dissenting.
With respect, I dissent. Hill, an aircraft mechanic employed by Lockheed, was reprimanded at two separate military jobsites, by two different and admittedly unbiased direct supervisors, for three separate violations of Lockheed’s work quality and safety standards. Under Lockheed’s standard operating procedures, the three reprimands triggered a termination decision that was imposed by Lockheed’s regional supervisor and program manager, who likewise are not charged with harboring any discriminatory animus.
However, because the safety inspector who reported Hill’s infractions to her direct supervisor at the last jobsite made derogatory comments to Hill about her age and sex, my friends in the majority conclude that Hill has presented direct evidence that she was instead terminated “because of’ her sex and age, entitling her to the more favorable “mixed-motive” method of proof set forth in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989). And, they reach this conclusion even though Hill concedes that her direct supervisor issued each reprimand for nondiscriminatory reasons after independently investigating the safety inspector’s reports.
As my colleagues point out, the issue of “whose motives matter” in a discrimination case is an evolving one. The holding today will be that a subordinate employee who has made discriminatory statements is a decisionmaker for Price Waterhouse purposes so long as he has what is deemed a “substantial influence” on the process that culminates in the employment decision. I believe this holding expands the scope of the discrimination statutes and Price Wa-terhouse beyond their intended limits. In order to impute the discriminatory motives of a subordinate employee to the formal decisionmakers of an employer, I would require a plaintiff to establish that the subordinate was the “actual decisionmaker” because the formal decisionmakers merely “rubber-stamped” or acted as a “cat’s paw” for the subordinate’s report, decision, or recommendation. In my view, Hill has failed to establish this causal link between the safety inspector’s alleged discriminatory animus and the disciplinary actions taken against Hill. Therefore, I would affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Lockheed.
I.
Hill was employed by Lockheed as an aircraft sheet metal mechanic working with a contract field team. Hill’s team was assigned to perform modifications to military aircraft at various military bases in the eastern United States, as called for by contracts between Lockheed and the United States government. Archie Griffin was the east coast senior site supervisor for Lockheed, but was not present at each military jobsite. Rather, Hill and the other aircraft mechanics were directly supervised by a “lead person” or “point of contact” at each base, who reported to Griffin *681in the line of authority. The lead person was ultimately responsible for enforcing the standard operating procedures (“SOP”) of Lockheed and ensuring that the military contracts were satisfactorily performed at the jobsite.
In addition to the mechanics and the direct supervisor, a safety inspector was assigned to each jobsite. Specific aircraft modifications scheduled to be performed under the military contracts were set forth in modification work orders (“MWOs”). As part of his duties, the safety inspector checked the modifications to ensure that they had been completed in accordance with the required specifications. However, the inspector had no direct supervisory authority over the mechanics, nor any authority to discipline them. Like the mechanics, the safety inspector reported to and worked directly under the supervision of the lead person.
During the last eight months of her employment with Lockheed, Hill received three written reprimands under Lockheed’s SOP: (1) a reprimand issued by Ronald Souders, the lead person at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for a violation of Rule 4 of the SOP — “unsatisfactory quality or quantity of work” — under a MWO assigned to Hill in September 1997; (2) a reprimand and disciplinary suspension issued by Richard Dixon, the lead person at Fort Drum, New York, for Hill’s violation of Lockheed’s tool control safety policy in April 1998; and (3) a reprimand issued by Dixon for another violation of Rule 4 of the SOP under several MWOs assigned to her in April and May 1998. J.A. 112.
Under Lockheed’s SOP 3.4.2, “[a]n employee who receives a combination of two written reprimands not involving a suspension and one involving a suspension (not necessarily on the same rule) will be subject to discharge.” J.A. 110. After Richard Dixon issued Hill her third reprimand, Dixon contacted Archie Griffin and was told to follow the SOP. Dixon then forwarded the disciplinary paperwork to Griffin, who made the decision, along with Thomas Priekett, Lockheed’s program manager in charge of the contract field teams, to terminate Hill.
Hill subsequently filed this lawsuit under Title VII and the ADEA alleging that she was reprimanded and terminated by Lockheed “because of’ her sex and age and in retaliation for her complaints of discrimination. Hill acknowledges that Souders and Dixon, the lead persons on both the Fort Bragg and Fort Drum job-sites, acted without a discriminatory or retaliatory motive in issuing the three reprimands, and she does not dispute that she violated the standards upon which those reprimands were based. Hill also does not dispute that the three reprimands subjected her to termination under SOP 3.4.2, and she does not allege that Griffin or Priekett acted with a discriminatory or retaliatory motive in terminating her. Rather, Hill’s claims of discrimination and retaliation stem wholly from her allegations that Ed Fultz, the safety inspector at Fort Drum, called her a “useless old lady,” who needed to be retired, a “troubled old lady,” and a “damn woman,” on several occasions while they were working together, J.A. 240-241A, 245, and that this discriminatory animus, along with a desire to retaliate against her when she complained to Dixon about Fultz’s comments, led Fultz to report the infractions that became the bases for the second and third reprimands issued to Hill by Dixon, and ultimately to her termination.
Concluding that Hill had failed to present sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence to support her claims of discrimination and retaliation by Lockheed’s decisionmakers, who issued the reprimands and terminated Hill in the ab*682sence of any such improper motivations, the district court granted Lockheed’s motion for summary judgment. Hill, claiming that she had presented sufficient evidence to prove that Fultz was instead the “actual decisionmaker,” appealed. I would affirm.
II.
Title VII forbids “an employer ... to discharge any individual ... because of such individual’s ... sex.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (West 1994) (emphasis added). The ADEA similarly forbids “an employer ... to discharge any individual ... because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a)(1) (West 1999) (emphasis added). Hill alleges that, as a result of Fultz’s discriminatory and retaliatory animus, she was disciplined and ultimately terminated by Lockheed “because of’ her age and sex, and not “because of’ her performance deficiencies.
A.
There are two avenues of proof by which a plaintiff can establish a claim for intentional discrimination: (1) “mixed-motive” cases, in which the employer is motivated to take an adverse employment action by both permissible and forbidden reasons; and (2) “pretext” cases, in which the employer advances a permissible reason for an adverse employment action, but the reason is pretextual because there is evidence that the employer was in reality motivated by a discriminatory animus. See Brinkley v. Harbour Recreation Club, 180 F.3d 598, 607 (4th Cir.1999); Tuck v. Henkel Corp., 973 F.2d 371, 375 (4th Cir.1992).
