concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join the majority’s waiver and new-trial holdings. I write separately, however, because I believe that the punitive damages award was not excessive under the Due Process Clause and therefore should be sustained in full.
“Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.” BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991). “In our federal system, States necessarily have considerable flexibility in determining the level of punitive damages that they will allow in different classes of cases and in any particular case.” Gore, 517 U.S. at 568, 116 S.Ct. 1589. “While States possess discretion over the imposition of punitive damages, it is well established that there are procedural and substantive constitutional limitations on these awards. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of *615grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (citations omitted).
Due-process review of punitive damages for gross excessiveness is governed by three “guideposts” announced in Gore, 517 U.S. at 574-75, 116 S.Ct. 1589. The Supreme Court recently summarized these factors: “(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 575, 116 S.Ct. 1589).
A. Reprehensibility
“[T]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (alteration in original) (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 575, 116 S.Ct. 1589). In making the reprehensibility determination, the Court has instructed us to consider whether: “[1] the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; [2] the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; [3] the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; [4] the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and [5] the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.” Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 576-77, 116 S.Ct. 1589).
1. Physical vs. Economic Harm
I agree that the type of harm — physical rather than merely economic — weighs strongly in favor of finding Chrysler’s conduct reprehensible. Moreover, the harm was complete in degree, i.e., death. As this court and others have recognized, a defendant’s conduct is particularly reprehensible when it results in someone’s death. E.g., Gregory v. Shelby County, 220 F.3d 433, 445 (6th Cir.2000); Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747, 757 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 125 S.Ct. 2915, 162 L.Ed.2d 296 (2005); Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 394 F.3d 594, 603 (8th Cir.2005); Stogsdill v. Healthmark Partners, L.L.C., 377 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir.2004); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Barber, 356 Ark. 268, 149 S.W.3d 325, 348 (2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 940, 125 S.Ct. 320, 160 L.Ed.2d 249 (2004); Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 98 Ohio St.3d 77, 781 N.E.2d 121, 140 (Ohio 2002); Cherokee Elec. Coop. v. Cochran, 706 So.2d 1188, 1194 (Ala.1997).
2. Indifference to or Reckless Disregard of the Safety of Others
Under the reprehensibility sub-factor of indifference to or reckless disregard of the safety of others, the district court found the following facts on the way to concluding that “[Chrysler’s] conduct evinces a reckless disregard for the safety of others since it exposed its customers to an untested product”:
[Chrysler] utilized a thin piece of sheet metal as a B-pillar at the door latch striker. [Clark] presented evidence that [Chrysler] knew that the piece of sheet metal was weak and that its strength had been untested. The sheet metal type of B-pillar had been removed from the modem state of the art and state of the industry for over 40 years. Every other modem motor vehicle on the market, including pickup trucks, employed a boxed B-pillar. General Motors had developed a system to test its door la[t]ches to insure they would withstand *616B-pillar twisting, which it shared with [Chrysler]. [Chrysler],however, failed to implement this test, even though it knew that a driver’s risk of death was greatly increased if ejected from a vehicle. Moreover, [Chrysler] knew that B-pillar twist-out was a failure mode known to the automotive industry and in fact the federal government was investigating the B-pillar twist-out problem. Despite this knowledge, [Chrysler] continued to utilize a thin piece of sheet metal in the place of a much stronger boxed B-pillar.... Additionally, [Chrysler] had received information which should have led it to question the safety of this product.
Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 34-35 (Dist. Ct. Op. & Order at 4-5) (emphases added). The lead opinion also recognizes much evidence that supports the district court’s finding that Chrysler’s conduct showed indifference to or reckless disregard of others’ safety. Lead Op. at 6.
Despite this evidence, the lead opinion concludes that Chrysler’s conduct did not reflect indifference to or reckless disregard of the safety of others because “[i] there is no evidence that a boxed-in B-pillar would have prevented the harm suffered by ... Clark, and ... [ii] there is a good-faith dispute over whether B-pillar testing is necessary.” Id. at 7. In light of the unusual circumstance in which the district court judge who presided at trial was not the judge who wrote the opinion we review today, I accept for present purposes giving less deference to the district court’s factual findings. Nevertheless, I cannot agree with the two premises under-girding the lead opinion’s conclusion.
In support of the first premise that “there is no evidence that a boxed-in B-pillar would have prevented the harm suffered by ... Clark,” the lead opinion argues that “[a]lthough Clark’s experts testified as to their belief that the un-boxed B-pillar was weak, they did not conduct any tests to see whether another B-pillar would have prevented a door latch from opening under similar circumstances.” Id. One of Clark’s experts testified that a “box[ed]” or otherwise “properly-constructed” B-pillar would have prevented the twist out and concomitant door-opening. J.A. at 292, 309 (Trial Tr. at 148, 165) (Peterson Test.). In a similar vein, another expert testified that a “state-of-the-art latch” would have prevented the ejection by not allowing the door to open in the accident. J.A. at 140,145 (Trial Tr. at 119, 124) (Gilberg Test.). The testimony of these two experts is more than enough evidence that another B-pillar and/or latch would have prevented the door from opening in similar circumstances.
