with whom Chief Judge MAYER and Circuit Judges PAULINE NEWMAN, GAJARSA, LINN, and DYK join, dissenting.
As I read it, the majority opinion gives short shrift to a well-established proposition of law: a money-mandating statute or regulation provides a basis for a cause of action under the Tucker Act. The corollary to that proposition is equally well-established: the statute of limitations barring such cause of action begins to run from the *1321time of an adverse decision under the statute or regulation, not before. The majority’s failure to properly apply these propositions to the case before us leaves me with no alternative but to respectfully dissent.
Gabriel Martinez petitioned the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (hereafter Board or Correction Board) for relief from the terms of his discharge from the Army. The Board denied his request. Martinez subsequently filed a complaint in the Court of Federal Claims alleging that the decision of the Board was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion. At the time he filed his suit, more than six years had elapsed since the date of Martinez’s initial discharge, though not from the date of the decision of the Correction Board.
Constrained by our precedent, specifically Hurick v. Lehman, 782 F.2d 984 (Fed.Cir.1986), the Court of Federal Claims dismissed the complaint as time-barred by the statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2501, on the ground that the statute runs from the date of discharge, not from the date of the Board’s decision.
As a matter of law, that rule is no longer supportable, if it ever was. The statutes and regulations applicable to the Army Correction Board leave little doubt that they are “money-mandating”; a complaint such as Captain Martinez’s challenging the correctness of a decision of the Board properly lies under the Tucker Act, and the statute of limitations must necessarily run from the time of the Board decision. Applying the correct law to the facts of the Martinez case, the judgment of the Court of Federal Claims should be reversed.
1.
A veteran who wishes to have judicial review of a military service’s decision to discharge him can bring suit in. the Court of Federal Claims. The jurisdictional basis for the suit is the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, which provides that court with jurisdiction over certain kinds of suits against the United States. Included are suits for money “founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).
In United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 96 S.Ct. 948, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976), the Supreme Court explained that the Tucker Act merely confers jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims whenever a substantive right exists; a substantive right is one, independent of the Tucker Act, that is enforceable against the United States for money damages. This concept gave rise to what is often referred to as the requirement that a plaintiff invoke a “money-mandating” source, such as a federal statute or a regulation of an executive department, as part of his cause of action under the Tucker Act. Failure to establish the existence of such a money-mandating source means that the plaintiff fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Gollehon Farming v. United States, 207 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed.Cir.2000); Palmer v. United States, 168 F.3d 1310, 1312-13 (Fed.Cir.1999) (explaining the difference in Tucker Act jurisprudence between a lack of jurisdiction arid a failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted).
If a claim states a cause of action under the Tucker Act, the Act expressly provides that the Court of Federal Glaims may, in addition to the monetary remedy, “issue orders directing restoration to office or position, placement in appropriate duty or retirement status, and correction of applicable records.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2). The Act further authorizes the court tp “remand appropriate matters to any administrative or executive body or official *1322with such direction as it may deem proper and just.” Id.
Under what is known as the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), the same suit, presumably with the same possible remedies, see Bobula v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 970 F.2d 854, 859 (Fed.Cir.1992), can be filed in a federal district court, provided only that the amount at issue does not exceed $10,000. Whether decided in the Court of Federal Claims or in a district court, any appeal from the trial court’s judgment in a suit brought under either of the Tucker Acts will be reviewed on appeal by, and decided under the law of, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2), (3).
Mr. Martinez argues that his cause of action did not accrue until the date of the Correction Board decision, 1995 (initial decision) or 1997 (reconsideration), because he challenged only the Board’s refusal to correct his records and not the Army’s original discharge decision. (His complaint clearly focuses his challenge on the decision of the Correction Board.) Under either of these dates his 1998 fifing in the Court of Federal Claims would be timely, i.e., within six years of the time his cause of action accrued. He asserts that had the court undertaken a review of the merits of his case, that review would be limited to consideration of the administrative record compiled by the Board, citing RCFC 56.1(a), and subject to the traditional administrative law “arbitrary and capricious” review standard.
