(dissenting). We granted leave in these cases to address two questions. The first is what is the proper standard to rebut the statutory presumption in a dram-shop case? MCL 436.1801(8) et seq. The second is what limitations did the Legislature intend, if any, on the type of evidence needed to show that a person was visibly intoxicated when served intoxicants by a dram-shop? The majority holds that, to rebut the statutory presumption, a plaintiff must present clear and convincing evidence. It also holds that, to establish “visible intoxication” under the statute, a plaintiff must present actually manifested signs of intoxication. I disagree. The majority has erroneously given unintended meaning to the statute with respect to both issues. Hence, I must respectfully dissent.
UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 20, 2001, at about 10:00 p.m., Curtis Breton drove his automobile while under the influence of more *545than 20 beers and crossed the center line of US-127 at more than 100 miles per hour. His automobile slammed into a vehicle occupied by Adam Kuenner and Lance Reed, killing them and Breton and destroying both vehicles. At the time of the accident, Breton’s blood alcohol level was 0.215 grams per 100 milliliters of blood.1 Plaintiffs, the personal representatives of the estates of Kuenner and Reed, filed suit against the Beach Bar for negligently selling intoxicating liquor to Breton in violation of MCL 436.1801(3).
Deposition testimony indicated that Breton spent the day of the accident drinking with his friend John Marsh, a fellow firefighter. They started their binge in the morning at the Firehouse Pub, where they each consumed at least two to three beers. They continued it when another firefighter joined them after lunch. They purchased a 12-pack of beer and drank it while they repaired a collapsed boat dock at a family home. Each consumed at least two to three beers during the repair project.
About 4:45 p.m., Breton and Marsh went to the defendant Beach Bar where they split two pitchers of beer. On leaving the bar, they proceeded to Marsh’s home and drank two beers each. They returned to the Beach Bar about a half an hour later and drank two more beers and split a pizza. At approximately 9:00 p.m. they left the bar. Marsh testified that he did not feel the effects of the alcohol until then. He also testified that, until they left the bar, Breton did not appear visibly intoxicated.
They left the Beach Bar and went to the Eagle’s Nest bar where they shared yet another pitcher of beer. At 9:50 p.m., Breton drove Marsh home. Concerned, *546Marsh asked Breton if he was “alright to drive.” Breton responded that he was. However, he died about 20 minutes later when he drove into oncoming traffic on the highway, killing himself, Kuenner, and Reed.
Before the fatal accident, Breton had returned to the Beach Bar where he attempted to get a date with Lindsay Mizerik, the waitress who had served him earlier in the evening. He did not drink during this return visit. Mizerik testified at deposition that she was trained in discerning intoxication and that Breton displayed no signs of intoxication while he was at the Beach Bar before the accident. Several others who saw Breton that evening testified that he did not appear intoxicated.
After the close of discovery, defendant Beach Bar filed a motion for summary disposition based on MCL 436.1801(8). Defendant argued that it was not the last establishment to serve alcoholic beverages to Breton, thus entitling it to a rebuttable presumption against liability under MCL 436.1801(8). Defendant argued that plaintiffs could not overcome the statutory presumption because they had no evidence that Breton was “visibly intoxicated” when he was served at defendant’s bar.
In response, plaintiffs presented circumstantial evidence, including the reports of two toxicologists. Reed’s expert estimated that Breton consumed 24 to 25 beers in the nine-hour period before the accident. He opined that this concentration of alcohol certainly affected Breton’s central nervous system and certainly resulted in visible signs of intoxication at the time the Beach Bar served Breton.
The trial court granted summary disposition against both plaintiffs. In its opinion, it held that plaintiffs failed to present a genuine issue of material fact regard*547ing the last location to serve alcohol to Breton. Hence, the Beach Bar was entitled to the statutory presumption of nonliability. The court then held that, to overcome the presumption, plaintiffs had to present “positive, unequivocal, strong and credible evidence” that Breton was visibly intoxicated when he was served at defendant’s bar. The court stated that the testimony of the expert witnesses was circumstantial, which by its nature is not unequivocal, strong, and credible.
Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed in a published opinion per curiam, remanding the cases for trial on the merits. 264 Mich App 363; 691 NW2d 779 (2004). The panel held that plaintiffs needed to present only competent and credible evidence that it is more probable than not that Breton was visibly intoxicated when served at defendant’s bar. It found that plaintiffs’ expert testimony met this standard.
THE DRAMSHOP ACT
At common law, no cause of action was available against a dramshop for negligently serving alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person who thereafter caused injury to another. Our Legislature changed the common law when it enacted the dramshop act. The act allows someone injured by an intoxicated person to bring suit against, among others, a retail establishment that served the person while he or she was visibly intoxicated. Specifically, MCL 436.1801(3) indicates in part:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, an individual who suffers damage or who is personally injured by a minor or visibly intoxicated person by reason of the unlawful selling, giving, or furnishing of alcoholic liquor to the minor or visibly intoxicated person, if the unlawful sale is proven to be a proximate cause of the damage, injury, or death, or the spouse, child, parent, or guardian of that *548individual, shall have a right of action in his or her name against the person who by selling, giving, or furnishing the alcoholic liquor has caused or contributed to the intoxication of the person or who has caused or contributed to the damage, injury, or death.
The act also provides a presumption of nonliability for all retail licensees that are not the last retailer to furnish alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person. The presumption is set forth in MCL 436.1801(8):
There shall be a rebuttable presumption that a retail licensee, other than the retail licensee who last sold, gave, or furnished alcoholic liquor to the minor or the visibly intoxicated person, has not committed any act giving rise to a cause of action under subsection (3).
The first question presented in this case is what is the proper standard to rebut the statutory presumption of nonliability in MCL 436.1801(8). Initially, it is necessary to review the law of presumptions. In most civil cases, a party must satisfy its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. It is generally recognized that the burden of proof is composed of two parts: the burden of persuasion and the burden of going forward with the evidence, commonly referred to as the burden of production. The burden of production may shift several times during the trial, but the burden of persuasion generally remains with the party who bears the risk of nonpersuasion. Widmayer v Leonard, 422 Mich 280, 290; 373 NW2d 538 (1985).
Presumptions generally affect the burden of production. MRE 301 explains:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by statute or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of *549proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
A presumption is best described as a procedural device. The function of a rebuttable presumption is solely to place the burden of producing evidence on the party opposing the presumption. It allows the party relying on it to avoid a directed verdict. It also aids that party in obtaining a directed verdict if the opposing party fails to introduce evidence rebutting the presumption. Widmayer, supra; Wojciechowski v Gen Motors Corp, 151 Mich App 399; 390 NW2d 727 (1986). A presumption disappears when the burden of production is met. Widmayer, supra at 286. MRE 301 requires that the judge decide whether a presumption has been rebutted. Widmayer, supra at 288.
It is without contest that, normally, to cause a rebuttable presumption to disappear, the challenging party must produce credible evidence to the contrary. Krisher v Duff, 331 Mich 699, 705; 50 NW2d 332 (1951). Krisher states:
It has been well settled in this State that the effect of a rebuttable presumption is to make out a prima facie case at the beginning of a trial. Having established the original prima facie case, the presumption then casts the burden of proof on the opposite party. Presumptions cannot be weighed against other credible evidence, for they have no value as evidence unless no other credible evidence whatsoever is introduced in regard to the presumed fact. As a rule they disappear if and when credible evidence is introduced from which the facts may be found. \Id.f2
*550THE REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION IN MCL 436.1801(8)
The majority finds that “clear and convincing” proof should be required to rebut the presumption in MCL 436.1801(8). It concludes, in effect, that reading the statute as written would render the presumption meaningless or redundant. I disagree.
