dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the doctrine of “substantial compliance” is not relevant here and that the trial court erred in granting Robert’s motion for summary judgment. However, I believe that a genuine issue of material fact as to the validity and effectiveness of Katherine’s change of beneficiary request remains.
As both the majority and Court of Appeals point out, the interest of an insurance policy beneficiary at the time of the insured’s death is defeated by a change of beneficiary form executed in accordance with the terms of the policy. I agree with the majority that the change of beneficiary form at issue here meets the requirements of the policy but the policy requires that the insured “change the beneficiary.” I think a question of fact remains as to whether the insured did so.
At the time the insured executed the change form, she did not direct that it be submitted to the insurer. Rather, she gave it to a caretaker with instructions to deliver it to the insurer in the event that “something happened.” This instruction is, I think, subject to conflicting interpretations. If the “something” the insured referred to was her death, then I think she “ehangefd] the beneficiary” and Robert’s claim is defeated. On the other hand, the insured might only have been asking the caregiver to hold the change form pending “something happening]” prior to her death that would cause her to go ahead and direct that the form be delivered to the insurer. Under this interpretation, I do not think she has “change[d] the beneficiary.”
I do not think that summary judgment in favor of either party is appropriate because I think a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether the insured “change[d] the beneficiary.”