thought Hill lied because of what Fultz told him. Because Hill has proffered evidence that Fultz’s report to Dixon about the cutters was false, there is a genuine factual issue about whether Hill would have been disciplined (reprimanded and suspended) over the tool in the absence of Fultz’s discriminatory animus. That disciplinary action was a necessary pre-requisite to Hill’s dismissal.12
*676Fultz was also heavily involved in Hill’s third reprimand, which was based on several minor errors that Fultz detected in her work. As we explain in greater detail in part III, infra, Hill has proffered evidence that Fultz wrote her up for these errors in swift retaliation for her complaints about his discrimination. There is a genuine factual issue about whether the third reprimand would have been issued in the absence of Fultz’s discrimination against Hill. The third reprimand was also a necessary prerequisite to Hill’s termination.
Thus, on Lockheed’s defense that it would have fired Hill even without Fultz’s discriminatory animus, the company has not proffered evidence so one-sided that it must prevail at the summary judgment stage. A rational factfinder could conclude that Lockheed would not have reached the same decision, that is, the decision to fire Hill, in the absence of Fultz’s discrimination. There is, in other words, a genuine issue of material fact about whether Lockheed would have issued the second and third reprimands, which triggered Hill’s dismissal, in the absence of Fultz’s illegitimate motives.
C.
To sum up, we conclude that Hill has proffered direct evidence of sex and age discrimination, thereby qualifying her to proceed under Price Waterhouse’s mixed-motive framework for proving a case. As a result, Lockheed is not entitled to summary judgment on Hill’s Title VII claim because a rational factfinder could conclude that sexual discrimination was a motivating factor in the decision to terminate her. In addition, Lockheed is not entitled to summary judgment on Hill’s ADEA claim because Hill has proffered evidence of age discrimination, and Lockheed has not proffered evidence that points indisputably to the conclusion that it would have fired Hill anyway.13
III.
Hill also alleges that her termination was in retaliation for her complaints to Dixon about Fultz’s discrimination. Hill last complained to Dixon about Fultz when *677she returned from her suspension in late April 1998. Dixon talked with Fultz soon thereafter, J.A. 137, and Fultz immediately began writing discrepancy reports against Hill. Fultz wrote up Hill twice on Thursday, April 30, 1998, three times on Friday, May 1, 1998, and again on Monday, May 4, 1998. Section 704(a) of Title VII provides that it “shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees ... because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
To defeat Lockheed’s motion for summary judgment on her retaliation claim, Hill relies on the three-step, burden shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas. Under this framework Hill must begin by establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. She does this by showing that (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) Lockheed took adverse employment action against her; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. See Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 271 (4th Cir.2001). Hill’s complaints to Dixon about Fultz’s discrimination constitute protected activity, and termination is an adverse employment action. A causal connection may be inferred when an employee is discharged soon after complaining, and Hill was fired within days of her last complaint and within weeks of her first one. See, e.g., Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir.1994) (“[T]he discharge of an employee soon after the employee engages in protected activity is strongly suggestive of retaliatory motive and thus indirect proof of causation.”). We agree with the district court that Hill “has established a prima facie case of retaliation.” J.A. 312.
Because Hill has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to Lockheed to proffer evidence of a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the discharge. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Lockheed’s proffered reason for firing Hill is that in one year she accumulated three written reprimands, one with a suspension, and this was grounds for discharge under the SOP. In short, Lockheed asserts that Hill was fired because the accumulation of three reprimands indicated she was not fit for her job.
In the third step under McDonnell Douglas, Hill must demonstrate that Lockheed’s proffered reason for firing her is pretext for retaliation. The district court concluded that Hill has not come forward with any evidence of pretext and that Lockheed is therefore entitled to summary judgment. To establish a pretext case before Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000), Hill would have had to prove that Lockheed’s proffered reason was false and then introduce independent evidence that discrimination was the real reason for her discharge. See, e.g., Jiminez v. Mary Washington Coll., 57 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir.1995). However, “the Reeves Court made plain that, under the appropriate circumstances, ‘a plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence, to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully [retaliated].’ ” EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 243 F.3d 846, 852 (4th Cir.2001) (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097). In other words, “it is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of [retaliation] from the falsity of the employer’s explanation.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097. Of course, if no rational fact-finder could find for the employee, then *678summary judgment is appropriate. See Rowe v. Marley Co., 233 F.3d 825, 830 (4th Cir.2000). However, if the plaintiff creates a genuine issue of material fact on whether the proffered reason was pretextual, then the employer must be denied summary judgment.