To the extent that the lead opinion ignores this evidence simply because the experts did not conduct tests, it acts beyond the scope of this appeal. In its prior appeal, Chrysler attacked Clark’s experts for not conducting tests specific to this suit. We resolved the issue in Clark’s favor in our prior opinion, Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 310 F.3d 461, 466-72 (6th Cir.2002), vacated on other grounds, 540 U.S. 801, 124 S.Ct. 102, 157 L.Ed.2d 12 (2003), and the Supreme Court remanded the case to us “for further consideration in light of [State Farm].” Chrysler Corp. v. Clark, 540 U.S. 801, 801, 124 S.Ct. 102, 157 L.Ed.2d 12 (2003). To reject the experts’ opinions here essentially revisits the evi-dentiary issue and therefore exceeds the scope of the Court’s remand, a move that is even more questionable in light of our reinstatement of the evidentiary holding of our earlier opinion.
In support of the second premise that “there is a good-faith dispute over whether B-pillar testing is necessary,” the lead opinion argues that “because the [twist-*617out] test was neither required by the government nor used by other manufacturers, we cannot conclude that Chrysler’s failure to adopt the test indicates a level of indifference to or reckless disregard for the safety of others sufficient to weigh in favor of reprehensibility.” Lead Op. at 7-8. Excusing Chrysler’s failure to adopt the test because of the lack of a government requirement is questionable at best when 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e) expressly provides that “[c]ompliance with a motor vehicle safety standard ... does not exempt a person from liability at common law,” while appealing to the other manufacturers’ failure to use the test ignores the fact that every other manufacturer used the safer boxed B-pillar. Why would these companies conduct tests on the safety of an obsolete part that they did not use? More to the point, why equate these manufacturers’ sensible reluctance not to test a part they did not use with Chrysler’s failure to test a part that it continued to use?1
The ample evidence discussed in the district court opinion, the lead opinion, and this separate opinion reflects Chrysler’s indifference to or reckless disregard for the safety of others. Therefore, this sub-factor weighs in favor of finding Chrysler’s conduct reprehensible.
3. Financial Vulnerability
I agree that the district court erred by holding that Chrysler’s wealth and Clark’s purchase of one of Chrysler’s vehicles automatically put Clark in a financially vulnerable position. Clark has not put forth other evidence of financial vulnerability, so this reprehensibility sub-factor does not weigh in Clark’s favor.
The lead opinion goes too far, however, in disapproving the consideration of a defendant’s financial condition when reviewing a punitive damages award.2 The Supreme Court has never forbidden such consideration. In Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991), the Court approved instructions that permitted the jury to consider, among other factors, “the financial position of the defendant,” holding that they “impose[d] a sufficiently definite and meaningful constraint on the discretion of [the jury] in awarding punitive damages.” Id. at 21-22, 111 S.Ct. 1032 (internal quotation marks omitted). In TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 113 S.Ct. 2711, 125 L.Ed.2d 366 (1993) (plurality opinion), the plurality cited Has-lip approvingly in rejecting the defendant’s contention that the jury impermissi-bly considered its “impressive net worth,” noting that it was “well-settled law” to allow consideration of this factor. Id. at 462 n. 28, 113 S.Ct. 2711. In Gore, the Court observed that “[t]he fact that BMW is a large corporation rather than an impecunious individual does not diminish its entitlement to fair notice of the demands that the several States impose on the con*618duct of its business,” 517 U.S. at 585, 116 S.Ct. 1589, but of course this statement does not purport to address — let alone disturb — the “well-settled law” that it is proper to consider a defendant’s wealth. Finally, in State Farm, the Court noted that “[t]he wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award,” 538 U.S. at 427, 123 S.Ct. 1513, but this statement is best understood in light of a passage it cites: “[Wealth] provides an open-ended basis for inflating awards when the defendant is wealthy .... That does not make its use unlawful or inappropriate; it simply means that this factor cannot make up for the failure of other factors, such as ‘reprehensibility,’ to constrain significantly an award that purports to punish a defendant’s conduct.” Gore, 517 U.S. at 591, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (Breyfer, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (alterations in original), cited in State Farm, 538 U.S. at 427-28, 123 S.Ct. 1513.
We recently summarized why consideration of the defendant’s financial resources is consistent with the purposes underlying punitive damages:
“Since a fixed dollar award will punish a poor person more than a wealthy one, one can understand the relevance of [the defendant’s financial position] to the State’s interest in retribution .... ” The defendant’s financial position is equally relevant to the State’s interest in deterrence, which is also a valid purpose of punitive damages.