A “plaintiff qualifies for the more advantageous standard of liability applicable in mixed-motive cases,” Taylor v. Virginia Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 232 (4th Cir.1999) (en banc), if the plaintiff presents “direct evidence that decisionmakers placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion in reaching their decision,” Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Such proof, however, commands the production of “evidence of conduct or statements that both reflect directly the alleged discriminatory attitude and that bear directly on the contested employment decision.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th Cir.1995).
If such direct evidence of discrimination is not available, a plaintiff may still establish a discrimination claim utilizing circumstantial evidence and the burden-shifting scheme set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered adverse employment action; (3) she was performing at a level that met her employer’s legitimate job expectations at the time of the adverse employment action; and (4) the position remained open or was filled by similarly qualified applicants outside the protected class. See Brinkley, 180 F.3d at 607. If a prima facie case is presented, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondis-eriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Assuming the employer meets this burden of production, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s stated reason is pretextual and that she has indeed been the victim of discrimination. See id.
B.
Thus, regardless of the method of proof employed by the plaintiff in a particular case, the ultimate question in every em*683ployment discrimination case is whether the plaintiff suffered adverse employment action “because of’ the plaintiffs protected traits. The plaintiff must present sufficient evidence, direct or circumstantial, to establish a causal link between discriminatory animus present in the workplace and the challenged employment decision. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 152-53, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). In order to evaluate whether the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination and the requisite causal connection to the challenged employment decision, the majority and I agree that we must first identify the person or persons who actually made the challenged decision on behalf of the employer. And, if that person is different from the person who harbors the discriminatory bias, we must determine whether we can fairly impute the improper motives of the subordinate employee to the formal decisionmaker.
A formalistic approach for determining who is a “decisionmaker” is not appropriate. As noted by Justice O’Connor in Price Waterhouse, stray remarks in the workplace do not justify requiring an employer to prove that its decision was based on legitimate criteria, nor do “statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself, suffice to satisfy the plaintiffs burden” of proving discrimination. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Brinkley, 180 F.3d at 608. On the other hand, in Reeves the Court recently confirmed that the person allegedly harboring discriminatory animus, and making statements reflecting such animus, need not be the “formal” decisionmaker to impose liability upon an employer so long as the plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to establish that the subordinate was the one “principally responsible” for, or the “actual decisionmaker” behind, the plaintiffs termination. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151-52, 120 S.Ct. 2097.
This point is best illustrated by the facts of the Reeves case itself. There, the formal decisionmakers made no discriminatory statements bearing upon the petitioner’s termination. However, the Court held that the employer was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the McDonnell Douglas framework because, “in addition to establishing a prima facie case of discrimination and creating a jury issue as to the falsity of the employer’s explanation, petitioner [had] introduced additional evidence that Chestnut,” one of petitioner’s superiors in the chain of authority, “was motivated by age-based animus and was principally responsible for petitioner’s firing.” Id. at 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097. In particular, Chestnut had told the petitioner “that he ‘was so old he must have come over on the Mayflower’ ” and “that he ‘was too damn old to do his job.’ ” Id. (internal alterations omitted). Although Chestnut was not the formal decisionmaker in the termination decision, he had recommended the petitioner’s termination to the company president, to whom he was married, and there was testimony from another employee that Chestnut essentially “exercised ‘absolute power’ within the company.” Id. at 152, 120 S.Ct. 2097.
Other courts have employed a similar analysis for determining whether a subordinate employee is an “actual decisionmaker” for purposes of a discrimination claim. See, e.g., Rios v. Rossotti, 252 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir.2001) (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court has assessed the value of discriminatory remarks [by nondecision-makers] by examining whether the remarks indicated invidious animus and whether the speaker of the remarks was ‘principally responsible’ for the adverse employment action”). For example, in *684Russell v. McKinney Hospital Venture, 235 F.3d 219 (5th Cir.2000), the court held that the repeated use of the term “old bitch,” when referring to plaintiff, by the son of the president of a parent company, was “appropriate additional circumstantial evidence of age discrimination” under McDonnell Douglas because, while not a formal decisionmaker, the president’s son was “primarily responsible” for plaintiffs termination. Id. at 226. Among other things, there was evidence that the president’s son “wielded ... great ‘informal’ power” within the workplace on a day-today basis, id. at 228, and had threatened their mutual supervisor, whose budget was controlled by his father, that he would quit if plaintiff were not fired, see id. Such leverage, the court held, was sufficient for a jury to tag the son as the person “principally responsible for the plaintiffs firing.” Id. at 228 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
C.
Accordingly, my colleagues in the majority and I agree that we cannot always limit our inquiry to the actions or statements of formal decisionmakers, because an employer should not be allowed to insulate itself from liability by hiding behind such formal decisionmakers. I diverge from their holding, however, that a biased subordinate who does not make the final or formal employment decision may count as a decisionmaker in a Price Waterhouse mixed-motive case simply because he has had a “substantial influence” on the process which led to the employment decision. In my opinion, more is required to hold an employer liable for the discriminatory motivations of a subordinate employee who participates in the discipline process.
As noted by the majority, many circuits have employed a “rubber-stamp” or “cat’s paw” approach as the appropriate means to prevent employers from unfairly insulating themselves from the consequences of adverse employment actions that are in reality based upon the discriminatory motives of a subordinate employee, while not unfairly tagging employers with the discriminatory motives of subordinate employees who have not been entrusted with formal decision-making authority. I believe this is the better course to follow.
The premise behind the “rubber-stamp” or “cat’s paw” analysis is fairly simple. An employer should not automatically be held hable for the discriminatory motivation of a subordinate employee that leads to an adverse employment action for another employee. However, if the formal deci-sionmakers choose to act in accordance with a report, decision, or recommendation of a biased subordinate without independently evaluating the aggrieved employee’s situation, the imposition of liability may be appropriate. If such claims are accepted at face value, the subordinate’s discriminatory statements and actions may then be fairly imputed to the formal decisionmak-ers and, by virtue of them, to the employer. See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[statements of non decision makers become relevant ... when the ultimate decision maker’s action is merely a ‘rubber stamp’ for the subordinate’s recommendation”); Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir.2000) (recognizing case law holding that an employer “may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the ‘cat’s paw,’ for a subordinate employee’s prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent”); Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that “there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum*685stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the ‘cat’s paw" of the subordinate”); cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (recognizing that the “cat’s paw” doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers).
