dissenting.
In a well-reasoned and persuasive opinion the Court of Appeals concluded that the general wrongful death statute could reasonably be interpreted as allowing punitive damages. I agree and therefore *767respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion in this case. P
One of the more difficult challenges of a reviewing court is discerning legislative intent when examining a statute. We have said that when examining a statute it is not our prerogative to engraft upon it a meaning the court determines to be wise or desirable. Walton v. State, 272 Ind. 398, 402, 398 N.E.2d 667, 670 (1980). Rather, we must attempt to determine what the legislative body intended when the statute was enacted. To facilitate this obligation courts have developed a number of rules on statutory construction, all of which are designed to give deference to the intent of the legislature. Concluding the legislature did not intend the general wrongful death statute to permit punitive damages, the majority has seized on two such constructions: (1) strict construction of statutes in derogation of the common law; and (2) legislative acquiescence. In my view the majority's conclusion cannot be sustained on these grounds.
The rule of strict construction requires the court to "presume that the legislature did not intend to make any change in the common law beyond those declared either in express terms or by unmistakable implication." South Bend Comm. Schs. Corp. v. Widawskti, 622 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ind.1993). Because actions for wrongful death did not exist at common law, it has been held that the wrongful death statute should be construed strictly against the expansion of liability. Thomas v. Eads, 400 N.E.2d 778, 780 (Ind.Ct.App.1980). I have no quarrel with this general proposition. In my view, however, its application by the majority is misplaced here. That is so because for over a century the allowance of punitive damages has been a part of the common law of this State. See, eg., Citizens' St. R.R. Co. of Indianapolis v. Willoeby, 134 Ind. 563, 33 N.E. 627 (1893); Louisville, New Albany & Chi. Ry. Co. v. Wolfe, 128 Ind. 347, 27 N.E. 606 (1891); Humphries v. Johnson, 20 Ind. 190 (1863). We must therefore presume that by enacting the wrongful death statute, the legislature did not intend to make any change in the common law with respect to punitive damages "beyond those declared either in ex press terms or by unmistakable implication." South Bend, 622 N.E.2d at 162.
In this case, not only does the statute exclude any reference to punitive damages, but also it declares "damages shall be in such an amount as may be determined by the court or jury, including, but not limited to, reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expenses, and lost earnings of such deceased person resulting from said wrongful act or omission." Ind.Code § 34-23-1-1 (1998) (emphasis added). This language simply does not support the notion that through express terms or unmistakable implication the legislature intended to wipe away an element of damage that has been in existence for a hundred plus years.
I find support for this conclusion by comparing Indiana's two other wrongful death statutes. The statute governing the wrongful death of children contains an exclusive list of damages recoverable by the child's parents or guardians. Ind.Code § 34-28-2-l(e). Because punitive damages are not a part of that list, it is clear by "unmistakable implication" that they are not recoverable. Nor are punitive damages recoverable under Indiana's newest wrongful death statute that allows death actions on behalf of non-dependent survivors of unmarried adults. Ind.Code § 34-28-1-2(c)(@)(B). Under this statute punitive damages are precluded in "express terms." Id. As with the other two statutes, when enacting the 1998 version of Indiana Code § 34-28-1-1, the legislature could 'very easily have revised it to exclude *768punitive damages either by express terms or unmistakable implication. It declined to do so. I am convinced therefore that the legislature did not intend to make any change in the common law where punitive damages are concerned. Indeed the argument that the legislature and not the courts should allow punitive damages in wrongful death cases is answered by the fact that courts, as a part of the common law, created the rule that punitive damages are not allowed in wrongful death cases. The authority to change the common law rests squarely with the courts.
As for legislative acquiescence, the doe-trine provides that "the failure of the legislature to change a statute after a line of decisions of a court of last resort giving the statute a certain construction amounts to an acquiescence by the legislature in the construction of the court and that such construction should not then be disregarded or lightly treated." Heffner v. White, 221 Ind. 315, 318-19, 47 N.E.2d 964, 965 (1943) (emphasis added). See also Miller v. Mayberry, 506 N.E.2d 7, 11 (Ind.1987); Foster v. Evergreen Healthcare, Inc., 716 N.E.2d 19, 28 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. de-mied. There has not been a line of decisions by this Court-a court of last resort-construing the question of whether punitive damages are recoverable under the general wrongful death statute. Rather, there has been only a single case before this Court that arguably touches on the subject, namely: Estate of Kuba v. Ristow Trucking Co., Inc., 508 N.E.2d 1 (Ind.1987). However, in that case the issue presented was whether a plaintiff in a wrongful death action could recover treble damages under the statute that authorized victims of certain crimes to bring a civil action seeking treble damages. Id. Nonetheless, even assuming Kuba unequivocally stands for the proposition that punitive damages are not recoverable in an Action for wrongful death, it is still but a single decision from this Court on the subject.
In sum, the majority's opinion today cannot be sustained on the grounds it asserts, namely: strict construction and legislative acquiescence. Rather, it can best be understood as an application of the doctrine of stare decisis. Under this doe-trine the court adheres to a principle of law that has been firmly established. This is so because important policy considerations weigh in favor of continuity and predictability in the law. In re Sandy Ridge Oil Co., Inc., 510 N.E.2d 667, 670 (Ind.1987). Precedent serves as a maxim for judicial restraint to prevent unjustified reversal of a series of decisions merely because the composition of the court has changed. Id. However, "the common law of today is not a frozen mold of ancient ideas, but such law is active and dynamic and thus changes with the times and growth of society to meet its needs." Perkins v. State, 252 Ind. 549, 554, 251 N.E.2d 30, 33 (1969), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rendleman, 603 N.E.2d 1333 (Ind.1992). It has never been the policy of this Court to close its eyes to change or to disregard reality. "When this Court has recognized that the legal and social underpinnings of a common law rule have evaporated, we have not refused to abolish or alter the rule." Boland v. Greer, 422 N.E.2d 1236, 1239 (Ind.1981) (Hunter, J., dissenting to denial of transfer) (citing Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794 (1972) (doctrine of interspousal immunity abolished as based on outmoded legal theories); Troue v. Marker, 253 Ind. 284, 252 N.E.2d 800 (1969) (prohibition of wife's recovery for loss of consortium abrogated on basis of changes in the legal and social status of women); Perkins, 252 Ind. at 557-58, 251 N.BE.2d at 35 (sovereign immunity abolished in face of changing role of government and development of insurance)). As this Court has done on *769other appropriate occasions, this too is an appropriate occasion to depart from the doctrine of stare decisis. As the Court of Appeals observed in this case:
[Lt is illogical to allow punitive damages in personal injury actions but not in wrongful death actions. We cannot perpetuate the adage that it is cheaper to kill than to maim with regard to general wrongful death actions. 4 .
Durham v. U-Haul Int'l, 722 N.E.2d 355, 363 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). I agree.
In conclusion, a fair reading of the general wrongful death statute supports an interpretation that would allow punitive damages to the same extent that punitive damages are recoverable in personal injury actions. To the extent prior case authority holds otherwise, it should be overruled. I therefore respectfully dissent.
DICKSON, J., concurs.