Affirmed by published opinion. Judge WIDENER wrote the opinion of the court, in which Judge NIEMEYER and Judge MICHAEL concurred except as to Part IV. Judge NIEMEYER wrote the opinion in Part IV for the court, in which Judge MICHAEL concurred, and Judge WIDENER wrote a concurring opinion as to Part IV.
OPINION
WIDENER, Circuit Judge:This is the second time we have reviewed defendant Aquilia Marcivicci Bar-nette’s death sentence. In United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 825-26 (4th Cir.2000), we affirmed Barnette’s convictions but vacated his death sentence because the district court erred in excluding the testimony of a defense expert during the sentencing hearing. We remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. 211 F.3d at 826. Upon remand, the district court conducted a sentencing hearing, and a second jury recommended the death sentence. The district court sentenced Barnette to death on August 20, 2002. Barnette appeals from this sentence. We affirm.
I.
Barnette met Miss Robin Williams in 1994, and they began dating. Miss Williams lived in Roanoke, Virginia, and Barnette resided in Charlotte, North Carolina. After dating for about a year, Miss Williams and Barnette began living together in an apartment in Roanoke. The relationship flourished at first, but Barnette and Miss Williams began to argue over the issue of infidelity. According to a neighbor, Barnette abused Miss Williams, and one of Miss Williams’ friends testified at the sentencing hearing that Miss Williams told her that Barnette had slammed Miss Williams into closet doors at the apartment. The relationship ended in April of 1996 after a fight in which Barnette attempted to choke Miss Williams. Barnette moved out of the apartment and returned to Charlotte. On April 29, 1996, Barnette called Miss Williams on the telephone and *780berated her over why she had broken up with him. Barnette became enraged when he learned that Miss Williams was at her apartment with a male friend. Barnette borrowed his brother’s car and drove to Roanoke. Along the way, Barnette filled two containers with gasoline and purchased a baseball bat. Barnette drove to Miss Williams’s apartment and parked on a street near the apartment. Barnette took a pair of pliers, the baseball bat, and the containers of gasoline out of the car and walked to Miss Williams’ apartment.
Barnette used the pliers to cut the telephone wires at Miss Williams’ apartment. Barnette started screaming at Miss Williams and broke a window in the apartment with a baseball bat. Miss Williams’ male friend, Benjamin Greene, testified that he was awakened by Miss Williams’ screaming on the night of April 30,1996, at some point between midnight and the break of dawn. He could not remember the exact time. Miss Williams attempted to call the police, but the phone line was dead. According to Greene, Barnette smashed the windows of Greene’s car and screamed at Miss Williams, telling her that she was going to die tonight and that he (Barnette) was going to kill her. Sergeant R.S. Kahl of the Roanoke city police department testified that Miss Williams told him that Barnette was screaming “die, bitch, die,” and Barnette testified that he did say “die, bitch, die.”
Barnette kicked the door in, but it jammed. Barnette poured gasoline from one of the containers through the door and on a window sill. Barnette set fire to the gasoline and moved away from the apartment. Greene testified that Barnette threw a Molotov cocktail into the apartment. According to Greene, the Molotov cocktail set fire to the living room curtains. Barnette then poured gasoline from the other container onto Greene’s car and set it afire. Barnette testified that he then heard what he believed to be a bullet zip past his ear. He dropped the bat and began running up the road toward his brother’s car. Barnette reached his brother’s car and began to drive away. He stopped to pick up the baseball bat. As Barnette picked up the bat, he could see that the apartment was burning.
In the burning apartment, Miss Williams and Greene could not escape through the front door. Instead, they went to Miss Williams’ bedroom on the second floor, knocked out a window and the blinds at that window, and jumped from the second story window. Greene was unhurt after escaping the fire. Miss Williams suffered second-degree burns on her right arm and second- and third-degree burns on her left arm. She underwent painful treatment and rehabilitation at the University of Virginia Health System in Charlottesville.
After the arson attack, Miss Williams spoke with Investigator K.O. Hubbard of the Roanoke city police department and identified Barnette as the perpetrator of the crime. Miss Williams gave the police Barnette’s address in Charlotte and a description of the car. The Roanoke police obtained felony warrants against Barnette for two counts of attempted murder and two counts of arson/firebombing.