In cases like this, where the person harboring the discriminatory animus is not a formal decisionmaker or a direct supervisor, but is in a-position to influence an employment decision, the “cat’s paw” analysis is particularly important. It should not be enough to show that a subordinate makes a recommendation or takes an action that is motivated by discriminatory animus, and that the recommendation or action causes the initiation of procedures which ultimately lead to the employment decision made by the formal decisionmak-ers. Rather, the aggrieved employee should be required to make the threshold showing that the subordinate was the “actual decisionmaker,” or the one “principally responsible” for the decision, Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151-52, 120 S.Ct. 2097, because “the decisionmaker followed the biased recommendation [of a subordinate] without independently investigating the complaint against the employee” and making his own determination as to the propriety of the employment action. English v. Colorado Dep’t of Corr., 248 F.3d 1002, 1011 (10th Cir.2001) (quoting Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir.1999) (per curiam)); see also Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (“Where an evaluation is the sole basis or comprises a substantial basis on which the decision maker acts, the evaluation may often constitute sufficient influence to fall under the ‘rubber stamp’ exception.”); Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1249 (11th Cir.1998) (defining a “cat’s paw” situation as one in which “the decisionmaker act[s] in accordance with the harasser’s decision without herself evaluating the employee’s situation”).
However, when the formal decisionmak-ers independently assess the employee’s situation, evaluate the propriety of the recommended action and validity of the alleged wrongdoing, and render the employment decision based upon legitimate factors without personal discriminatory motivations, “ ‘the causal relationship between the subordinate’s illicit motive and the employer’s ultimate decision is broken.’ ” Griffin v. Washington Convention Ctr., 142 F.3d 1308, 1311 (D.C.Cir.1998) (quoting Willis, 118 F.3d at 547); see also Stimpson, 186 F.3d at 1331 (noting that “[w]hen the biased recommender and the actual decisionmaker are not the same person or persons, a plaintiff may not benefit from the inference of causation that would arise from their common identity. Instead, the plaintiff must prove that the discriminatory animus behind the recommendation, and not the underlying employee misconduct identified in the recommendation, was an actual cause of the other party’s decision to terminate the employee.”). In such circumstances, “ ‘the ultimate decision is clearly made on an independent and a legally permissi[ble] basis, [and] the bias of the subordinate is not relevant.’ ” Griffin, 142 F.3d at 1311 (quoting Willis, 118 F.3d at 547).1
*686III.
With these principles in mind, I turn to a more detailed recitation of the facts underlying Hill’s reprimands and termination, viewed in the light most favorable to Hill, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), and the question of whether Hill has demonstrated that Fultz, the safety inspector at Fort Drum, was the “actual decisionmaker” or the one “principally responsible” for each of these decisions.
A. The First Reprimand (Fort Bragg) 2
Although not the subject of challenge, the first reprimand is relevant because it is similar to Hill’s third reprimand and serves as a predicate for the ultimate termination. The reprimand was issued to Hill during her assignment to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in September 1997, for “unsatisfactory quality of work,” a violation of Rule # 4 of the SOP. J.A. 124. Specifically, Hill was reprimanded for installing rivets that were too small to properly hold an antenna mount. Donald Wiggins, the assigned safety inspector, wrote up the violation, which was issued by Ronald Souders, the lead person on the Fort Bragg job. Hill testified that the disciplinary report was accurate and that Wiggins and Souders did not act unfairly in issuing this reprimand or otherwise discriminate against her.
B. The Second Reprimand (Fort Drum)
Hill’s second reprimand, by contrast, is the subject of the most contention in this case. In early 1998, Hill was assigned to work at Fort Drum in New York. Dixon was the lead person and Fultz was the assigned safety inspector. Prior to Hill’s assignment, Griffin spoke with Hill about complaints he had received about her job performance. Griffin told Hill that her work had not been up to par and that, because the lead persons were ultimately responsible for “the quality of [her] work on the road” and “she had to be followed up on,” they had expressed some resistance to her assignment to their sites. J.A. 188.
Hill’s second written reprimand, her first at Fort Drum, imposed a three-day disciplinary suspension based upon Hill’s violation of Lockheed’s tool control policy, which requires employees to accurately account for their tools at all times and to promptly report lost or missing tools to their immediate supervisor. The importance of the policy is not in dispute. As acknowledged by Hill, the policy ensures that “all of the mechanics that are working around the aircraft ... keep track of their tools so they don’t get left in the aircraft.” J.A. 76. All tools are marked for identification by the mechanic’s initials or social security number, and the mechanic’s toolbox is outlined, or “shadowed,” so that missing tools are immediately apparent when the toolbox is opened.
In April 1998, a pair of blue-handled cutters bearing Hill’s identification mark was found on a maintenance stand by military employees and turned in to Fultz, who gave them to Dixon. After consulting with Hill, Dixon issued the following writ*687ten reprimand, in accordance with Lockheed’s SOP:
On 14 April 98 it was brought to my attention that your 4" Diagonal Cutters with Blue Handle Grips were found on a maintenance stand. You failed to bring it to my attention or the Inspector’s attention that you lost or misplaced this tool. These cutters were held in my possession until you discovered they were missing. During Tool Inventory Check at close of business (COB) on 14 April 98, you were questioned as to the whereabouts of these cutters by the Inspector. Your answer: “I told Richard I had taken the tool home.” Your toolbox was checked again on 15 April 98 in the morning and again at close of business. When asked if you had all your tools, your answer was “yes.”
On the morning of 16 April 98, after a very in-depth Safety Brief on F.O.D. and Tool Control, your toolbox was checked and a like pair of 4" Diagonal Cutters were in your toolbox, when I still held your original pair in my possession.
When I confronted you at approximately 0900 hours on 16 April 98, you denied the 4" Diagonal Cutters with the Blue Handle Grips, with your tool markings engraved in them, were yours.
J.A. 125-126. At the time the reprimand was issued, Hill’s toolbox was only partially “shadowed,” a deficiency she corrected during her three-day suspension.
