dissenting.
The majority concludes that 5 U.S.C. § 2105(f) allows Department of Veterans Affairs (‘VA”) medical personnel to avail themselves of the jurisdiction of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) in cases arising out of a “question of professional conduct or competence” and resulting in “a major adverse action,” despite the fact that 38 U.S.C. § 7462(a)(1) gives VA Disciplinary Appeals Boards “exclusive jurisdiction” over such cases. Majority op. at 1376.1 am unable to agree. In my view section 2105(f) does not create an exception to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Appeals Boards under section 7462(a)(1).
*1378I.
Dr. Harding was removed from his position as a VA staff physician for persistent failure properly to maintain certain patient records. His removal, which was a “major adverse action,” was for a matter that involved “a question of professional conduct or competence.”1 Under these circumstances, 38 U.S.C. § 7462(a)(1) entitled Dr. Harding to appeal the action to a VA Disciplinary Appeals Board, which he did. In due course, the Disciplinary Appeals Board mitigated the removal to a fourteen-day suspension. Dr. Harding could have appealed this ruling in federal district court pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7462(f). See, e.g., Abaqueta v. United States, 255 F.Supp.2d 1020 (D.Ariz.2003); Claasen v. Brown, 33 F.Supp.2d 511 (N.D.W.Va.1998), aff'd, 1999 U.S.App. LEXIS 20838, 1999 WL 672196 (4th Cir. Aug. 30, 1999). It appears that he did not do so, however.
While his case was pending before the Disciplinary Appeals Board, Dr. Harding-filed an individual right of action (“IRA”) claim with the Office of Special Counsel (“OSC”), in which he alleged that his removal was in retaliation for whistleblowing activities. Eventually, OSC closed the case without taking action, and Dr. Harding lodged an IRA appeal with the Board. The Board dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that Dr. Harding’s exclusive remedy was to challenge the removal action before the Disciplinary Appeals Board pursuant to section 7462(a)(1). Harding v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 98 M.S.P.R. 296, 297 (2005).
II.
38 U.S.C. § 7462(a)(1) gives the Disciplinary Appeals Boards “exclusive jurisdiction to review any case which arises out of (or which includes) a question of professional conduct or competence of a section 7401(1) employee” resulting in a “major adverse action.” As a physician, Dr. Harding is “a section 7401(1) employee.” Standing alone, section 7462(a)(1) compels the Board’s ruling dismissing Dr. Harding’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
The question, of course, is whether the amendment to the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub.L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 5 of the United States Code) (“WPA”), that is embodied in 5 U.S.C. § 2105(f), changes that result. Section 2105(f) states that, “[f]or purposes of sections 1212, 1213, 1214, 1215, 1216, 1221, 1222, 2302, and 7701, employees appointed under chapter 73 or 74 of title 38 shall be employees.” I read section 2105(f) as extending the protections of the WPA to physicians such as Dr. Harding. Indeed, we so noted in James v. Von Zemenszky, 284 F.3d 1310, 1320 (Fed.Cir.2002). That is not to say, however, that the effect of section 2105(f) is to abrogate the jurisdictional mandate of section 7462(a)(1) in a case where a section 7401(1) employee who is the subject of a “major adverse action” for reasons of “professional conduct or competence” claims retaliation for whistle-blowing. In my view, such a result is barred by the provisions of 38 U.S.C. § 7425.
Section 7425(a)(8) provides in relevant part that “[pjhysicians ... appointed under section 7401(1) ... of this chapter are not subject to ... [sjubchapter V of chapter 75 of title 5.” What this means is that a VA physician is not an “employee” under 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501 and 7511. Consequently, he or she may not directly appeal an ad*1379verse personnel action, such as a removal or a suspension for more than 14 days, 5 U.S.C. § 7512(1), (2), to the Board. Only someone who is an “employee” has the right to appeal to the Board. See 5 U.S.C. § 7701. Significantly, 38 U.S.C § 7425(b) states in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no provision of title 5 or any other law pertaining to the civil service system which is inconsistent with any provision of ... this chapter shall be considered to supersede, override, or otherwise modify such provision of ... this chapter except to the extent that such provision of title 5 or of such other law specifically provides, by specific reference to a provision of this chapter, [f]or such provision to be superseded, overridden or otherwise modified.