Romanski v. Detroit Entm’t, L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629, 647 (6th Cir.2005) (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 591, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (Breyer, J., concurring)) (alterations in original) (citations omitted). Moreover, if a defendant’s financial condition were not considered, defendants with superior resources (and correspondingly more aggressive defenses) could over-deter potential plaintiffs from bringing suit. Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir.2003) (Posner, J.). In light of (i) the Supreme Court’s approval of considering the defendant’s resources and (ii) the logical link between the defendant’s financial condition and punitive damages, it is not surprising that we have taken the defendant’s finances into account when reviewing punitive awards for excessiveness. Romanski, 428 F.3d at 647-48, 649-50; see also Mathias, 347 F.3d at 677.
4. Repeated Actions vs. Isolated Incident
The lead opinion concludes that “there is no evidence that Chrysler repeatedly engaged in misconduct while knowing or suspecting that it was unlawful.” Lead Op. at 8. This conclusion appears to rely principally on two premises. The first is that “there is no evidence that Chrysler knew that its use of the un-boxed B-pillar could cause ... Clark’s injury.” Id. at 9. As discussed in the indifference/reckless disregard section above, there is ample evidence — including much acknowledged in the lead opinion — that Chrysler knew of the dangers of B-pillar twist-out.
The second premise is that there is a lack of “evidence of earlier, similar accidents that might have alerted Chrysler to the problem.” Id. The failure to point to such accidents, however, does not automatically render this reprehensibility sub-factor in Chrysler’s favor. In Gore, where the complained-of conduct was the defendant automobile distributor’s failure to disclose when its new cars had been repaired for minor predelivery damage, 517 U.S. at 562, 116 S.Ct. 1589, the plaintiff argued that the defendant should be treated as a recidivist because it “should have anticipated that its failure to disclose [such] repair work could expose it to liability for fraud,” id. at 577,116 S.Ct. 1589 (emphasis added). The Court rejected this argument, using the following logic. (1) “[Actionable fraud requires a material misrep*619resentation or omission.” Id. at 579, 116 S.Ct. 1589. (2) In deciding whether or not to disclose the repairs at issue, the defendant “reasonably reified] on state disclosure statutes for guidance” as to whether the repairs it did not disclose were too minor to be material. Id. (3) These disclosure statutes “could [be] reasonably interpreted] ... as establishing safe harbors” for the nondisclosure of minor repairs. Id. at 577-78, 116 S.Ct. 1589.(4) Therefore, the defendant reasonably did not anticipate that its conduct would give rise to liability for fraud.
Notably, the Gore Court did not reject per se the plaintiffs “anticipated liability” theory of finding repeated actions. Instead, the Court rejected it on the facts because the defendant had reasonably relied on statutes that could reasonably be interpreted to provide a safe harbor for its conduct. Chrysler can make no such claim here, because 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e) expressly provides that “[compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard ... does not exempt a person from liability at common law.”
In light of its awareness of the dangers of B-pillar twist-out and its knowledge that there were no statutory “safe harbors” for its conduct, Chrysler should have anticipated that its conduct could expose it to liability and punitive damages. Gore implies that such a conclusion would make the defendant a recidivist for purposes of the repeated-action sub-factor; therefore, it weighs in Clark’s favor.
5. Intentional Malice, Trickery, or Deceit vs. Mere Accident
I agree that because (i) Chrysler did not act with intentional malice, trickery, or deceit and (ii) Clark’s death was not the result of a mere accident, this reprehensibility sub-factor is neutral, favoring neither party.
6. Summary
The State Farm Court cautioned that “[t]he existence of any one of these factors weighing in favor of a plaintiff may not be sufficient to sustain a punitive damages award; and the absence of all of them renders any award suspect.” 538 U.S. at 419, 123 S.Ct. 1513. Here, three factors (the harm was physical; Chrysler showed indifference to or reckless disregard of the safety of others; Chrysler’s conduct involved repeated conduct) weigh in favor of Clark; one factor (Clark was not financially vulnerable) weighs in favor of Chrysler; and one factor (Chrysler’s conduct involved neither intentional malice, trickery, or deceit nor mere accident) is neutral. This balance surpasses the sufficiency standard of only one factor in favor of the plaintiff, and it is of course enough to avoid the automatically “suspect” condition when all five factors are absent. In light of the fact that three out of four non-neutral factors favor the plaintiff — especially when those three are the plaintiffs physical injury, the defendant’s indifference toward or reckless disregard of the safety of others, and the defendant’s repeated conduct— Ghrysler’s conduct was reprehensible.
B. Ratio
Judge Restani concludes that a ratio between punitive and. compensatory damages of 13:13 is “not justified” but a ratio *620of 2:1 “is appropriate.” Lead Op. at 10. She reaches this conclusion by presuming that the ratio should be less than 4:1 but more than 1:1, but fails persuasively to justify the choice of these two ratios as bookends within which the instant ratio must fall.