Hill does not dispute that Dixon’s decision to issue the reprimand or that the three-day suspension was authorized by Lockheed’s disciplinary rules. Indeed, Hill acknowledged that Dixon could have chosen instead to immediately terminate her for the violation. Rather, Hill claims that this valid reprimand issued by Dixon, an unbiased “decisionmaker,” was rendered discriminatory by Fultz’s involvement in the incident.
As reflected in the written reprimand, Fultz, in addition to turning over the cutters to Dixon, told Dixon that he had earlier noticed that Hill was missing a pair of cutters during a tool inventory check and that, when he questioned Hill about them, Hill told Fultz that “I told Richard [Dixon] I had taken the tool home.” J.A. 125. Hill now denies ever discussing the missing cutters with Fultz. The crux of her claim, therefore, is that Fultz was motivated by his discriminatory animus towards her to lie to Dixon about this conversation and that, as a result, Dixon issued a reprimand that he would not otherwise have issued. For the following reasons, I believe Hill has failed to produce sufficient evidence upon which to conclude that Fultz was “principally responsible” for Dixon’s decision to issue the reprimand, or that Dixon merely acted as Fultz’s “rubber stamp” in doing so.
As an initial premise, the written reprimand for Hill’s violation of the tool control policy, completed by Dixon and signed by Hill when they met to discuss the incident, plainly sets forth Fultz’s statement to Dixon about the now-disputed conversation with Hill. Dixon did not arbitrarily act to issue a reprimand and suspension for the misplaced tool based upon what Fultz had told him. Hill was presented with the tool bearing her identification mark and notified of the facts related to Dixon about the incident, including Fultz’s alleged conversation with her about the missing tool. Faced one-on-one by her direct supervisor, the actual decisionmaker and man that Hill, freely professes was acting entirely without a personal discriminatory motivation, Hill was given an opportunity to tell her side of the story and dispute the information she now challenges. There is no evidence that she did so at the time. Nor, for *688that matter, is there any indication that she did so during her deposition. Hill’s denial of the conversation with Fultz appears for the first time in the form of an affidavit, completed one day before her response to Lockheed’s motion for summary judgment and four months after the deposition.
In evaluating whether an employee has been disciplined or terminated “because of’ a protected trait, we must “look at the facts as. they appear to the person making the decision.” Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1231; Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1318 (10th Cir.1999) (noting that “[t]he relevant inquiry is not whether [the employer’s] proffered reasons were wise, fair or correct, but whether [the employer] honestly believed those reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs.”); see also McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 149 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir.1998) (holding that plaintiff failed to establish pretext where plaintiff was terminated after the employer conducted an investigation into a subordinate’s allegations of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff and believed the allegations to be true, even though plaintiff presented evidence in the lawsuit that the allegations may have been false). Before issuing the reprimand, Dixon informed Hill of the supposed “lie” and gave Hill an opportunity to tell her side of the story or otherwise refute it. It was, in my view, incumbent upon her at that point to do so if she intended to complain later. See English, 248 F.3d at 1011 (“A plaintiff cannot claim that a firing authority relied uncritically upon a subordinate’s prejudiced recommendation where the plaintiff had an opportunity to respond to and rebut the evidence supporting the recommendation.”); Willis, 118 F.3d at 547-48 (holding that the “cat’s paw” line of cases was not applicable because the formal decisionmaker investigated the subordinate’s motives by meeting with the plaintiff before acting on the subordinate’s adverse recommendation).
In addition, Hill’s evidence fails to support the claim that Dixon’s conclusion that Hill was less than candid was based entirely on Fultz’s report that he had questioned Hill about the misplaced cutters or that Dixon thought Hill lied only because of what Fultz told him. Although Dixon acknowledged that Fultz’s statement was considered, as evidenced by its inclusion in the written reprimand, the evidence does not support the conclusion that Dixon would not have exercised his discretion to reprimand Hill had Fultz not made this statement. Dixon testified that if Hill had acknowledged that she was missing a tool, she probably would not have received a written reprimand. J.A. 251A. But, Dixon did not testify that he based his belief that Hill was not being candid on Fultz’s statement about the tool being taken home. Rather, as Dixon’s testimony clearly demonstrates, his concern was Hill’s refusal to admit to him that she had misplaced the tool:
Q: [Fultz] said that Ms. Hill had said that she had talked to you about [the tool] and told you that she had taken it home?
Yes, sir.
And, of course, she hadn’t? ¿O
Yes, sir. í>
But you don’t know whether or not she said that to Mr. Fultz? «O
A: That’s hearsay of what he told me.
Q: Did that alarm you that she had made that statement?
A: It kind of made me mad.
Q: Sure. Because she wasn’t telling the truth.
*689Wasn’t telling the truth and severe the deal of missing tools [sic].
Okay.... In your mind if she’d said that statement that Mr. Fultz attributed to her, she would have been dishonest? <y
Yes, sir. <j
And ... the fact that you thought she was being dishonest about it played a role in the discipline, didn’t it? <y
Yes, sir. >
And, of course, you relied on Mr. Fultz to be honest because that’s a serious accusation when an employee is being dishonest? ¿O
That’s right. <J
Well, if she hadn’t been dishonest, you would have treated her in a different way, wouldn’t you? &
... If she’d acknowledged, “yes, I’m missing a tool,” wouldn’t nothing ever been said.
Okay. She wouldn’t have been written up at all, would she? <3?
Probably wouldn’t’ve been wrote up at all.
Okay. When did you ... first talk to Mrs. Hill about it?
I talked to her the next morning, I believe. And in her box at that time was a tool. She said it was ... there, she had her tools.
Okay. a?
But I — at the time talking to her, I had the tool in my desk. <i
You wrote down in [the reprimand] that ... you showed her the cutters and she denied that they were hers? <y
Yeah. At first she did. [>
Did she acknowledge it later that they were? <©
Could be hers. t>
Q: Could be hers. Acknowledged that it had her number of it?
A: Yeah. Had her number and—
Q: Okay. So she did acknowledge it?
A: Yeah. After I—
Q. But based on the history of this, you went ahead and wrote her up and suspended her?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So if she hadn’t’ve lied to Mr. Fultz and told [him] that she had did that and then she had come in and ultimately acknowledged that these were hers, you wouldn’t have written her up?
A: I wouldn’t. There wouldn’t’ve been nothing said.