After leaving Miss Williams’ apartment, Barnette drove to Charlotte. Barnette saw his picture on the television news in Charlotte, which reported that he was wanted for a firebombing in Roanoke. Barnette stayed away from his mother’s house in Charlotte and took up residence with his cousin in east Charlotte. Bar-nette did not turn himself in to the police but instead waited for the police to arrest him.
On May 20, 1996, Barnette purchased a 12-gauge Stevens shotgun from a pawn*781shop in Charlotte using Virginia identification with the name of his brother, Mario Vonkeith Barnette. As part of the transaction, Barnette falsely stated on the federal firearms transaction form that he was neither a previously convicted felon nor a fugitive against whom charges were pending.1
The Stevens shotgun was defective, and Barnette exchanged it for a Winchester semiautomatic shotgun. Barnette hid the shotgun under his bed for a week before he cut off a portion of the shotgun’s barrel and stock to “[m]ake it easier to conceal.” Barnette collected shotgun shells, a crowbar, bolt cutters, and a pen flashlight. Barnette stored these items in a bag that he had used as luggage when he went to see Miss Williams. On the day before the murders, Barnette taped the flashlight to his shotgun and coated the lens with a red marker. On the morning of June 21,1996, Barnette awoke after a night of drinking and, as he testified at the sentencing hearing, he came to the conclusion- that this was the day that he and Miss Williams were going to die.
Before midnight on June 21, 1996, Bar-nette collected his shotgun and bag and walked a mile from his mother’s house to the intersection of Billy Graham Parkway and Morris Field Road in Charlotte. Bar-nette testified that he needed to get to Roanoke to see Miss Williams and that he was going commit a carjacking to obtain a vehicle to drive to Roanoke. Barnette threw his bag into the bushes near the intersection, loaded his shotgun, crouched down, and waited.
A car came down to the intersection, with the window down and music blaring. Barnette ran to the car, put his shotgun to the window, and ordered the driver out of the vehicle. Barnette directed the driver toward the location of Barnette’s bag. Once into the bushes and woods adjacent to the road, Barnette took the driver’s wallet and then shot and killed the driver.
The driver was twenty-two-year-old Donald Lee Allen. Barnette shot Allen multiple times and left Allen’s body in a ditch by the intersection. Barnette took Allen’s blue Honda Prelude and began driving to Roanoke.
Barnette drove to Miss Williams’ mother’s house in Roanoke and parked Allen’s car near the house. At morning twilight on June 22, . 1996, Barnette saw Miss Williams come to the front door and let her dog out. Miss Williams’ mother, Mrs. Bertha Williams, then came out to pick up her grandchild from a car that dropped her off outside the house. Barnette then moved Allen’s car to the alleyway behind the house. Barnette got out of the car, removed his shotgun, and walked toward the back door of the house. Barnette moved through a gate in the fence and proceeded to the back of the house where he cut the telephone lines with wire cutters.
Barnette moved around to the kitchen door. He'approached the door and tried to open it. After being unable to open the door, Barnette held back the screen door, held the gun with both hands, aimed at the dead bolt, and began firing. Barnette fired three shells into the door. Barnette entered the house 'and saw Miss Williams standing on the front porch holding the screen door open. After seeing Miss Williams, Barnette reloaded the shotgun.
Mrs. Williams saw Barnette and told Miss Williams to run. Barnette testified that he did not want to go through Mrs. Williams, and he retreated out the back *782door of the house. Barnette testified that he knew that Miss Williams ran out by the front gate because he could hear that gate swinging. Barnette also went through the front gate of the fence. After he cleared the gate, Barnette looked for Miss Williams, and he caught sight of her as she came around the back of the duplex. Bar-nette began to chase her. A neighbor, Sonji Hill, heard the commotion and saw Miss Williams fleeing from Mrs. Williams’ house.
Miss Williams fell twice as she tried to flee through a yard and over a hill. After she fell the second time in the nearby yard, Barnette grabbed her and began dragging her with his left hand while holding the shotgun in his right hand. Bar-nette tried to drag Miss Williams to the car. Miss Hill called the police, but, as she was talking on the phone on her porch, Barnette pointed his shotgun at her and told her to hang up the phone. Miss Hill hung up her phone and went back inside of her house.