The Government responds that the Court of Federal Claims, following Hurick, correctly held that Mr. Martinez’s cause of action is based on his alleged wrongful discharge in 1992, not on the Board’s decisions regarding that discharge which occurred some years later. The Government asserts that the Hurick decision rests upon sound principles: (1) Congress has only assented to a Tucker Act suit relating to an allegedly unlawful discharge, and the suit may only be construed as a suit for monetary relief; (2) the long-standing rule has been that a claim for unlawful discharge accrues upon the date of loss of pay or discharge, and thus the claim first accrues on that date, because no other act by either party remains to be performed before suit may be filed; (3) the plaintiff chose to sue in the Court of Federal Claims, and chose to sue for money; his challenge to the Correction Board’s decision is merely ancillary to his jurisdiction-creating pay claim. Thus the denial by the Board does not create a new cause of action.
I do not agree with the Government’s approach to the question of whether a Board decision creates a new cause of action, or with the majority’s approval of that approach. The Government posits that Mr. Martinez’s challenge to the adverse Board decision is merely ancillary to his discharge and, thus, did not create a new cause of action, even if, ultimately, implementation of a Correction Board decision might give rise to liability for damages by the United States. The Government relies for support for its position on United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 23 L.Ed.2d 52 (1969), which reversed a 1968 decision by the Court of Claims.
The King case is hardly support for the Government’s position. First, the case turned on whether the Court of Claims had authority to grant declaratory relief in the absence of a claim for actual, presently due money damages; the Court of Claims thought it had authority to grant the requested relief, the Supreme Court said it did not. That case is not on point with regard to the issue before us. Second, our predecessor court, the Court of Claims, specifically rejected that same argument *1323by the Government regarding the King case twenty years ago, holding that 10 U.S.C. § 1552, the Correction Board statute, provided an independent basis for a cause of action. Blum v. United States, 227 Ct.CL 555, 559 n. 3 (1981).
The point is not whether Mr. Martinéz had a cause of action for an allegedly wrongful discharge when it occurred in 1992; no one says he did not. Nor is the point whether an appeal to a Correction Board is necessarily “ancillary” to an allegedly wrongful discharge, in the sense that without the earlier alleged wrong, there would have been no appeal to the Board; the relationship between the two is obvious. Rather, the question here is whether, at the time of the Correction Board decision, the statutes and regulations governing the Correction Board were “money-mandating” so that, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Testan, the decision of the Board creates as a matter of law a separate cause of action under the Tucker Act. If so, then a complainant has a cause of action under the Tucker Act, a cause of action that arises when the decision is rendered. That is not a question of parsing prior precedent, or of judicial syllogisms. That is a question of statutory and regulatory construction; the answer lies in an examination of the applicable statutes and regulations.
2.
Section 1552 of title 10 of the United States Code provides for the correction of military records and for payment of claims incident thereto. The statute authorizes the Secretary of a military department to correct any military record of the Secretary’s department “when the Secretary considers it necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice.” 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1). With certain limited exceptions, “such corrections shall be made by the Secretary acting through boards of civilians of the executive part of that military department.” Id. Ordinarily a request for correction must be filed within three years after the claimant discovers the error or injustice, but the Board may waive the requirement “in the interest of justice.” Id. § 1552(b).
Importantly, subsection (c) provides that the Secretary “may pay, from applicable current appropriations, a claim for the loss of pay, allowances, compensation, emoluments, or other pecuniary benefits, or for the repayment of a fine or forfeiture, if, as a result of correcting a record under this section, the amount is found to be due the claimant.” In other contexts we have held that a statute using the term “may” rather than “shall” is nevertheless “money-mandating.” See McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.Cir.2002) (“[T]he use of the word ‘may’ does not, by itself, render a statute wholly discretionary, and thus not money-mandating.”); Doe v. United States, 100 F.3d 1576, 1579-83 (Fed.Cir.1996) (holding that the federal moiety statute, though using the term “may” and thereby according the Secretary some discretion, -is money-mandating). However, because of the clear mandate of the regulations adopted by the Army pursuant to this statute, as explained next, it is unnecessary to decide whether this statute alone would be sufficient basis for a Tucker Act remedy.