Q: Because ultimately she did acknowledge it. Right?
A: Yes, sir.
J.A. 251-253. Thus, after Fultz told Dixon about his encounter with Hill, Dixon independently investigated the matter by meeting with Hill and giving her the opportunity to tell her side of the story. At the time, Hill had replaced the missing tool in her toolbox and told Dixon she had all of her tools. When presented with the tool in Dixon’s possession that bore her number, Hill only acknowledged that it “could be hers” and gave Dixon no reason to disbelieve Fultz’s version of the events.
Hill’s testimony also contradicts the claim that Dixon based his decision that Hill was not being candid upon Fultz’s statement. Hill admits that, at the time Dixon was called upon to make a decision, she only acknowledged that the cutters “had my number on them,” and “that’s all I said.” J.A. 78. Even during her deposition, Hill would only acknowledge that the cutters were “most likely” hers. J.A. 81. And, when she was asked in her deposition *690directly whether she had, in fact, lost a pair of diagonal cutters, Hill again refused to own up, testifying instead that, “I had so many, I actually could not answer that.” J.A. 78. Later, Hill admitted that she had only owned three pairs of cutters before Dixon gave her the disputed pair, and that she only had three pairs afterwards. But, even then Hill would only admit that she lost a pair of cutters, not that pair of cutters, and she raised the possibility that another person could have etched her number on the pair of cutters that was in Dixon’s possession. Of course, even if that were true, a pair would still be missing. Given the fact that the very purpose of the tool policy is to ensure that tools are not misplaced in an aircraft where they could wreak havoc and perhaps tragedy, one hardly wonders why Dixon felt it important that his aircraft mechanics be candid when confronted by him about missing tools.
In sum, Hill has presented insufficient evidence to support' a finding that Fultz’s discriminatory animus caused her to be reprimanded for her violation of the tool control policy or that Fultz’s alleged discriminatory motives should be imputed to Dixon. The most that can be said is that Hill created a factual dispute as to whether Fultz discussed the missing tool with her because she has now submitted an affidavit disclaiming any such conversation took place. But, Hill has failed to present any evidence that she challenged that conversation at the time Dixon made his independent decision to reprimand her for her loss of the cutters or to substantiate her current claim that Dixon would not have issued the reprimand had Fultz not told him about his alleged conversation with Hill. Given Hill’s own testimony, it is patently obvious that Dixon’s conclusion that Hill was “less than candid” and that a reprimand was warranted did not rest upon Fultz’s involvement.3 See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (“Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.”). My colleagues conclude that a jury could find that the second reprimand was issued “because of’ Hill’s sex and age because, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Hill, Fultz lied to Dixon about his conversation with Hill and Dixon would not have issued the reprimand had Fultz not done so. In my view, the evidence does not permit such an inference. Accordingly, I would hold that Hill has failed to present sufficient evidence to substantiate a claim that she received her second reprimand “because of’ Fultz’s discriminatory animus.
C. The Third Reprimand (Fort Drum)
Similarly, I believe that Hill has presented insufficient evidence upon which to recharacterize the equally legitimate third reprimand, which was the triggering event for her termination under Lockheed’s SOP, as the product of Fultz’s discriminatory animus.
After Hill completed her three-day suspension for the violation of Lockheed’s tool control policy, she returned to work at Fort Drum. Over the next few days, Hill was issued six installation discrepancy reports by Fultz for MWOs that Hill had signed off on as completed, but which *691Fultz determined to be unsatisfactory. Once again, Fultz took no disciplinary action, nor was he authorized to reprimand or discipline Hill for the discrepancies. Rather, Fultz, in accordance with his job duties, reported each of his perceived discrepancies, via Lockheed’s standard installation “Discrepancy Record.” J.A. 128-31. Dixon, in accordance with his job duties, personally investigated the discrepancy records and checked each before it was corrected. With the exception of one, Dixon independently reached the conclusion that all of the installation discrepancy reports were accurate and legitimate write-ups and Dixon spoke with Hill about each discrepancy. For her part, Hill admitted that four of the discrepancy reports were factually correct,4 and Hill does not question Dixon’s authority to issue the reprimand on that basis.
Accordingly, Hill is again faced with the burden of producing sufficient evidence that this valid reprimand, issued by Dixon based on her admittedly inadequate work performance, was rendered discriminatory because Fultz issued the installation discrepancy reports upon which it was based. Hill asserts that she has met this burden because she believes the discrepancy reports issued by Fultz, although accurate, were “nit-picky and trivial,” J.A. 83, and that, because they were issued during the same time period that Fultz was uttering discriminatory statements that she had complained about to Dixon, a jury could find that she received the reprimand “because of’ her sex and age. I disagree.
As an initial premise, I note that Hill has presented no evidence that similarly situated male or young employees were not issued discrepancy reports for the same or similar deficiencies in their work performance, or that they were not issued written reprimands once such discrepancy reports were verified by the lead person. On the contrary, Hill testified that Fultz had written “many diserepancfy]” reports for faulty work completed by other mechanics at the Fort Drum worksite during their assignment there, at least one of which resulted in the suspension of a male employee, J.A. at 94-95, and Hill’s supervisor at Fort Bragg had issued her first reprimand based upon a single discrepancy report by the safety inspector there.
In addition, even if I accepted the proffered inference that Fultz only issued the reports because of his discriminatory and retaliatory animus towards Hill, I could not agree with the conclusion that this improper animus can be imputed to Dixon. Dixon acted without any personal animus and did not rely solely upon the word of Fultz or “rubber stamp” his findings. The reprimand was issued by Dixon only after Dixon independently verified the accuracy of the discrepancy reports. And, Hill’s argument ignores the fact that Dixon, after verifying the accuracy of the reports, independently determined that the infractions were sufficiently serious to warrant *692not only a written reprimand, but the third reprimand that would trigger Hill’s termination. Thus, any causal connection between Fultz’s animus and the reprimand was broken.5
For similar reasons, I am unpersuaded that summary judgment should be withheld simply because the reprimand might not have been issued by Dixon in the absence of Fultz’s discriminatory animus towards Hill. Even if true, this is an insufficient basis upon which to impose liability upon an employer who independently verifies such reports. Otherwise, an unbiased employer could never discipline or terminate an employee for an undisputed violation of company rules, including such egregious things as fighting or stealing (or endangering the lives of those who fly on aircraft to which a mechanic has carelessly attended), so long as the employee can demonstrate that she was “turned in” by a subordinate employee “because of’ a discriminatory attitude.