Barnette told Miss Williams that he was going to kill her and that he had one shotgun shell for her and one for him. Miss Williams then tried to grab the shotgun from Barnette. As she reached for the shotgun, Barnette pulled back and shot her in her side. Miss Williams lifted her arm up and began to run towards her mother who was coming up the street. As Miss Williams ran toward her mother, Barnette shot Miss Williams in the back. Miss Williams fell right in front of her mother and died a short time later. Bar-nette testified that the reason he did not put the shotgun to his mouth and kill himself at that moment was because he panicked after seeing what the shotgun shells did to Miss Williams.
Barnette went to Allen’s car and began to drive. Barnette drove on Interstate 81 South and arrived in Knoxville, Tennessee. In Knoxville, Barnette purchased some duct tape and a hose. Barnette testified that he attempted suicide by placing one end of the hose in the exhaust pipe of Allen’s vehicle and the other end in the window of the car. Barnette did not complete the attempt. Barnette stole a Tennessee license plate and replaced Allen’s South Carolina plate with the Tennessee plate.
Barnette left Knoxville and drove back to Charlotte. Barnette abandoned Allen’s car at a shopping center in Charlotte on June 24, 1996. Police officers discovered the vehicle that night. In a nearby dumpster, officers discovered Barnette’s shotgun with the flashlight taped to it and a bag containing black pants, a black cap, a white towel, a garden hose, bolt cutters, and a crowbar.
Barnette made his way back to his mother’s house. After meeting with his mother, Barnette prepared to meet agents of the FBI, who arrived at the house after Barnette’s mother telephoned them. Bar-nette was taken to an FBI office and given his Miranda warnings. Barnette confessed to both murders and later rode with agents to the location where he had murdered Allen. Barnette also identified the car that he had stolen from Allen. Bar-nette’s confessions are not at issue in this appeal.
II.
A grand jury indicted Barnette on 11 criminal charges: 1) interstate domestic violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261(a) & (b); 2) use of a destructive device, a firebomb, during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1); 3) using and carrying fire and explosive materials during a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1); 4) making a false statement during the purchase of a fire*783arm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6) & 924; 5) making a firearm by sawing off his shotgun without complying with the provisions of the National Firearms Act, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5821, 5822, 5861(f) & 5871; 6) possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) & 924; 7) commission of a carjacking that results in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(3); 8) using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, namely a carjacking, in which death occurs, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1) & (i)2(l); 9) transporting a stolen vehicle in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312; 10) interstate domestic violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261(a)(1) & (b)(1); and 11) using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, namely interstate domestic violence, in which death occurs, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1) & (i)2(l). After a trial in January of 1998, the jury found Barnette guilty on all counts. Barnette, 211 F.3d at 808. The district court held a sentencing hearing, the jury recommended, and the district court imposed, a death sentence on each of the capital counts, Counts Seven, Eight and Eleven. 211 F.3d at 808. The district court also sentenced Barnette to prison on the non-capital counts.
Barnette appealed his convictions and his sentence. We affirmed his convictions but vacated his death sentence. 211 F.3d at 826. We remanded the case back to the district court for resentencing as to the capital counts.
The district court commenced the sentencing hearing in July; of 2002. The district court seated a new jury. After hearing the evidence presented at this sentencing hearing, the jury returned recommendations for death sentences on Counts Seven, Eight and Eleven. Bar-nette again appeals his death sentences.
III.