In the case of the Army, the Secretary has adopted regulations, 32 C.F.R. § 581.3, establishing the Army Board for Correction of Military Records, and the procedures governing the Board’s activities. The chair of the Board is directed to ensure that the applicant receives a full and fair opportunity to be heard, and to certify the record of the proceedings. Id. § 581.3(b)(3). The Board members are instructed to review all applications that are *1324properly before them to determine the existence of error or injustice, id. § 581.3(b)(4)(i), and if persuaded that material error or injustice exists, to direct changes in military records to correct the error or injustice. Id. § 581.3(b)(4)(ii).
Under the regulations, the Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), is responsible for settlement of monetary claims arising from activities of the Correction Board. Specifically, 32 C.F.R. § 581.3, subsection (h), entitled “Claims/Expenses,” provides that “[t]he ABCMR [Correction Board] will furnish DFAS copies of decisions potentially affecting monetary entitlement or benefits. The DFAS will treat such decisions as claims for payment by or on behalf of the applicant.” Id. § 581.3(h)(2)(i) (emphasis added). The subsection further provides that “[t]he DFAS will settle claims on the basis of the corrected military record.” Id. § 581.3(h)(2)(ii) (emphasis added).
Read together, these provisions of statute and regulations leave little doubt that the decision of the Board has direct consequences regarding an applicant’s monetary remedy. A favorable result before the Board mandates that the applicant be paid any monies due him; no discretion exists in the hands of the paymaster, beyond that of determining the correct amount due. This clearly meets the test set out by the Supreme Court: “the asserted entitlement to money damages depends upon whether any federal statute [or regulation] ‘can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.’ ” Testan, 424 U.S. at 400, 96 S.Ct. 948 (citation omitted). (Although not an issue in Testan, the Tucker Act expressly includes, along with an Act of Congress, a regulation of an executive department as a money-mandating source.)
There can be no doubt that once a favorable decision by the Correction Board is rendered, the statute and regulations create an enforceable obligation against the Government, and that no further action by the applicant to perfect that obligation is required. The converse then is true: since the statute and regulations governing the Board processes and outcome are “money-mandating,” a negative decision by a Board that is challenged in a well pleaded complaint as being in violation of law, thus denying the applicant a monetary remedy otherwise due, would constitute a cause of action under the Tucker Act. As our predecessor court stated in Blum v. United States:
We do not agree with [the Government] that Ray [v. United States, 197 Ct.Cl. 1, 453 F.2d 754 (1972)] can be distinguished solely on the ground that in Ray the Board had already ruled in the plaintiff’s favor on disability retirement before the case was filed here. If we were ultimately to find in the present suit that the Board had acted wrongfully in denying plaintiffs request for a review of his retirement classification, and that plaintiff was actually entitled to receive disability retirement, we would have the power, under Ray and 10 U.S.C. § 1552 supra, to grant plaintiff the relief he seeks, regardless of the fact that the Correction Board had refused to take the initiative and correct its own error.
227 Ct.Cl. at 558-59 (footnotes omitted).
Under the plain meaning of the statutes and regulations applicable to a decision of the Army Correction Board relating to an alleged unlawful discharge, there is created a separate cause of action reviewable independently of the original discharge decision. A claim challenging a Correction Board decision relating to a discharge *1325therefore accrues on the date of the Board’s final decision.
Regrettably,, the majority opinion addresses the statutory framework only glancingly, and the regulatory provisions not at all. See Maj. op. at 1314-1315. I do agree with the majority that it is unnecessary to accept the Government’s invitation to review and resolve conflicts in the prior precedents of this court and its predecessor, the Court of Claims. Over the years the cases have dealt with disparate problems, with disparate results.
Some cases involved disability claims, and some involved military discharges as such, rather than the after effects of a Correction Board decision. Some cases appear to announce rules that are in direct conflict, though ultimately not. For example, our predecessor court in the Blum case, cited above, stated without question that § 1552, the statute at issue here, is indeed money-mandating: “10 U.S.C. § 1552 is a statute expressly mandating compensation, and we can enforce it if the plaintiff should have been retired for disability but the Correction Board illegally failed to so find.” Blum, 227 Ct.Cl. at 559 n. 3 (holding that § 1552 was a sufficient basis for stating a claim for relief under the Tucker Act, even though not pled as such). Yet a later decision of this court stated the contrary. See Dehne v. United States, 970 F.2d 890, 894 (Fed.Cir.1992) (“[B]y its terms, section 1552(c) does not mandate pay at all. Rather, it provides for appropriate discretionary payment by the Secretary in certain circumstances.”). The Dehne court held that the veteran had failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted; Blum was not cited. The apparent conflict in the law is resolved by our established rule that earlier precedents must be followed unless changed by an en banc court.