I understand section 7425(b) to say that no provision of title 5 or of any other law pertaining to the civil service system that is inconsistent with any provision of chapter 74 of title 38 shall be deemed to supersede such provision of chapter 74 unless it specifically refers to the chapter 74 provision. In other words, a provision of law that is inconsistent with a provision of chapter 74 and that purports to supersede the chapter 74 provision will not be viewed as doing so unless it specifically refers to the provision to be superseded.
This interpretation of section 7425(b) is supported by a passage from the Explanatory Statement accompanying the predecessor of section 7425. That statement provides that under section 7425(b)’s predecessor,2 “no provisions of title 5 ... shall be considered to supersede, override, or otherwise modify title 38 provisions unless such other provision does so expressly by specific reference to the title 38 provision.” 126 Cong. Rec. 20,761 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2565 (emphasis added). I think my view is also consistent with the decisions of several of our sister circuits holding that under the predecessor of section 7425(b), title 5 yields to title 38 in the case of a conflict, unless the conflicting provision of title 5 expressly supersedes the title 38 provision. In American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. Federal Labor Relations Authority an employee sought to challenge her discharge through arbitration under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 71 — 1— 7135 (the “FSLMRA”). 850 F.2d 782, 784 (D.C.Cir.1988). The decision to discharge the employee had previously been reviewed and affirmed by a VA Disciplinary Appeals Board. Id. at 783. The D.C. Circuit held that allowing arbitration under the FSLMRA would conflict with 38 U.S.C. § 4110, which stated that a VA Disciplinary Appeals Board decision was “final.” Id. at 788. The court ruled that the employee could not seek arbitration because section 7425(b)’s predecessor “categorically and unequivocally” required FSLMRA to yield to title 38. Id. at 787; see also Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, Local 3306 v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 2 F.3d 6, 10 (2d Cir.1993) (rejecting arguments that the broad language of the FSLMRA superseded conflicting provisions of title 38 under section 7425(b)’s predecessor); Veterans Admin. Med. Ctr. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 705 F.2d 953, 958 (8th Cir.1983) (holding that conflict between the Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7121, and title 38 must be resolved in favor of title 38).
In my view, 5 U.S.C. § 2105(f), the provision upon which the majority relies, does not meet the requirements of section 7425(b). The majority reads section *13802105(f) as abrogating the jurisdictional requirement of 38 U.S.C. § 7462(a)(1) in the case of a VA doctor who is removed based upon a matter relating to “professional conduct or competence” and who claims retaliation for whistleblowing. Majority op. at 5. When read in this manner, section 2105(f) plainly is inconsistent with section 7462(a)(1) and has the effect of superseding section 7462(a)(1). Yet, section 2105(f) does not, as required by section 7425(b), provide “by specific reference to” section 7462(a)(1) for section 7462(a)(1) to be superseded. Section 2105(f) nowhere mentions or references section 7462(a)(1). Thus, in accordance with the plain language of section 7425(b), section 2105(f) cannot alter the exclusive jurisdictional requirement of section 7462(a)(1). Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the Board that, on account of section 7462(a)(l)’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the Disciplinary Appeals Boards, it lacked jurisdiction over Dr. Harding’s appeal.