Barnette raises several issues for review. In this appeal, he contends: 1) that Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), requires a grand jury, to consider and find statutory aggravating factors to make Barnette eligible for the death penalty under the Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3591 et seq.; 2) that Ring renders the Federal Death Penalty Act unconstitutional; 3) that the district court violated Barnette’s Constitutional rights by excusing a prospective juror who was partial to life imprisonment but could impose a death penalty and by not excusing a prospective juror who was partial to capital punishment and could not say that he could set aside his feelings; 4) that the government’s exercise of peremptory challenges violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); 5) that the government’s victim-impact evidence violated the Federal Death Penalty Act and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987), overruled in part, Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), and denied Barnette his right to a fair and reliable capital sentencing proceeding; 6) that the aggravating factor of “substantial planning and premeditation” was not supported by the evidence and that the district judge erred in answering the jury’s- question concerning this factor; 7) that the aggravating factor of commission of the offense in expectation of the receipt of anything of pecuniary value was not applied properly; 8) that Barnette was sentenced by a juror who had made up his mind about the result in violation of Bar-nette’s right to a fair and reliable capital sentencing, proceeding; 9) that issues previously raised by Barnette and rejected by *784the district court and this court warrant a reversal of Barnette’s death sentence; and 10) that inflammatory, unreliable, and prejudicial evidence infected the capital sentencing decision, allowing the death sentence to be imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or an arbitrary factor, and that the exclusion of rebuttal evidence requires resentencing. We address each issue.
IV.
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, writing for the court on the issue of whether the death sentences are invalid by reason of a constitutionally deficient indictment:
For his first argument on appeal, Bar-nette contends that his death sentences are invalid because the indictment “failed to charge any death-eligible offense, and the death sentences rest upon statutory aggravating factors which were not submitted to and found by the grand jury.” Relying in part on Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), which held that statutory aggravating factors required to render a defendant eligible for the death penalty are the functional equivalents of elements of a greater offense and must therefore be found by the jury, Barnette contends that these functional elements of a capital offense must also be alleged in the indictment. See Jones v. United, States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n. 6, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999) (“[A]ny fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt”); see also United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 299 (4th Cir.2003) (holding that because at least one aggravating factor is required by the Federal Death Penalty Act “to render a defendant death-eligible,” the indictment must allege at least “one such aggravating factor”); cf. United States v. Wills, 346 F.3d 476, 501 (4th Cir.2003) (noting that Ring does not require “aggravating factors to be alleged in the indictment”). Accordingly, Barnette asserts that the death penalties imposed against him on Counts 7, 8, and 11 must be vacated.
Although Ring itself does not address the requirements "of an indictment, the Ring Court made clear that when a statute requires the finding of an aggravating factor as a condition to imposition of the death penalty, the aggravating factor requirement functions as an element of the offense. Ring, 536 U.S. at 597, 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428; see also Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 111, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (reiterating Apprendi’s principle that any fact that “increases the maximum punishment that may be imposed on a defendant ... constitutes an element” of the offense). In addition, the Supreme Court has stated clearly that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that “any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment.” Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n. 6, 119 S.Ct. 1215 (emphasis added). Applying these principles to a prosecution under the Federal Death Penalty Act, we held in Higgs that an indictment for capital murder must contain at least one aggravating factor “[bjecause only one statutory aggravating factor is required under the Act to render a defendant death-eligible.” Higgs, 353 F.3d at 299; cf. Wills, 346 F.3d at 501 (stating that Ring does not require aggravating factors to be alleged in the indictment).
In this case brought under the Federal Death Penalty Act, the jury recommended the death penalty on Counts 7, 8, and 11 of the indictment. In recommending the death penalty on Counts 7 and 8, the jury found as a statutory aggra*785vating factor for each that the government had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Barnette committed the offense “in the expectation of the receipt of something of pecuniary value,” thus justifying the jury’s consideration of the death penalty for those counts. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(8). Barnette contends, however, that the indictment did not allege that statutory aggravating factor and therefore was deficient. We disagree. Count 7 of the indictment alleges that Barnette
with intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, did knowingly, willfully and unlawfully take by force, violence and intimidation, that is, he shot to death and took from the person of Donald Lee Allen, a motor vehicle which had been shipped, transported and received in interstate or foreign commerce, that is, a 1994 Honda Prelude.
Donald Lee Allen’s Honda Prelude represented a pecuniary gain to Barnette at least insofar as it provided him with transportation to Roanoke — transportation for which he would otherwise have had to pay. With respect to Count 8, our conclusion is the same, inasmuch as Count 8 explicitly incorporates Count 7.