The Court of Claims early on made clear that it had jurisdiction to directly review decisions by the Correction Boards. See Sanders v. United States, 219 Ct.Cl. 285, 594 F.2d 804, 811 (1979) (en banc) (“[W]e have reviewed these board actions with great frequency since 1951 when the present correction board statute became law, explicitly authorizing the payment of claims consequent upon the correction of military records.”). Yet a few cases made a point of noting that when the Correction Board decision involved only partial relief, the court had power to review the case under the so-called half-a-loaf theory, meaning that a complainant was entitled to full relief, not partial, and that justified judicial intervention. See, e.g., DeBow v. United States, 193 Ct.Cl. 499, 434 F.2d 1333, 1335 (1970).
Whatever one wishes to make of the various turns and twists announced in cases decided over several decades, the issue before us remains straightforward: when the Army Correction Board undertook to decide Captain Martinez’s appeal, were the statute and regulations governing the Board such that the consequences of a decision in his favor would be money-mandating? If the answer to that is yes, a petition, in a well-pleaded complaint, seeking review in the Court of Claims from a negative decision states a cause of action under the Tucker Act.
The majority opinion does not explain why § 1552 and the cited regulations adopted thereunder, not to mention prior governing precedent, do not satisfy the money-mandating requirement. What we get is a replay of the Government’s circular argument. It begins with the premise that there is really only one cause of action in these cases, the original discharge cause of action; any further review, such as that of the Correction Board, is “ancillary,” results from, is a consequence of, the original *1326cause of action; therefore there is no second cause of action when the Correction Board wrongfully acts, only the first cause of action being reheard a second time. That of course is entirely circular, since it begins with the conclusion that is the question.
The argument posed in that fashion avoids the fundamental question of the legal consequences that attach to a decision by a Correction Board. The failure to grasp the nettle is illustrated by the majority’s hypothetical, used to illustrate its view of the law. See Maj. op. at 1312. The question is posed whether a decision by an agency official, who has power to grant relief from an agency’s decision, could possibly create a new cause of action, one that is independent of the agency’s earlier decision. The answer given by the majority is “if the agency official denied a particular claim, it would not make sense to say that the denial would give rise to a second accrual of the original claim, so that the statute of limitations for a Tucker Act action on that claim would begin anew as of the date of the agency official’s denial.” That’s it; end of case.
If that argument arose in court, I would ask, “Why not, why doesn’t it make sense? What are the consequences that attach to an affirmative decision by the agency official? Are there statutes and regulations we need to consider? Could the agency official’s decision be considered money-mandating under the law? What about the Blum decision (quoted above), which holds that a negative decision is as much money-mandating as an affirmative one? And what about Sanders and Blum together, holding that Correction Board decisions — your agency official analog — are independently renewable by our court, and that the law governing the Boards is money-mandating?” At the least we would have a lively discussion.1
3.
Martinez’s case does not stand simply on concluding that Hurick was in error, though an error repeated. Even if I were not persuaded that Hurick was wrongly decided, and even assuming that, at the time they were decided, Hurick and other military discharge cases could plausibly have relied on language in Friedman, it is clear today, in light of the now-effective statutes and regulations, that when a Correction Board decides a wrongful discharge case, such decision can be found to create a cause of action that is separate from the original discharge decision. At least that is the conclusion reached by every other federal court of appeals that has addressed the question; these circuits uniformly allow veterans six years to request judicial review of a Correction Board decision.
Other circuits get involved in these cases because a veteran who wishes to have judicial review of an adverse decision of a Correction Board regarding his discharge from the military, but eschews any interest in a money claim against the Government as a consequence of the discharge, has an alternative to a Tucker Act-based suit. Such a plaintiff can seek review of the decision of the Correction Board in a federal district court under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702 *1327et seq. The suit will be decided under the law of, and reviewed on appeal by, the appropriate regional circuit court of appeals. The difference stems from whether the veteran requests a purely administrative remedy — for example, purging of the record, reinstatement, promotion — or whether the veteran as part of the relief sought would be entitled to a monetary award for denied pay.