Judge Restani begins by presuming that the punitive-to-compensatory ratio should be less than or equal to 4:1. This ratio is one that the Supreme Court supposedly set as a ceiling in Haslip, Gore, and State Farm. Upon closer inspection, however, it is clear that the Court has never actually said that the 4:1 ratio is a constitutional ceiling. A review of the cases shows that the Court has only intimated that a 4:1 ratio might be close to the line. In Haslip, the Court assessed a punitive damages award of “more than 4 times” the compensatory damages award.4 499 U.S. at 23, 111 S.Ct. 1032. The Court observed that although this ratio “may be close to the line,” ultimately it “[did] not cross the line into the area of constitutional impropriety.” Id. at 23-24, 111 S.Ct. 1032 (emphasis added). The Gore Court cited Haslip for the proposition that a ratio of more than 4:1 “might be ‘close to the line.’ ” 517 U.S. at 581, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (emphasis added). But the Court had no occasion to give greater meaning to the 4:1 ratio, because the ratio in Gore was “a breathtaking 500 to 1.” Id. at 583, 116 S.Ct. 1589. Finally, in State Farm the Court noted that it had said in Haslip and Gore that the 4:1 ratio “might be close to the line.” 538 U.S. at 425,123 S.Ct. 1513 (emphasis added). But once again the Court did not give any special weight to the 4:1 ratio, because the ratio before it was 145:1. In other words, the Court has never explicitly said that a 4:1 ratio actually is close to the constitutional line, just that it might be.
One might object that this distinction between is and might is purely a semantic one, and that the Court really has given the 4:1 ratio a special place in the due process excessiveness analysis. Such a position does not withstand scrutiny, however, in light of the Court’s decision in TXO. There the punitive damages award was “over 526 times as large” as the compensatory damages award.5 TXO, 509 U.S. at 459, 113 S.Ct. 2711. The plurality explained that the relevant measure for comparison was the potential damage, id. at 462, 113 S.Ct. 2711, which lowered the ratio to somewhere between 1.2:1 and 10:1.6 The Court has since characterized the ratio in TXO as “not more than 10 to 1.” Gore, 517 U.S. at 581, 116 S.Ct. 1589; see also State Farm, 538 U.S. at 430 n. 1, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting the Gore Court’s characterization of the TXO ratio); TXO, 509 U.S. at 472, *621113 S.Ct. 2711 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the Court’s decision as upholding a “10-to-l ratio between punitive damages and the potential harm” (emphasis deleted)). When one considers that the Court in TXO upheld a punitive award that, even when charitably interpreted, featured a 10:1 ratio,7 one cannot seriously conclude that the Court really has designated the 4:1 ratio as close to the constitutional line or as a presumptive ceiling.8 See Mathias, 347 F.3d at 676 (“The Supreme Court did not, however, lay down a 4-to-l or single-digit-ratio rule — it said merely that ‘there is a presumption against an award that has a 145-to-l ratio,’ — and it would be unreasonable to do so.” (internal citation removed) (quoting State Farm, 538 U.S. at 426, 123 S.Ct. 1513)).
Having decided that the instant ratio should be less than 4:1, Judge Restani then makes a subtle rhetorical move, devoting the rest of her analysis to explaining why the ratio should be greater than 1:1. Yet just as she did not demonstrate why 4:1 should be the ceiling, Judge Res-tani does not persuasively show why the floor should be so low. She begins by relying on State Farm, stating that the Court “concluded that ‘in light of the substantial compensatory damages awarded (a portion of which contained a punitive element), [... ] a punitive damages award at or near the amount of compensatory damages’ was justified.” Lead Op. at 11 (quoting State Farm, 538 U.S. at 429, 123 S.Ct. 1513). Two aspects of this claim are worth exploring at greater length.
First, this characterization of State Farm overstates what the Court actually said. The Court held that the $145 million punitive damages award was excessive but never reached the issue of what size award would be justified: the Court remarked that the facts of the case “likely would justify a punitive damages award at or near the amount of compensatory damages” but left “[t]he proper calculation of punitive damages ... [to] be resolved, in the first instance, by the Utah courts.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 429, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (emphasis added). Indeed, on remand the state supreme court reduced the award from $145 million to about $9 million, yielding a 9:1 ratio. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 98 P.3d 409, 420 (Utah), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 874, 125 S.Ct. 114, 160 L.Ed.2d 123 (2004). The Supreme Court denied State Farm’s subsequent petition for certiorari. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 543 U.S. 874, 125 S.Ct. 114, 160 L.Ed.2d 123 (2004).
Second, even if the Court was in fact strongly hinting to the Utah Supreme Court that it should remit the punitive award to a 1:1 ratio, it did so “in light of the substantial compensatory damages awarded (a portion of which contained a punitive element).” State Farm, 538 U.S. *622at 429, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (emphasis added). The Court’s parenthetical phrase is no throwaway line — it refers to the discussion of an issue that is highly relevant to the instant case:
The compensatory award in this case was substantial; the Campbells were awarded $1 million [in compensatory damages] for a year and a half of emotional distress. This was complete compensation.... The compensatory damages for the injury suffered here, moreover, likely were based on a component which was duplicated in the punitive award. Much of the distress was caused by the outrage and humiliation the Campbells suffered at the actions of their insurer; and it is a major role of punitive damages to condemn such conduct. Compensatory damages, however, already contain this punitive element. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908, Comment c, p. 466 (1977) (“In many cases in which compensatory damages include an amount for emotional distress, such as humiliation or indignation aroused by the defendant’s act, there is no clear line of demarcation between punishment and compensation and a verdict for a specified amount frequently includes elements of both”).