D. The Termination
This leaves for consideration Lockheed’s ultimate decision to terminate Hill, which rested primarily with Griffin, the senior site supervisor for Lockheed’s east coast jobsites, and Prickett, Lockheed’s program manager in charge of the contract field teams. As noted previously, Lockheed’s SOP 3.4.2 provides that “[a]n employee who receives a combination of two written reprimands not involving a suspension and one involving a suspension (not necessarily on the same rule) will be subject to discharge.” J.A. 110. Thus, after Dixon issued the third reprimand to Hill, he sent her home to await final word on her status. Dixon contacted Griffin, who told Dixon to follow Lockheed’s SOP.
Dixon then forwarded the disciplinary paperwork to Griffin. At this point, the propriety of Hill’s first reprimand at Fort Bragg was wholly undisputed. Hill had not challenged the facts upon which the second reprimand was based, and she was issued that reprimand by Dixon only after he had independently investigated the matter and given Hill an opportunity to tell her side of the story. And, Dixon had issued the third reprimand only after he had independently investigated and verified the discrepancies cited by Fultz and had given Hill had an opportunity to respond to them. In addition to these violations, Dixon testified that Hill was terminated because he “felt like she couldn’t do the job anymore” and that, although he declined to specifically recommend her termination, “that’s what I told the boss, and he said put the paperwork in.” J.A. 150.6 More specifically, Dixon testified that Hill “could do one job today normal. Tomorrow she would mess it up, and ... you’d tell her that she messed this up and then she’d correct it.... This airplane may be *693fine. The next one may be off.” J.A. 146. Also, at the time Griffin was presented with this valid paperwork, he was personally aware of the general dissatisfaction Hill had engendered on prior jobsites.
For his part, Fultz had no direct supervisory authority over Hill, but he was in a position to observe the quality of Hill’s job performance and to comment upon it. However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Hill, Hill has merely demonstrated that Fultz was consulted by Griffin and that Fultz, who was critical of Hill’s work performance, essentially agreed with Dixon’s unbiased assessment of Hill’s deficiencies. In my view, this does not support the conclusion that Fultz was “principally responsible” for Hill’s termination, or that the formal decisionmak-ers merely “rubber-stamped” Fultz’s decision. There is no evidence that Fultz voiced any discriminatory statements or opinions to the formal decisionmakers when he reported Hill’s infractions of Lockheed’s safety rules and quality standards or when he was contacted by Griffin. Accordingly, I would hold that Hill has presented insufficient evidence to impute Fultz’s discriminatory motives to Dixon, Griffin, or Prickett, who clearly made independent and admittedly unbiased decisions to discipline and terminate Hill for her violations of Lockheed’s safety and quality standards.
E. Conclusion
To conclude, I would not impose liability under Title VII or the ADEA upon an employer for the discriminatory motives of a subordinate employee simply because that employee has played a role, even a significant one, in the process that led to the employment decision. In my view, the plaintiff should be required to present evidence that the subordinate was the “actual decisionmaker,” or the one “principally responsible,” for the decisions leading to her termination because the formal decision-makers merely rubber-stamped his decisions. I am satisfied that Hill has failed to do so.
To the extent Fultz initiated the process which led to the final two reprimands, he was only “principally responsible” for bringing Hill’s shortcomings to light. Fultz was in a position to inspect Hill’s work and to report safety and work quality violations to her direct supervisor, Dixon, and ultimately to Griffin. But even if Fultz was motivated to report Hill’s infractions in part by discriminatory animus, this is not the situation the Supreme Court contemplated in Reeves, in which the “actual decisionmaker” was married to the formal decisionmaker and “exercised ‘absolute power’ within the company.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 152, 120 S.Ct. 2097.7
*694Nor do I believe Hill has demonstrated that Prickett, Griffin, and Dixon were essentially rubber stamps for Fultz or that Lockheed chose to hide behind its formal decisionmakers. By Hill’s own account of the events leading up to her termination, it was Dixon, the lead person and Hill’s direct supervisor, who was “principally responsible” for each of the challenged decisions in this case. Dixon issued the final two reprimands only after he independently investigated the underlying bases and gave Hill an opportunity to respond. Dixon sent Hill home to await word as to whether she would be terminated in accordance with Lockheed’s policy, and that decision was only made after Griffin, who had been advised of performance problems prior to Hill even going to Fort Drum, had received documentation of the three reprimands and word from Dixon that her performance problems had continued and that her work quality was unreliable. Fultz was asked to work with Dixon to prepare a written report documenting deficiencies, which was forwarded to Griffin.8 However, the mere fact that a biased subordinate’s opinion is solicited during the course of an investigation taken by nondiscriminatory formal decisionmakers should be, in circumstances such as these, insufficient to overcome the fact that the formal decisionmakers reached an independent, non-biased decision.
Under today’s decision, if a plaintiff presents evidence that a subordinate employee was motivated to report wrongdoing “because of’ the other’s protected traits, that discriminatory animus will be imputed to the employer even though unbiased decisionmakers independently investigate and verify the violation, the employee admits the violation, the employer has a preexisting policy of taking the precise employment action as a consequence of the reported violation, and there is no evidence that the employer enforces that policy in a discriminatory fashion. Suppose, for example, Fultz had reported that Hill was stealing from Lockheed and Hill confessed when confronted by Dixon. Griffin, after consulting with Fultz and Dixon, hears nothing to militate against Hill’s termination, and Lockheed fires her. *695Fultz will have single-handedly caused Hill’s termination, because he turned her in. Indeed, he has done more than “substantially influence” the outcome; he has precipitated the termination. Under today’s holding, Lockheed would be denied summary judgment under the theory that Fultz’s statements demonstrating a discriminatory animus should be imputed to Dixon, Griffin, and the other decisionmak-ers, rendering Hill’s termination a violation of Title VII if the jury believes that Fultz was motivated to turn her in because of his discriminatory animus. In my .view, Title VII and the ADEA were not intended to impose this burden upon employers.
