(concurring). I concur with the majority’s reasoning and decision to remand this case for further proceedings. I agree that a premises owner has no duty to protect an invitee from open and obvious dangers on a premises unless “special aspects” render the condition “unreasonably dangerous.” Lugo v Ameritech, 464 Mich 512, 517; 629 NW2d 384 (2001).
I do not consider the more difficult questions whether plaintiffs cause of action is precluded by the *335dramshop act and whether Manuel v Weitzman, 386 Mich 157, 163; 191 NW2d 474 (1971), should be overruled because those arguments were never presented in the circuit court. Defendant raised the dramshop act’s exclusivity provision1 in a pretrial conference only in connection with jury instructions. It explicitly waived the issue that the dramshop act was plaintiffs exclusive remedy.2 Thus, although plaintiffs proofs at trial appeared to invade the province of the dramshop act, I do not need to consider that question because of the procedural posture of the case.
“This section provides the exclusive remedy for money damages against a licensee arising out of the selling, giving, or furnishing of alcoholic liquor.” MCL 436.1801(10).
Defendant’s attorney stated “Mr. Brittain has talked a lot about how he’s entitled to bring a premises claim. We’ve never disputed that.”