Id. at 426, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (emphases, including those in the parenthetical quotation of the Restatement, added). In the instant case, the jury awarded Clark $250,000 for the destruction of his earning power; $100,000 for his mental and physical suffering; $100,000 for his wife’s loss of his aid, assistance, services, society, and companionship; $12,778.26 for medical expenses; and $8,480 for burial expenses. J.A. at 424 (Jury Verdict). In other words, the award was not directed at harms — emotional distress caused by humiliation, outrage, or indignation — that the Supreme Court identified as the punitive element of compensatory damages. Because there is thus no concern that “[t]he compensatory damages for the injury suffered here ... likely were based on a component which was duplicated in the punitive award,” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 426, 123 S.Ct. 1513, there is no reason to hew blindly to the 1:1 ratio that the State Farm Court supposedly endorsed.
Judge Restani also attempts to justify the choice of a 1:1 floor by citing two Eighth Circuit cases that reduced punitive awards to a 1:1 ratio. Yet these cases are also readily distinguishable. In Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 394 F.3d 594 (8th Cir.2005), the court remitted the punitive award of $15 million to $5 million where the plaintiff had received a compensatory award of over $4 million on claims that the defendant’s design defect had resulted in his wife’s illness and wrongful death. Id. at 598, 603. As Judge Restani concedes, however, the compensatory award in the instant case— approximately $471,000 or $236,000, depending on one’s choice of the appropriate baseline — is not as substantial as the compensatory award in Boerner. Indeed, the compensatory award in Boerner was 8.54 or 17.08 times larger than the compensatory award here. This disparity between the compensatory awards in Boerner and in the instant case would seem to militate against using the 1:1 ratio as a baseline. In Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790 (8th Cir.2004), the court remitted the punitive award of over $6 million to $600,000 where the plaintiff had received a compensatory award of $600,000 on a hostile work environment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Id. at 793, 799. Although the misconduct of those who commit workplace harassment and the harms endured by their victims should not be minimized, it cannot seriously be questioned that the harm of death (and the misconduct causing it) is different in kind. No further com*623ment is necessary to see that the use of the ratio in a harassment case to set the ratio in a wrongful death case is misguided.
The very approach of setting the 1:1 floor is at least as problematic as the individual distinctions between the instant case and State Farm, Boerner, and Williams. A court cannot simply set floors or ceilings in the case before it by borrowing ratios from other cases. To do so ignores both the Supreme Court’s “consistent ] reject[ion][of] the notion that the constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula,” Gore, 517 U.S. at 582, 116 S.Ct. 1589, and its instruction that “[t]he precise award in any case, of course, must be based upon the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s conduct and the harm to the plaintiff,” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425, 123 S.Ct. 1513.
Having rejected the presumptive ceiling and floor as flawed both in approach and in the specific ratios chosen, I see no independent justification for reducing the ratio from 13:1. Indeed, Judge Restani makes several points (in the discussion of why the ratio should be greater than 1:1) that actually favor leaving the full punitive award undisturbed. First, “the ratio here is not comparable to other ‘breathtaking’ awards.” Lead Op. at 10. Second, the compensatory award is not “overly” or “particularly” large and in fact could be fairly described as “not very substantial.”9 Id. at 10, 11. Third, Clark endured a “severe noneconomic harm.” Id. at 10.
Whether the injury is physical is, of course, part of the reprehensibility analysis (Gore’s first prong). But as Judge Restani seems to recognize, it also deserves special consideration under the ratio guidepost. Over the course of its punitive damages jurisprudence, the Court has struck down ratios of 500:1 (Gore) and 145:1 (State Farm), while upholding ratios of 10:1 (TXO) and 4:1 (Haslip). In none of these cases did the plaintiff suffer physical injury, let alone death. Yet the Court has suggested that physical harm would justify higher ratios. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 426, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (holding the 145:1 ratio too high while noting that the economic injury in that case “arose ... not from some physical assault or trauma; there were no physical injuries”). To strike down a wrongful-death punitive award with a ratio barely higher than those that the Court has upheld in economic injury cases would ignore the Court’s none-too-subtle suggestion.
