(dissenting). I agree with the result advocated by Justice KELLY in her dissent because it comports with my position in this case the first time it was before this Court. See People v McCuller, 475 Mich 176, 214; 715 NW2d 798 (2006) (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting). When dealing with intermediate sanctions, I believe that the requirements set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004), and further applied in Cunningham v California,_US_; 127 S Ct 856; 166 L Ed 2d 856 (2007), must be followed. Thus, the trial court improperly engaged in judicial fact-finding, and this case should be remanded for resentencing.