The interpretation offered by the majority contradicts well-established rules of statutory construction because it adds words to the statute that the Legislature did not put there. The words that the Court adds are, “The presumption may be overcome only by a showing of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.”
In interpreting statutory language, courts must determine and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). When ascertaining legislative intent, we look first at the words of the statute itself. House Speaker v State Administrative Bd, 441 Mich 547; 495 NW2d 539 (1993). There is no standard in MCL 436.1801(8) for determining how the presumption may be rebutted. The Legislature is presumed to know the law. Wold Architects & Engineers v Strat, 474 Mich 223, 234; 713 NW2d 750 (2006), citing Bennett v Weitz, 220 Mich App 295, 299; 559 NW2d 354 (1996). Michigan law holds that a rebut-table presumption normally can be rebutted by credible evidence. Krisher, supra.
Hence, the majority creates a new “clear and convincing evidence” standard out of thin air in complete disregard of the text of MCL 436.1801 and of recognized *551rules of statutory interpretation. It offers no policy considerations to justify this action, as the Court did in Krisher.
Interestingly, the Legislature has shown that it is quite capable of providing a heightened burden for rebutting a presumption when it chooses to do so. For example, it inserted into MCL 570.1203(2) a presumption that payment has been made to a contractor for improvements. It then added that the presumption may be overcome “only by a showing of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.”
The lack of the same or a similar addition to MCL 436.1801 strongly indicates that the Legislature intended the courts to apply our general common-law standard to the presumption in that statute. We should not alter this policy choice by the Legislature. This year, the Court held that the absence of evidence of specific legislative intent to change the common law shows that the Legislature meant to leave the common law untouched. See Wold, supra. Nothing in the statutory text at issue indicates that the Legislature intended any standard other than our common-law standard to apply.
I acknowledge that, in reviewing a statute’s language, “every word should be given meaning, and we should avoid a construction that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.” Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d 686 (2001), citing Altman v Meridian Twp, 439 Mich 623; 487 NW2d 155 (1992). In these cases, I interpret the rebuttable presumption of MCL 436.1801(8) to give it full force and effect. My interpretation is that the presumption existed on defendant’s behalf but disappeared when defendant’s motion for summary disposition was heard. This is because plaintiffs produced *552credible evidence that defendant served beer to Breton while he was visibly drunk.
Even if the standard were “clear and convincing,” the presumption would have disappeared in these cases. However, I am convinced that the correct standard is “credible evidence,” only. There is no valid legal justification to change the common-law standard or to manufacture a special enhanced standard for this statute. The Legislature chose not to do so, and no public policy reasons have been advanced to justify it. My interpretation renders the presumption neither surplusage nor nugatory.3 And, unlike the interpretation of the majority, it adds no new and higher standard without justification and contrary to the intent of the Legislature.
PROOF OF ACTUAL VISUAL INTOXICATION
The second issue is whether the Legislature intended to restrict the type of circumstantial evidence that qualifies as proof that the drunk was visibly intoxicated when served by the dramshop. The statute refers to the tortfeasor repeatedly as a “visibly intoxicated person.” MCL 436.1801(3), (6), (7), (8), and (9). As explained later in this opinion, a retail licensee may be liable under the statute when it serves an alcoholic beverage to a visibly intoxicated person.
The act does not define “visibly intoxicated.” It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction in this state *553that, unless otherwise defined by law, statutory words or phrases are given their plain and ordinary meaning. MCL 8.3a. When appropriate, this Court often refers to dictionary definitions to interpret statutory language. “Visibly” is the adverbial form of “visible.” The principal definition of “visible” is “capable of being seen.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997).
This definition indicates that the Legislature did not intend that a plaintiff is limited to producing a witness who actually saw signs that the intoxicated person exhibited intoxication. The statute does not require “actually manifested signs of intoxication.” Rather, a plaintiff may show that indicators of the intoxication in the person were capable of being seen, that someone viewing the intoxicated person could have seen the indicators.4 Had the Legislature intended to require at least some evidence that a witness actually saw signs that the person was intoxicated, it could have written:
There shall be a rebuttable presumption that a retail licensee, other than the retail licensee who last sold, gave, or furnished alcoholic liquor to the minor or person seen by an eyewitness to be visibly intoxicated, has not committed any act giving rise to a cause of action under subsection (3).