Finally, the following statement by the Gore Court is instructive: “In most cases, the ratio will be within a constitutionally acceptable range, and remittitur will not be justified on this basis [i.e., a high ratio]. When the ratio is a breathtaking 500 to 1, however, the award must surely ‘raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow.’ ” 517 U.S. at 583, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 481, 113 S.Ct. 2711 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)). This statement strongly suggests that judges should not lightly deem a ratio excessive under the second Gore guidepost. The Supreme Court found a compelling reason to hold the ratios excessive in Gore and State Farm: they were breathtakingly large. As Judge Restani acknowledges, however, this reason is ab*624sent here, because a 13:1 ratio certainly is not breathtaking. Even if we were to assume that a ratio need not be breathtaking to be excessive, holding that a 13:1 ratio is not “within a constitutionally acceptable range” flies in the face of the Court’s admonition that punitive award ratios will pass constitutional muster “[i]n most cases.” This is especially true considering that (i) the ratio is only 1.3 times as large as the 10:1 ratio upheld in TXO10 and (ii) the award was given to a plaintiff claiming wrongful death rather than mere economic injury.
As Judge Posner ably put it, “[t]he judicial function is to police a range, not a point.” Mathias, 347 F.3d at 678. We recently echoed this principle: “Although individual members of the panel might have awarded fewer punitive damages if acting as a trial judge, the standard of review for such awards is deferential and, absent legal error, does not allow us to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.” Pollard v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, Inc., 412 F.3d 657, 668 (6th Cir.2005). Today, the majority ignores this principle by policing a point rather than a range. Given the modest approach that the Court has advised us to take and the additional considerations discussed above, I would hold that the second Gore weighs in favor of finding the punitive award well within the bounds required by due process.11
C. Comparable Penalties
The lead opinion concludes that under the third Gore guidepost, the $3 million punitive damages award is excessive because it is “significantly larger” than the maximum $800,000 civil penalty Chrysler could have faced under 49 U.S.C. § 30165(a). Lead Op. at 11. This conclusion is unsupportable for at least two reasons.
First, the punitive award is hardly excessive relative to the comparable civil penalty in light of the Supreme Court’s cases. If one were to read State Farm for the proposition that the punitive-to-compensatory ratio should have been 1:1 (as the lead opinion suggests and which I assume only for the purposes of this analysis), then the Court would have upheld a $1 million punitive award even though the comparable civil penalty was a mere $10,000 fine. 538 U.S. at 428, 123 S.Ct. 1513. These figures yield a ratio between the punitive award and the comparable civil penalty of 100:1. In Haslip, too, the Court tolerated a large punitive-to-comparable-civil-penalty ratio. There, the Court upheld an $840,000 punitive award even though it was “much in excess of the fine that could be imposed for insurance fraud under [Alabama law].” 499 U.S. at 23, 111 S.Ct. 1032 (citing ala. Code §§ 13A-5-11, 13A-5-12(a), 27-1-12, 27-12-17, 27-12-23). Although the Court did not specify the size of the potential fine that the award was “much in excess of,” the largest fine enumerated in the statutes cited by the Court was $20,000. ala. Code § 13A-5-11. Thus, the punitive award in Haslip was upheld even though the ratio between the punitive award and the comparable civil penalty was 42:1.12 In contrast, when the *625Court struck down the punitive award in Gore, it was 1,000 times greater than the maximum civil penalty.13 517 U.S. at 584, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (comparing $2 million punitive award to $2,000 statutory fine). The punitive-to-comparable-civil-penalty ratio in the instant case is only 3.75:1, which can hardly be characterized as excessive when it is less than the approved ratios of 100:1 and 42:1 in State Farm and Haslip, respectively, and falls far short of the 1,000:1 ratio deemed excessive in Gore.14
Second, the lead opinion’s analysis relies on the flawed premise that $800,000 is the maximum comparable civil penalty. The district court found that Chrysler could have been subject to a much larger civil penalty under Kentucky law: “suspension or revocation of corporate charters for acts of wrongdoing.” J.A. at 40 (Dist. Ct. Op. & Order at 10) (citing ky. Const. § 205; icy. Rev. Stat.Ann. §§ 271B.14-300, 502.050). The lead opinion suggests that consideration of this potential civil penalty is inconsistent with State Farm. While it is true that the Court rejected the state court’s “speculation] about the loss of State Farm’s business license,” it did so because the state court’s “references were to the broad fraudulent scheme drawn from evidence of out-of-state and dissimilar conduct.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 428, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (emphasis added). The district court in the instant case did not premise the potential loss of Chrysler’s business license on “out-of-state and dissimilar conduct.” Recognition of this key difference — which the lead opinion ignores— makes it clear that the district court did not run afoul of State Farm when it considered the potential suspension or revocation of Chrysler’s Kentucky charter under the third prong of the Gore analysis.