In sum, I believe that Hill has presented insufficient evidence that Fultz was the “actual decisionmaker” or otherwise “principally responsible” for her discipline and termination, and insufficient evidence that either Prickett, Griffin, or Dixon acted as a mere “rubber stamp” or “cat’s paw” for Fultz’s discriminatory decisions. Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Lockheed.
IV.
Hill’s retaliation claim fails for the same reason that her discrimination claims fail. Hill complained to Dixon about her treatment at the hands of Fultz. Hill asserts that she told Dixon that Fultz kept calling her an “old and useless” woman; Dixon asserts that Hill only told her that Fultz was picking on her and yelling at her. The difference in the recollection of the two, however, is unimportant because, even if we assume that Hill complained to Dixon of the age and sex comments, it is undisputed that Dixon talked to Fultz about the complaint and that Dixon did not discipline or recommend Hill’s termination in retaliation for her complaints against Fultz.
Although Hill claims that Fultz retaliated against her by writing her up for a series of infractions, Hill admits that infractions were committed, Dixon personally verified that they were committed, and Dixon independently determined that the write-ups were properly issued. There is no evidence that similar infractions were overlooked when it came to other employees; indeed, the evidence is to the contrary. In addition, Hill herself testified that she believes she would have been terminated even if she had not complained to Dixon.9 And, Hill has presented no evidence that Griffin or Prickett knew of her complaints about Fultz.
V.
In view of my belief that Hill has failed to. demonstrate that Fultz was the “actual decisionmaker,” or that his motivations could otherwise be fairly imputed to the formal decisionmakers, I would not reach the issue of whether the remarks made by Fultz were sufficiently “direct” to invoke the more favorable standards of employer liability available in mixed-motive cases. Because I write in dissent, however, I note briefly my reservations regarding this holding as well.
*696In order to establish a discrimination claim by direct evidence, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to produce “evidence of conduct or statements that both reflect directly the alleged discriminatory attitude and that bear directly on the contested employment decision.” Taylor, 193 F.3d at 232; see Fuller, 67 F.3d at 1142. The plaintiff “must produce evidence that clearly indicates a discriminatory attitude at the workplace and must illustrate a nexus between that negative attitude and the employment action.” Brinkley, 180 F.3d at 608 (emphasis added); see also Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir.1999) (explaining that direct evidence is “evidence that can be interpreted as an acknowledgment of discriminatory intent by the defendant” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Indurante v. Local 705, Int’l Bhd. Teamsters, AFL-CIO, 160 F.3d 364, 366 (7th Cir.1998) (explaining that direct evidence is “the sort of evidence of discrimination that in itself entitles [a plaintiff] to take [her] case to a jury without disproving [the defendant’s] stated rationale for firing [her]”).
“[Wjhether a case is a pretext or mixed-motive case ultimately hinges on the strength of the evidence establishing discrimination.” Fuller, 67 F.3d at 1143. In Price Waterhouse, the Court found direct evidence of discrimination where partners, who were directly involved in deciding whether the plaintiff would be allowed to join them, were heard to describe the plaintiff as “macho” and as “overcompen-satfing] for being a woman,” and directly urged plaintiff directly to “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.” Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 277, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (O’Connor, J„ concurring); see also Rose v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 257 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir.2001) (finding that plaintiff was entitled to a Price Waterhouse charge where plaintiffs direct supervisor, the superintendent of the school, had specifically threatened to replace plaintiff with someone “younger and cheaper” on two occasions and later recommended to the school board that she be demoted).
In Reeves, by contrast, the Supreme Court did not employ the Pnce Waterhouse direct evidence inquiry to evaluate the discriminatory statements and actions of a lower-level supervisor who recommended the plaintiffs termination, even though the supervisor had told plaintiff “that he was so old he must have come over on the Mayflower” and that he “was too damn old to do his job.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Rather, the Court concluded that the district court properly submitted the case to the jury because the plaintiff, in addition to establishing a prima facie case and creating a jury issue as to the falsity of the employer’s explanation, had produced additional evidence that the supervisor, who was manned to the ultimate decisionmaker, was the “actual decisionmaker behind [the] firing,” id. at 152, 120 S.Ct. 2097, and was “principally responsible” for the firing, id. at 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097.
We, too, have more narrowly construed the circumstances under which the general discriminatory statements of nondecision-makers and other subordinates should be considered as direct evidence of discrimination by the employer. For example, in Brinkley, we held that the discriminatory statements by a subordinate who was very popular and highly valued by the ultimate decisionmakers, to the effect that he would have difficulty working for a woman, were insufficient to establish by direct evidence that plaintiff was demoted and terminated because of her sex. See Brinkley, 180 *697F.3d at 608-09. In Tuck, we noted that the discriminatory statements of a supervisor, who had recommended and influenced the termination decision, to the effect that he “wanted to get rid of the older people and replace them with ‘young blood,’ ” and that the company needed “younger people,” Tuck, 973 F.2d at 373, were best evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas framework rather than as direct evidence of discrimination, see id at 375. And, in Taylor, we rejected the plaintiffs claim that the police chiefs statement that “he was never going to send a female to the Academy” was direct evidence of discrimination because the statement did not “bear directly on the contested employment decision ... not to send [plaintiff] to the Police Academy” and the police chief made the statement in response to another employee’s question as to whether plaintiff would be attending. Taylor, 193 F.3d at 232 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, Fultz made several comments to the effect that Hill was old and useless and that she should retire. There is no evidence, however, that Fultz told Hill “I’m going to get you fired because you are old and female.” Majority Op. at 666. Fultz’s statements may well have evidenced a- discriminatory attitude towards Hill because of her age and sex, but the statements did not “bear directly on the contested employment decision.” Taylor, 193 F.3d at 232 (internal quotation marks omitted). For the reasons already explained in detail, I believe Hill has failed to “Alústrate [the required] nexus between that negative attitude and the employment action.” Brinkley, 180 F.3d at 608. Accordingly, I am unconvinced that Fultz’s statements rise to the level of the direct evidence necessary to invoke the mixed-motive method of proof under Price Waterhouse.
VI.
In my view, the case comes down to this. Fultz made discriminatory remarks about Hill and later reported her for various workplace violations. If the decisionmak-ers in the discipline process had simply taken Fultz’s word that there was wrongdoing on Hill’s part and Hill disputed that wrongdoing, then Hill might well have a valid basis to present her Title VII and ADEA claims to a jury.
