dissenting.
In holding that Petitioner’s counsel’s performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness as measured by prevailing professional norms, the majority engages in speculation and conjecture about what evidence defense counsel’s investigation would have turned up and the nature of various witnesses’ testimony had defense counsel performed in accordance with acceptable professional standards in death penalty litigation. In so doing, the majority resolves all doubts against Petitioner and holds that none of the evidence Petitioner’s counsel might have garnered would have sufficiently impacted the jury’s decision-making to alter the outcome of the penalty phase trial. Contrary to the majority, I believe that the record is too conflicted as to whether potential witnesses would have been willing to testify, and the nature of the testimony is too sparse to permit the formation of a rehable opinion as to whether counsel’s investigation into Petitioner’s family, social, or psychological history was adequate under an objective standard. Thus, I would remand for an evidentiary hearing so that the record could be developed as to counsel’s investigation in this regard, thereby allowing for an informed decision as to whether Petitioner was prejudiced and ultimately denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
Petitioner claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during the penalty phase of the trial by failing, among other things, to investigate into Petitioner’s family, social, or psychological background for mitigating evidence; failing to present Petitioner’s family members, friends, and employer as mitigating witnesses; and failing to prepare Petitioner to testify to mitigating evidence. Petitioner’s case thus primarily turns on whether counsel’s investigation of his family, social, and psychological history was adequate to justify their strategy of presenting a single witness other than Petitioner on Petitioner’s behalf at mitigation. As in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Wiggins v. Smith, — U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2538-539, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003), if counsel’s investigation was -itself inadequate, counsel’s strategic choice of only presenting two witnesses on Petitioner’s behalf at mitigation must also be considered objectively unreasonable under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See Wiggins, — U.S. at -, 123 S.Ct. at 2538-539 (recognizing that “ ‘strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation’ ”) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052).
The majority attempts to distinguish Wiggins by concluding that there is nothing on the record that should have caused counsel to delve deeper into Petitioner’s family, social, or psychological history. However, the majority reaches this conclusion based on the limited nature of the testimony and evidence derived from Petitioner’s post-conviction hearing which, as indicated, is too sparse and conflicted to make such a determination at this point of the proceedings. That is not to say that upon further review by way of an eviden-tiary hearing the result reached by the majority would necessarily be different. But in a case where a petitioner’s life rests *576upon the nature of the evidence presented, it is imperative that the petitioner be allowed to present all of the evidence necessary for the court to make an informed decision. This is particularly so in a case such as this where, aside from Petitioner, the sole witness called on Petitioner’s behalf was a minister whose testimony that Petitioner had expressed that “he knew that ultimately one day he would have to give an accounting of his life to God[,]” may have actually worked against him.
Moreover, even upon this sparse record, there is evidence to indicate that counsel should have delved deeper into Petitioner’s past family, social, and psychological history. For example, at the hearing on the first post-conviction petition, Petitioner testified that prior to trial he provided trial counsel with the names of a number of witnesses who could testify on his behalf, including family members, his Mend Barry Gray, and others who could rebut evidence that Petitioner’s marriage was rocky. A number of Petitioner’s family members and acquaintances testified at the post-conviction hearing. Some of them indicated that they would have offered testimony sympathetic to Petitioner but were not called to testify or were never contacted by defense counsel. The contention of Petitioner’s counsel that a number of the potential witnesses were not inclined to testify is disputed by several of them.
Specifically, Petitioner’s mother, Ruby Johnson, testified that trial counsel did not ask her about Petitioner’s background; however, she also testified that if asked, she would have told counsel and the jury that she did not know of any problems in Petitioner’s marriage, and that he was a hard worker who cared for his family and raised well-mannered children. Likewise, Petitioner’s father, James Johnson, testified at the post-conviction hearing that, if called, he would have testified that Petitioner was devoted to his family and that he was a good son, a hard worker, and a good family man. Petitioner’s father also testified that trial counsel asked him “very little” about Petitioner’s background and schooling, and that when he offered to testify at the mitigation hearing, counsel stated that it would be better not to offer any testimony by family members. (J.A. at 188.)
Petitioner’s brother, James Johnson, Jr., similarly testified that trial counsel did not ask about Petitioner’s background, “[n]oth-ing other than his arrest in Ohio, things of that nature[,]” despite the fact that Johnson had spent a significant amount of time with Petitioner and his family, and that he was willing to testify that he never knew of any problems in Petitioner’s marriage. (J.A. at 188.) Johnson also testified that he advised defense counsel that he was available to testify on behalf of Petitioner at the mitigation trial, but that counsel said “it would be advisable not to.” (Id.)
Petitioner’s sister, Shirley Ward, testified that she was never contacted by trial counsel; however, if called upon she would have testified that Petitioner was a good family man who did not have any problems at home, and that the relationship between her brother and his wife seemed harmonious and happy the weekend before the murder. Petitioner’s other sister, Mary Ward, testified that she told trial counsel she was available to testify at trial and that, if called, she would have testified that Petitioner loved his wife and would not have killed her.