Indeed, several of our sister circuits have considered the loss of a business license when conducting the Gore comparable-penalty inquiry. Willow Inn, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 399 F.3d 224, 237-38 (3d Cir.2005) (upholding a punitive award thirty times larger than the potential civil fine while noting that state law provided for penalties “up to and including the suspension and revocation of one’s license”); Greenberg v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 91 Fed.Appx. 539, 542 (9th Cir.2003) (unpublished opinion) (upholding a $2.4 million punitive award without dis*626cussing potential civil fines but “[c]onsider-ing that possible civil sanctions for this type of conduct include the suspension or revocation of an insurer’s licenses”), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 939, 124 S.Ct. 2918, 159 L.Ed.2d 815 (2004); Mathias, 347 F.3d at 678 (upholding a punitive award nearly seventy-five times larger than the potential civil fíne where the defendant was “subject to revocation of its license, without which it [could not] operate”); Grabinski v. Blue Springs Ford Sales, Inc., 203 F.3d 1024, 1026-27 (8th Cir.2000) (upholding punitive awards between $10,000 and $100,000 where the potential civil fines under two statutes were $1,000 per violation and $5,000 total, respectively; noting that a state agency had “the authority to refuse the issuance or the renewal of a motor vehicle dealer’s license”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 825, 121 S.Ct. 70, 148 L.Ed.2d 35 (2000); see also Bielicki v. Terminix Int’l Co., 225 F.3d 1159, 1166 (10th Cir.2000) (noting that state law provided for fines and suspension or revocation of the defendant’s license but ultimately relying on the potential criminal punishment).
A number of state courts have similarly considered the potential loss of a business license under the third Gore prong. Myers v. Workmen’s Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 95 P.3d 977, 992 (2004) (upholding a $300,000 punitive award without discussing the size of potential civil fines but noting that “[e]ven the threat of losing licensure in the State did not have an immediate [deterrent] effect upon” the defendant); Campbell, 98 P.3d at 418 n. 8 (upholding a punitive award over 900 times larger than the potential civil fine while noting that the defendant’s behavior “may ... be justification for termination of its license”); Dardinger, 781 N.E.2d at 143 (upholding a $2.5 million punitive award where the potential civil fine was $3,500 per violation and the defendant could “lose its license to engage in the business of insurance in Ohio”); Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, Inc., 331 Or. 537, 17 P.3d 473, 489 (2001) (upholding a $1 million punitive award where the potential civil fine was $25,000 per violation and “administrative sanctions” included “the loss of a business license”); Krysa v. Payne, 176 S.W.3d 150, 163-64 (2005) (upholding a $500,000 punitive award without discussing the size of potential civil fines but recognizing that the defendant’s conduct “could result in the suspension or revocation of the dealership’s license”); Hollock v. Erie Ins. Exch., 842 A.2d 409, 422 (Pa.Super.2004) (upholding a $2.8 million punitive award where the potential civil fine was $5,000 per violation and the state could “suspend or revoke the offender’s license”), appeal granted in part, 583 Pa. 689, 878 A.2d 864 (2005); Baribeau v. Gustafson, 107 S.W.3d 52, 64 (Tex.App.2003) (upholding a $200,000 punitive award without discussing potential civil fines but noting that “exemplary damages [are] a less severe punishment than suspension or revocation of [the defendant’s] medical license”), cert. denied,543 U.S. 871, 125 S.Ct. 272, 160 L.Ed.2d 118 (2004); Hundley v. Rite Aid of South Carolina, Inc., 339 S.C. 285, 529 S.E.2d 45, 63-64 (2000) (upholding punitive awards of $1 million and $10 million without discussing potential civil fines but recognizing that the state “is empowered to suspend or revoke the permit of any drug dispensing facility” committing violations like the defendant’s).
The lead opinion argues that in contrast to the instant case, in Mathias there was evidence that the defendant “gained financially from its misconduct and could likely lose its business license.” Lead Op. at 12 n. 18. The Seventh Circuit did not, however, condition its consideration of the loss of a business license upon the defendant’s financial gain. In fact, the court did not discuss this fact at all while applying the *627Gore factors. See Mathias, 347 F.3d at 677 (noting the defendant’s profit from misconduct in the context of a general discussion of the deterrent effect of punitive damages, several paragraphs before its discussion of comparable civil penalties). Moreover, the court made no judgment with respect to the likelihood of the defendant’s losing its business license; instead, it simply stated that “a Chicago hotel that permits unsanitary conditions to exist is subject to revocation of its license.” Id. at 678 (emphasis added). The district court used the same neutral “subject to” language in the instant case. J.A. at 40 (Dist. Ct. Op. & Order at 10). The fact is that neither Mathias nor any other case cited above has erected these (or any other) prerequisites to the consideration of the potential loss of a business license under the third Gore guidepost.
The low 3.75:1 ratio between the punitive award and the relevant civil fíne, buttressed by consideration of the potential loss of Chrysler’s corporate charter, compels the conclusion that the punitive award is not excessive relative to comparable civil penalties.
D. Summary
Because Chrysler’s conduct was reprehensible, the ratio between the punitive and compensatory damages awards was neither breathtaking nor otherwise unreasonable given the circumstances of the case, and the punitive damages award was in line with comparable civil penalties, I would affirm the district court and sustain the full $3 million in punitive damages.
. The Supreme Court has not discussed consideration of the defendant’s financial condition in the context of the reprehensibility guidepost. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 427-28, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (discussing the defendant's assets under the ratio guidepost); Gore, 517 U.S. at 585, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (discussing the defendant’s status as “a large corporation” in the conclusion). I discuss the issue here only because the lead opinion discusses it under the first guidepost and my responses will be clearest if I maintain a parallel organization.