My rationale is supported not only by the actual language of the statute, but by case law as well. In Dines v Henning,5 this Court reversed the Court of Appeals judgment and adopted Judge MICHAEL J. KELLY’s dissenting opinion that stated, “Eyewitness testimony of *554visible intoxication is not required to establish a dram-shop claim; visible intoxication may be proven by circumstantial evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom.”6 Dines v Henning, 184 Mich App 534, 540-541; 459 NW2d 305 (1990) (KELLY, J., dissenting).
Judge KELLY based his decision on Heyler v Dixon, 160 Mich App 130; 408 NW2d 121 (1987). In that case, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the dramshop act was amended in 1972 to substitute “visibly intoxicated” for “intoxicated.” Id. at 145. The Court noted that case law existing at the time required that the allegedly intoxicated person must be “visibly” intoxicated at the time of the sale. Id., citing Archer v Burton, 91 Mich App 57; 282 NW2d 833 (1979); McKnight v Carter, 144 Mich App 623; 376 NW2d 170 (1985).
The Heyler Court then noted that the existing standard jury instructions defined a person as visibly intoxicated “when his or her intoxication would be apparent to an ordinary observer.” SJI2d 75.02. The Court noted that the Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that claims brought under the dramshop act may be proven by circumstantial evidence and that, “if the combination of the circumstantial evidence and the permissible inferences drawn therefrom are sufficient to establish a prima facie case, a directed verdict is improper.” Heyler, supra at 146. See Villa v Golich, 42 Mich App 86, 88; 201 NW2d 349 (1972); Durbin v K-K-M Corp, 54 Mich App 38, 56-57; 220 NW2d 110 (1974). The Court concluded by finding in that case that sufficient circum*555stantial evidence existed to render summary disposition improper. No limitations were read into the type of circumstantial evidence that is permissible.
In making its determination in Heyler, the Court of Appeals stated that a jury could conclude that someone was a “visibly intoxicated person” from evidence showing that (1) the person admitted that he drank one or two beers an hour, (2) he stayed at the bar either 14 hours or nine hours, (3) he consumed somewhere between nine and 28 beers during his stay at the bar, (4) the accident occurred within minutes after the person left the bar, and (5) there was testimony from officers arriving at the scene of the accident that the person “ ‘smelled highly’ ” of alcohol. Heyler, supra at 147. In this case, there was similar testimony about how long and approximately how much Breton drank. There was similar evidence that Breton caused the accident and that he was highly intoxicated at the time.
The majority misreads Dines to conclude that expert testimony predicated on circumstantial evidence is insufficient to establish that a person was visibly intoxicated. Dines specifically adopted the long line of Court of Appeals cases holding that circumstantial evidence, standing alone, is sufficient to establish and support a dramshop claim. The majority opinion does not rely on Dines as it asserts; in fact, it limits the holding by restricting the circumstantial evidence that is admissible to that which was actually seen by a witness.
In these cases, the circumstantial evidence on which the expert opinions were based sufficed by itself to rebut the statutory presumption and establish plaintiffs’ prima facie case. In Heyler, circumstantial evidence was found to be sufficient even though, unlike in these cases, it was not supported by strong expert testimony.
*556Here, plaintiffs had evidence that Breton’s consumption of 24 to 25 beers in a nine-hour period had to have affected his central nervous system and resulted in visible signs of intoxication. While it is true that all of defendant’s witnesses testified that Breton was not visibly intoxicated, that does not prevent the cases from going to the jury. It is not uncommon for a jury to disbelieve multiple eyewitnesses. See, e.g., McKenzie v Taft Estate, 434 Mich 858 (1990) (dissenting statement of Levin, J.).