Barry Gray, who had been a friend of Petitioner since childhood, testified at the hearing that he would have informed the jury that Petitioner was a good friend and a hard worker who seemed to care and provide for his family. Officer James Ingram, a deputy jailer with the Shelby County Sheriffs Department, testified at *577the hearing that when Petitioner was incarcerated, “[h]e never had a disciplinary write-up or anything to my knowledge[,]” and that he would have been willing to testify to this effect at Petitioner’s mitigation trial but did not receive a subpoena. (J.A. at 189-90.) David Force, an owner of Force Camping where Petitioner worked, also testified, at the hearing and stated that, if asked, he would have said that Petitioner was a good employee.
Petitioner also presented expert testimony at the post-conviction hearing as to the manner in which background investigations should be performed in capital cases in Tennessee. That is, Jeff Blum, administrator of the Capital Case Resource Center, testified about the necessity of speaking extensively with persons who had contact with Petitioner or his family members. Blum stated that:
We do a fairly extensive search of all the various points of contact an individual would have had sometime in their past life. And through that process, gathering as much written material, papers, files, records that we can in that process toward discovering information we feel may be helpful in mitigation, and at the same time, gathering names of other individuals who may be helpful in testifying on behalf of the defendant.
(J.A. at 191-92.)
Thus, even in light of the record before us, there is clear indication that defense counsel should have investigated further into Petitioner’s family, social, and psychological history before making the strategic choice to present only one other witness aside from Petitioner at the mitigation hearing. The statements made by Petitioner’s family, close friends, and employer provided a basis upon which counsel should have known that further inquiry into Petitioner’s past was needed for the purpose of allowing these witnesses to convince as few as one juror that Petitioner was someone undeserving of the death penalty. Further factual development by way of an evidentiary hearing may serve to support this conclusion thereby establishing that counsel failed to conduct an adequate investigation; this is particularly so where, in addition to the above testimony, the record indicates that counsel failed to obtain any medical, school, or social service records- concerning Petitioner.
Indeed, Respondent does not contest that trial counsel’s performance during the penalty phase of the trial fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Rather, Respondent only contests the second prong of Strickland — Whether trial counsel’s failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence prejudiced Petitioner. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Respondent argues that no prejudice occurred to Petitioner because the evidence merely consisted of family members’ statements that Petitioner was a good family man who had a happy marriage, and a good friend and employee.
The fallacy in Respondent’s argument, however, is that it assumes that the only mitigating evidence trial counsel could have presented was the testimony of Petitioner’s family members, friends, and employer, and it assumes that the nature' of these witnesses’ testimony was adequately developed. A proper investigation into Petitioner’s background and the nature of the witnesses’ testimony may have revealed other mitigating evidence to persuade the jury to sentence Petitioner to life in prison as opposed to death. Because there is no evidence on the record of what an investigation of Petitioner’s background would have revealed, this Court cannot conclude that Petitioner was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence. Thus, this case should be remanded with instructions that *578the district court conduct an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s claim for further factfinding as to the scope of counsel’s investigation and the nature of what evidence, if any, further investigation would have revealed. See Mason v. Mitchell, 320 F.3d 604, 620-21 (6th Cir.2003) (“Because the record as it now stands reflects disputes about defense counsel’s performance with respect to the sentencing phase of [the petitioner’s trial], we remand the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on this issue.”).
Similarly, the majority’s contention that the error, if any, was harmless because testimony as to Petitioner’s character as a loving husband or family man would have opened the door to potentially unfavorable testimony, is also based on speculation. That is to say, on the record before us, it is impossible to conclude that any unfavorable testimony that may have come into evidence by way of favorable character evidence would have unanimously persuaded a jury that the unfavorable testimony outweighed the favorable testimony. See id.
The record before the Court, although needing further factual development, provides clear indication that Petitioner’s trial counsel failed in their responsibility to investigate and present mitigating evidence at Petitioner’s penalty phase trial. Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, it cannot be determined, based upon the present record, whether proper representation of Petitioner at the penalty phase trial would have resulted in a different outcome. Since the record fails to establish whether the scope of counsel’s investigation was adequate under Strickland, it cannot be said at this juncture whether Petitioner was prejudiced by counsel’s performance. Compare Wiggins, 123 S.Ct. at 2538-39. Thus, I would remand for an evidentiary hearing. Only by so doing could we determine whether Petitioner received constitutionally adequate representation before requiring Petitioner to pay the ultimate penalty. See Mason, 320 F.3d at 620-21 (remanding the death penalty petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim for an evidentiary hearing where the record was inadequate to allow for meaningful appellate review as to whether counsel performed an adequate investigation and preparation as to mitigating evidence); see also Griffin v. United States, 330 F.3d 733, 739 (6th Cir.2003) (remanding the petitioner’s § 2255 motion to the district court for an evidentiary hearing where the petitioner “presented a potentially meritorious claim for ineffective assistance of counsel” while noting that the petitioner “deserve[d] the right to develop a record” in order to demonstrate prejudice). I therefore respectfully dissent.