. Judge Restará calculated the 13:1 (12.73 rounded) ratio after apportioning for comparative fault, meaning that she used half the compensatory damages in the ratio's denominator. Judge Kennedy implicitly analyzes a different ratio — 6.4:1 (6.37:1 rounded) — by using the entire compensatory award in the ratio’s denominator. Judge Kennedy then reaches "the same conclusion as Judge Resta-ni that $471,258.26 is the maximum constitu*620tional award in this case based on a one-to-one ratio of compensatory to punitive damages.” J. Kennedy Op. at 18. As this difference in approach suggests, the issue of the proper Gore ratio denominator is a difficult one. Because I conclude that even the higher ratio is not excessive in this case, a choice of denominator is unnecessary. Instead, I simply accept the 13:1 ratio for current purposes, assuming that half the compensatory damages is the appropriate figure to use in the denominator. Thus, the panel leaves the resolution of the denominator issue for an appropriate future case.
. The precise figures were $840,000 punitive damages and $200,000 compensatory damages, Haslip, 499 U.S. at 7 n. 2, 111 S.Ct. 1032, for a ratio of 4.2:1.
. The precise figures were $10 million punitive damages and $19,000 compensatory damages, TXO, 509 U.S. at 451, 113 S.Ct. 2711, for a ratio of 526.3:1.
. The plurality cited figures from $1 million to $8.3 million as possible values of the potential harm to the plaintiffs, TXO, 509 U.S. at 462, 113 S.Ct. 2711, which yield ratios of 10:1 and 1.2:1, respectively.
. The Court has also upheld a ratio of punitive to compensatory damages of over 100:1, albeit under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 262, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989) ($6 million punitive award and $51,146 compensatory award, for a ratio of 117.3:1).
. Perhaps instead Judge Restani believes the 13:1 ratio is too high because it exceeds double digits. Yet just as Haslip, Gore, and State Farm did not establish a 4:1 ceiling, State Farm did not establish a 10:1 ceiling, presumptive or otherwise. Instead, the Court advised that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”’ State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (emphasis added). Although 13:1 is a double-digit ratio, it surely does not exceed single digits "to a significant degree.” And, of course, a ratio of 6.4:1 does not exceed single digits at all.
. Judge Restani cites a case, Phelps v. Louisville Water Co., 103 S.W.3d 46 (Ky.2003), in support of her argument that the instant ratio should be higher than 1:1 because Clark's compensatory award is "not very substantial.” Lead Op. at 11. In Phelps, the court upheld a $2 million punitive award where the compensatory award was approximately $175,000, yielding a ratio of over 11:1. 103 S.W.3d at 54. Judge Restani offers no reason why a case that approved an 11:1 ratio supports allowing a ratio of greater than 1:1 but no more than 2:1.
. By comparison, the ratios in Gore and State Farm were 38.5 and 11.2 times greater, respectively, than the 13:1 ratio here.
. The arguments made in this section apply with equal force to Judge Kennedy's opinion, which relies on "the case law cited by Judge Restani” — presumably State Fann, Boerner, Williams, and Phelps — to conclude that the compensatory award in the instant case was "substantial” before offering no justification for settling on the 1:1 ratio. J. Kennedy Op. at 613.
.Two provisions cited by the Court also permitted the levy of a fine of "[a]ny amount not exceeding double the pecuniary gain to *625the defendant or loss to the victim caused by the commission of the offense." ala. Code §§ 13A-5-11, 13A-5-12. Another provision permitted a fine of $1,000 per violation, ala. Code § 27-1-12. Although these sections would appear to permit a fine larger than $20,000, which would in turn lower Haslip's punitive-to-comparable-civil-penalty ratio, the Court's "much in excess” language makes it more likely that the Court was comparing the punitive award to the enumerated values in the statutes, ala. Code §§ 13A-5-11 (specifying fines of $20,000, $10,000, and $5,000), 13A-5-12 (specifying fines of $2,000, $1,000, and $500).
. Neither the TXO plurality nor Justice Kennedy (who concurred in part and concurred in the judgment) compared the punitive award to the comparable civil penalty. Justice O'Connor noted in dissent, however, that the punitive award was "orders of magnitude larger than authorized civil and criminal penalties for similar offenses.” TXO, 509 U.S. at 482, 113 S.Ct. 2711 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
. The lead opinion responds to this point by noting that the third Gore guidepost "does not dictate what the punitive damage award should be, but rather indicates whether the award is unreasonably excessive.” Lead Op. at 11 n. 17. This rebuttal is completely unresponsive to the question of why a punitive award that is only 3.75 times greater than the comparable civil penalty is "unreasonably excessive” under the third Gore prong when the Supreme Court has held that punitive awards forty-two and one hundred times greater than the respective comparable civil penalties were not excessive.