concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I fully agree that Amaya-Portillo waived any right to appeal his sentence on Sixth Amendment grounds. See United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 170 (4th Cir.2005). I do not agree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that a “felony drug offense” is not an “aggravated felony” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. The majority admits that its interpretation creates an “odd result” in that an offense that qualifies as a “felony drug offense” is nevertheless not a felony. Ante at 435. In my view, neither the relevant statutes nor our case law requires such a result.
The Sentencing Guidelines provide for an eight-level enhancement for unlawful reentry into the United States when the defendant was previously deported after “a conviction for an aggravated felony.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(C). Although the term “aggravated felony” is not defined in § 2L1.2, the application note for that subsection states that “ ‘aggravated felony’ has the meaning given that term in [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) ].” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(C), Application Note 3(A).* Under § 1101(a)(43), the term “aggravated felony” includes “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance ... including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of title 18, United States Code).” A “drug trafficking crime” under § 924(c)(2) is “any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act [“CSA”].” Thus, if cocaine possession is a felony punishable under the CSA, then it is an “aggravated felony” for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. See United States v. Wilson, 316 F.3d 506, 512 (4th Cir.2003).
Because it is undisputed that cocaine possession is punishable under the CSA, we need only determine whether it “amounts to a felony within the meaning of section 924(c)(2).” Id. Section 924(c)(2) does not define the term “any felony.” Indeed, as we noted in Wilson, “[s]ection 924(c)(2) does not contain any internal limitation on its broad reference to ‘any felony’ other than that such felonies be punishable under one of the enumerated *437statutes.” 316 F.3d at 513. ■ The common and ordinary meaning of the word “felony” is “a serious crime usually punishable by imprisonment for more than one year or by death.” Black’s Laic Dictionary (8th ed.2004). Thus, any offense punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment qualifies as “any felony” under § 924(c)(2).
To the extent that the term “any felony” has a specialized meaning in this context, we should consider relevant definitions in the CSA to determine what Congress meant by this term. See Wilson, 316 F.3d at 513 (stating that “[t]he CSA definition of felony, while not itself a part of section 924(c)(2), is nevertheless relevant as an interpretive matter”). The CSA contains two definitions relevant to the issue presented in this case. First, the CSA defines “felony” as “any Federal or State offense classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(13). Second, the CSA defines “felony drug offense” as “an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign country that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, or depressant or stimulant substances.” Id. § 802(44).
The majority asserts that our decision in Wilson precludes any consideration of the definition of “felony drug offense” under § 802(44). I disagree. In Wilson, we addressed the question whether a state law crime that was both classified as a felony under state law (but not federal law) and punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment qualified as “any felony” within the meaning of § 924(c)(2). Using the “clear and unambiguous” definition of “felony” in § 802(13) as interpretive guidance, we held that the state law offense at issue in Wilson was a felony within the meaning of § 924(c)(2) because the offense was classified as a felony under state law. 316 F.3d at 513.
Wilson does not address the issue presented here, i.e., whether an offense that is not classified as a felony but that is punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment qualifies as “any felony” for purposes of § 924(c)(2). Nor does Wilson purport to restrict the meaning of “any felony” to the definition of “felony” in § 802(13). In my view, the definition of “felony drug offense” in § 802(44) is just as relevant to the interpretation of “any felony” as the definition of “felony” in § 802(13).
The alternate definition of “felony drug offense” in § 802(44) indicates Congress’ understanding that offenses punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment— whatever their classification — are considered to be felonies. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) (describing all federal offenses punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment as felonies); Id. § 922(g)(1) (criminalizing possession of a firearm by any person “who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”); U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, Application Note 2 (defining “felony” for certain purposes to mean any offense “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”). Given the purpose of § 924(c) to punish criminals who use firearms “during and in relation to any ... drug trafficking crime,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), I think it unlikely that Congress intended to restrict the meaning of “any felony” in § 924(c)(2) to only those offenses formally classified as felonies. Rather, the term “any felony” under § 924(c)(2) should include all offenses that are either classified as felonies or punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment. In other words, although classification as a felony is sufficient to qualify an offense as “any felony” under *438§ 924(c)(2), see Wilson, 316 F.3d at 513, it is not necessary.
Under Maryland law, cocaine possession is classified as a misdemeanor but punishable by up to four years’ imprisonment. See Md.Code Ann., Crim. Law § 5-601(c)(1) (2005). Because cocaine possession is punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment, it is “any felony” under § 924(c)(2) and therefore an “aggravated felony” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. I would affirm the district court’s application of the eight-level enhancement.
Application Note 3(A) plainly refers to § 1101(a)(43) to supply a definition for the term "aggravated felony,” and the majority's reliance upon the definition of "felony” in Application Note 2 is misplaced. According to the majority, the fact that Application Note 3 does not incorporate the definition of "felony” described in Application Note 2 "indicates that the Sentencing Commission did not intend for potential punishment to be the appropriate measure for determining whether a prior offense constitutes an 'aggravated felony.' " Ante at 433. I disagree. Application Note 3 indicates nothing more than the Commission’s intention to define "aggravated felony” in a manner consistent with the definition of that term in another federal statute. Thus, if the majority wishes to say that the term "aggravated felony” is defined by reference to classification but not potential punishment, then it must say so on the authority of § 1101(a)(43) and not Application Note 2. In any event, nothing in the definition of "felony” in Application Note 2 excludes consideration of potential punishment in determining whether an offense is an "aggravated felony” under Application Note 3.