dissenting:
Neither the IEP requirement nor the reevaluation requirement apply in the present case, since the regulation and statute from which they arise are triggered only when it is determined that a child presently has a disability. The hearing officer’s decision does not support classifying A.O. as such.
The IEP requirement is found in 34 C.F.R. § 300.306(c)(2) (formerly 34 C.F.R. § 300.535(b)): “[i]f a determination is made that a child has a disability and needs special education and related services, an IEP must be developed for the child.” The hearing officer found “that [A.O.] was eligible for special education from January 24, 2004, through April 26, 2004,” (emphasis added), and elsewhere stated that he “makes no findings ... with regard to [A.O.]’s eligibility after April 26, 2004.” Since the decision was issued and dated June 1, 2004, there was no point at which Appellant could rely on it to establish that A.O. “has a disability” as required to enforce 34 C.F.R. § 300.306(c)(2). The best Appellant could show is that during a specified but foregone period, A.O. had a disability.
The requirement that a school district reevaluate eligible children before effecting a change in their eligibility does not change this result. That requirement, found in 20 U.S.C. § 1414(c)(5)(A), mandates that “a local educational agency shall evaluate a child with a disability ... before determining that the child is no longer a child with a disability.” The hearing officer’s express limitation on the eligibility finding forecloses the possibility of concluding that A.O. was a “child with a disability.” His decision supports, at most, the retrospective observation that A.O. was so qualified during a specified period in the past.
The school district had begun its own assessment of A.O.1 Under other circumstances, a hearing officer’s ability to limit an eligibility determination would not likely be disputed. Consider, for example, a parent who files suit seeking compensation for resources expended to educate a temporarily disabled child. The hearing officer’s decision that the student was disabled for a period of several months the year prior could not be asserted as finding that the “child has a disability” under 34 C.F.R. § 300.306(c)(2). Nor can it constitute a determination rendering the student a “child with a disability” pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1414(c)(5)(A). Thus, while the parent might be entitled to an award of damages, the student’s school would not incur obligations under either provision. The fact that the expressly limited period of past eligibility here coincidentally bordered the present does not change this analysis.
Although the ordinary effect of the tandem operation of the IDEA’S IEP and reevaluation requirements is that prior eligibility findings automatically result in continuing eligibility, this is not the case when the hearing officer explicitly limits his eligibility finding to a discrete period in the past.
Park, ex rel. Park v. Anaheim Union High School District, 464 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir.2006), does not change the analysis. Park does state that a determination that a child was denied a free and appropriate *1236public education “is the most significant of successes possible” under the IDEA. Id. at 1036. But even if Appellant achieved this “most significant of successes,” she nonetheless failed to effect a material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties and is not a prevailing party. I would therefore affirm the district court’s proper denial of attorneys’ fees.
. I disagree with the majority’s contention that either the hearing officer’s reason for limiting his holding — or the school district’s anticipation of the eligibility determination— is a nuance the understanding of which is crucial to the case’s outcome. Neither impacts the legal effect of the hearing officer’s decision.