But that is not what Hill’s evidence demonstrates. Instead of blindly taking Fultz’s word for it, Dixon personally verified the reports of wrongdoing. He met with Hill face to face, advised her. of the reports against her, and gave her opportunities to deny or disprove them. For Hill’s work quality errors, he also personally observed Hill’s work and confirmed that it was done improperly. These independent investigations by the supervisor allowed him to make an unbiased decision that removed any taint of discrimination that might have otherwise attached to the reports by Fultz. It was these unbiased decisions that were forwarded for review to Griffin, a member of management who Hill concedes also acted without discriminatory bias. Under these undisputed facts, I cannot conclude there is any basis for imputing liability to the company. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
. I have treated the question of whether a subordinate employee such as Fultz is an "actual decisionmaker” as the threshold inquiry. If the plaintiff presents sufficient evidence upon which the jury can conclude that the formal decisionmaker acted as a “rubber stamp” for the subordinate's recommendation or decision, then we may proceed to the determination of whether the subordinate’s statements are properly viewed as "direct” evidence that an illegitimate factor was a motivating factor in his decision and, therefore, *686whether tire "mixed-motive” or the "pretext” method of proof is the appropriate one to employ.
. Actually, Hill had received two prior reprimands on a Lockheed jobsite in 1995. Because these reprimands had apparently been removed from Hill's record pursuant to Lockheed's SOPs, they were not considered under SOP 3.4.2. The reprimand issued at Fort Bragg, therefore, was considered to be the first reprimand for purposes of the termination decision.
. I also disagree that Hill was blindsided by Dixon's question because Fultz had not questioned her. The tool control policy requires employees to report missing tools to their supervisor; Fultz was under no obligation to question Hill first. Even if Hill was unaware that she was missing a tool, Hill was presented with a pair of cutters with her identification mark on them and the account of Fultz's involvement that she now disputes. Hill has offered no evidence that she was blindsided by Dixon's simple inquiry as to whether the cutters were or were not hers.
. Hill’s specific testimony on this point is as follows:
Q. And these documents are called discrepancy records?
A. Right.
Q. What is a discrepancy record?
A. It's something that is done wrong or not done.
Q. I understand your point that some of these, you believe, are nit-picky?
A. Very nit-picky and trivial.
Q. My question: Are they accurate? I mean, is he right that this is, in fact, what happened, that they weren't done correctly even if you believe it was trivial?
A. Okay. Yeah.
J.A. 82-83.
. I am also unpersuaded by Hill's argument that Fultz was the “actual decisionmaker” because Dixon allegedly told Hill that he had no power to override Fultz's actions under the SOP. Viewing Dixon's alleged statement to Hill in the light most favorable to her, it is at best evidence that Dixon was not authorized to arbitrarily override a legitimate and accurate discrepancy report issued by a Lockheed safety inspector charging an aircraft mechanic with improper completion of an aircraft modification work order. And, even if true, it does not alter Dixon's ability to evaluate, and verify or reject, discrepancy reports when exercising his sole authority to impose disciplinary action upon the aircraft mechanics under Lockheed’s SOP.
. I do not find Dixon's testimony to be inconsistent on this point. In my view, it is not inconsistent for a direct supervisor of an employee subject to termination due to work performance problems to candidly convey his criticisms to a formal decisionmaker, yet decline to specifically recommend the ultimate termination decision.
. In this regard, I note that Tuck v. Henkel Corporation, 973 F.2d 371 (4th Cir.1992), does not compel a different result. There, the employer, Henkel, contended that formal de-cisionmakers had fired Tuck because they redefined the job duties of his position as plant manager and found him to be no longer qualified. Tuck, on the other hand, alleged that his former supervisor had demonstrated age-based bias and influenced his termination.
We evaluated Tuck’s claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework and concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate for two reasons. First, Tuck had established a prima facie case, including its requirement that he was performing his job at a level that met Henkel's legitimate expectations at the time he was discharged. Hill has not. Second, unlike Hill, Tuck had presented an abundance of evidence that the employer’s proffered reason was pretextual. In addition to "some probative evidence that [his former supervisor] was biased against older workers and ... influenced” the actual decisionmak-ers to terminate him, id. at 376-77, Tuck presented undisputed evidence that Tuck’s, first replacement was over 20 years younger that Tuck (and arguably no more qualified), *694and that the second replacement was clearly no more qualified than Tuck, see id. at 375-76, as well as "strong anecdotal evidence ... that Henkel fire[d] its employees before they reach [ed] retirement age.” Id. at 376. Of particular significance, the Director of Human Resources was only able to remember two Henkel employees — both high-ranking officers — who had reached retirement age at the company, and another employee testified that "Henkel’s well-known reason for this practice [was] to save on retirement benefits.” Id. Accordingly, we held, "[i]f it is Henkel's position that it fires older employees ‘merely’ to save on pension benefits, then the jury should be given the opportunity to consider such a policy as evidence of age discrimination." Id.
In sum, Tuck is hardly dispositive precedent for a determination that the comments by Fultz, who was not a direct supervisor of Hill, can be construed as direct evidence under Price Waterhouse that Hill was terminated by Lockheed "because of” her sex or age and not "because of” the admitted performance deficiencies that had been verified by the non-biased decisionmakers within the company.
. Fultz denied ever talking to Griffin about Hill during the time Griffin was reviewing Hill's infractions of company policy. Since Griffin testified at deposition that there was some discussion between them, I accept at this stage the testimony of Griffin, and I agree with my colleagues that an adverse inference can be drawn as to Fultz from his denial. However, I do not view this inference as sufficient to prevent summary judgment for Lockheed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Whatever this evidence may say about Fultz, the fact still remains that there is no evidence that Griffin acted with any discriminatory animus, and Hill agrees that Griffin had no such bias. Additionally, I note that the statement Fultz prepared for Griffin is devoid of discriminatory remarks.
. Hill’s testimony on this point is as follows:
Q: Was [Fultz] mad at you because you had complained to Mr. Dixon?
A: That, I don't know. That was my assumption on that.
Q: But you don’t have any evidence to support that?
A: No.
Q: Do you think you would have been terminated if you had not complained to Mr. Dixon?
A: Oh, yeah.
Q: Do you think you would have been terminated either way?
A: Yeah.
J.A. 106 (emphasis added).