Lockheed argues that the district court correctly concluded that Hill failed to meet her burden because she has not come forward with any evidence to show (1) that the formal decisionmakers were motivated by retaliation or (2) that Fultz issued the flurry of discrepancy reports in retaliation for Hill’s complaints about him.
Both of Lockheed’s arguments are without merit. As we discussed in part II.A.2, supra, the innocence of its formal decision-makers does not shield an employer from liability on discrimination claims if an actual decisionmaker (that is, someone with substantial influence on the employment decision) was motivated by illegal considerations. See Tuck v. Henkel Corp., 973 F.2d 371 (4th Cir.1992). For example, an employer is not shielded from liability on a retaliation claim when a formal decision-maker with no retaliatory motive fires someone based on a poor evaluation by an actual decisionmaker who wrote the poor evaluation in retaliation for protected activity. Here, the formal decisionmakers at Lockheed relied on three written reprimands when firing Hill. Without all three she would not have been eligible for termination, according to Lockheed’s SOP. If any of those reprimands were due to Fultz’s retaliation, then Lockheed is liable. Hill’s third reprimand, which was based on Fultz’s discrepancy reports, occurred after her protected activity. According to Dixon, Hill would not have been fired but for the flurry of discrepancy reports issued by Fultz that led to Hill’s third reprimand. Dixon Dep. 31. Therefore, the question is whether Hill raises a genuine issue of material fact about whether Fultz’s discrepancy reports were in retaliation for Hill’s complaints about his discriminatory comments and conduct.
Lockheed maintains that there is no genuine factual issue because Hill admits that she committed most of the errors noted in the discrepancy reports. However, the question is not whether Fultz could have written up Hill’s mistakes. The question is whether Hill creates a genuine issue as to whether Fultz would have written the reports absent a retaliatory animus. Lockheed inspectors do not automatically issue a discrepancy report for every error. On the contrary, inspectors have discretion on whether or not to write up minor mistakes. Dixon Dep. 27. (We know the errors here were not serious because Fultz designated all of them as “minor.”) Fultz concedes that he had this discretion and that he did not issue a discrepancy report every time an employee erred. Fultz Dep. at 37.
We conclude that Hill has offered sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that had Fultz not been gunning for her, he would not have written a discrepancy report on every minor mistake that she made.14 First off, the timing of the discrepancy reports sets off alarm bells. Fultz’s write-ups of Hill followed immediately. after Dixon told Fultz that *679Hill had registered a complaint against him. After Fultz learned of Hill’s complaint, he wrote up Hill at least once a day every single day — a total of six times in three days — until she was told to go home. A reasonable factfinder could attribute the sudden burst of write-ups to Fultz’s retaliation rather than to a sudden deterioration in Hill’s work.’ “When these facts are considered in light of the close temporal relationship ... it is reasonable to conclude that the plaintiff would have a fair chance of demonstrating that she was terminated in retaliation.” King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d 887, 894 (7th Cir.1999) (internal quotations omitted). See also Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 356 (5th Cir.2001) (“ ‘[TJhe combination of suspicious timing with other significant evidence of pretext, can be sufficient to survive summary judgment.’ ” (quoting Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 409 (5th Cir.1999))). There is, of course, more to this than the timing and volume of the discrepancy reports. All of the mistakes noted by Fultz were minor, and one of the discrepancy reports appears to have been unfounded because Dixon refused to sign off on it. Moreover, Hill has presented evidence that Fultz is not being truthful about the discrepancy reports. Fultz claims that at the time he wrote the reports, he had no knowledge of Hill’s complaints about him and that he issued the reports solely because of Hill’s poor performance. J.A. 160. Yet Fultz’s claim conflicts with Dixon’s statement that he had spoken to Fultz about Hill’s complaints shortly before Fultz began issuing discrepancy reports. Furthermore, Hill’s termination statement, which