The majority has erroneously changed the meaning this Court has given for the past 15 years to “visibly intoxicated person” in MCL 436.1801. Plaintiffs presented compelling circumstantial evidence and strong expert testimony that Breton was visibly intoxicated when defendant served him beer before the accident.
CONCLUSION
I find that the presumption of MCL 436.1801(8) can be rebutted by credible evidence. Credible evidence is the common-law standard that courts in Michigan have applied for years to rebuttable presumptions absent policy reasons or legislative language enhancing the standard. No policy reasons exist to enhance the standard applicable to MCL 436.1801. The majority has raised the standard without either policy reasons or statutory authorization to do so.
What has happened here is that the majority has taken upon itself to be helpful to the Legislature. The Legislature wrote a rebuttable presumption into the dramshop act, but failed to include a standard for rebuttal higher than the normal standard. The majority has reasoned that the Legislature must have intended a higher standard, so it has furnished one. However, especially given that our Legislature has shown itself *557perfectly capable of supplying a higher standard itself, the Court should not rewrite the statute to its own liking. It is the Legislature’s job to do that. My colleagues should willingly concede that the majority of legislators may not have been able to agree to give more teeth to the presumption by adding a higher rebuttal standard.
The majority has also increased the burden on an injured party to prove that a dramshop served intoxicants to a drunken patron. It has accomplished this by rewriting the statute to require actual signs of the intoxication, whereas, for decades, other circumstantial evidence has sufficed. The statute, by its terms, does not require a showing that someone testify to having actually seen signs that a drunk was intoxicated before the drunk was served at a bar.
It will now be more difficult for persons injured by a drunken driver to recover from a bar that served the drunk while that person was visibly intoxicated. The majority points to nothing in the dramshop act that suggests that it was the Legislature’s intent to hinder, rather than facilitate, recovery from those serving drunks who injure others. This drastic change in the law defies both public policy and common sense.
Therefore I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the cases for trial.
CAVANAGH, J., did not participate in the decision of these cases.Legal intoxication is statutorily defined as 0.08 grams per 100 milliliters of blood. MCL 257.625(1)03).
The Court in Krisher increased the weight given to the statutory-presumption that the owner of an automobile gave permission to drive it to the party causing an injury. The Court found that “policy factors operate to make this a stronger presumption than the ordinary rebut-*550table presumption.” Krisher, supra at 707. The policy considerations present in Krisher do not apply in the instant case.
The majority justifies raising the standard to be used in rebutting the statutory presumption because otherwise, it reasons, the presumption would be meaningless. But this justification is misleading. The Court need do nothing to give meaning to the presumption. It stands on its own two feet without our help. What the majority is doing, in the name of preventing the presumption from becoming “meaningless,” is giving it strength that the Legislature did not give it. It is judicially rewriting the statute. The majority’s attack on my position offers no response to the fact that the majority is adding words and meaning to the statute that are not there. That is, of course, because no good response exists.
AlS the majority acknowledges (at its footnote 11 on page 542), the standard jury instructions define a “visibly intoxicated” person as one whose intoxication “would be apparent to an ordinary observer.” SJI2d 75.02. Significantly, the jury instructions do not state, as the majority does, that the intoxication must “actually” have been seen by an ordinary observer.
437 Mich 920 (1991).
Judge Kelly stated, and this Court adopted, the rule that eyewitness testimony is not essential. The majority now apparently requires actual eyewitness testimony of signs of intoxication in order to sustain a dramshop action. If a plaintiffs evidence lacks “actually manifested signs of intoxication,” the majority removes the case from the jury. This has never been the law. It represents a drastic departure from existing law and it defies a reasonable construction of the text of the dramshop act. *563restriction will be assured that the plan will be completely achieved. [Lanski v Montealegre, 361 Mich 44, 47; 104 NW2d 772 (1960) (emphasis in original).]