In the purely administrative remedy context, the action is based on § 702 of the APA, which waives the United States’s sovereign immunity for claims in certain cases involving a decision of an administrative agency. The military services are considered administrative agencies for this purpose.
The Second Circuit addressed the issue in Blassingame v. Secretary of the Navy, 811 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir.1987). A Vietnam veteran sought upgrade of an undesirable discharge to an honorable discharge. The Navy’s Correction Board (as well as its Discharge Review Board, see 10 U.S.C. § 1553(a)) had denied relief. Thirteen years after his discharge, but within one year of the Correction Board decision, suit was brought in federal district court. The district court held, inter alia, that the statute of limitations barred the suit to review the decision of the Correction Board.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding: (1) since the veteran had expressly relinquished his demand for monetary damages, appeal was properly in the Second Circuit, and not in the Federal Circuit under the Tucker Act; (2) the jurisdiction of the district court lay under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), federal question jurisdiction, and APA § 702, waiver of sovereign immunity; (3) the six year statute of limitations for civil actions against the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), applies, but the cause of action accrues at the time of the Correction Board decision, not, as the Government argued and the district court held, from the time of the underlying discharge.
In reaching that conclusion, the Second Circuit reviewed the history of the 1940s legislation establishing the several boards, and the development since then of judicial review of agency action under the APA. The court noted particularly the-emphasis placed by the Supreme Court in Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 78 S.Ct. 433, 2 L.Ed.2d 503 (1958), on judicial review of agency action unless there is clear and convincing evidence that Congress intended to foreclose such review. Blassingame, 811 F.2d at 71.
The court pointed out that the Government’s view to the contrary would in some circumstances preclude altogether judicial review of Correction Board action. That circumstance, the court noted, could occur in a number of ways. For example, by statute veterans have fifteen years to take certain discharge cases to the Discharge Review Board, 10 U.S.C. § 1553(a), and three years after that to appeal the Review Board’s decision to the Correction Board, 10 U.S.C. § 1552(b). Under the Government’s view, a veteran whose board reviews were completed within six years from the date of discharge could obtain judicial review, but a veteran whose board reviews extended beyond that would be denied any judicial review. As the court emphasized, that created disparate results, and was inconsistent with Harmon in that there was no reason to think Congress intended to preclude judicial review of agency action in that fashion. Blassingame, 811 F.2d at 71-72.
The Second Circuit took particular note of the Federal Circuit’s contrary position in Hurick, saying:
Although we acknowledge the vast experience of the Federal Circuit and its predecessor regarding challenges by veterans to their discharges, we note *1328that the leading case relied on by that circuit, Friedman was decided in 1962, before it became clearer over the intervening years that there is a presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action.
Id. at 71.
In reaching its conclusion that the cause of action accrues at the time of the Correction Board decision, not at the time of the underlying discharge, the Second Circuit followed with approval the same conclusion reached in similar cases in the Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits. See Dougherty v. United States Navy Bd. for Corr. of Naval Records, 784 F.2d 499 (3d Cir.1986); Geyen v. Marsh, 775 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir.1985); Smith v. Marsh, 787 F.2d 510 (10th Cir.1986). No circuit other than ours follows Hurick.
The decision of the Second Circuit, citing that of the Fifth, particularly noted that review of a Correction Board decision should be distinct from direct review of the underlying discharge because, although the factual record may be similar, the focus of the former is on the action of the Correction Board rather than on that of the discharge officials. Blassingame, 811 F.2d at 72; Geyen, 775 F.2d at 1308-09. As in the case before us, the Correction Board may consider evidence not in the original record, 32 C.F.R. § 581.3(c)(2)(iii), and, in cases in which the veteran was required to apply first to a Discharge Review Board, it must also consider policy and procedure changes implemented subsequent to the discharge. Geyen, 775 F.2d at 1308-09 (citing 32 C.F.R. § 70.9(c)(1), which provides Army Discharge Review Board standards); see also Blassingame, 811 F.2d at 72-73 (citing 32 C.F.R. § 724.903, which provides Naval Discharge Review Board standards). The issue for judicial review as these courts see it is whether, on the factual record before the Correction Board, its decision was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706; Blassingame, 811 F.2d at 72; Geyen, 775 F.2d at 1309.