was prepared by Fultz, suggests that he knew about Hill’s complaints. Fultz wrote, “Every sign off that E. Lou Hill completes I must look at, not because I am picking on her, but because without exaggeration approximately 80% of all her work is unsatisfactory.” J.A. 170 (emphasis added). Why would Fultz deny picking on Hill unless he knew she had made an accusation against him? When asked to explain this, Fultz claimed that he was not aware of Hill’s complaint that he had discriminated against her, but he just wanted to make it clear that he was not biased. “I probably inserted that because she is of the female gender,” Fultz said. J.A. 160. Dixon’s contradiction of Fultz plus Fultz’s defensive comment in the termination statement would allow a reasonable factfin-der to conclude (1) that Fultz lied when he said that he did not know about Hill’s complaints and (2) that he also lied about his reasons for writing the discrepancy reports. This alone could support a finding of pretext. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (internal quotations omitted) (noting that it is a “general principle of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party’s dishonesty about a material fact as affirmative evidence of guilt.”).
When all of the factors are considered together, it becomes clear that a reasonable factfinder could determine that Fultz wrote the discrepancy reports in anger because he wanted to retaliate against Hill for her complaints, and not because he wanted to make a fair evaluation of her work. These factors include Fultz’s animosity towards Hill because of her sex and age; the timing and volume of the discrepancy reports, which came immediately on the heels of Hill’s complaint; and the nature of the discrepancy reports — reporting minor work errors, errors that are not always written up. There is also the issue of Fultz’s credibility. He claims that he did not know about Hill’s complaints, but that claim is directly contradicted by Dixon. Moreover, Fultz’s defensive statement in the termination report indicates that he knew about Hill’s complaints. With all of *680this evidence, Hill has created a genuine issue of material fact about whether the discrepancy reports that led to her third reprimand were in retaliation for her discrimination complaints. Lockheed is therefore not entitled to summary judgment on Hill’s retaliation claim.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Lockheed, and we remand the case for a trial on Hill’s claims under Title VII, the ADEA, and the New York Human Rights Law.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
. The parties agreed in district court "that the legal analysis applied to the federal questions [on summary judgment] will control this case under New York law." J.A. 301.
. Our circuit has not decided whether section 107(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), applies to ADEA mixed-motive cases. The issue was not addressed by the district court, and the parties have not briefed it for us. We therefore assume without deciding that § 2000e-2(m) does not apply to the ADEA and that the original Price Waterhouse framework is still controlling for ADEA claims. Thus, we assume that a defendant-employer in a mixed-motive case under the ADEA may escape liability if it shows it would have made the same decision based solely on legitimate factors. If it becomes necessary on remand, the district court can consider whether § 2000e-2(m) governs ADEA mixed-motive claims.
. Although our circuit has not expressly held that evidence of discriminatory conduct by a *667subordinate who substantially influences the formal decisionmaker may count as direct evidence in the mixed-motive context, our decision in Wilhelm v. Blue Bell, Inc., 773 F.2d 1429 (4th Cir.1985), is consistent with that approach. In Wilhelm three plaintiffs charged that their employer had fired them because of their age, and the plaintiffs relied in part on the comments of their immediate supervisor. When placing one of the plaintiffs on probation, the supervisor said that "older people tend to become complacent whereas younger people have more drive and ambition.” Id. at 1433. The supervisor added that "[h]e was going to take care of [the targeted employee] first and then there were going to be some others.” Id. at 1433-34. We never characterized the supervisor as a final decisionmaker. In fact, the supervisor was no longer managing at least one plaintiff at the time of that plaintiff's discharge. Nevertheless, we considered the supervisor's earlier comments to be direct evidence of age discrimination.