What section 2105(f) plainly does do is make provisions of the WPA applicable to VA medical personnel appointed to their positions under 38 U.S.C. § 7401(1), as we recognized in Von Zemenszky, 284 F.3d at 1320. For example, if Dr. Harding believed that, as a result of whistleblowing activity, he had been subjected to a “prohibited personnel practice” under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) in the form of a “personnel action” such as a denial of a promotion, see 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(ix), he could have pursued the remedies available to him under the WPA. These would include making an allegation of a “prohibited personnel practice” before OSC pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 1214 and thereafter lodging an IRA appeal with the Board pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 1221.
I recognize that one of the “personnel actions” listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A) is “an action under chapter 75” and that a removal is “an action under chapter 75.”3 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 2302(a)(2)(A)(iii), 7512(1). I also recognize that the result of my reading of the statutes is that a VA physician such as Dr. Harding may bring an IRA appeal to the Board in the case of certain “personnel action[s],” but may not do so in the case of others, such as a removal, that amounts to a “major adverse action” and that arises out of “a question of professional conduct or competence.”4 *138138 U.S.C. § 7462(a)(1). However, I cannot escape the conclusion that this is the correct result in view of the plain language of 38 U.S.C. §§ 7425(b) and 7462(a)(1). If Congress wishes to alter the statutory scheme to compel a different result, it certainly is free to do so. Until then, however, I think we are bound by the terms of the statute.
For the foregoing reasons, it is my view that section 2105(f) does not create an exception from section 7462(a)(1), which gives the VA Disciplinary Appeals Boards exclusive jurisdiction over any case arising from “a question of professional conduct or competence” resulting in a “major adverse action.” Thus, I would affirm the Board’s decision that it lacked jurisdiction over Dr. Harding’s appeal. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
. A "major adverse action” is defined in 38 U.S.C. § 7461(c)(2) as any adverse action including a suspension, a transfer, a reduction in grade, a reduction in basic pay, or a discharge. Under section 7461(c)(3), a "question of professional conduct or competence” involves either "[djirect patient care” or "[c]linical competence.”
. Until 1991, section 7425(b) was codified at 38 U.S.C. § 4119. Department of Veterans Affairs Health-Care Personnel Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-40, 105 Stat. 187. The provisions of section 7425(b) and its predecessor are identical.
. Further, I acknowledge that there is substantial overlap between the types of actions that comprise a "major adverse action” under 38 U.S.C. § 7461(c)(2) and the "personnel action[s]” that may comprise a "prohibited personnel practice” under 5 U.S.C. § 2302.
. 38 U.S.C. § 7463 applies in cases that do not involve either a "major adverse action” or "a question of professional conduct or competence.” Section 7463(a) provides in relevant part:
The Secretary shall prescribe by regulation procedures for the consideration of grievances of section 7401(1) employees arising from adverse personnel actions in which each action taken either—
(1) is not a major adverse action; or
(2) does not arise out of a question of professional conduct or competence. Disciplinary Appeals Boards shall not have jurisdiction to review such matters ....
Based on the plain language of section 7463(a), it appears that any adverse action that does not fall under section 7462(a) falls instead under section 7463(a). Section 7463 allows the Secretary of of the Department of Veterans Affairs (“Secretary”) to create procedures for grievances. Unlike section 7462, which states that the Disciplinary Appeals Boards "shall have exclusive jurisdiction” over cases meeting the criteria set forth at section 7462(a)(1), section 7463 does not contain any statement of exclusive jurisdiction. Thus, it appears that section 2105(f) and section 7463 do not conflict in the same way that the section 2105(f) and section 7462 conflict. Accordingly, an employee who is subject to an adverse action under section 7463 may avail himself or herself of the procedures set forth in the WPA. See, e.g., Yunus v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 242 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed.Cir. 2001) (noting that a section 7401(1) employee may bring an IRA appeal with the Board *1381alleging that his removal violated the WPA even though the Board would lack jurisdiction to directly review the employee’s removal). Significantly, in my view, the removal of the physician in Yunus did not arise out of “a question of professional conduct or competence.” Consequently, the exclusive jurisdiction provision of section 7462(a)(1) was not implicated.