In support of the majority’s refusal to change this circuit’s position on the matter, it might seem that, in light of the opportunity provided in these other circuits, there is no particular reason why we should bother to correct our law. But getting a case into a regional circuit under the APA, and avoiding the consequences of this circuit’s Hurick decision, may not be as simple as it first appears. See Mitchell v. United States, 930 F.2d 893 (Fed.Cir.1991). Equally importantly, the current scheme tends to discourage a veteran, who seeks monetary as well as other relief, from exhausting available administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court. A veteran who seeks only correction of his records — for example, when the only issue is whether a discharge should be upgraded from less than honorable to honorable— has six years from the date of a Correction Board decision to file a claim under the APA in federal district court, so there is little reason not to await the Correction Board decision before requesting judicial review. A veteran who challenges the nature of his discharge but whose suit incorporates money damages, however, must file a claim in federal court within six years of his initial discharge. Thus, he may need to file a claim in the Court of Federal Claims or district court before the Correction Board issues its decision, or in some cases before he has even applied to the Correction Board. This can be both wasteful and unnecessary.
4.
In my view, applying the correct law to the case of Mr. Martinez results in his getting his day in court; his challenge to *1329the Correction Board’s adverse decision would not be barred by the statute of limitations.
Mr. Martinez would be free to pursue his argument that the Correction Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously. I believe he has a well-pleaded complaint against the Board. With regard to the Article 15 proceeding under which Captain Martinez was punished, the Correction Board first stated that
nonjudicial punishment [NJP] is appropriate in all cases involving minor offenses in which nonpunitive measures are considered inadequate or inappropriate. It is a tool available to commanders to correct, educate and reform offenders ...; to preserve a member’s record of service from unnecessary stigma ...; and to further military efficiency by ... requiring fewer resources than trial by court-martial.
Then, however, despite its recognition of the usefulness of the Article 15 proceeding in military discipline cases, the Board summarily concluded that “it [is] improbable that anyone would accept the NJP procedure, with its relaxed rules of evidence, if he truly believed that he was guiltless unless they believed that a trial by court-martial would elicit even more damaging information.” Further, the Correction Board, in a one-sentence finding without further explanation, stated that Mrs. Martinez’s sworn statement to the effect that the charges against Captain Martinez were phony was “unconvincing” since “she probably has a vested interest in the continuation of [Martinez’s] career.”
An opportunity for judicial review of administrative action is an essential element of due process. Applied to this case, it would afford an opportunity to test, among other issues, whether the Correction Board’s view, that anyone who was guiltless would not accept the Article 15 Non Judicial Punishment procedure under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, expressed a view of the law inconsistent with basic Constitutional principles, and with the Army’s own rules.2 To deny Martinez this opportunity is to deny a fundamental right, one clearly present under established law. At the same time, the Government would have the opportunity to show, if it can, that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Board’s declaration dismissing Mrs. Martinez’s sworn statement on the basis of a possible interest in Mr. Martinez’s career, a declaration Mr. Martinez alleges is without any record support.
In view of the manner in which I would decide this case, I find it unnecessary to address the other issues raised by Mr. Martinez, and dealt with at length by my colleagues. I respectfully dissent from the court’s failure to provide Mr. Martinez with the process that is his due.
. In response to the dissent, the majority favors us with yet another hypothetical, this time rising all the way to the Secretary of Defense. These are interesting academic inquiries, which might be relevant if they were supported by an explication of detailed statutes and regulations such as those under which the Army Correction Board operates. It is the legal fabric of decision, not the fact that a decision is possible, that determines what qualifies as "money-mandating.”
. See Record of Proceedings Under Article 15, UCMJ, an executed copy of which was in the record before the Board, which states that, before a service member can be punished under Article 15, the deciding officer must be "convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that you committed the offense(s).” DA Form 2627, Record of Proceedings Under Article 15, UCMJ, para. 2, in this case completed and signed by BG Kilmartin. Accord U.S. Dep’t of Army, Reg. 27-10, Legal Services: Military Justice, para. 3-18 (Aug. 20, 1999).