. Although the remaining circuits have not expressly held that direct evidence of discrimination can come from the statements of a person who influences, but does not formally make, the adverse employment decision, several may be heading in that direction. See, e.g., Hoffman v. MCA, Inc., 144 F.3d 1117, 1121-22 (7th Cir.1998) ("Normally the plaintiff must prove that the decisionmaker uttered the remarks” to be entitled to Price Water-house mixed motive instructions, yet “if a plaintiff can show that the attitudes of the person who made the remarks tainted the decisionmaker's judgment, the remarks can be relevant to prove discrimination.”); Trotter v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama, 91 F.3d 1449, 1453-54 (11th Cir.1996) ("For statements of discriminatory intent to constitute direct evidence of discrimination, they must be made by a person involved in the challenged decision.”); Thomas v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 131 F.3d 198, 204 (D.C.Cir.1998) (internal quotations and citation omitted) (Price Waterhouse "burden shifting requires evidence of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decision-making process”).
The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have never reached the question of whether the discrimination of someone who influences an employment decision is admissible as direct evidence in a mixed-motive case. This is probably because these circuits have a very strict view *668of what qualifies as direct evidence in a mixed-motive case. In the Tenth Circuit, for example, a comment by a formal decision-maker that the plaintiff was an "incompetent n_[racial slur]” was not direct evidence because the factfinder "would have to infer that the bias reflected in the statement[ ] was the reason behind the adverse employment decision.” Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir.1999). The Fifth Circuit has taken a similarly strict view of direct evidence. See Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1218 (5th Cir.1995). But see Brown v. East Mississippi Elec. Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir.1993) (holding that a supervisor’s "routine use of racial slurs constitutes direct evidence that racial animus was a motivating factor in the contested disciplinary decisions”). As we have explained earlier, see supra note 3, the Fourth Circuit does not take such a restrictive approach.
. A number of courts and our dissenting colleague, Judge Traxler, use the terms "cat’s paw” and "rubber stamp” to characterize their standards for deciding when a subordinate's bias can be used to prove a discriminatory employment decision. See post at 684; see also Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 La. L.Rev. 495, 511-12 (2001). While the two terms are clever and often useful, we do not include them in our formal holding. Infra at 670-71. When the terms are confined to their literal meanings, they characterize very limited circumstances. The term "cat's paw” means "dupe” or "tool” and originates from a fable in which a monkey duped a cat into using its paw to pull roasting chestnuts from a fire. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 354 (1993). Taken literally, "cat's paw” would cover only the situation when a biased subordinate dupes a formal decisionmaker into taking adverse action against another employee. Similarly, "rubber stamp” means "to approve endorse, or dispose of (as a document or policy) as a matter of routine usually without the exercise of judgment or at the expressed or implied command of another person or body.” Id. at 1983. Taken literally, “rubber stamp” would apply only to the situation when the formal decisionmaker automatically endorses the biased subordinate’s recommendation without exercising independent judgment. Nonetheless, as the cases we will mention illustrate, some courts that adopt what they call a "cat's paw” or "rubber stamp” standard go beyond the literal meaning of the terms in applying the standard.
. See also Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir.2000) ("[A] defendant may be held liable if the manager who discharged the plaintiff merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the 'cat's paw’ for a subordinate employee's prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent.”); Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1249 (11th Cir.1998) ("In a cat’s paw situation, the [person with the discriminatory animus] clearly causes the tangible employment action, regardless of which indi*670vidual actually signs the employee's walking papers.”).
. See also Griffin v. Washington Convention Ctr., 142 F.3d 1308, 1312 (D.C.Cir.1998) ("Thus do we join at least four other circuits in holding that evidence of a subordinate’s bias is relevant where the ultimate decision-maker is not insulated from the subordinate’s influence.”); Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir.2000) ("One method [of proving pretext] is to show that discriminatory comments were made by the key decisionmaker or those in a position to influence the decisionmaker.”); Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 354-55 (6th Cir.1998) ("[R]emarks by those who did not independently have the authority or did not directly exercise their authority to fire the plaintiff, but who nevertheless played a meaningful role in the decision to terminate the plaintiff, were relevant.”).
