dissenting.
The Court of Appeals concluded that Initiative Petition 8 (2006) (IP 8) contained two or more amendments to the Oregon Constitution that must be submitted to and voted on separately by the voters as Article XVII, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution requires. I agree with that conclusion and, consequently, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the Court of Appeals.
*302The majority concludes that “the changes proposed by IP 8 would, in fact, alter at least three existing constitutional provisions.” 341 Or at 297. The majority also notes that each of those changes are substantive ones and that the state intends to submit each of those constitutional amendments together for a single vote in the context of IP 8.1 agree with each of those conclusions.1
If we pause the legal analysis of this case at that point, it appears beyond question that IP 8 violates the unambiguous terms of Article XVII, section 1, which provides, in part:
“When two or more [constitutional] amendments shall be submitted in the manner aforesaid to the voters of this state at the same election, they shall be so submitted that each amendment shall be voted on separately.”
The purpose that underlies that provision is clear. The drafters of Article XVII, section 1, intended to preclude use of the practice known as “logrolling,” in which initiative drafters might join more than one constitutional amendment in a single initiative petition in order to secure sufficient affirmative votes for the entire package. The constitutional drafters chose to require the submission of each proposed constitutional amendment for a separate vote by the voters. That policy choice insures that the voters’ voice will be expressed in clear terms as to each proposed constitutional amendment. If we evaluate IP 8 under the unambiguous terms of Article XVII, section 1, it is difficult to conceive of a clearer violation of that constitutional requirement.
The majority, however, does not pause in its analysis at that point but proceeds to consider whether the multiple constitutional amendments contained in IP 8 are “closely related.” The phrase “closely related” does not appear in Article XVII, section 1, or in any other provision of the Oregon Constitution.
*303The parties to this case and the Court of Appeals have observed, correctly, that this court created the phrase “closely related” in case law that applied Article XVII, section 1, but that this court has never explained what that phrase meant. That is a fair criticism. As the majority acknowledges, this court’s cases have announced little more than conclusions that various proposed measures were not closely related and, therefore, ran afoul of Article XVII, section l.2
The majority purports to answer that criticism here by offering the following conclusions about IP 8. First, “IP 8 does not change different constitutional provisions that confer different fundamental rights on different groups of persons.” Id. at 301. Second, “the supermajority requirement is a procedural condition on which the right to exercise substantive authority is predicated.” Id. at 301.
I do not quarrel necessarily with the accuracy of those statements about IP 8. However, they do not convince me that IP 8 satisfies Article XVII, section 1. The majority’s first conclusion introduces criteria that water down the clear terms of Article XVII, section 1, to the point that those terms are unrecognizable. The majority’s second conclusion simply matches one subjective conclusion “closely related” — to another equally undefined conclusion — the term “procedural.”3 In my view, calling IP 8 a mere “procedural” change to the legislature’s constitutional mode of operation does not explain why the relationship between the two amendments is “close” and simply trivializes the significant change to the existing requirements for legislative action that IP 8 embodies.
I emphasize that I cannot tangibly demonstrate that my dissenting view is legally correct and that the majority opinion is legally erroneous, because the governing criterion under discussion — “closely related” — invites little more than *304a subjective opinion about the existence of more than one amendment in a proposed initiative amendment to the constitution. Subjective opinions by judges are not what Article XVII, section 1, calls for. For me, the paradigm is and should remain the clear terms of Article XVII, section 1, not an elastic, adjectival modifier that, in truth, merely invites judges to render subjective conclusions about constitutional requirements.
This court, in my view, intended the phrase “closely related” to explain why a proposed alteration of more than one phrase or clause of a constitutional provision nevertheless constituted a single amendment. The court’s goal in using that phrase was to implement Article XVII, section 1, not to undermine or alter the clear terms of that provision.
The unfortunate consequence of today’s decision is to shift the focus of the single vote inquiry away from the clear terms of Article XVII, section 1, to a court-created adjectival phrase that is, in effect, standardless. That shift will induce initiative drafters to combine multiple constitutional amendments in a way that purports to create some relationship— perhaps a close one — between separate proposed constitutional amendments. The proper focus, in the words of Article XVII, section 1, should be on the presence of more than one constitutional amendment, not on whether multiple amendments stand in some relationship to each other and, if so, whether that relationship, in the subjective opinion of judges, is “close.”
All parties concede that IP 8 modifies Oregon’s free speech provision, Article I, section 8. As the majority correctly concludes, IP 8 also changes Article IV, section 25, which provides, in part, that “a majority of all the members elected to each House shall be necessary to pass every bill or Joint resolution.” (Emphasis added.) It would do so by substituting a supermajority vote requirement for the existing majority vote requirement for the adoption or amendment of laws restricting campaign contributions and expenditures.
Those proposed changes do bear some relationship to each other, in that they each concern the financing of political campaigns in Oregon. But the issues that those proposed amendments raise are quite distinct. It is easy to imagine *305that some voters may desire to authorize the legislature to regulate campaign contributions and expenditures, but object to the creation of a supermajority voting requirement for the legislature that necessarily will grant a legislative veto power to a small political minority.
I cannot conclude that there is a “close” relationship between two separate constitutional amendments, one that would alter a significant aspect of the free speech guarantee to all citizens in Oregon’s Bill of Rights, and one that would modify the constitutional voting requirements that now govern each house of the Oregon Legislature. The combination of those distinct constitutional amendments for a single vote by the electorate invites the very evil — logrolling—that the drafters of Article XVII, section 1, intended to prevent.
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that IP 8 violates the separate-vote requirement in Article XVII, section l.4 The majority errs in overturning that conclusion. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I also join in the majority’s conclusions that sustained the Court of Appeals’ rulings on the availability of a preelection challenge in this context and plaintiffs satisfaction of any applicable requirements regarding their standing to bring this action and their exhaustion of any applicable administrative remedies.
The majority criticizes the Court of Appeals’ reasoning with respect to that court’s apprehension about the tendency of IP 8 to shift legislative power between the state legislature and the voters exercising the power of initiative. I agree with that criticism. However, that criticism by the majority does not answer the Court of Appeals’ broader conclusion that IP 8 contains multiple amendments and violates Article XVII, section 1.
The majority also labels both amendments as “substantive” elsewhere in its opinion. Id. at 298.
The majority also refers in a footnote to the court’s creation in a past case of a timeline for a late challenge to a proposed measure. Id. at 294 n 5. The majority appears to assert that this case raises no issue regarding the timeliness of plaintiffs’ challenge. I agree and, therefore, see no purpose in discussing that case law or in inviting litigation of timeliness questions that may arise in other cases. For me, the question of what rules should govern the timely filing of litigation pertaining to an election is a matter for the legislature.