In recommending the death penalty on Count 11, the jury found as a statutory aggravating factor that the government had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Barnette committed the offense “after substantial planning and premeditation to cause the death of Robin Williams,” thus justifying its consideration of the death penalty on Count 11. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(9).
Although the allegations in Count 11 of the indictment are not as explicit as those in Counts 8 and 9, they nevertheless provide adequate notice to Barnette that guilt was to be grounded on a finding of “substantial planning.” Count 11 alleges that Barnette
knowingly used and carried a firearm, that is, á sawed-off Winchester semiautomatic shotgun, during and in relation to a crime of violence, for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, that is the act of inter-' state domestic violence set forth in Count Ten above, and in the course of this violation caused the death of Robin Williams, through the use of a firearm, which killing is a murder as defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 1111, in that the defendant, with malice aforethought, did unlawfully kill Robin Williams by shooting her with the firearm willfully, deliberately, maliciously, and with premeditation.
Count 10, which was explicitly incorporated by reference into Count 11, alleges that Barnette
did travel across a state line, that is, did transport himself from Charlotte, North Carolina to Roanoke, Virginia with the intent to injure, harass, and intimidate an intimate partner, Robin Williams, and in the course and as a result of such travel intentionally committed a crime of violence, that is, shot and killed Robin Williams causing bodily injury and death to her.
Although the words “substantial planning” are not used in either Count 10 or Count 11, that language must, as a fair construction, be read into the indictment. See Hagner v. United, States, 285 U.S. 427,433, 52 S.Ct. 417, 76 L.Ed. 861 (1932) (holding that an indictment can be upheld if “the necessary facts appear in any form, or by fair construction can be found within the terms of the indictment”). Count 10 alleges that Barnette traveled from Charlotte to Roanoke “with the intent to injure” Williams. The planned trip was, we take notice, a three-hour journey of just under 200 miles. A fair construction of this allegation in the indictment, therefore, leads *786to the inevitable conclusion that Barnette planned his crime and planned to take the three-hour journey to commit it.
“[Substantial planning and premeditation,” as included in the statutory aggravating factor of § 3592(c)(9), means “ ‘a higher degree of planning than would have the words ‘planning and premeditation’ alone — i.e., more than the minimum amount sufficient to commit the offense.’ ” United States v. Jackson, 327 F.3d 273, 301 (4th Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 896 (4th Cir.1996)). We believe that the allegations in Count 11 that incorporate the interstate domestic violence set forth in Count 10 effectively charge substantial planning and premeditation because the charged conduct included not only the minimum planning necessary to commit the crime but also the planning of a trip of 200 miles to commit it. Such planning, accompanied by the premeditation alleged in the indictment for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111, therefore satisfies us that the indictment sufficiently alleged the statutory aggravating factor of “substantial planning and premeditation.”
Moreover, if the statutory aggravating factors were inadequately alleged in the indictment, the deficiency was in any event harmless in the circumstances of this case. First, the indictment provided at least the factual structure from which the aggravating factors could have been found. Second, the government served Barnette with a formal notice of intent to seek the death penalty under 18 U.S.C. § 3593, in which the government listed the statutory aggravating factors that it intended to prove at the sentencing hearing. Accordingly, Barnette knew as to each capital count precisely what the government would seek to prove at his sentencing hearing. He cannot claim, even in the slightest, that the government ambushed his defense by attempting to prove previously unknown statutory aggravating factors at the sentencing hearing. Indeed, Barnette does not claim a lack of adequate notice. Because the indictment provides adequate notice and also can surely be pleaded as a defense of double jeopardy for any subsequent prosecution of the conduct for which he was found guilty in this case, it is not constitutionally deficient. See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962).
In sum, we reject Barnette’s argument that the indictment was deficient in failing to allege at least one aggravating factor as necessary to subject him to the death penalty. Alternatively, we conclude that any deficiency in the indictment that may have existed was, in any event, harmless in the circumstances of this case.
We concur in the other portions of Judge Widener’s opinion' — Parts I — III and V-XIV — and we concur in the judgment. Judge Michael has indicated that he joins in this opinion and in the judgment.
. Barnette was convicted in 1994 in Mecklen-burg County, North Carolina Superior Court for felonious restraint. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14-43.3.