. See also Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 990 F.2d 1051, 1057 (8th Cir.1993) (" '[A]n employer cannot escape responsibility for wilful discrimination by multiple layers of paper review, when the facts on which the reviewers rely have been filtered by a manager determined to purge the labor force of older workers.’ ” (quoting Gusman v. Unisys Corp., 986 F.2d 1146, 1147 (7th Cir.1993))).
. We do not mean to quibble, but we are uncomfortable with the dissent's characterization of our standard. See post at 684 (stating that under our holding "a biased subordinate ... may count as a decisionmaker ... simply because he has had a 'substantial influence' on the process which led to the employment decision”) (emphasis added). Our standard focuses on the subordinate’s influence on the decision, not on the process.
. Contrary to the dissent’s worry, see post at 695, Lockheed would be entitled to summary judgment under the following hypothetical facts if they were undisputed. Hill steals from Lockheed. Fultz, because of his age- and sex-based animus towards Hill, reports her theft to Dixon. Dixon confronts Hill and she confesses to the theft. Dixon then passes word of Fultz's report and Hill’s confession on to Griffin. Griffin investigates and determines that a theft occurred and that Hill confessed to the misdeed. Griffin fires Hill as a result. Lockheed would get summary judgment because it is undisputed in this hypothetical that the decision to fire Hill was based on her theft and that the decision was not influenced by Fultz’s discriminatory animus. Stated another way, summary judgment would be appropriate because the hypothetical facts demonstrate that Griffin conducted an independent investigation and exercised independent judgment in terminating Hill. The actual case before us today is different. Hill has proffered evidence that Fultz's discrimination substantially influenced the decisions to issue the reprimands, the actions that led to Hill’s termination. Moreover, Fultz influenced the ultimate decision to fire Hill, according to her evidence.
. The dissent argues that Hill cannot establish that her second reprimand for the mislaid *676cutters was a product of Fultz’s bias for two reasons. First, the dissent faults Hill for not defending herself against Fultz’s false report when Dixon confronted her about the misplaced cutters on the morning of April 16, 1998. See post at 687-88. The problem is this: although Dixon, because of Fultz’s report, believed that Hill had lied, Dixon did not tell Hill at that meeting what Fultz had reported. Hill therefore had no clue that she should defend herself against a false statement by Fultz. According to the record, Hill did not know about Fultz's lie until it appeared in the written reprimand, which was handed to her a week later, on April 22, 1998. Compare J.A. 249A-253 with J.A. 125-26. By that time the decision to discipline Hill had already been made. Second, the dissent says that Hill has not proffered evidence to show (1) that Dixon's erroneous conclusion that Hill had lied to Fultz led to her second reprimand or (2) that if Fultz had not lied, Dixon would not have reprimanded Hill. See post at 689-90. The facts, taken in the light most favorable to Hill, show that she has met her burden at this stage. Dixon acknowledges that he was mad when he confronted Hill because he thought (due to Fultz's report) that Hill had lied to Fultz by telling him that she had already talked to Dixon about the missing cutters. Dixon’s deposition testimony reveals that his belief that Hill had lied to Fultz played a key role in the disciplinary action. A jury, in other words, could reasonably find that Fultz’s false report substantially influenced Dixon’s decision to issue the second reprimand.
. Because we have concluded that Hill is entitled to pursue her sex and age discrimination claims under the mixed-motive method of proof, we do not consider her alternative argument that she is entitled to proceed under the pretext theory.
. Hill's retaliation claim does not fail as a result of her deposition statement that she thought she would have been terminated if she had not complained to Dixon about Fultz. See post at 695 & n. 9. That statement came right after Hill testified that Fultz "constantly] ” accused her of being "a troubled old lady.” J.A. 106. Hill believed, it appears, that Fultz was committed to getting her out of the company as soon as he could, regardless of whether she complained about his discrimination. That belief on Hill’s part does not absolve Fultz of retaliation.